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6 March 2014 
Dear Mr President 
Dear Madam Speaker 
The Australian National Audit Office has undertaken an independent 
performance audit in the Department of Defence and the Defence 
Materiel Organisation titled Air Warfare Destroyer Program. The audit 
was conducted in accordance with the authority contained in the 
Auditor-General Act 1997. I present the report of this audit to the 
Parliament. 
 
Following its presentation and receipt, the report will be placed on the 
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1. At a budgeted cost of $8.455 billion  for all phases,  the SEA 4000–Air 
Warfare  Destroyer  (AWD)  Program  is  to  design,  build  and  deliver  three 
Hobart‐class guided missile destroyers  (DDGs) and  their Support System  to 
the  Royal  Australian  Navy  (RAN).  These  DDGs  are  to  be  named  and  are 
scheduled  for  delivery  as  follows:  HMAS  Hobart—March  2016;  HMAS 
Brisbane—September  2017;  and  HMAS  Sydney—March  2019.  They  are  to 
replace  the RAN’s  six Adelaide‐class guided missile  frigates  (FFGs),  two of 
which were withdrawn  from  service  in  2005  and  2008. The  remaining  four 
FFGs are scheduled for withdrawal from service by June 2019.1 
2. The AWD Program has four principal objectives: deliver an affordable 
Maritime  Air  Warfare  capability  to  meet  Australian  Defence  Force  (ADF) 
requirements,  within  established  schedule  and  cost  constraints;  markedly 
improve  the overall  capability of  the RAN’s  surface  combatant  force; build 
the ships in Australia, thereby sustaining and providing significant work for 
Australia’s  shipbuilding  industry2;  and  establish  and  sustain  a  design 
capability  in Australia that can support  the evolution of the ships  in service 
in a responsive and cost‐effective manner. 
3. Figure  S.1  shows  the  future  HMAS  Hobart  under  construction  in 
December 2013. The three Australian Hobart‐class DDGs are to be based on the 
F‐104 platform design  from Navantia S.A. of Spain  (Navantia), with  specified 
F‐105 modifications, and additional modifications primarily to accommodate the 
Australianised  Combat  System,  which  comprises  an  upgraded  United  States 
Aegis Weapon System and additional Australian elements to meet specific  
                                                     
1  Between 1990 and 2001 the RAN withdrew from service its three former DDGs, known as the Perth 
class, without replacement. 
2  In 2007, the Treasury noted that the premium associated with building the DDGs in Australia was 
around $1 billion. 
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distributed‐build  process  at  four  shipyards  in  Australia  and  overseas:  ASC 
AWD Shipbuilder Pty Ltd (ASC4), at Osborne, South Australia; Forgacs Pty Ltd 
(Forgacs),  in  Newcastle,  New  South  Wales;  BAE  Systems  Australia  (BAE 
Systems),  in  Williamstown,  Victoria;  and  Navantia,  in  Ferrol,  Spain.  Block 
consolidation  is  conducted  by  ASC  at  Osborne,  and  the  DDGs’  platform, 
sensors and weapons systems will also be integrated, set‐to‐work and harbour‐
tested  at  Osborne.  At  the  time  of  the  audit,  the  AWD  Program  was  in  its 
construction phase; by  January 2014, block production was well advanced at 
all  four shipyards, with consolidation of blocks  in  the  form of a hull nearing 
completion on Ship 1.5 
5. During  the  audit,  the  AWD  Program  was  dealing  with  a  range  of 
challenges related to the construction and governance strategy adopted for the 











3  The terms F-104 and F-105 refer to the Spanish F-104 Méndez Núñez-class FFG and the F-105 
Cristóbal Colón-class FFG respectively. The Hobart-class DDG design contains changes to the F-104 
design (including specified F-105 modifications) that address: obsolescence, Australian legislative 
compliance, integration of Australian selected elements into the Combat System, agreed 
improvements in capability and the mitigation of technical risk. 
4  ASC AWD Shipbuilder Pty Ltd is a subsidiary of the Commonwealth Government Business Enterprise 
ASC Pty Ltd. For convenience throughout this report, the acronym ASC generally refers to this 
subsidiary. Where this is not the case, the report makes it clear whether a reference is to the parent 
company or the subsidiary. 
5  In parallel, work was progressing on Ships 2 and 3. 
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6. The  Ministers  for  Defence  and  Finance  announced  on  17  December 





two  contracts  for  the  design,  construction  and  delivery  of  the  DDGs.7  A 
contract for the Platform System Design was awarded to Navantia.8 A second 
contract, for the construction of the ships, and involving a three‐way Alliance 
Based  Target  Incentive  Agreement  (ABTIA),  was  awarded  to  ASC  AWD 
Shipbuilder Pty Ltd and Raytheon Australia Pty Ltd  (Raytheon). This  report 
refers  to  the ABTIA as  the Alliance  contract. Under  this  contract, ASC  is  the 
Shipbuilder,  and  Raytheon  is  the  Combat  System–Systems  Engineer, 
responsible  for  designing  the  Combat  System  and  integrating  it  into  the 
Platform System. Together, ASC and Raytheon are referred to as the Industry 
Participants  in  the AWD Alliance. Figure S.2  shows  the AWD Alliance’s key 
contractual and governance relationships. 
8. The  Alliance  contract  binds  three  diverse  organisations:  the 
Commonwealth’s Department of Defence, represented by the Defence Materiel 
Organisation  (DMO),  as  the  owner‐participant;  and  two  non‐owner 
participants,  namely  ASC  AWD  Shipbuilder  Pty  Ltd,  the  subsidiary  of  a 
(Commonwealth)  Government  Business  Enterprise  (GBE)  and  Raytheon,  a 
public  company. The  three Alliance participants are aligned  in a managerial 
and  financial  sense  by  the  need  to  deliver  the  three DDGs within  cost  and 
schedule parameters, and to meet capability specifications, under the Alliance 
contract.  Further,  the  Alliance  contract  formally  requires  openness,  mutual 
                                                     
6  Minister for Finance and Minister for Defence, Coalition committed to the efficient delivery of the Air 
Warfare Destroyer Program, media release, 17 December 2013. 
7  The Hon. Dr Brendan Nelson MP, Minister for Defence, Air Warfare Destroyers—The Foundations 
Laid, media release, 4 October 2007. 
8  Navantia S.A. is a shipbuilding firm owned by the Spanish Government through its industrial holding 
company, Sociedad Estatal de Participaciones Industriales (SEPI), which controls all company stock 
owned by the Spanish State. 
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trust  and  honest  dealing,  and  the  sharing  of  data  across  the  Alliance 
organisation. 
Figure S.2: AWD Alliance key contractual and governance relationships 
 
Source: Defence Materiel Organisation. 
Notes: FMS—Foreign Military Sale (US). 
PSD—Platform System Design. 
9. The  Alliance  contract’s  cost‐plus‐incentive‐fee  arrangement  provides 
ASC and Raytheon with monthly payments for their Direct Project Costs, and 
incentive fees which vary according to the Industry Participants’ collective cost 
and  schedule performance  relative  to  a Target Cost Estimate. Known  as  the 
pain‐share gain‐share arrangement, the incentive fees decrease toward zero as 
the Direct Project Costs exceed the Target Cost Estimate, or increase when the 
Direct  Project  Costs  fall  below  the  Target  Cost  Estimate.  This  arrangement 




both  the Alliance contract and  the Platform System Design contract  (between 
the DMO and Navantia)  contain obligations  for all parties  to  carry out  their 
respective roles in a spirit of collaboration and cooperation. The AWD Alliance 
Industry Participants manage  the Platform System Design contract on a day‐
to‐day  basis,  and  have  appointed  a  Platform  System  Design  Director  who, 
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11. As  the Commonwealth representative  in  the Alliance,  the DMO has a 
number of roles and responsibilities. The DMO is responsible, via its Materiel 
Acquisition Agreement with Defence, for the overall management of the AWD 
Program.  In  its  role of project  customer,  the DMO  seeks  a  compliant design 
and the on‐time delivery of the DDGs and their Support System. This includes 
bringing to the Alliance an understanding of Defence’s requirements through 
its  reach  into  the Australian Defence Organisation,  and granting Provisional 
Acceptance of products delivered through the Alliance contract. 
Audit objective and scope 
12. The objective of the audit was to report on the progress of the current 
phase of the AWD Program, which is known as SEA 4000 Phase 3–Build. This 
phase  commenced  in  June  2007,  and  covers  the  finalisation  of  the  detailed 
design, the signing of the Alliance and Platform System Design contracts, and 





14. The audit  focused primarily on Defence’s administration of  the AWD 
Program. It examined Defence’s progress thus far in establishing and working 
through  the management  structures and processes used  to deliver  the DDGs 
within  approved  cost,  schedule  and  performance  parameters.  The  audit 
considered  the Hobart‐class DDGs’ design  and  construction  in  terms  of:  the 
achievement of key engineering and construction milestones, based on systems 
engineering  criteria;  the  management  of  cost,  schedule  and  their  attendant 
risks; and the effectiveness of the Alliance contract. 
15. The  high‐level  criteria  used  in  the  audit  to  assess  Defence’s 
administration were as follows: 
 contract management processes should be  in accordance with  internal 
Defence procedures and contractual provisions; 
 appropriate  project  governance,  financial  controls,  and  reporting 
mechanisms should be in place; 
  
ANAO Audit Report No.22 2013–14 





11. As  the Commonwealth representative  in  the Alliance,  the DMO has a 
number of roles and responsibilities. The DMO is responsible, via its Materiel 
Acquisition Agreement with Defence, for the overall management of the AWD 
Program.  In  its  role of project  customer,  the DMO  seeks  a  compliant design 
and the on‐time delivery of the DDGs and their Support System. This includes 
bringing to the Alliance an understanding of Defence’s requirements through 
its  reach  into  the Australian Defence Organisation,  and granting Provisional 
Acceptance of products delivered through the Alliance contract. 
Audit objective and scope 
12. The objective of the audit was to report on the progress of the current 
phase of the AWD Program, which is known as SEA 4000 Phase 3–Build. This 
phase  commenced  in  June  2007,  and  covers  the  finalisation  of  the  detailed 
design, the signing of the Alliance and Platform System Design contracts, and 





14. The audit  focused primarily on Defence’s administration of  the AWD 
Program. It examined Defence’s progress thus far in establishing and working 
through  the management  structures and processes used  to deliver  the DDGs 
within  approved  cost,  schedule  and  performance  parameters.  The  audit 
considered  the Hobart‐class DDGs’ design  and  construction  in  terms  of:  the 
achievement of key engineering and construction milestones, based on systems 
engineering  criteria;  the  management  of  cost,  schedule  and  their  attendant 
risks; and the effectiveness of the Alliance contract. 
15. The  high‐level  criteria  used  in  the  audit  to  assess  Defence’s 
administration were as follows: 
 contract management processes should be  in accordance with  internal 
Defence procedures and contractual provisions; 




ANAO Audit Report No.22 2013–14 







16. At  a  budgeted  cost  of  some  $8.5  billion,  the  SEA  4000–Air  Warfare 
Destroyer (AWD) Program is one of the largest acquisitions undertaken by the 
Department of Defence  (Defence)  for  the Royal Australian Navy  (RAN).9 The 
Program  will  deliver  three  Hobart‐class  Guided  Missile  Destroyers  (DDGs) 
that  will  replace  the  RAN’s  four  remaining  Adelaide‐class  Guided  Missile 
Frigates  (FFGs).  The  DDGs  are  based  on  a  modified  version  of  an  existing 
design, newly exported by a Spanish designer to a new Australian shipbuilder 
for construction  in a distributed‐build environment. The Alliance contract  for 
the  construction  of  the  DDGs  involves  the  Commonwealth  as  the  owner‐
participant;  and  two  non‐owner  Industry  Participants,  namely  ASC  AWD 
Shipbuilder  Pty  Ltd,  the  subsidiary  of  a  (Commonwealth)  Government 
Business Enterprise (GBE) and Raytheon, a public company. 
17. The  AWD  Program’s  governance  and  construction  arrangements  are 
inherently complex, but seek to strike a reasonable balance between assigning 
core  responsibilities  to  individual  parties  and  promoting  a  cooperative 
relationship between the Alliance participants. The Alliance contract imposes a 
‘fundamental obligation’ on the Industry Participants to deliver the DDGs and 
other  Supplies  and  to  achieve  delivery  schedule  commitments.  There  is, 
accordingly, high dependency on the performance of the Industry Participants 
to  manage  the  project  risks  in  association  with  the  Commonwealth.  Any 
residual risks accrue to the Commonwealth  in funding the project, and to the 
Commonwealth’s  representative  in  the  Alliance,  the  Defence  Materiel 
Organisation  (DMO),  in managing  the  delivery  of  this  significant  capability 
within  cost  and  to  schedule,  as  the  AWD  Program  manager  and  project 
customer on behalf of the RAN. 
18. Successive  Australian  governments  have  accepted  that  building  the 
DDGs  in  Australia  would  involve  a  premium  over  and  above  the  cost  of 
                                                     
9  Although the acquisition of a fleet of F-35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft is expected to cost a total of 
$13.2 billion, the Government has as yet approved only a small part of this amount. See ANAO Audit 
Report No.6, 2012–13, Management of Australia’s Air Combat Capability—F-35A Joint Strike Fighter 
Acquisition, p. 118. 
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building  them overseas. The decision  to build  locally  is based on a desire  to 
retain  shipbuilding  jobs and  facilities, project management and design  skills, 
and  experience  with  sophisticated  naval  combat  systems,  so  as  to  enable 
through‐life  support  of  the  DDGs  in  Australia  and  a  continuing  naval 
shipbuilding  industry.  As  part  of  the  June  2007  Second  Pass  submission  to 
government, the Treasury noted that the premium associated with building the 
DDGs  in  Australia  was  around  $1 billion,  representing  an  effective  rate  of 
assistance of over 30 per cent for naval shipbuilding. 





structurally  complete  and  production  outfitting  was  underway.  In  the  near 
future,  the  build  phase  will  expand  into  the  installation,  set‐to‐work  and 
systems  integration of complex  state‐of‐the‐art warship platform and combat 
systems. Nevertheless, under current plans, there is a gap between the DDGs’ 
production  and  the  next design‐and‐construction  program  for major  surface 
ships, which would result in a reduction in the naval shipbuilding workforce. 
A  range  of  Defence  stakeholders10  have  observed  a  risk,  which  is  under 
consideration  by  the  Australian  Government,  that  the  experience  and 
knowledge gained by the shipbuilding sector during the build phase may not 




and the close  involvement of  industry during that phase. This resulted  in the 
selection  of  a  modified  Existing  Design  by  the  then  Government  in  2007 
instead of an Evolved Design. The Evolved Design was considered  to be  too 
immature  and  presented  high  risk.  In  developing  the  Alliance  contractual 
                                                     
10  See, for example, ACIL Allen Consulting, Naval Shipbuilding & Through Life Support: Economic Value 
to Australia, December 2013, which stated (p. ii) that: 
 A pattern of slowing down and then starting up again imposes large costs. The direct costs of re-
opening a closed shipyard are relatively minor compared with the costs of retraining the workforce. 
[…] In addition, there are very large but unquantifiable costs resulting from the loss of the supply 
chain expertise gathered over many years. 
11  Total expenditure on Phase 1 (preliminary design and build strategy) and Phase 2 (Design) was 
$262 million. 
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arrangement, Defence  combined  elements  of  a  typical  alliance  contract with 
the more  ‘standard’ risk allocation provisions of a fixed‐price contract, with a 
view  to  protecting  the  Commonwealth’s  interests.  The  Alliance  contract 
obliges  the  Industry  Participants  to  deliver  the  DDGs  and  meet  schedule 




21. Despite  the  contractual  arrangements  put  in  place  to  manage  the 
project,  the  AWD  Program  has  experienced  a  range  of  delivery  issues, 
including  significant  immaturity  in  detailed  design  documentation12,  major 
block  construction  problems  and  substantially  lower  than  anticipated 
construction  productivity.  The  design  and  construction  issues  have  led  to 
extensive, time‐consuming and costly rework. 
22. The  Alliance  reported  in  November  2013  that  the  contract  for  the 
construction of  the DDGs would be  completed at an  estimated  cost of  some 
$302  million  or  6.8 per  cent  in  excess  of  the  Target  Cost  Estimate.  The  cost 
overrun  is  attributable  to  the  shipbuilding  elements  of  the  project.13  As 
previously reported  in  the 2012–13 Major Projects Report,  the AWD Program 
exceeded its original budget allocation for 2012–13 by $106.4 million as a result 
of  increased  Direct  Project  Costs  from  the  Industry  Participants  for  labour, 
materials and subcontract costs.14  In  the same  report,  the CEO DMO advised 
that: 
There  are  emerging  concerns  from  the AWD Alliance  around  cost  overruns 
and  associated  delays  in  shipbuilding  aspects  of  the  AWD  Program.  An 
                                                     
12  Immaturity can include errors, omissions and changes. For an explanation of different design phases, 
see footnote 255. 
13  The Alliance CEO informed the ANAO in January 2014 that ‘Alliance records also disclose that the 
[cost] over-run has primarily resulted from an increase of about $400m in the Estimate At Completion 
for Ship-building elements of the program primarily during the production period from the end of 2009 
until now’. See page 3 of the Alliance CEO’s letter to the ANAO, reproduced in Appendix 2. 
14  ANAO Report No.12, 2013–14, 2012–13 Major Projects Report, pp. 147, 151. 
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independent review  is  to be commissioned  to  identify  factors contributing  to 
cost growth and delays, and to recommend remediations and mitigation.15,16 
23. In the light of these concerns about cost overruns, the current estimated 
cost  of  $302 million  in  excess  of  the Target Cost Estimate  should  be  treated 
with caution; the cost increase is likely to be significantly greater. 
24. The delivery  schedule  for  the  three DDGs was  revised  in  September 
2012 and is now some 15 to 21 months later than the original delivery schedule 
(for Ships 1  to 3). Despite  the effect of design and construction  issues on  the 
cost and schedule for the DDGs, their materiel capability requirements remain 
as  specified  at  Second  Pass  approval.  However,  Operational  Test  and 
Evaluation  to  validate  the  specified  capability  achievement  is  scheduled  to 
commence  in  August  2015  for  Ship  1,  12  months  later  than  originally 
scheduled.  
25. While Defence did seek  to adopt prudent  risk mitigation strategies  in 
the  design  and  build  phases  of  the  program,  drawing  heavily  on  industry 
input  and  experience  to  inform  its  advice  to  government,  the  risks  of 
developing  a  modified  design,  exporting  the  design  for  construction  in 
distributed Australian shipyards, and re‐establishing Australia’s shipbuilding 
capability  were  underestimated.  This  is  the  first  time  the  Spanish  designer 
Navantia has exported a surface ship design for construction by  international 
shipyards, the first time ASC has built a surface ship, and the other Australian 
shipyards  lacked  recent  experience  in  complex  warship  building.  While 
Defence  has  subsequently  sought  to  address  design,  construction  and 






15  The DMO also acknowledged in the 2012–13 Major Projects Report that there is some uncertainty in 
relation to the adequacy of contingency for the AWD Program, and that the program is funding actual 
cost increases with project contingency funds. Nonetheless, having reviewed the current, financial, 
contractual obligations of the DMO for this project, current known risks and estimated future 
expenditure, the DMO considered, as at 30 June 2013, that there was sufficient budget remaining for 
the project to complete against the agreed scope. ANAO Report No.12, 2013–14, 2012–13 Major 
Projects Report, pp. 34, 143, 157. 
16  The Ministers for Defence and Finance confirmed on 17 December 2013 that the Government would 
establish an independent review into the AWD Program, with terms of reference to be finalised in early 
2014. 
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Technical and contractual risk mitigation strategies 
26. Defence  sought  to  assess  and  mitigate  design  and  production  risks 
through  a  substantial  investment  in  the design phase  (Phase  2) of  the AWD 
Program, which drew heavily on  industry  input and advice, and through the 
terms  and  conditions  of  the Alliance  and Platform  System Design  contracts, 
which were also intended to harness industry cooperation. During Phase 2, the 
DMO engaged two teams of shipbuilders and designers to analyse an Existing 
Design  and  an  Evolved  Design  and  arrive  at  an  overall  Hobart‐class  DDG 
design.18 In August 2004, the US Navy’s Aegis Weapon System was selected as 
the preferred combat system  for  the yet‐to‐be‐selected DDG platform system. 
In  April  2005,  Raytheon  was  selected  as  the  Combat  System–Systems 
Engineer.19 Phase  2  ended  in  June  2007 with  the  then Government’s  Second 
Pass  approval  of  the  acquisition  of  three  Hobart‐class  DDGs  based  on 
Navantia’s existing F‐104 platform design, with specified F‐105 modifications, 
and  additional  modifications  primarily  to  accommodate  the  Australianised 
Combat  System,  which  comprises  an  upgraded  Aegis  Weapon  System  and 
additional Australian  elements  to meet  specific  capability  requirements. The 




the program’s design phase,  the  selected design did not exist  in an  ‘as built’ 
                                                     
17  The ANAO has previously observed that it is not uncommon for major projects, including Defence 
projects, to experience cost overruns and integration issues. There is a tendency for initial estimates to 
be optimistic, contingencies to be too low, the severity of risks to be underestimated, delays to be 
more extensive than anticipated and the complexity of integration issues not to be fully appreciated. 
See ANAO Audit Report No.41, 2008–09, The Super Seasprite, p. 18. 
18  ASC and Raytheon were engaged to work with Navantia on its Existing Design option and with Gibbs 
& Cox on its Evolved Design option. 
19  The Aegis Weapon System is an advanced air defence system in service with the US Navy, which 
offers improved precision and shorter reaction times than those that have been previously deployed on 
Australian vessels. Raytheon is responsible for integrating Aegis and the other combat system 
equipment. For a fuller description of the Aegis Weapon System, see the section beginning at 
paragraph 6.66. 
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were overoptimistic during Phase  2 of  the AWD Program.21 Defence  and  its 
industry advisers underestimated  the  risks associated with  incorporating  the 
design changes to Navantia’s F‐104 design, exporting that design to Australia, 
and  adapting  the designer’s build  strategy  and processes  to  accommodate  a 
distributed  build  at  shipyards  that  lacked  recent  experience  in  warship 




the  detailed  design  and  moving  into  production,  with  strengthened  design 
supply management processes to reduce the risks associated with the exported 
design, and  its distribution  to  the shipbuilding contractors.  It  is also  likely  to 
have  led  to  a  stronger  focus  on  the  Australian  shipbuilders’  production 
engineering  processes  and  shipbuilding  productivity  from  the  outset  of  the 




Alliance  Industry Participants  (ASC and Raytheon)  to work  cooperatively  in 
the  pursuit  of  cost,  schedule  and  performance  parameters.  The  Alliance 
governance and program management arrangements also enable the DMO, as 
the owner‐participant  in  the Alliance,  to closely monitor  the build phase and 
work through the Alliance to address issues. 
29. However,  the  intention  to  include  Navantia,  the  Platform  System 




20  Navantia, in its January 2014 response to an extract from this audit report, stated that ‘The design of 
the Australian AWD is very different from that of the existing F-104, incorporating lessons learnt from 
the Spanish Navy’s F-105 (not all known at the time of the contract), implementing Australian 
regulations, and taking account of obsolescence, Contract Amendment Proposals, etc. All these items, 
together with the supply chain information modifications in respect to F-104 equipment, imply a very 
relevant number of revisions/modifications to the existing F-104 design, to be implemented at the time 
that the information is made available to the designer—in most cases out of the designer’s control.’ 
See page 1 of Navantia’s comments to the ANAO, reproduced in Appendix 5. 
21  For example, the Second Pass submission to government in 2007 stated that Navantia had proven 
work packages prepared for the Existing Design option. 
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have  led  to  a  stronger  focus  on  the  Australian  shipbuilders’  production 
engineering  processes  and  shipbuilding  productivity  from  the  outset  of  the 




Alliance  Industry Participants  (ASC and Raytheon)  to work  cooperatively  in 
the  pursuit  of  cost,  schedule  and  performance  parameters.  The  Alliance 
governance and program management arrangements also enable the DMO, as 
the owner‐participant  in  the Alliance,  to closely monitor  the build phase and 
work through the Alliance to address issues. 
29. However,  the  intention  to  include  Navantia,  the  Platform  System 




20  Navantia, in its January 2014 response to an extract from this audit report, stated that ‘The design of 
the Australian AWD is very different from that of the existing F-104, incorporating lessons learnt from 
the Spanish Navy’s F-105 (not all known at the time of the contract), implementing Australian 
regulations, and taking account of obsolescence, Contract Amendment Proposals, etc. All these items, 
together with the supply chain information modifications in respect to F-104 equipment, imply a very 
relevant number of revisions/modifications to the existing F-104 design, to be implemented at the time 
that the information is made available to the designer—in most cases out of the designer’s control.’ 
See page 1 of Navantia’s comments to the ANAO, reproduced in Appendix 5. 
21  For example, the Second Pass submission to government in 2007 stated that Navantia had proven 
work packages prepared for the Existing Design option. 
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for  Navantia  to  put  its  own  profit  share  at  risk  by  entering  an  Alliance 
arrangement with a new shipbuilder, and  taking part  in  the pain‐share gain‐
share  regime  it  imposed  on  potential  profit.22  While  Defence  has  delegated 
responsibility  for  the day‐to‐day management of  the Platform System Design 
contract to the Industry Participants, by itself this measure has not resulted in 
effective  integration  between  the  designer  and  the Alliance,  and  a  range  of 
other  strategies  have  been  applied  over  a  four‐year  period  to  strengthen 
integration. The non‐inclusion of Navantia has detracted  from  the Alliance’s 
ability  to collectively and collaboratively manage  risks, which are among  the 
main  reasons  for  establishing  such  an  arrangement;  and  there  has  been 
incomplete  alignment  of  incentives  for  sharing  of  best  practices  and  for 
reducing  costs,  from  design  conception  through  to  shipbuilding  and  ship 
acceptance. This experience highlights  the challenges  in effectively managing 
the risks when a key  industry participant  is not party  to an alliance contract; 
and,  while  accepting  that  the  terms  of  an  alliance  contract  need  to  be 
acceptable  to  all  of  the  key  industry  participants,  underlines  the  benefits  of 
establishing arrangements which include all such participants. 
Design and construction progress 
30. Since  the  initial delivery of construction drawings and  the completion 
of design  and production  readiness  reviews  in  2009,  the  build program  has 
experienced: 
 Immaturity  in  the  detailed  design  documentation  provided  by 
Navantia, predominantly associated with drawing errors or omissions, 
contract  amendments  and  late  Vendor  Furnished  Information.23  The 
volume  and  timing  of  design  change  have  been  significant,  at  times 
saturating  the  Alliance’s  engineering  and  planning  departments, 
                                                     
22  The DMO’s Phase 2 Overall Program Report states that Navantia was not prepared to agree to the 
liability regime that the Alliance contract was to impose. For its part, Navantia informed the ANAO in 
October 2013 that there was a lack of clarity with respect to the proposed liability regime, and stated 
that: 
  When the possibility of being part of the AWD Alliance was on the table, it was not clear to the 
parties how to integrate Navantia into the Alliance. Navantia considered it clearer and more 
appropriate that the contract be made with DMO (although it could have been made with ASC), 
and this course of action was quickly agreed with the AWD Alliance. 
23  As discussed in detail in Chapter 5, a number of causes can contribute to any particular design 
change, and it is difficult to isolate the cause of any one change. As for the impact of design change, 
all design change received from Navantia generates some level of additional work for the Alliance. 
This can range from re‐review and release of revised drawings, replanning of work packages through 
to scrapping of material already procured and production rework or development strategies to avoid 
consequential impacts. 
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and  revised  drawings  were  still  being  provided  in  late  2013.  This 




more  recently at Forgacs.  In  the case of BAE Systems,  this  resulted  in 
rework and  the  reallocation of work between shipyards. The Alliance 
has noted  that during Phase 2, government and  industry operated on 
the  shared  assumption  that  potential  block  subcontractors  had  the 
financial  capacity,  facilities  and  commercial  incentive  to  complete 
significant  portions  of  the  DDG  hull  block  production.  However,  it 
became apparent during  the block  subcontract  and  tendering process 
that none of  the  tendering shipyards had  recently performed work of 
this  type  on  the  scale  anticipated,  and  that  each  facility  required 




costing  ASC,  the  lead  shipbuilder,  $1.60  to  produce  work  that  was 
originally estimated to cost $1.00.26 As discussed later in paragraph 33, 
a  range  of  factors  have  been  assessed  as  contributing  to  low 
construction  productivity,  including  the  performance  of ASC  and  its 
Australian block subcontractors, and construction rework arising from 
both ongoing changes  in  the detailed design and rectification of block 
subcontractor  work.  The  Australian  shipyards’  distributed‐build 
                                                     
24  For example, even the five keel blocks built by Navantia in Spain have required rework. 
25  As discussed in detail in Chapter 6, construction difficulties at BAE Systems early in 2010 led to a 
succession of reallocations of block construction among shipyards, in order to reduce an expected 
two-year delay. As a result of deteriorating performance and significant cost escalation at Forgacs 
during the latter half of 2013, a further block reallocation occurred in December 2013. 
26  This amount is based on the Alliance Earned Value Management System (EVMS) data. It includes 
DDG block construction by ASC and its block subcontractors, block consolidation, production 
supervision, operations, production management, apprentice and production training. It does not 
include DDG pre-production, which includes engineering reviews and planning, configuration 
management, Combat System production support, work orders and materials support. 
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production  engineering  strategies  and  build  processes  continued  to 
evolve into 2013, some four years after block construction began. 
31. In  responding  to  this  report,  the  two  major  subcontractors,  BAE 
Systems  and  Forgacs,  emphasised  the  significant  challenge  they  faced  in 
re‐establishing  shipbuilding  facilities  and  skills  after  a  gap  in  naval 
shipbuilding.27 
32. Defence  has  sought  to  address  the  range  of  program  risks  in  such  a 
major  acquisition  through  DMO  involvement  in  Alliance  governance  and 
program management. The Alliance applied a series of strategies between 2009 
and 2013  to address  immaturity  in detailed design documentation,  including 
the purchase  and use  of  3‐D Computer Aided Design  (CAD) models  of  the 
DDGs28,  and better  leveraging  of Navantia’s knowledge  and  experience  into 
the Alliance. These  strategies primarily  involved  the  assessment of potential 
design  issues,  and  the  implementation  of  revised  approaches  to  manage 
change  in  the  detailed  ship  design.  During  the  same  period,  the  Alliance 
progressively  reallocated  blocks  between  shipyards  in  response  to  capacity 
and  skills  issues. Nevertheless, detailed design  immaturity  and  construction 
performance  issues were ongoing  in  late 2013, and continue  to pose a risk  to 
the program’s cost and schedule. 
33. Defence has also  taken steps  to examine  the construction productivity 
issues  and promote  shipbuilding productivity  improvements. The DMO has 
raised  productivity  at  the  AWD  Principals  Council  and  engaged  the 
internationally  recognised  shipbuilding  advisory  firm  First  Marine 
International  (FMI)  to  carry out  an  independent  assessment of objective  and 
                                                     
27  See paragraphs 96 and 97. 
 Forgacs, for example, informed the ANAO that its shipyard had been engaged in building ‘haul pack’ 
truck bodies for mining operations after the cessation of naval ship construction work in the nine years 
prior to AWD project signature, and as such had lost much of its shipbuilding capacity, equipment 
serviceability and knowledge. 
28  3-D Computer Aided Design (CAD) tools are generally used extensively in the construction of modern 
warships. CAD-assisted clash and interference checking is performed on structures, equipment, piping 
systems, cable systems and air-conditioning systems etc to ensure that they are properly spaced for 
installation, that moving parts such as doors and hatches can move as intended, and that equipment 
may be installed and operated correctly. The overall aim is to discover and solve design problems in 
the drafting room rather than during PO1 and PO2, when design changes often become extremely 
expensive. 
 While Navantia used multiple 3-D CAD models, these were not closely integrated, making it more 
difficult to identify and resolve detailed design issues. Further, under the Platform System Design 
contract, Navantia was only required to deliver two-dimensional (2-D) engineering drawings in PDF 
format, which can be difficult to interpret. For further discussion, see paragraphs 5.64 and 6.7 to 6.11. 
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issues  surrounding  the  technical  information  and  the  transfer  of  technology 
from Navantia. It also suggested that a concerted effort be made to move away 
from  project  development  and  to  settle  into  a  stable  production  process  as 




35. However,  during  the  DDG  construction  program,  immaturity  in 
detailed  design  documentation  has  tended  to  overshadow  other  factors 
contributing to low shipbuilding productivity30, and the link between stable or 
mature design data and shipbuilding productivity continues to be emphasised 
in  the  media.31  FMI  reported  mixed  progress  against  the  observations  and 
suggestions it made  in 2010 and 2011, and made many new observations and 
suggestions  in  2012  to  improve  shipyard  performance.32  Further,  it was  not 
until 2013 that the Alliance put in place extensive key performance measures of 
productivity,  and  reported  more  detailed  cost  variance  analysis  on  factors 
contributing to productivity shortfalls, such as design change, out‐of‐sequence 
                                                     
29  Core productivity is the best productivity a shipyard can achieve given a mature design. Although there 
are notable exceptions, core productivity is generally not reached before the fourth vessel in a series. 
Due to first-of-class performance drop-off, which can be as high as 50 per cent in established naval 
builders, actual productivity achieved early in the series is much lower than core productivity. 
30  In 2012, the AWD Alliance Principals Council discussed productivity, noting that: 
  productivity needed to improve at both Forgacs and ASC. The Council acknowledged the current 
issue of lack of a mature TDP and agreed that an increase in productivity would require the design 
to stabilise and change to cease. 
 AWD Alliance Principals Council, meeting minutes, 20 February 2012, p. 3. 
31  For example, in September 2013 the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of ASC was quoted as highlighting 
that ongoing design revisions might disrupt the delivery schedule. Sarah Martin, ‘AWD program 
“plagued” by design changes’, The Australian, 18 September 2013, p. 2. 
 In subsequent correspondence with the ANAO, the ASC confirmed that it regarded design immaturity 
as having ‘caused considerable cost and delay to date’. See page 3 of ASC’s letter to the ANAO, 
reproduced in Appendix 3. 
32  FMI reported that, of the 72 overall observations and suggestions it made in 2010, 2011 and 2012, 49 
(68 per cent) were found to be new issues or were issues where little effective action had been taken, 
17 (24 per cent) showed some effective action taken, four issues (5 per cent) were largely resolved, 
and the status of the remaining two issues was not reported. 
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it  is  clear  that  a  rigorous  focus  will  be  required  to  address  the  underlying 
causes of low shipbuilding productivity so that construction cost overruns are 
contained over the remainder of the DDG build program, and more broadly so 
that  the AWD Program’s  four principal objectives  (listed  in paragraph 2) are 
achieved. 
Cost and schedule performance 
36. The Alliance has estimated that the Alliance contract will be completed 
for $4.776 billion (December 2006 prices), which is $302 million or 6.8 per cent 
over  the  Target Cost  Estimate.34 However,  in  September  2013  an  Integrated 
Baseline  Review  Report35  indicated  that  major  corrective  actions  were 
necessary to restore confidence in the AWD build program’s cost and schedule 
estimates.  The  report  highlighted  problems  with  the  EVMS’s  Performance 
Measurement Baseline36 and that corrective action was required for the EVMS 
to  be  considered  acceptable  for  accurate  performance  measurement.  As 
discussed  in  paragraph  22,  the  CEO  DMO  has  also  noted  that  there  are 
emerging concerns about cost overruns and associated delays  in shipbuilding 
aspects of the AWD Program. 
37. Following  the  emergence  of  block  construction  issues  at  the  BAE 
Systems  shipyard,  in  September  2012  the Government  announced  a  plan  to 
extend the AWD Program so that the delivery of the first ship was delayed by 
15 months and  the  interval between  the delivery of  the  ships was  increased 




33  ASC and the Alliance CEO noted that isolating costs associated with immaturity in detailed design 
documentation was difficult, particularly when revised drawings contained multiple changes that were 
not identified by Navantia. 
34  Based on past cost and schedule performance, combined with the Alliance’s forward estimates. 
35  An Integrated Baseline Review is a detailed review of a project to ensure that the necessary work is 
appropriately scheduled, budgeted and resourced. 
36  A Performance Measurement Baseline is a time-phased schedule of all the work planned to be 
performed, expressed in terms of the budgeted cost of that work—or in other words, the Budgeted 
Cost of Work Scheduled (BCWS or Planned Value). 
37  The Hon. Stephen Smith MP, Minister for Defence, Air Warfare Destroyer update, media release, 
6 September 2012. 
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in order  to achieve Final Operational Capability  in March 2020, when all  the 
Fundamental Inputs to Capability for the DDGs are expected to be in place.38 
Defence’s position within the Alliance 
38. As noted  in paragraph  28,  the Alliance’s  contractual  and governance 
arrangements have promoted cooperative relations, but cannot be expected to 
eliminate  all  tensions  between  the  parties,  such  as  those  arising  from  the 
erosion of fees due to higher than anticipated costs in constructing the DDGs. 
Under  the Alliance  contract, Defence  pays  all  specified  direct  costs  that  the 
Industry Participants incur (reimbursable Direct Project Costs), and if there are 
cost  overruns,  the  Alliance  Industry  Participants  share  reductions  in  their 
incentive  fees, because  these  fees are geared  to  the Alliance contract’s Target 
Cost Estimate and the Industry Participants’ collective cost efficiency. In March 
2012, the Industry Participants submitted to the AWD Alliance Project Board a 
$240.6 million  (December  2006  prices)  claim  for  a  schedule  extension  and  a 
Target  Cost  Estimate  adjustment,  based  on  the  amount  of  Platform  System 
Design  change  they  had  experienced.  The  Alliance  Project  Board  could  not 
come to an agreement on the claim, because the DMO member, on advice from 
DMO Counsel, did not agree  to  the claim. Within  this context,  the DMO has 
not  fully  utilised  the  overarching  governance  body,  the  Alliance  Principals 
Council,  to  contribute  to  the  mitigation  of  risk  and  the  resolution  of  issues 
between  the  parties.  Further,  the  position  of  the  independent  chair  of  the 
Council—a  potential  source  of  additional  insight  and  advice  to  the Alliance 
participants,  the  Defence  Minister  and  the  ASC  shareholder  Minister  (the 
Minister for Finance)—has been left unfilled since August 2011. 
39. As  noted  in  paragraph  17,  there  is  high  dependency  on  the 
performance  of  the  Industry  Participants  to  manage  risks  with  the 
Commonwealth.  The  DMO  has  appropriately  reminded  the  Industry 
Participants of their contractual obligations39 and the warranties they provided 
                                                     
38  ADF capability is formed by combining eight Fundamental Inputs to Capability, categorised and 
broadly defined in Table 1.3. The March 2020 date to achieve Final Operational Capability, reported in 
the 2012–13 Major Projects Report, represents a four-month delay over that reported a year earlier. 
ANAO Report No.12, 2013–14, 2012–13 Major Projects Report, p. 154; ANAO Report No.15, 2012–
13, 2011–12 Major Projects Report, p. 195. 
39  As discussed in paragraph 17, the Alliance contract imposes a ‘fundamental obligation’ on the Industry 
Participants to deliver the DDGs and other Supplies and to achieve certain schedule commitments 
(such as achieving Key Target Dates for Provisional Acceptance of each DDG). 
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38  ADF capability is formed by combining eight Fundamental Inputs to Capability, categorised and 
broadly defined in Table 1.3. The March 2020 date to achieve Final Operational Capability, reported in 
the 2012–13 Major Projects Report, represents a four-month delay over that reported a year earlier. 
ANAO Report No.12, 2013–14, 2012–13 Major Projects Report, p. 154; ANAO Report No.15, 2012–
13, 2011–12 Major Projects Report, p. 195. 
39  As discussed in paragraph 17, the Alliance contract imposes a ‘fundamental obligation’ on the Industry 
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(such as achieving Key Target Dates for Provisional Acceptance of each DDG). 
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to  deliver  the DDGs  based  on  their work  during  Phase  2.40 Nevertheless,  it 
remains incumbent on the DMO, as the owner‐participant, to make full use of 
the Alliance  structure  and  framework  to  inform  itself  of  program  risks  and 
take an active role in guiding and gaining assurance about the strategies to be 
pursued  by  the  Industry Participants  to manage  and  resolve  build program 
issues,  which  are  ongoing.  The  DMO  faces  both  an  immediate,  and  a 
continuing  challenge,  in  acting  to mitigate  the  key  risks  faced  by  the AWD 
Program,  so  as  to  achieve  the  timely delivery  of  capability  to  the RAN  and 
limit the overall cost to the Commonwealth. 
Recommendations 
40. In  the  context  of  ongoing  challenges  during  the  build  phase  of  the 
AWD Program and a proposed government review of the program, the ANAO 
has  recommended  that  the DMO  reinvigorate  the AWD Alliance’s Principals 
Council  to provide additional  leadership and assist  in addressing  the serious 
issues  facing  the AWD Program,  including  by  raising with  the Minister  the 
appointment of a suitably experienced and independent chair.41 
41. The ANAO has made  two  further recommendations directed  towards 
future  Australian  naval  construction  programs.  The  first  of  these 
recommendations  focuses on reducing  the risk of detailed design errors  from 
the  outset  of  naval  construction,  through  a  fully  integrated  design  review 
process, supported by contemporary Computer Aided Design technology. 
42. The final recommendation focuses on the development and monitoring 






40  As part of the Alliance contract, the Industry Participants warranted that: they had assessed, to their 
own satisfaction, the risks they were assuming; and they had the resources (or sufficient access to 
resources) required to perform their obligations under the contract. The Industry Participants also 
acknowledged that the Commonwealth was relying on their skill and judgement. 
41  Clause 8.2.1(e) of the Alliance contract makes provision for the appointment of an independent chair 
by the Minister for Defence, after consultation with the Industry Participants. Clause 8.3.1(b) of the 
contract provides that one of the functions of the Principals Council is to provide leadership, oversight 
and strategic direction for the work under the agreement in seeking to achieve program objectives. 
42  See paragraphs 2.57, 2.64, 5.59 and 6.24. 
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AWD Program review 
43. The Ministers for Defence and Finance confirmed on 17 December 2013 
that  the Government would  establish  an  independent  review  into  the AWD 
Program, with terms of reference to be finalised in early 2014. The independent 
review  presents  an  opportunity  to  identify  strategies  aimed  at  addressing 
construction  challenges,  increasing  productivity  and  mitigating  further  cost 
overruns, in a timely manner. 
Lessons for future naval construction programs 
44. The  audit  highlights  some  key  lessons  for Defence’s  management  of 
risk,  alliance  contractual  arrangements  and  naval  construction  programs. 
These broadly  focus on  the effective  integration of key  industry participants, 
and the management of maturity in the design and production systems. 
45. A common  issue that has been experienced  in complex state‐of‐the‐art 
warship  building  in  recent  decades  has  been  immaturity  in  the  design  and 
production  system.43  The  AWD  design  phase  demonstrated  the  potential 
benefits of close industry involvement during the planning phase to inform the 
management of  such  risks.  It has also become  an accepted practice  to  adopt 
alliance contractual arrangements where there  is project risk and cost sharing 
between the various parties. 
46. Where  a  key  industry  participant  is  not  party  to  an  alliance 
arrangement, a  rigorous approach  is needed  to ensure  that  the products and 
services  they  provide  will  match  the  construction  strategies  applied  by  the 
alliance.  Alliance  governance  and  operational  arrangements  should  also  be 
explicitly  adapted  from  the  outset  so  as  to  make  up  for  any  contractual 
shortfall and provide  sufficient  forums  for  joint oversight of key  issues. This 
may include regular involvement by the industry participant in alliance board 
discussions. 
47. Looking  forward,  for programs such as  the Future Frigate  (SEA 5000) 
and  the  Future  Submarine  (SEA  1000),  the  design  process,  and  subsequent 
design  and  production  reviews  need  to  be  effective  in  working  through  a 
range of fundamental issues relating to the design and construction. Proposed 
                                                     
43  See, for example, Audit Report No.34 1997–98, New Submarine Project, p. xv; and Malcolm McIntosh, 
Report to the Minister for Defence on the Collins Class Submarine and related matters, Canberra, 
1999. 
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43  See, for example, Audit Report No.34 1997–98, New Submarine Project, p. xv; and Malcolm McIntosh, 
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designs,  and  construction  and  delivery  schedules,  need  to  be  thoroughly 
assessed  to  confirm  that  there  is  sufficient  time  to  conduct  adequate  pre‐
production  systems  engineering  processes,  including  Preliminary  Design 
Reviews, Critical Design Reviews, Detailed Design Reviews  and  Production 
Readiness  Reviews.  Designers  need  sufficient  time  to  incorporate  design 
changes that allow an acceptable level of concurrent design and production to 
proceed.  Construction  should  commence  only  when  the  infrastructure, 
resources  and  construction  data  are  stable  enough  to  allow  production  to 
commence  within  manageable  cost  and  schedule  risk  profiles.  Shipbuilders 
need sufficient time to assess, in detail, the overall capability of their shipyards, 
to  ensure  that  their  production  engineering  management  systems,  quality 
systems  (including  dimensional  control  systems  and  workshop  skill‐levels) 




48. Building  a  ship  as  complex  as  the Hobart‐class DDGs  is  a  significant 
challenge  even  with  a  stable  design  package.  While  the  construction  of  the 
three DDGs will  be  completed  and  the  ships  commissioned  sequentially,  in 
practice,  significant  construction  work,  such  as  block  building  and 
consolidation,  is occurring  in parallel with  the  integration of platform‐system 
and  combat‐system  elements.  This  places  a  premium  on  the  effective 
management of  the design,  the coordination of engineering activities and  the 
maintenance of effective relationships between the parties. The exporting of a 
design also creates challenges in terms of different work practices and levels of 
experience  in  modern  warship  building  between  the  designer  and  the 
shipbuilder.  For  future  naval  construction  programs  with  similar 
characteristics,  a  high  level  of  integration  should  be  sought  between  the 
designer and shipbuilder throughout the program.44 
                                                     
44  In September 2013, the CEO of ASC also publicly suggested lessons learned for Future Submarines, 
particularly related to the quality of design prior to production. Sarah Martin, ‘Coalition facing troubled 
waters as it prepares to sink $250bn into naval shipbuilding’, The Weekend Australian, 28 September 
2013, p. 15. 
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Key findings by chapter 
The AWD Program (Chapter 2) 
49. The  AWD  Program’s  preliminary  design  phase,  known  as  SEA 4000 
Phase 1, commenced in 2002, and involved the selection of the DDGs’ combat 
system  and  competitive  selection  of  the major  contractors  for  the project.  In 
May  2005,  the  AWD  Program  received  First  Pass  government  approval  to 








could  rely  on  comprehensive  analysis  of  operational  capability,  cost 





design. Phase 2 ended  in  June 2007 with  the  then Government’s Second Pass 
approval of  the acquisition of  three Hobart‐class DDGs based on Navantia’s 









45  At the time the Shipbuilder role was awarded to ASC, it had been government policy to privatise ASC 
since the then Government took full public ownership of the company in 2000. In March 2004, 
Defence’s external adviser had recommended that 2006–07 would be a suitable time for privatisation. 
In February 2009, however, the then Government announced that the sale of ASC would not proceed, 
citing global financial uncertainty as presenting risks to a successful sale. 
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advised government  that:  the  technical  risk  in  the program was high but  the 
platform risk was low, because the design existed and was in service with the 
Spanish  Navy;  the  schedule  risk  was  low–medium,  because  Navantia  had 
proven  work  packages  prepared  for  the  Existing  Design  option,  and  the 
industry proposal took a conservative approach to schedule; and cost risk was 
medium, with  the main  sources of  risk being  the non‐Aegis  elements of  the 
combat  system,  and  possible  labour  costs.  The  submission  also  advised 
government  that  the F‐100 platform,  including  the proposed design changes, 
was based on a mature design and mature production processes, which could 
be  transferred  to  Australian  shipbuilders  at  relatively  low  risk. 
Notwithstanding the resources applied during Phase 2 to develop the designs 
and mitigate  risks, half way  into  the build phase of  the AWD Program,  it  is 
apparent  that  the  risks  associated with  incorporating  the  design  changes  to 
Navantia’s F‐104 design, exporting that design to Australia, and adapting the 
designer’s  build  strategy  and  processes  to  accommodate  a  distributed‐build 
construction method in Australia, were underestimated at the time of the June 
2007 Second Pass submission to government. 
52. Contract  amendments  are  expected  and  budgeted  for  in  a  defence 
program of  the  size  and  technological  complexity of SEA 4000 Phase  3. Five 
Alliance  contract  amendments  relate  to  scope  change  for  the  construction of 
the ship, and were foreshadowed in the funding submission at Second Pass in 
2007. That  submission  contained  an  allowance  of  $122 million  for  platform‐
related  changes  that  were  a  consequence  of  F‐105  modifications  and  RAN 
requirements. As at December 2013, the AWD Alliance’s Target Cost Estimate 
for construction of the DDGs had increased by $124 million, or 2.9 per cent, as 
a  result  of  19  contract  amendments.  While  the  value  of  Alliance  contract 
amendments was largely known at Second Pass, in the context of an exported 
design and distributed‐build strategy, the contract amendments have added to 
the  risks and  challenges  faced by  the Alliance during  the build phase of  the 
AWD Program. 
53. SEA  4000  Phase  3  includes  the  objective  of  achieving  expenditure  of 
50 per  cent  of  the Alliance  contract’s  Target Cost  Estimate  on  products  and 
services  provided  by Australian  industry. By October  2013,  52.3  per  cent  of 
Direct  Project  Costs—or  $1.635  billion  of  $3.129  billion—had  been  spent  in 
Australia.  Based  on  expenditure  by  currency,  as  at  December  2013, 
51.1 per cent  of  the  overall  Phase 3  expenditure  had  occurred  overseas,  and 
48.9 per cent of expenditure had occurred in Australia. 
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case  the  Chief  of  Navy),  to  facilitate  the  introduction  of  full  operational 
capability  into service by  the date agreed by Government. SEA 4000 Phase 3 
commenced prior  to  the  introduction of  Joint Project Directives, and Defence 
has  not  retrospectively  developed  a  directive  for  the  AWD  Program.46 
Nevertheless, the completion of a Joint Project Directive for the AWD Program 
would assist to maintain clarity in roles and responsibilities within Defence for 
the delivery of  the DDGs,  including  in  the event of  turnover of key Defence 
personnel,  or  changes  in  program  parameters  as  a  result  of  government 
decisions. 
The AWD Alliance and the Design Contract (Chapter 3) 
55. The  three‐way Alliance  between  the DMO  as  owner‐participant,  and 
ASC  and  Raytheon  as  non‐owner  participants,  binds  three  diverse 
organisations  in  a managerial  and  financial  sense by  the need  to deliver  the 
three DDGs within cost, schedule and capability specifications. 
56. Project  alliances  offer  potential  benefits  over  traditional  construction 
contracting methodology. They also raise new and different risks that have to 
be  managed—in  particular,  determining  the  appropriate  balance  between 
maintaining  the  collaborative  spirit  of  the  alliance,  and  protecting  the 
Commonwealth’s  financial  interests  and  expected  outcomes.47  Under 
traditional contracts, the parties have specific individual obligations, and risks 
are  generally  allocated  to  the  party  considered  best  able  to  manage  them. 
Under  a  project  alliance,  risks  and  responsibilities  are  generally  shared  and 
managed collectively, rather than allocated to individual parties.48 Informed by 
external advice, the provisions of the Alliance contract were intended to strike 
a  reasonable  balance  in  promoting  a  collaborative  management  approach 
                                                     
46  For discussion of Joint Project Directives, see ANAO Audit Report No.6, 2013–14, Capability 
Development Reform, Chapter 11. The report noted that Joint Project Directives were first proposed in 
the response to the Mortimer Review in May 2009, with the prime function of clearly expressing, in a 
working form, the essence of a government decision and assigning responsibilities to Defence Groups. 
However, Defence took over two years to begin to produce Joint Project Directives and, contrary to the 
intent expressed in the original proposal, Joint Project Directives have not been issued immediately 
after government approval. 
47  ANAO Audit Report No.34, 1999–2000, Construction of the National Museum of Australia and 
Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies, p. 13. 
48  Victorian Government, Department of Treasury and Finance, Project Alliancing Practitioners’ Guide, 
Melbourne, 2006, p. 9. 
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46  For discussion of Joint Project Directives, see ANAO Audit Report No.6, 2013–14, Capability 
Development Reform, Chapter 11. The report noted that Joint Project Directives were first proposed in 
the response to the Mortimer Review in May 2009, with the prime function of clearly expressing, in a 
working form, the essence of a government decision and assigning responsibilities to Defence Groups. 
However, Defence took over two years to begin to produce Joint Project Directives and, contrary to the 
intent expressed in the original proposal, Joint Project Directives have not been issued immediately 
after government approval. 
47  ANAO Audit Report No.34, 1999–2000, Construction of the National Museum of Australia and 
Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies, p. 13. 
48  Victorian Government, Department of Treasury and Finance, Project Alliancing Practitioners’ Guide, 
Melbourne, 2006, p. 9. 
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while protecting  the Commonwealth’s  interests.  In consequence,  the Alliance 
contract  combines  elements  of  a  typical  alliance  contract  with  the  more 
‘standard’ risk allocation provisions of a fixed‐price contract. 
57. The  Alliance  contract  is  intended  to  provide  financial  incentives  to 
motivate the Industry Participants to work together to mitigate AWD Program 
risks  and  to  quickly  resolve  issues.  The  reimbursement  of  defined  Direct 
Project Costs  and  the payment of  ‘Fee’  (profit  and Corporate Overhead)  are 
determined  by  the  Industry  Participants’  collective  (not  individual) 
performance against an agreed Target Cost Estimate. The management reserve 
also  enables  contingencies  to  be  managed  within  existing  contractual 
arrangements. The Alliance  contract has been  instrumental  in  facilitating  the 






may  reduce  to zero,  the Commonwealth will  continue  to be  liable  for Direct 
Project Costs. 
58. Notwithstanding  the  financial  incentives  provided  by  the  Alliance 
contract,  and  its  other  features  intended  to  protect  the  Commonwealth’s 
interests,  such  as  the  ‘fundamental  obligation’  and  industry  warranties,  the 
underlying design of the Alliance means that significant risk remains with the 
Commonwealth. While ASC AWD Shipbuilder Pty Ltd is a subsidiary of ASC 
Pty  Ltd,  and  does  not  have  the  legal  persona  of  the  Commonwealth,  it  is 
nonetheless a subsidiary of a Commonwealth business entity whose board  is 
ultimately responsible to the Australian Government (through the shareholder 
Minister)  and  the  Parliament,  and  whose  income  flows  primarily  from  the 
Commonwealth.  In  these  circumstances,  the  fundamental  obligations  agreed 
by ASC, and the contractual warranties  it has offered to the DMO, may be of 
limited  financial  benefit  to  the  Commonwealth.  A  range  of  mechanisms  is 
available  to  the  Australian  Government,  as  discussed  in  its  Commonwealth 
Government  Business  Enterprise—Governance  and  Oversight  Guidelines,  for  the 
shareholder Minister to be provided with additional performance information 
from ASC  and  its  subsidiary  about  the  project,  should  government wish  to 
receive such information. 
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59. The Australian Government  can  reasonably  look  to  the DMO,  as  the 
Commonwealth representative  in  the Alliance and  the  ‘owner‐participant’,  to 
adopt  an  active  stance  within  the  context  of  the  Alliance,  while  also 
encouraging and enabling the Industry Participants to apply their expertise to 
quickly  resolve  issues.  In  this  respect,  the  ANAO  noted  that  the  DMO  has 
appointed  several  experienced  officers  with  relevant  industry  expertise  in 
shipbuilding  to  the AWD  Program Management Office,  and  has  engaged  a 
firm with major construction contract management expertise  to provide day‐
to‐day  advice  on  contractual  issues.  The  DMO  has,  as  part  of  the  Alliance 
contract, also  invested  significantly  in directly  staffing  the Alliance, as a  risk 
mitigation strategy. These arrangements assist the DMO in its interactions with 
the  Industry  Participants,  and  in  providing  advice  on  risk  management 
approaches. 
60. As  at  November  2013,  the  Alliance  was  experiencing  a  range  of 
difficulties that have cost and schedule implications. Longstanding issues with 
the  maturity  of  detailed  design  documentation  were  ongoing,  resulting  in 
significant  rework,  major  construction  problems  had  re‐emerged  at 




strategies  to be pursued by  the  Industry Participants  to manage and  resolve 
build program issues. 
61. Further,  the  Alliance  operates  under  three  major  governance  bodies: 
the Principals Council, the Project Board, and the Alliance Management Team. 
However,  the  Alliance  governance  structure  has  not  been  fully  utilised  to 
contribute to the mitigation of risk. The Principals Council, consisting of chief 
executives and an independent chair, has met only eight times since 2007, not 
achieving  the  annual  frequency  envisaged  by  the  Alliance  contract  (no 
meetings  were  held  in  2011  or  2013).  The  Project  Board,  the  working‐level 
governance body, has generally met at least monthly since 2007, and hence has 
provided  the primary decision‐making body  for  the Alliance. The potentially 
valuable  role  of  the  independent  chair  of  the  Principals  Council  remains 
vacant, and Navantia is outside the Alliance. 
62. The original  intention  to  include  the Platform System Designer  in  the 
Alliance did not eventuate, and  this has contributed  to difficulties associated 
with  exporting  the  design  to Australia.  The DMO’s  Phase  2 Overall  Program 
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59. The Australian Government  can  reasonably  look  to  the DMO,  as  the 
Commonwealth representative  in  the Alliance and  the  ‘owner‐participant’,  to 
adopt  an  active  stance  within  the  context  of  the  Alliance,  while  also 
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firm with major construction contract management expertise  to provide day‐
to‐day  advice  on  contractual  issues.  The  DMO  has,  as  part  of  the  Alliance 
contract, also  invested  significantly  in directly  staffing  the Alliance, as a  risk 
mitigation strategy. These arrangements assist the DMO in its interactions with 
the  Industry  Participants,  and  in  providing  advice  on  risk  management 
approaches. 
60. As  at  November  2013,  the  Alliance  was  experiencing  a  range  of 
difficulties that have cost and schedule implications. Longstanding issues with 
the  maturity  of  detailed  design  documentation  were  ongoing,  resulting  in 
significant  rework,  major  construction  problems  had  re‐emerged  at 
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Report  states  that Navantia was not prepared  to agree  to  the  liability  regime 
that  the Alliance contract was  to  impose. For  its part, Navantia  informed  the 
ANAO  in  October  2013  that  there  was  a  lack  of  clarity  with  respect  to  the 
proposed  liability  regime,  and  that  it  preferred  a  separate  contract  be 
established  for  the Platform System Design. Defence  sought  to minimise  the 
impact of Navantia’s exclusion  from  the Alliance by  incorporating provisions 
into  the  Alliance  and  Platform  System  Design  contracts  that  provide  for 
cooperation  and  collaboration between Navantia  and  the Alliance,  including 





an arrangement. It has also resulted  in an  incomplete alignment of  incentives 
for  sharing  of  best practices  and  for  reducing  costs,  from design  conception 
through  to  shipbuilding  and  ship  acceptance.  The  design  issues  have 
highlighted  that,  ideally,  an  alliance  should  include  all  of  the  key  industry 
contributors to the task being undertaken, as  initially envisaged for the AWD 
Program.  When  it  is  not  possible  to  achieve  a  comprehensive  alliance 
arrangement  because  of  the  stance  taken  by  an  industry  contributor, 
appropriate governance and operational arrangements  should be  established 
to mitigate  the  associated  risks  and  enable  effective  integration  between  the 
key contributors to the project. 
Engineering, Regulation and Test and Evaluation (Chapter 4) 
63. The AWD Program has three key Capability Definition Documents that 
specify the program’s requirements in terms of: the functions that each DDG is 
to  perform,  how  well  each  function  is  to  be  performed,  and  the  tests  and 
evaluations  needed  to  verify  and  validate  contractor  achievement  of  the 
specified  requirements. Requirements  contained within  these documents  are 
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in 2002  to ensure  that ADF materiel  is  fit  for service. The AWD Program has 
complied  with  those  sections  of  the  Technical  Regulatory  Framework  that 
cover program activities up to midway through the build phase, including the 
preparation of a Project Certification Plan and Safety Program Requirements. 
The  AWD  Alliance  achieved  the  status  of  an  Authorised  Engineering 




individuals  responsible  for  accepting  designs,  or  assessing  the  risks  in 
accepting the designs. However, the Alliance Technical Director is responsible 
for  the  certification  of  the  Hobart‐class  DDG  design,  and  the  Alliance 
Engineering Director’s Design Acceptance Representatives are responsible for 
providing  independent  assessments  of  the  technical  integrity  risk  associated 
with that design. To support the integrity of these risk assessments, the Design 
Acceptance  Representatives  report  to  the  General  Manager  Stakeholder 
Engagement  (GMSE). GMSE  is  a  one‐star Officer  of  the RAN’s  Engineering 
Branch, and reports  to DMO’s AWD Program Manager on design acceptance 
issues.  GMSE  also  chairs  the  RAN’s  one‐star  Program  Management 
Stakeholder  Group,  and  reports  to  the  three‐star  Program  Management 
Stakeholder Group. 
66. In August 2013, Defence informed the ANAO that the Naval Technical 
Regulatory  System  has  assurance  mechanisms  to  provide  high  levels  of 





work. Consequently,  it may  not  be  until December  2014—when  the  combat 
system of Ship 1  is scheduled  to be  fully  installed—that  the AWD Program’s 
system‐level tests and evaluations, on board the ship and at sea, will begin to 
fully  verify  and  validate  system  performance  against  function  and 
performance specifications. In January 2014, the AWD Alliance CEO informed 
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the  ANAO  that,  of  1986  Combat  System  requirements,  864  had  been  fully 
completed and are not subject to further validation.49 
Design Progress (Chapter 5) 
68. No matter how well planned a project has been,  if there  is  inadequate 
control over changes,  this will compromise  the  likelihood of completing  it on 
schedule and to budget. The AWD Program sought to mitigate design change 
risks  by  basing  the  Hobart‐class  DDGs  on  the  F‐104  platform,  which  was 
designed and built by Navantia and is in operation with the Spanish Navy. A 
number  of  changes  have  been  included  in  the  Hobart‐class  DDG  platform 
design, as the schedule for those options was seen as being manageable. Four 
main  reasons  for  these  changes  were:  the  Australianised  Combat  System 
(based  on  the  Aegis  Weapon  System),  obsolescence,  Australian  legislative 
requirements50  and  lessons  learned  from  the  F‐105.  Platform  System  design 
changes may be considered as evolutionary and relatively  low‐risk when  the 
designers,  shipbuilders  and  technical  regulators  have  a  history  of  working 
together on the development of the particular class of ship. However, the same 
design changes can take on a quite different character and level of risk when a 
shipbuilding  program  involves  a  newly  exported design,  a  new  shipbuilder 
and a distributed design‐and‐build environment of the sort established for the 
Australian AWD Program. 
69. The  AWD  Program’s  Critical  Design  Review,  as  required  by  the 
Alliance contract, focused on the functional design of the DDGs and concluded 
in late 2009 that ‘the team is well positioned to proceed through Detail Design 
and Construction’. However,  the  report  also noted  that a key  challenge was 
‘churn  in  the design  and  construction due  to  changes,  holds  and  revisions’. 
Nonetheless,  construction  began  as  planned  within  one  month  of  this 
conclusion. 
70. The  Alliance  formed  the  view  that  the  design‐to‐production  process 
could  operate  effectively  without  Navantia  providing  extensive  Lead  Yard 
Services51,  including planning and production support  intended  to ensure, as 
                                                     
49  See also the overview of the Combat System Design at page 8 of the Alliance CEO’s letter to the 
ANAO, reproduced in Appendix 2. 
50  Such as compliance with requirements for protected fuel tanks, appropriate sewage treatment, and 
doors that open to 90 degrees. 
51  These services are defined as the collective services that the lead shipbuilder for a class of ships will 
provide to another shipyard that is building follow-on ships of the same class. 
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far  as  is  reasonably  practicable,  that  the  lessons  from  the  initial  build  are 
transferred  to  the  follow‐on  build  yard.  In  light  of  the  problems  that  have 
occurred in transferring the design to Australia, ASC informed the ANAO that 
there  was  an  expectation  that  production  issues  commonly  captured  in  ‘as 
built’ drawings would have been fed back into the design by Navantia because 
this  is  standard  shipyard  practice.  For  its  part,  Navantia  noted  that  some 
aspects  of  the design‐to‐production process  adopted  for  the DDGs were not 




71. During  the  construction  phase,  the  AWD  Program  has  experienced 
ongoing  immaturity  in  the detailed design, which has  significantly exceeded 
that expected at the time of Second Pass approval in 2007.52 This has involved 
Navantia providing a large number of revised design documents between 2009 
and  2013.  The  extent  of  this  problem  is  evident  from  the  large  number  of 
drawing revisions  that have been delivered by  the designer, at an average of 
2.75  revisions per drawing  (as at March 2013), and by design deficiency and 
design  interference  accounting  for  some  5000  records  or  46  per  cent  of  all 
records in the Alliance’s Problem and Issue Reports database (as at April 2013). 
Drawing  revisions  from  Navantia  have  at  times  saturated  the  Alliance’s 
engineering  and  planning  departments,  resulting  in  late  releases  of  design 
drawings to ship production. 
72. AWD  Alliance  records  indicate  that  drawing  revisions  and  updates 
have occurred for a variety of reasons, including: drawing errors or omissions, 
to  incorporate design  changes  required by Defence,  and  to  cater  for Vendor 
Furnished Information (VFI). During the audit, the ANAO was advised by the 




of detailed design change  is due  to defects and deficiencies  in drawings. On 
                                                     
52  In the 2012–13 Major Projects Report, the DMO acknowledged design change management as a 
major project issue, and stated that it will impact cost and possibly schedule. The DMO further stated 
that the severity of the cost and schedule impacts to the Commonwealth will be dependent on the 
scope and timing of the change implementation relative to ship completion. ANAO Report No.12, 
2013–14, 2012െ13 Major Projects Report, p. 157. 
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52  In the 2012–13 Major Projects Report, the DMO acknowledged design change management as a 
major project issue, and stated that it will impact cost and possibly schedule. The DMO further stated 
that the severity of the cost and schedule impacts to the Commonwealth will be dependent on the 
scope and timing of the change implementation relative to ship completion. ANAO Report No.12, 
2013–14, 2012െ13 Major Projects Report, p. 157. 
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the  other  hand, Navantia  has  emphasised  that  a  large majority  of drawings 
were affected by Contract Amendment Proposals, and that Vendor Furnished 
Information  (VFI)  caused 700 hold‐ups  (notices  to  stop work)  that had  to be 
implemented  in  later  drawings.  Navantia  also  emphasised  that  it  invested 
significant  resources  to  incorporate  additional  detail  into  the  construction 




73. The  Alliance  CEO  informed  the  ANAO  that,  while  the  volume  of 
detailed design change has been high in shipbuilding terms, it is the timing of 
the delivery of change  that has had  the most significant  impact on  the AWD 







74. Navantia’s  contract  allows  for  ‘maintenance’ updates  to  the Platform 
System Design, and the incorporation of some updates is necessary to preserve 
warranties  from  Navantia  as  to  the  DDGs’  Platform  System  function  and 
performance. The cost of incorporating design updates, and the risk of updates 
continuing,  are  factored  into  the  Alliance  contract’s  gain‐share  pain‐share 
regime. To date, design  changes have  resulted  in  reduced  fees  for ASC  and 
Raytheon,  and  in  extra  Direct  Project  Costs  for  Defence.  However,  as 
previously  discussed, Navantia  is  not  part  of  the Alliance. This  reduces  the 
contractual  incentives on  the ship designer  to eliminate errors and omissions 
quickly. 
75. Irrespective  of  the  causes  of  design  change,  the  Alliance  contract 
requires  the  Industry  Participants  to  work  together  with  the  DMO  and  the 
Platform System Designer  to address design  issues. The Alliance has  taken a 
range of actions to mitigate the  impact of  immaturity  in the detailed design.53 
                                                     
53  In January 2014 the Alliance CEO informed the ANAO that, while actions taken by the Alliance have 
mitigated the impact of design change, only Navantia, as the owner and producer of the platform 
design, can rectify the design quality issues. 
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The  actions  taken  have  included  the  application  of  additional  engineering 
review effort,  the purchase and use of Computer Aided Design  (CAD)  tools, 
schedule  prioritisation,  better  leveraging  of  Navantia’s  knowledge  and 
experience  to  support  the  design‐to‐production  process,  and  developing  a 
Collaborative  Change  Assessment  Process.  However,  these  steps  have  been 
taken over a four‐year period, during which time design maturity issues have 
continued  to  emerge,  and  have  affected  the  shipbuilding  process.  The 
problems  of  design  change  and  its  consequences  were  ongoing  in  2013,  as 
illustrated  by  the  Alliance  CEO’s  October  2013  advice  to  the  ANAO  about 
emergent  issues  and  the  ASC  CEO’s  public  warning  in  October  2013  that 
ongoing design revisions might disrupt the delivery schedule.54 The DMO has 
appropriately  reminded  the  Industry  Participants  of  their  contractual 
obligations,  including  the  ‘fundamental  obligation’  to deliver  the DDGs  and 
other  Supplies  and  to  achieve  certain  schedule  commitments.  As  the 
Commonwealth’s  representative  in  the  Alliance,  the  DMO  appreciates  the 
need  to  be  actively  engaged  in  monitoring  developments,  managing  the 
relationships between  the parties and ensuring  that  technical  issues are dealt 
with expeditiously. 
Build Progress (Chapter 6) 
76. 3‐D  Computer  Aided  Design  (CAD)  tools  are  generally  used 
extensively  in  the  design  and  construction  of  modern  warships.  While 
Navantia used multiple 3‐D CAD models,  these were not  closely  integrated, 
making it more difficult to identify and resolve detailed design issues. Further, 






of production  issues, and  in  January 2013 Navantia placed a design approval 
engineer  at  ASC  Osborne.  While  the  3‐D  CAD  models  and  increased 
integration with Navantia are supporting more timely and effective resolution 
                                                     
54  Sarah Martin, ‘AWD program “plagued” by design changes’, The Australian, 18 September 2013, p. 2. 
Shortly after, the CEO also publicly suggested lessons learned for Future Submarines, particularly 
related to the quality of design prior to production. Sarah Martin, ‘Coalition facing troubled waters as it 
prepares to sink $250bn into naval shipbuilding’, The Weekend Australian, 28 September 2013, p. 15. 
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54  Sarah Martin, ‘AWD program “plagued” by design changes’, The Australian, 18 September 2013, p. 2. 
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of  design  and  construction  issues,  it  would  have  been  preferable  to  have 
applied  suitable  technology  and  expertise  from  the  outset  of  the  build 
program,  particularly  given  the  risks  associated  with  Navantia  exporting  a 
design for the first time to a third‐party shipyard. 
77. During  the  design  phase  of  the  AWD  Program,  SEA  4000  Phase  2, 
industry  and  government  operated  on  the  shared  assumption  that  potential 
subcontractors  to  the AWD Program had  the  financial capacity,  facilities and 
commercial  incentive  to  develop  capabilities  necessary  to  win  and  execute 
contracts for significant portions of the DDG hull block production. However, 
during  the  subsequent  block  subcontract  tendering  and  source  selection 
process, it became apparent that none of the tendering shipyards had recently 
performed work  of  this  type  on  the  scale  anticipated,  and  that  each  facility 
where  work  could  potentially  be  conducted  required  significant  capital 
investment to develop the necessary handling and processing capability.55 The 
allocation of blocks to subcontractors was developed by ASC, approved by the 
Alliance  Project  Board  and  subsequently  negotiated  by  ASC  in  2009.  BAE 
Systems  was  allocated  36  blocks,  which  included  the  DDGs’  complex  keel 
blocks, and Forgacs was allocated 29 blocks. 
78. The Production Readiness Reviews  conducted by  the Alliance  in  late 
2009  and  early  2010  to  determine  the  readiness  of  block  construction 
contractors  to commence production appear now  to have been  inadequate  in 




keel  block  being  constructed  by  BAE  Systems.  This  placed  the  block 
construction schedule in  jeopardy, particularly as BAE Systems’ simultaneous 
construction of other blocks  for  the DDGs and  the Landing Helicopter Dock 
ships stretched its capacity to the point that, without remedial action, the first 
DDG would have been  two years  late. Defence advised  the  then Minister  for 
Defence  in October 2010  that  ‘the poor build quality was  largely  the result of 
BAE  Systems  not  having  sufficient  experienced  production  supervisors—
workshop  engineers  and  foremen—despite  being  one  of  Australia’s  most 
experienced  shipbuilding  organisations’.  Consequently,  there  was  a 
                                                     
55  AWD Alliance, Schedule Replan, Project Board paper, 16 June 2011, p. 2. 
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reallocation  of  some  BAE  Systems  blocks  to  Forgacs,  and  to  Navantia’s 
shipyard  in Ferrol, Spain.56 Defence  records  show  that  further  reallocation of 
blocks  between  shipyards was  under  discussion  by  the Alliance  during  the 
latter half of 2013, as a result of deteriorating performance and significant cost 
escalation  at Forgacs.  In December  2013,  three more blocks were  reallocated 
from Forgacs to BAE Systems. 
80. The  detailed  design  immaturity  issues  discussed  in  Chapter  5  have 
adversely  impacted  block  production.  In  2010,  the  Alliance  Project  Board 
decided  that,  rather  than  rejecting Navantia’s design  documentation  until  it 
had  reached  the  anticipated  level  of maturity,  a  better  strategy would  be  to 
continue working and consequently allow some defects and deficiencies in the 
supplies  to  progress  into  production.  In  October  2013,  the  Alliance  CEO 
informed  the ANAO  that  the majority of defects and deficiencies were more 
insidious, and were either discovered  in production or  identified  later by  the 
Platform  System  Designer  in  the  form  of  change.  The  receipt  of  revised 






the  time  taken  to conduct  rework  reduces  the Alliance  Industry Participants’ 
ability  to  qualify  for  incentive  payments  for  delivering  the  DDGs  ahead  of 
schedule,  and  increases  the  Industry  Participants’  exposure  to  the  Alliance 
contract’s  liquidated damages  for  late delivery. While Navantia  is not part of 
the Alliance  and  is  therefore  not  exposed  to  reduced  incentive  payments,  it 
does  bear  the  cost  of  revisions  to  rectify  errors  and  omissions  in  design 
documentation. 
82. Based  on  the  forward  estimates  by  the  Alliance’s  Control  Account 





56  In March 2012 and May 2013, BAE Systems was reallocated a total of eight blocks. The reallocation 
recognised that BAE Systems had the capacity and skill to successfully take on an increased share of 
the workload. 
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56  In March 2012 and May 2013, BAE Systems was reallocated a total of eight blocks. The reallocation 
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block  rework  to  address  changes  in  the  detailed  design  and  rectify  work 
undertaken  by  its  block  subcontractors,  have  contributed  to  persistent 
productivity  below  planned  levels  and  production  cost  overruns.  By 
November 2013, it was costing ASC $1.60 to produce work that was originally 
estimated  to  cost  $1.00,  or  in  EVMS  terms,  production  cost  efficiency  had 
declined  from 1.0  in September 2010  to 0.62  (62 per cent) by November 2013. 
However  combat  system development  is progressing more  satisfactorily. By 
September  2013,  Raytheon  had  expended  69  per  cent  of  its  budget  for  the 
DDGs’ Combat System engineering work, with the Earned Value Management 
System  showing  its  cost  efficiency  at  1.0  or  100  per  cent,  and  schedule 
performance at 0.99 or 99 per cent. 
83. Between  2010  and  2013,  the  Alliance  and  ASC  did  not  routinely 
quantify the various elements that contributed to reduced productivity.57 ASC 
and the Alliance CEO noted that isolating costs associated with immaturity in 
detailed  design  documentation  was  difficult,  particularly  when  revised 
drawings contained multiple changes that were not identified by Navantia.58 In 
2013  the Alliance CEO began presenting more detailed  cost‐variance data  to 
the Alliance Project Board, drawing on EVMS data and ASC Control Account 
Manager  estimates  of  the  extent  to  which  different  factors  impacted  on 
shipbuilding productivity.59  In  January  2014,  the Alliance CEO  informed  the 
ANAO that: 
...  there are a variety of  root‐causes  for  the  cost  increases and  these  include: 
schedule  prolongation;  block  sub‐contract  outcomes;  churn  in  the  detailed 
design  being  greater  than  expected  (or  allowed  for);  costs  not  properly 
estimated  or  budgeted  in  the  TCE  [Target  Cost  Estimate]  (and/or  invalid 
                                                     
57  In 2012, the AWD Alliance Principals Council discussed productivity, noting that: 
  productivity needed to improve at both Forgacs and ASC. The Council acknowledged the current 
issue of lack of a mature TDP and agreed that an increase in productivity would require the design 
to stabilise and change to cease. 
 AWD Alliance Principals Council, meeting minutes, 20 February 2012, p. 3. 
58  See paragraphs 5.45 and 6.112. 
59  DMO’s AWD Program Office analysed the monthly cost variance data for the period August to 
December 2013. The analysis showed that design change, out-of-sequence work, defects and left-off 
work, rework, productivity and estimating error, and block subcontractors’ performance all directly 
contributed to monthly cost overruns in shipbuilding. The largest direct contribution to cost increases 
between August and December 2013 came from subcontractors’ performance. It should be noted that 
design change also has an indirect impact on other factors. 
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84. FMI  independently  assessed  the  objective  and  actual  productivity  of 
the Australian DDG block builders between  2010  and  2012, producing  three 
reports  on  the matter.  FMI’s  2012 update  report,  released  in  February  2013, 
noted that changes made by the shipbuilders had led to improvements in some 
areas.  However,  FMI  also  found  that,  of  the  72  overall  observations  and 
suggestions it made  in 2010, 2011 and 2012, 49 (68 per cent) were found to be 
new  issues  or  were  issues  where  little  effective  action  had  been  taken, 
17 (24 per  cent)  showed  some  effective  action  taken,  four  issues  (5 per  cent) 
were  largely  resolved,  and  the  status  of  the  remaining  two  issues  was  not 
reported.  FMI’s  72  observations  and  suggestions  were  grouped  into  the 




85. In  September  2012,  the Government  announced  a plan  to  extend  the 
AWD Program so that the delivery of the first ship was delayed by 15 months, 
and the interval between the delivery of the ships was increased from 15 to 18 
months.  Defence  and  the  Industry  Participants  subsequently  commenced 
rebaselining  the  construction  schedule.  The  September  2013  Integrated 
Baseline Review report indicated that major corrective actions were necessary 
to restore confidence in the AWD Program’s cost and schedule estimates. The 
report  highlighted  problems  with  the  EVMS’s  Performance  Measurement 
Baseline,  and  that  corrective  action  was  required  for  the  EVMS  to  be 
considered acceptable for accurate performance measurement. Consequently, a 
recalculation of  the estimated cost of  the Alliance contract  (that  is,  the EVMS 
Estimate At Completion discussed above) is necessary to ensure that adequate 
allowance has been made for remaining AWD build risks and  issues, such as 
those  relating  to  construction  drawing  maturity  and  future  productivity 
projections. 
                                                     
60  See page 3 of the Alliance CEO’s letter to the ANAO, reproduced in Appendix 2. 
61  First Marine International, Assessment of actual and planned shipbuilding productivity for the AWD 
project, SEA 4000 Air Warfare Destroyer Program, 2012 update, 8 February 2013, p. 32. 
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intellectual  property,  and  the  industrial  capacity  to  undertake  repairs, 
upgrades  and  maintenance.  Defence  has  sought  to  mitigate  risks  by 
commencing the development of the Hobart‐class DDG Support System early 
in the AWD Program’s build phase. Progress is being monitored by the RAN, 
including  by  the  one‐star  and  three‐star  Program  Management  Stakeholder 
Groups  (see  Appendix  8).  While  these  are  positive  developments,  the 
sustainment phase of  the DDGs’  lifecycle  is not expected  to begin until 2016, 
and it is too early to assess the adequacy of the Support System arrangements. 
87. Public works  that  cost more  than $15 million must be  referred  to  the 
Parliamentary  Standing  Committee  on  Public  Works  (Public  Works 
Committee) before work can commence. Defence records show that there was 
a significant delay  in gaining  the approval  to  refer  the DDG Support System 
facilities  to  the  Public  Works  Committee.  Defence  initiated  the  process  by 
seeking ministerial approval in late 2011, but it was not until March 2013 that 
the referral to the committee was made, and thus the facilities expenditure was 
not  approved  by  the  House  of  Representatives  until  May  2013.  This  has 
resulted in an overall delay of some 25 months in the delivery of the DDG crew 
training  facilities  at  Randwick  Barracks  and  the  Command  Team  Trainer 
facility  at  HMAS Watson.  The  RAN  and  the  AWD  Program  will  not  have 
permanent, dedicated training facilities for crew and support personnel for the 
first DDG, and alternative temporary arrangements will need to be established. 





DDG  capability  was  $3.4  billion,  with  annual  NPOC  of  $70.4  million  from 
2018–19 (Budget 2007–08 Constant Price and Exchange). In December 2012, the 
RAN  revised  the  estimated NPOC  for  the DDGs  in  light of  their postponed 
delivery  dates  and  the  consequent  delay  in  withdrawing  the  FFGs  from 
service. The RAN now estimates the NPOC for the DDGs at $619 million in the 
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years up  to and  including 2019–20, and a  further $2.07 billion  in  the years  to 
2029–30. 
89. The  knowledge  and  experience  acquired  in  the  development  of  the 
DDGs will  form  the basis  for  the DDG Support System necessary  to  sustain 
and upgrade  this complex capability over  its expected  service  life. However, 
the Support System work is likely to be undertaken against the background of 
a  decline  in  work  for  the  Australian  shipbuilding  sector.  There  is  a  risk, 
observed by Defence stakeholders and under consideration by  the Australian 
Government,  that  the  knowledge  and  experience  gained  by  the  Australian 
shipbuilding sector during the DDG build phase may not be available to meet 
future RAN capability and whole‐of‐life support requirements. 




Defence  welcomes  this  timely  and  thorough  review  of  the  Air  Warfare 




In  respect  of  recommendation  one, Defence will  re‐invigorate  the Principals 
Council and appoint a suitably experienced independent Council Chair. 
Defence  notes  that  with  respect  to  Recommendations  2  and  3,  the  ANAO 
report recognises that both recommendations are already current practice.62 
In respect of the report more broadly,  it finds that, at  the time that  the AWD 
Project was approved by Government, Defence may not have fully appreciated 
the  immaturity  of ASC  shipbuilding  capabilities,  or  the  extent  to which  the 
capabilities of BAE Systems and Forgacs shipyards had atrophied since  their 
last  major  shipbuilding  activity.  Defence’s  understanding  of  the  Australian 
capability to build the AWD was in fact informed by significant investment in 
studies  and  preliminary  design  activities  conducted  by  the  industry 
                                                     
62  ANAO comment: Recommendations 2 and 3 address design review and performance monitoring 
arrangements that should be implemented from the outset of future Australian naval shipbuilding. 
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62  ANAO comment: Recommendations 2 and 3 address design review and performance monitoring 
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participants, and  relied on  the  resultant assurances and warranties provided 
by industry. Defence agrees with the report’s assessment that it overestimated 
the ability of domestic shipyards to  ‘ramp up’ their productivity  levels to the 
required  level within  a  reasonable  time.  In  this  context, Defence  also  agrees 
with the ANAO commentary that normal levels of design change can take on a 
different  character  and  level  of  risk with  an  inexperienced  shipbuilder,  and 
block  building  subcontractors  which  had  lost  much  of  its  shipbuilding 
capability. 
The  audit  has  identified  the  potential  problems  that  stem  from  inconsistent 
demand. This is particularly important if Australia is to retain an efficient and 
competent naval shipbuilding capability. 
Defence  accepts  that  the  report  accurately  reports  the  current  status  and 
challenges faced by the project. Defence would, however, make the following 
comments. 
Firstly,  the  report  suggests  that DMO did not make  sufficient  allowance  for 
factors  such  as  importing  a  surface  ship  design  and  the  inexperience  of 
domestic  shipyards. Defence  did  consider  these  issues  throughout  Phases  1 
and 2 of the AWD project and made sizeable investments in the shipbuilding 
industry  in  studying  existing  and  evolved  designs,  and  comparing  these  to 
contemporary projects  of  similar  scale  and  scope  in Australia  and  overseas. 





original  F100  design  and  build. Given  the  uncertainty  surrounding  the  cost 




of  design  change. Defence  considers  the  amount  of  design  change  was  not 
excessive  for  a  design  of  the  complexity  of  the AWD,  nor was  the  level  of 
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these  changes was  in  the  immaturity of  the processes  to manage  the design 
change  challenge  with  the  designer  and  the  block  subcontractors.  Defence 
accepts this is a major concern which must be addressed as a core performance 
requirement of an effective and efficient shipbuilding industry. 
Finally  the  report  suggests  Defence  did  not  adequately  monitor  shipyard 
performance.  Since  the  commencement  of  production, Defence  has  engaged 
First Marine  International,  a  highly  regarded  consultant  to  the  international 
marine  industry,  to  conduct annual benchmark assessments on  shipbuilding 
performance in the AWD project. Defence has made these reports available to 
each of  the shipyards on an annual basis  to assist  them with  identifying key 
areas for improvement.64 
91. The  other  participants  in  the  AWD  Program,  including  ASC  and 
Raytheon Australia  as  the AWD Alliance  Industry Participants, Navantia  as 
the Platform System Designer, and the two major subcontractors BAE Systems 
and Forgacs, were also provided with the opportunity to comment on relevant 
extracts  from  this  audit  report. Their  summary  responses  are  set  out below, 
and their formal covering letters are reproduced at Appendices 2 to 7. 




issues  and  has  delivered  related  commentary  and  interpretation.  The AWD 
Alliance  construct  by  its  very  nature  and  intent  has  established  a  close 





63  ANAO comment: The audit identifies significant immaturity in the detailed design documentation 
provided by Navantia as a major AWD Program delivery issue. This issue is separate from, but related 
to, agreed changes in the design of the DDGs, which have led to churn in Navantia’s detailed design 
documentation and contributed to immaturity. The audit identifies drawing errors or omissions, contract 
amendments and late Vendor Furnished Information as major causes of immaturity in detailed design 
documentation. The volume and timing of changes in the detailed design documentation have resulted 
in costly and out-of-sequence rework in cases where construction work already undertaken no longer 
matched the design. 
64  ANAO comment: While recognising the value of First Marine International’s annual assessments of the 
productivity of the Australian shipyards, the audit report also emphasises the need to monitor 
productivity metrics from the outset of future naval construction as part of regular project reporting. 
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First Marine  International,  a  highly  regarded  consultant  to  the  international 
marine  industry,  to  conduct annual benchmark assessments on  shipbuilding 
performance in the AWD project. Defence has made these reports available to 
each of  the shipyards on an annual basis  to assist  them with  identifying key 
areas for improvement.64 
91. The  other  participants  in  the  AWD  Program,  including  ASC  and 
Raytheon Australia  as  the AWD Alliance  Industry Participants, Navantia  as 
the Platform System Designer, and the two major subcontractors BAE Systems 
and Forgacs, were also provided with the opportunity to comment on relevant 
extracts  from  this  audit  report. Their  summary  responses  are  set  out below, 
and their formal covering letters are reproduced at Appendices 2 to 7. 




issues  and  has  delivered  related  commentary  and  interpretation.  The AWD 
Alliance  construct  by  its  very  nature  and  intent  has  established  a  close 





63  ANAO comment: The audit identifies significant immaturity in the detailed design documentation 
provided by Navantia as a major AWD Program delivery issue. This issue is separate from, but related 
to, agreed changes in the design of the DDGs, which have led to churn in Navantia’s detailed design 
documentation and contributed to immaturity. The audit identifies drawing errors or omissions, contract 
amendments and late Vendor Furnished Information as major causes of immaturity in detailed design 
documentation. The volume and timing of changes in the detailed design documentation have resulted 
in costly and out-of-sequence rework in cases where construction work already undertaken no longer 
matched the design. 
64  ANAO comment: While recognising the value of First Marine International’s annual assessments of the 
productivity of the Australian shipyards, the audit report also emphasises the need to monitor 
productivity metrics from the outset of future naval construction as part of regular project reporting. 
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The  ANAO  report  gives  focus  to  schedule,  cost,  ship  design,  the  Alliance 
contract and the performance of both the  ‘Owner‐Participant’ (DMO) and the 
Industry  Participants  (ASC  and  Raytheon)  in  executing  the  AWD  project. 
AWD  is  a  large  and  complex  project  and  unsurprisingly,  the  related 
considerations  and  issues  are  similarly  complex  and  open  to  interpretation. 
ANAO  has  provided  extended  commentary  on  the  AWD  design  process 
noting  that  the current AWD cost and  schedule pressures have a number of 
root  causes  and  these  include:  schedule  prolongation;  block  subcontract 
outcomes;  churn  in  the  detailed  design  being  greater  than  expected  (or 
allowed  for);  costs  not  properly  estimated  or  budgeted  in  the  Target  Cost 
Estimate  (and/or  invalid  assumptions)  and  production  productivity  not 
achieving the levels assumed in development of the Target Cost Estimate. 
CEO  AWD  generally  concurs  with  the  primary  recommendations  made  by 
ANAO and the focussed commentary within the report. Notwithstanding, the 
majority of the ANAO commentary tends to focus on the issues, and less has 
been said about  the successes, or  in  fact  that  the potential  impacts of various 
challenges have been mitigated, and some  issues avoided altogether  through 
the cooperative and collaborative approach taken within AWD. 
Noteworthy  successes  include:  establishment of  the workforce, development 
of  the  facilities,  achievement of  the  early design milestones, product quality 
and utility  of  the Alliance  arrangement  in problem  resolution on  a best‐for‐
program  basis.  Appropriate  credit  should  be  given  to  the  architects  of  the 
Alliance  arrangement  and  the  participants  that  work  tirelessly  to  make  it 
successful. There  are many positive  lessons  learnt  that  should be  applied  in 
consideration of future programs of this type. 
ASC 
93. ASC’s covering  letter  in  response  to an audit extract  is  reproduced at 
Appendix 3. ASC’s response to the audit extract is set out below: 
ASC  is  absolutely  committed  to  the  safe delivery  of  three Hobart Class Air 
Warfare Destroyers to the satisfaction of all our key stakeholders including the 
Australian  Government,  the  Department  of  Defence,  the  Royal  Australian 
Navy  and  the  Defence  Materiel  Organisation,  our  shareholder  and  our 
industry partners. ASC will  continue our drive on productivity and we will 
deliver these ships. 
As  your  audit  identifies,  the  risks  associated  with  the  design  and  build 
strategy  were  underestimated  at  the  time  of  the  June  2007  Second  Pass 
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a view of quality,  cost  and  schedule performance  can only be  arrived  at by 
considering the performance of all the members of the team, underpinned by a 
desire  to work collaboratively  to  improve performance. ASC stands  ready  to 
work  to  a  set  of  program  arrangements  that  adequately  address  the  actual 
risks in the program. 
Raytheon Australia 





AWD,  like  any  other  frigate  program,  is  a  very  complex  program,  and  this 
requires  the  shipbuilder  to  cope  with  several  revisions  to  the  drawings  in 
order to capture the  latest technical  information available, which comes from 
many different sources and is often out of the designer’s control. This process 








96. The  BAE  Systems  covering  letter  in  response  to  an  audit  extract  is 
reproduced at Appendix 6. The BAE Systems response  to  the audit extract  is 
set out below: 
BAE  Systems  appreciates  the  invitation  to  comment  on  the  extract  of  audit 
findings and  recommendations. However, we are unable  to comment on  the 
ANAO  recommendations  because  none  were  shared  with  us  in  the  extract 
provided. We are also unable  to  comment on many of  the audit  findings as 
only  a  limited  number  of  them  were  included  in  the  extract  provided. 
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reproduced at Appendix 6. The BAE Systems response  to  the audit extract  is 
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Nevertheless,  we  agree  with  the  facts  as  presented  in  the  extract  that  was 
shared with us. Reference is made to our full response for elaboration.65 
BAE Systems fully agrees that all of the Australian naval shipbuilding industry 
companies  that  have  participated  in  the  AWD  Program,  our  company 
included,  have  faced  a  significant  challenge  from  the  need  to  re‐establish 
capability,  capacity  and  experience  after  the  gap  in  naval  shipbuilding  that 
preceded  the  start of AWD  construction. Over  the  course of  the program  to 
date,  BAE  Systems  has  been  able  to  rectify  these  initial  issues  through 
investment,  reachback  to  our  global  organisation  and  additional  hiring  to 
rapidly  build  capability.  Our  performance  on  the  AWD  Program  has  been 
recognised  by  the  AWD  Alliance,  as  evidenced  by  the  reallocation  of 
additional  blocks  and  by  DMO’s  Directorate  of  Maritime  Safety  and 
Sustainment Assurance, which has  assessed  the BAE  Systems Williamstown 
Shipyard as performing significantly above DMO’s own  industry benchmark 
score. Clearly  therefore,  in  our  view,  a  key Recommendation  in  this  report 
should be for the Commonwealth to act quickly to ensure that the impending 
gap  in  naval  shipbuilding  currently  being  faced  again  by  the  industry  is 
avoided. 
Forgacs 






work  on HMAS Manoora  and Kanimbla  and  the  start  of  the AWD Program. 
Accordingly, many of the facilities, cranage and general yard facilities were ill 
prepared  to  commence  block  production  at  the  schedule,  quality  and  cost 
demanded under the contract; and the pilot block allocated to assess capability 
was too small a sample to be a valid  indication of capability or capacity. The 
subsequent  reallocation  of  the  BAE  blocks  to  Forgacs,  just  as  the  shipyard 
commenced  to  improve  in maturity, placed  additional  stress  on  the  already 
strained  facilities and workforce, and caused  further  issues with quality and 
schedule achievement at the Forgacs facilities. 
                                                     
65  ANAO comment: The ANAO provided only a small extract of the draft audit report to BAE Systems 
because the company is not a member of the AWD Alliance. The parts of the draft audit that were 
provided to BAE Systems mainly concerned its performance as a block subcontractor. 
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Whilst  the  imperative of building  ships  fitted with naval  combat  systems  in 
Australia  is  well  articulated  by  the  government,  the  concern  of  Forgacs  is 
twofold: 
 That  the  costs  of  ramping  back  up  to  a  competitive  shipyard  to 
maintain  the  indigenous  shipbuilding  capability have not been  fully 
appreciated  in  terms of  the magnitude of  the  investment  required  in 
facilities, recruitment, training and retention of the workforce to reach 
competitive productivity; and 
 Once  established,  the  shipbuilding  capability  will  once  again  dilute 
and disappear if not utilised in an ongoing shipbuilding program out 
across  the  Defence  portfolio.  Whilst  again  much  discussion  has 
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 reinvigorate  the  AWD  Alliance  Principals 
Council,  as  a  source  of  additional  leadership, 
insight and strategic advice on key  issues  facing 
the Alliance participants; and 
 raise  with  the  Minister  for  Defence  the 
appointment  of  a  suitably  experienced  and 







of  detailed  design  errors  from  the  outset  of  future 
Australian  naval  shipbuilding,  Defence  require  and 
oversee  the  implementation of a  fully‐integrated design 






The  ANAO  recommends  that,  for  future  Australian 
naval  construction  programs,  Defence  monitor 
performance  against  a  set of productivity metrics  from 
the outset, so as to promote productivity, gauge the key 
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1.1 At  a budgeted  cost of  $8.455 billion  for  all phases,  the SEA  4000–Air 
Warfare  Destroyer  (AWD)  Program  is  to  design,  build  and  deliver  three 
Hobart‐class  guided missile destroyers  (DDGs)  and  their  Support  System  to 
the  Royal  Australian  Navy  (RAN).  These  DDGs  are  to  be  named  and  are 
scheduled  for  delivery  as  follows:  HMAS  Hobart—March  2016;  HMAS 
Brisbane—September  2017;  and  HMAS  Sydney—March  2019.  They  are  to 
replace  the RAN’s  six  Adelaide‐class  guided missile  frigates  (FFGs),  two  of 
which  were  withdrawn  from  service  in  2005  and  2008.  The  remaining  four 
FFGs are scheduled for withdrawal from service by June 2019.66 
1.2 The Hobart‐class DDGs are highly complex platforms, which combine 
advanced  sensors  and  weapons  to  achieve  extensive  air,  surface,  and 
subsurface mission  requirements.  Figure  1.1  shows  the DDGs’ platform  and 
combat‐system  configuration.  Each  ship  is  comprised  of  31  blocks  (or  ship 
sections)  constructed  via  a  distributed‐build  process  at  four  shipyards. ASC 
AWD  Shipbuilder  Pty  Ltd  (ASC67)  is  responsible  for  all  block  construction 
through its own shipyard and those of its subcontractors. Block consolidation 
is conducted by ASC, at  the Government of South Australia’s Common User 
Facility,  Techport  Australia,  Osborne.  The  DDGs’  platform,  sensors  and 
weapons  systems  will  be  integrated,  set‐to‐work  and  harbour‐tested  at 
Osborne. At the time of the audit, the AWD Program was in its construction  
                                                     
66  Between 1990 and 2001 the RAN withdrew from service its three former DDGs, known as the Perth 
class, without replacement. 
67  ASC AWD Shipbuilder Pty Ltd is a subsidiary of the Commonwealth Government Business Enterprise 
ASC Pty Ltd. For convenience throughout this report, the acronym ASC generally refers to this 
subsidiary. Where this is not the case, the report makes it clear whether a reference is to the parent 
company or the subsidiary. 
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phase;  by  January  2014,  block  production  was  well  advanced  at  all  four 
shipyards,  with  consolidation  of  blocks  in  the  form  of  a  hull  nearing 
completion on Ship 1.68 
1.3 The  DDGs’  concept  of  operations  includes  defending  a  naval  force 
(comprising  for  instance,  the Landing Helicopter Dock  (LHD) heavy  lift and 
amphibious assault vessels and forces ashore) from aircraft and missile attack, 
as well  as  operating  independently  against  other  ships  and  submarines  and 
providing naval gunfire support. 
1.4 During  the  audit,  the  AWD  Program  was  dealing  with  a  range  of 
challenges related to the construction and governance strategy adopted for the 












Design and shipbuilding strategy 
1.5 The  three Australian Hobart‐class DDGs are  to be based on  the F‐104 
platform design from Navantia S.A. of Spain (Navantia), with specified F‐105 
modifications,  and  additional  modifications  primarily  to  accommodate  the 
Australianised Combat  System, which  comprises  an upgraded United  States 
Aegis Weapon  System69  and  additional Australian  elements  to meet  specific 
                                                     
68  In parallel, work was progressing on Ships 2 and 3. 
69  The US Navy’s Aegis Weapon System was selected in August 2004 as the preferred combat system 
for the yet-to-be-selected DDG platform system. 
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capability  requirements.70 Navantia  is  responsible  for designing  the Platform 
System  indicated in Figure 1.1, and for providing the AWD Alliance with the 
technical data needed  to construct  the ships. Navantia  is also  responsible  for 
providing  a  warranty  that  the  Hobart‐class  DDG  Platform  System  will,  if 
constructed in accordance with its Category 1 Technical Data Package, achieve 
the  function  and  performance  requirements  specified  in  the  Hobart  Class 
Platform System Specification. The Platform System, for a warship, includes all 
elements of the ship other than the Combat System, including the hull system, 
propulsion  system,  electrical  system,  auxiliary  system,  outfit,  furnishings, 
explosive ordnance handling and storage. 
1.6 As discussed above, the AWD Program is based on a highly distributed 
model  which  draws  its  designs  and  equipment  from  international  and 
domestic suppliers (Figure 1.2 shows some elements of the supply chain). The 
Platform System Design and some elements of  the Combat System are being 
produced  in  Europe  and  in  the United  States  of America  (US)  respectively. 
Software  development  is  also  occurring  at  those  locations  and  in Australia. 
Block construction is occurring in three Australian states and at Ferrol in Spain, 
with  block  consolidation,  systems  integration,  and  test  and  evaluation 
occurring in South Australia. 
1.7 While  the  three  DDGs  will  be  completed  and  commissioned 
sequentially,  significant  construction  work,  such  as  block  building  and 
consolidation, as well as the integration of platform‐system and combat‐system 
elements,  are  occurring  in  parallel.  This  places  a  premium  on  the  effective 
sequencing  and  coordination  of  activity  and  the  maintenance  of  effective 
relationships between the parties, in the context of a highly distributed project 
model.  An  alliance  contract  model,  discussed  below,  has  been  adopted  to 
address such issues and attendant risks. 
                                                     
70  The terms F-104 and F-105 refer to the Spanish F-104 Méndez Núñez-class FFG and the F-105 
Cristóbal Colón-class FFG respectively. The Hobart-class DDG design contains changes to the F-104 
design (including specified F-105 modifications) that address: obsolescence, Australian legislative 
compliance, integration of Australian selected elements into the Combat System, agreed 
improvements in capability and the mitigation of technical risk. Navantia S.A. is a shipbuilding firm 
owned by the Spanish Government through its industrial holding company, Sociedad Estatal de 
Participaciones Industriales (SEPI), which controls all company stock owned by the Spanish State. 
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70  The terms F-104 and F-105 refer to the Spanish F-104 Méndez Núñez-class FFG and the F-105 
Cristóbal Colón-class FFG respectively. The Hobart-class DDG design contains changes to the F-104 
design (including specified F-105 modifications) that address: obsolescence, Australian legislative 
compliance, integration of Australian selected elements into the Combat System, agreed 
improvements in capability and the mitigation of technical risk. Navantia S.A. is a shipbuilding firm 
owned by the Spanish Government through its industrial holding company, Sociedad Estatal de 
Participaciones Industriales (SEPI), which controls all company stock owned by the Spanish State. 
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Figure 1.2: Elements of the Hobart-class DDG supply chain 
 
Source: AWD Program Management Office. 
Shipbuilding alliance 
1.8 In October 2007, the Australian Government announced the signing of 
two  contracts  for  the  design,  construction  and  delivery  of  the  DDGs.71  A 
contract  for  the  Platform  System  Design  was  awarded  to  Navantia  (where 
appropriate  referred  to  in  this  report  as  the  Platform  System  Designer).  A 
second contract,  for  the  construction of  the  ships, and  involving a  three‐way 
Alliance  Based  Target  Incentive  Agreement  (ABTIA),  was  awarded  to  ASC 
AWD  Shipbuilder Pty Ltd  and Raytheon Australia Pty Ltd  (Raytheon). This 
report refers to the ABTIA as the Alliance contract. 
1.9 The  Alliance  contract  binds  three  diverse  organisations:  the 
Commonwealth’s Department of Defence, represented by the Defence Materiel 
Organisation  (DMO),  as  the  owner‐participant72;  and  two  non‐owner 
participants,  namely  ASC  AWD  Shipbuilder  Pty  Ltd,  the  subsidiary  of  a 
(Commonwealth)  Government  Business  Enterprise  (GBE)  and  Raytheon,  a 
                                                     
71  The Hon. Dr Brendan Nelson MP, Minister for Defence, Air Warfare Destroyers—The Foundations 
Laid, media release, 4 October 2007. 
72  Various contracts and documents referred to in this audit report name the Commonwealth as the 
contracting entity. In order to identify the responsible part of the Commonwealth, the ANAO has 
referred to the DMO as the contracting entity, rather than to the Commonwealth. 
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public  company.  Under  the  Alliance  contract,  ASC  is  the  Shipbuilder,  and 





1.10 The  three  Alliance  participants  are  aligned  in  a  managerial  and 
financial sense by the need to deliver the three DDGs within cost and schedule 
parameters, and to meet capability specifications, under the Alliance contract. 




both  the Alliance contract and  the Platform System Design contract  (between 
Navantia and  the DMO)  contain obligations  for all parties  to  carry out  their 
respective roles in a spirit of collaboration and cooperation. 
1.12 The  three  Alliance  participants  are  responsible,  under  the  Alliance 
contract,  for  the  outcomes  of  all  work  conducted  to  meet  the  contract 
requirements. The successful delivery of contract requirements depends on the 
work of  the Alliance  Industry Participants  (ASC and Raytheon), Defence, all 
related  subcontractors, Navantia, and  the US Navy and  its  subcontractors  in 
delivering  the  core  Aegis  Weapon  System.  One  exception  to  these 
accountability  arrangements  is  that  Defence  warrants  the  performance  and 
fitness  for  purpose  of  all  mandated  Government  Furnished  Material  and 
mandated  equipment  solutions,  including  the  Aegis  Weapon  System. 
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public  company.  Under  the  Alliance  contract,  ASC  is  the  Shipbuilder,  and 





1.10 The  three  Alliance  participants  are  aligned  in  a  managerial  and 
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Figure 1.3: AWD Alliance key contractual and governance relationships 
 
Source: Defence Materiel Organisation. 
Notes: FMS—Foreign Military Sale (US). 




Program.  In  its  role of project  customer,  the DMO  seeks  a  compliant design 
and the on‐time delivery of the DDGs and their Support System. This includes 
bringing to the Alliance an understanding of Defence’s requirements through 
its  reach  into  the Australian Defence Organisation,  and granting Provisional 
Acceptance of products delivered through the Alliance contract.73 
                                                     
73  Within the Alliance contract context, Provisional Acceptance of a DDG is achieved by the DMO issuing 
a Certificate of Provisional Acceptance if the DDG, as delivered, complies with the requirements of the 
Alliance contract, subject only to Minor Defects. At this point, responsibility for the management and 
maintenance of the DDG transitions from the Alliance to the DMO. AWD Alliance, Phase 3 Project 
Management Plan, 18 January 2008, pp. 21, A-8. 
 Within Navy’s Technical Regulations context, the DDG must then transition from the DMO to the RAN. 
This occurs through two milestones: at Initial Materiel Release (IMR), the DMO advises the RAN that 
the acquisition requirements have been met and the capability is ready to be transitioned to the in-
service phase, and at Initial Operational Release (IOR), the Chief of Navy accepts all technical and 
operational risks, on the advice and recommendation of the Fleet Commander, being satisfied that the 
operational and materiel state of the equipment, including deficiencies, training and supportability 
elements, are such that it is safe to proceed into Operational Test and Evaluation. 
Footnote continued on the next page… 
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1.15 The DMO  is also  the supplier  to  the Alliance  Industry Participants of 
the DDGs’ Platform System Design, and the Aegis Weapon System and other 
systems  and  subsystems,  including  elements  of  the DDGs’  Support  System. 
Further,  the DMO manages  the  interactions between  the Alliance contractors 
and  foreign governments; and engages  the RAN’s certification agency, which 
is  to provide  the Chief of Navy with  assessments  concerning  the  safety  and 
suitability  for service of  the DDGs when  they are offered by  the DMO  to  the 
RAN for Acceptance into Naval Service. 
1.16 ASC, as the Shipbuilder, is responsible for building the DDGs, and for 
the  distributed‐build  arrangements  involving  DDG  block  (section) 
construction,  which  has  been  subcontracted  to  three  firms:  Forgacs 
Engineering  Pty  Ltd  (Forgacs);  BAE  Systems  Australia  (BAE  Systems);  and 
Navantia. 
1.17 Raytheon, as  the Combat System–Systems Engineer,  is responsible  for 










 At Initial Operational Release, management and security oversight of the equipment is transferred 
from the DMO’s Chief Executive Officer to the Chief of Navy and to the operational authority of the 
Navy’s Fleet Commander. Royal Australian Navy, ABR 6205, Naval Operational Test and Evaluation 
Manual (NOTEMAN), Edition 4, 2011, Chapter 5. 
74  The air warfare component of the DDGs’ combat system is based on the Aegis Weapon System 
Version 7.1, which includes the AN/SPY-1D(V) phased array radar and the SM-2 missile system. The 
underwater warfare component is based on the Ultra sonar system and the surface-launched MU-90 
lightweight torpedo system, and the surface and air-launched Mk54 torpedo system. 
75  The US Department of Defense’s Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program allows foreign governments to 
purchase defence articles, services, and training, as well as design and construction services, from the 
US Government. This program is operated on a ‘no profit/no loss’ basis by the US Government, and 
requires an authorised representative to submit a Letter of Request (LOR) to the US Government for 
desired defence articles and services. Acquisition by FMS purchasers will be in accordance with US 
Department of Defense regulations and procedures. This affords the foreign purchaser the same 
benefits and protection that apply to US Department of Defense procurement, and is one of the 
principal reasons why foreign governments and international organisations prefer to procure through 
FMS channels. FMS requirements may be consolidated with US Government requirements or placed 
on separate contract, whichever is more expedient and cost effective. 
76  For discussion of the Australian Tactical Interface, see paragraphs 6.69 to 6.70. 
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testing  involving  elements  of  the Aegis Weapon  System  and  the Australian 
Tactical Interface. 
1.18 Although  the  Platform  System  Design  contract  is  between  the  DMO 
and Navantia, the AWD Alliance Industry Participants manage the contract on 
a  day‐to‐day  basis.  The  Industry  Participants  have  appointed  a  Platform 
System Design Director  following  the approval of  the AWD Alliance Project 
Board.  Under  a  delegation  from  the  DMO’s  AWD  Program  Manager,  the 
Platform System Design Director carries out the general supervision, direction 
and  management  of  the  Platform  System  Designer  under  the  contract,  and 




AWD Program progress and expenditure 
1.19 Successive  Australian  governments  have  accepted  that  building  the 
DDGs  in  Australia  would  involve  a  premium  over  and  above  the  cost  of 
building  them overseas. The decision  to build  locally  is based on a desire  to 
retain  shipbuilding  jobs and  facilities, project management and design  skills, 
and  experience  with  sophisticated  naval  combat  systems,  so  as  to  enable 
through‐life  support  of  the  DDGs  in  Australia  and  a  continuing  naval 
shipbuilding  industry.  In  the  June  2007  Second  Pass  submission  to 
government, the Treasury noted that the premium associated with building the 
DDGs  in  Australia  was  around  $1 billion,  representing  an  effective  rate  of 
assistance of over 30 per cent for naval shipbuilding. 
1.20 At  the  time  of  Government  Second  Pass  approval  in  200779,  the 
expectation was  that  the  three DDGs would be delivered  in December 2014, 
March  2016  and  June  2017  respectively.  However,  by  May  2011  the  AWD 
Program  was  reporting  that  difficulties  with  initial  block  production  and 
shipyard  capacity80 had  affected  the  schedule  to  the  extent  that,  if no  action 
                                                     
77  Air Warfare Destroyer Program Manager, Defence Materiel Organisation, Commonwealth 
Representative Delegations to PSD Director, 24 February 2010. 
78  Commonwealth of Australia, ASC AWD Shipbuilder, Raytheon Australia, Air Warfare Destroyer 
(SEA 4000) Alliance Based Target Incentive Agreement, General Conditions of Contract, clause 
65.2.3. For further detail, see paragraphs 3.71 to 3.82. 
79  The First and Second Pass approval process is discussed at paragraphs 2.2 and 2.3. 
80  See the chronology in Table 1.2, and Chapter 6. 
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subsequent  ships.  Action  taken  by  the  AWD  Alliance  included  a  one‐year 
delay  in  the  overall  schedule,  as  well  as  reallocation  of  blocks  between 
shipyards,  with  the  intention  of  reducing  the  overall  delay  by  up  to  12 
months.81 
1.21 In  September  2012,  the Government  announced  a plan  to  extend  the 
AWD Program so that the delivery of the first ship was delayed by 15 months, 
and  the  interval between  the delivery of  the  ships was  increased  from 15  to 
18 months. At the time of the audit, the revised delivery schedule was: March 
2016  (HMAS  Hobart),  September  2017  (HMAS  Brisbane)  and  March  2019 
(HMAS  Sydney).82  The  three  DDGs  will  progress  through  sea  trials  and 
increasing  levels  of  Operational  Capability  in  order  to  achieve  Final 




Table 1.1: Rescheduling of ship delivery dates, 2007–12 






October 2007 December 2014 March 2016 June 2017 
May 2011 Expected two-year delay reduced ‘by up to 12 months’ through reallocation of blocks. 
September 2012 March 2016 September 2017 March 2019 
Source: Ministerial media releases; Alliance contract. 
Note: The May 2011 reschedule was not incorporated into the Alliance contract. 
                                                     
81  The Hon Stephen Smith MP, Minister for Defence, Changes to Air Warfare Destroyer construction 
program, media release, Canberra, 26 May 2011; ANAO Report No.20, 2011–12, 2010–2011 Major 
Projects Report, p. 190. 
82  The Hon. Stephen Smith MP, Minister for Defence, Air Warfare Destroyer update, media release, 
6 September 2012. 
83  ADF capability is formed by combining eight Fundamental Inputs to Capability, categorised and 
broadly defined in Table 1.3. The March 2020 date to achieve Final Operational Capability, reported in 
the 2012–13 Major Projects Report, represents a four-month delay over that reported a year earlier. 
ANAO Report No.12, 2013–14, 2012–13 Major Projects Report, p. 154; ANAO Report No.15, 2012–
13, 2011–12 Major Projects Report, p. 195. 
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decline  in naval  shipbuilding before  the next projects  commence, and 
hence  foster  a  sustainable  naval  shipbuilding  industry  in Australia85; 
and 
(d) an extension of  the  time  interval between  the delivery of  the Landing 





84  In January 2014, Forgacs informed the ANAO that ‘AWD and ASC program rescheduling of ship 
delivery dates has not manifested itself in a full reduction or relief in Forgacs schedule delivery dates. 
On the contrary, as the costs of delivering the capability increased, Forgacs has been required to 
direct its efforts to truncate the schedule and thus reduce project overhead. This had exactly the 
opposite effect intended by the rescheduling initiative of the AWD Alliance. Additionally, as schedule 
pressures increased, the resource histogram also increased; to meet the demand, marginally skilled 
labour was recruited and quality reduced accordingly, resulting in a demand for yet more labour. Once 
completed the consequent rapid reduction of the workforce as a result of the compressed schedule will 
also contradict the aim of the AWD reschedule to provide resource levelling’. 
85  For some time, there has been public discussion of a so-called ‘valley of death’ between existing and 
future projects for the Australian naval shipbuilding industry. For example, the Australian Financial 
Review has described ‘an expected gap of two years that threatens job losses after the end of the 
current air warfare destroyer [AWD] and troop transport projects [LHD] being completed’. John Kerin, 
‘Coalition to tackle China on cyber theft’, Australian Financial Review, 30 August 2013, p. 9. For a 
different perspective, see also ‘Fourth AWD would be strategic folly: ASPI’, AAP General News Wire, 
19 October 2013. 
86  Defence, ministerial submission, Air Warfare Destroyer Program Rebaseline, 31 August 2012.  
 At the time of the audit, the two Canberra Class LHDs (Landing Helicopter Dock), to be known as 
HMAS Canberra and HMAS Adelaide, were undergoing construction under JP 2048 Phase 4A/B, and 
were scheduled to achieve Initial Operational Capability in December 2014 and November 2016 
respectively. 
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Table 1.2: Chronology of key program events 
Date Event 
December 2000 Defence White Paper announces decision to acquire ‘at least three air-
defence capable ships’, and states that the ‘Government’s strong 
preference is to build these ships in Australia, which will provide significant 
work for Australia’s shipbuilding industry.’ 
October 2001 The RAN retires the last of its three Perth-class DDGs. 
May 2002 AWD Program, SEA 4000, officially commences, Phase 1–Preliminary 
Design and Build Strategy. 
May 2004 Government announces that the DDGs will be built by an alliance. 
August 2004 Government selects the Aegis Weapon System. 
October 2004 Government states that the DDGs will be built in Australia by an Australian 
company. 
April 2005 Raytheon selected as Combat System–Systems Engineer. 
May 2005 First Pass approval. 
ASC AWD Shipbuilder Pty Ltd selected as Shipbuilder. 
Commencement of Phase 2–Design. 
August 2005 Government selects Gibbs & Cox as ‘preferred designer’, to further develop 
its ‘Evolved Design’. Navantia to remain in the design competition with its 
‘Existing Design’. 
December 2005 AWD Alliance Principals Council established. 
June 2007 Second Pass approval. 
Commencement of Phase 3–Build. 
The AWD design approved at Second Pass was an Australianised Combat 
System integrated into Navantia’s F-104 platform system, with certain 
modifications to meet Australian capability requirements. 
4 October 2007 AWD Alliance contract and Platform System Design contract signed for the 
build phase. 
5 October 2007 Effective Date (commencement) of the Alliance contract. 
December 2009 DDG block construction commences at ASC and at the ASC subcontractor, 
BAE Systems. 
March 2010 DDG block construction commences at the ASC subcontractor, Forgacs. 
May 2010 Standard quality assurance procedures detect defects in Ship 1’s (HMAS 
Hobart’s) Block 107, constructed at BAE Systems. These defects are well 
outside the normal range of defects and require specialist skills to correct. 
August 2010 BAE Systems informs ASC of a likely delay due to block construction 
issues. 
November 2010 Block reallocation process begins in response to construction difficulties at 
BAE Systems. 
December 2010 New AWD Systems Centre opens at Techport Australia, Osborne, South 
Australia. 
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May 2011 Announcement of two-year production delay, and steps taken to reduce the 
delay by up to 12 months. 
June 2011 Navantia is allocated construction responsibility for Ship 2 (HMAS Brisbane) 
keel blocks, with Navantia, BAE Systems and Forgacs invited to compete 
for Ship 3 (HMAS Sydney) keel blocks. 
July 2012 Ship 3 construction commences. 
September 2012 Keel is laid for HMAS Hobart, beginning the block consolidation phase. 
Announcement of an AWD Program schedule rebaseline. 
January 2013 BAE Systems delivers its final set of blocks for Ship 2 under its original 
subcontract. 
May 2013 Four blocks are reallocated from Forgacs to BAE Systems. 
Project Board discusses block building difficulties at Forgacs and potential 
for further block reallocations. 
June 2013 Last blocks for HMAS Hobart are delivered from Newcastle to Adelaide. 
December 2013 Hull integration of HMAS Hobart due to be completed under September 
2012 reschedule. 
Three blocks are reallocated from Forgacs to BAE Systems. 
February 2014 Hull integration of HMAS Hobart forecast to be completed. 
Keel laid for HMAS Brisbane. 
Source: ANAO analysis of Defence and DMO documentation. 
1.25 In  2001,  the  SEA  4000  entry  in  the Defence  Capability  Plan  2001–2010 
contained an initial cost estimate of $3.5 to $4.5 billion.87 By June 2007, the cost 
analysis for design and acquisition of SEA 4000 was complete, and the cost of 
the  overall  three‐ship  AWD  Program,  based  on  the  Existing  Design,  was 
$7.207 billion,  with  the  first  ship  to  be  delivered  no  later  than  2014.  As  at 
December  2013,  the  estimated  cost  of  all  phases  of  the  entire  three‐ship 
program was $8.455 billion.88 At  the same  time, Defence’s expenditure on  the 
AWD  Program  totalled  $5.370  billion.  Expenditure  on  the  build  phase 
(Phase 3)  totalled $4.920 billion, of which $3.325 billion had been paid  to  the 
AWD  Alliance  Industry  Participants,  through  the  Alliance  contract,  and 
$0.390 billion had been paid to Navantia. 
                                                     
87  Department of Defence, Defence Capability Plan 2001–2010. Public Version, Canberra, 2001, p. 264. 
88  See Table 2.1 for details. The estimates over time are based on different price indices. 
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The inputs to Australian Defence Force capability 
1.26 Australian  Defence  Force  (ADF)  capability  is  formed  by  combining 
eight  ‘Fundamental  Inputs  to  Capability’  (FIC),  categorised  and  broadly 
defined in Table 1.3. 
Table 1.3: The Fundamental Inputs to Capability (FIC) 
Input Key Provider 
1. Personnel. All people within Defence, both military (permanent 
and Reserves) and civilian. The input incorporates recruiting, 
individual training and all conditions of service and employment, 
including entitlements, salaries and wages, superannuation and 
allowances. 
Capability Manager 
2. Organisation. Flexible functional groupings with an appropriate 
balance of competency, structure and command and control to 
accomplish their tasks. This input also includes critical organisations 
that directly support the ADF effort. 
Capability Manager 
3. Collective training. A defined training regime undertaken by 
organisations, which is validated against the preparedness 
requirements for operations, derived from government guidance. The 
regime is to include frequency and depth of competency in skills, with 
a particular emphasis on long-term readiness critical warfighting 
skills. 
Capability Manager 
and Chief Joint 
Operations 
Command 
4. Major Systems. Systems that have a unit cost of $1 million or 
more or have significant Defence policy or joint service implications, 
which are designed to enhance Defence’s ability to engage military 
power. Input includes, but is not limited to, ships, tanks, missile 
systems, armoured personnel carriers, major surveillance or 
electronic systems and aircraft. 
DMO 
5. Supplies. Supplies needed for Defence to operate, including stock 
holdings, provisioning lead times, serviceability and configuration 
status. 
DMO 
6. Facilities and training areas. Buildings, structures, property, 
plant, equipment, training areas, civil engineering works, through-life 
maintenance and utilities necessary to support capabilities, both at 
the home base and at a deployed location. Input may involve direct 
ownership or leasing. 
DMO for equipment 
and systems, 
Defence Support 
Group for facilities 
7. Support. Infrastructure and services from the wider national 
support base in Australia or offshore, which are integral to the 
maintenance of Defence effort. This input encompasses and 
originates from civil/private industry/contractors, other government 
agencies and international support base agencies. 
Suppliers to DMO for 
Mission and Support 
Systems 
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that directly support the ADF effort. 
Capability Manager 
3. Collective training. A defined training regime undertaken by 
organisations, which is validated against the preparedness 
requirements for operations, derived from government guidance. The 
regime is to include frequency and depth of competency in skills, with 
a particular emphasis on long-term readiness critical warfighting 
skills. 
Capability Manager 
and Chief Joint 
Operations 
Command 
4. Major Systems. Systems that have a unit cost of $1 million or 
more or have significant Defence policy or joint service implications, 
which are designed to enhance Defence’s ability to engage military 
power. Input includes, but is not limited to, ships, tanks, missile 
systems, armoured personnel carriers, major surveillance or 
electronic systems and aircraft. 
DMO 
5. Supplies. Supplies needed for Defence to operate, including stock 
holdings, provisioning lead times, serviceability and configuration 
status. 
DMO 
6. Facilities and training areas. Buildings, structures, property, 
plant, equipment, training areas, civil engineering works, through-life 
maintenance and utilities necessary to support capabilities, both at 
the home base and at a deployed location. Input may involve direct 
ownership or leasing. 
DMO for equipment 
and systems, 
Defence Support 
Group for facilities 
7. Support. Infrastructure and services from the wider national 
support base in Australia or offshore, which are integral to the 
maintenance of Defence effort. This input encompasses and 
originates from civil/private industry/contractors, other government 
agencies and international support base agencies. 
Suppliers to DMO for 




ANAO Audit Report No.22 2013–14 
Air Warfare Destroyer Program 
 
75 
Input Key Provider 
8. Command and Management. Written guidance such as 
regulations, instructions, publications, directions, doctrine, tactical 
level procedures and preparedness documents required for Defence 
to support decision-making, administration and operations. Input also 
includes funding not readily attributable to any other FIC elements, 
(e.g. discretionary funding). 
Capability Manager, 




for system acquisition 
and logistics 
management 
Source: ANAO, adapted from Defence Materiel Organisation, DMO Acquisition and Sustainment Manual, 
2007, pp. 74–5. 






1.28 Defence’s Capability Manager  for  the AWD  Program  is  the Chief  of 
Navy,  who  is  responsible  for  overseeing  and  coordinating  all  elements 
necessary to achieve the DDGs’ full level of operational capability by the date 
agreed  to  by  government.  The  RAN  has  established  an  AWD  Capability 
Implementation Team (AWD CIT) to assist the Chief of Navy in that role. 
1.29 Contractual delivery of  the  first DDG by  the  Industry Participants  to 
the  Program  Management  Office  and,  subsequently,  from  the  Program 
Management  Office  to  the  RAN  is  identified  as  Initial  Materiel  Release,  or 
Provisional  Acceptance  in  Alliance  contract  terms.  The  Chief  of  Navy  is 
responsible for the achievement of Initial Operational Capability. 
1.30 Initial  Operational  Capability  is  the  point  in  time  at  which  the  first 
subset of a  capability  system  that  can be operationally employed  is  realised. 
Initial  Operational  Capability  will  be  achieved  when  the  first  Hobart‐class 
DDG has  successfully  completed a Unit Ready Work Up, prior  to deploying 
for Combat  System  Ship Qualification  Trials  (see  paragraph  2.34)  and  SM‐2 
and ESSM missile firings. 
1.31 The DMO  is  responsible  for delivering  the major systems  (the DDGs) 
and also the supplies and facilities needed to sustain the DDGs’ capabilities, as 
defined  in  the  SEA  4000  Phase  3  Materiel  Acquisition  Agreement  and  the 
Materiel  Sustainment  Agreement  between  the  DMO  and  Defence.  These 
agreements  set  out,  in  broadly  defined  terms,  the  materiel  acquisition  and 
sustainment services that the DMO is to deliver to the Chief of Navy. The SEA 
  
ANAO Audit Report No.22 2013–14 





Audit objective and scope 
1.32 The objective of the audit was to report on the progress of the current 
phase of the AWD Program, which is known as SEA 4000 Phase 3–Build. This 
phase  commenced  in  June  2007,  and  covers  the  finalisation  of  the  detailed 
design, the signing of the Alliance and Platform System Design contracts, and 
the construction and delivery of  the ships by  the  Industry Participants  to  the 
DMO.89 
1.33 The audit  focused primarily on Defence’s administration of  the AWD 
Program. It examined Defence’s progress thus far in establishing and working 
through  the management  structures and processes used  to deliver  the DDGs 












1.35 Phase 2 of  the AWD Program,  the design phase, ended  in  June 2007. 
Phase  2  is  addressed  in  this  report  in  terms  of  its  role  in  reducing  risks  in 
Phase 3. Phases 3.2 and 4, which are to acquire the DDGs’ guided missiles, are 
discussed only briefly in Chapter 2. 
1.36 The  ANAO  did  not  intend,  nor  was  it  in  a  position,  to  conduct  a 
detailed  analysis of  the  full  range of  engineering or  contracting  issues being 
managed within the AWD Program, or to resolve issues between the Alliance 
                                                     
89  AWD Alliance, Engineering Management Plan, Issue 6, May 2012, p. 2. 
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89  AWD Alliance, Engineering Management Plan, Issue 6, May 2012, p. 2. 
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set  out  some  of  the  views  of  the  Alliance  Industry  Participants  and  the 
Platform System Designer so as  to provide a more complete picture of  issues 
affecting the AWD Program. 
1.37 The  high‐level  criteria  used  in  the  audit  to  assess  Defence’s 
administration were as follows: 
 contract management processes should be  in accordance with  internal 
Defence procedures and contractual provisions; 
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Structure of this Audit Report 
1.39 The remainder of this Audit Report is arranged as follows: 
Table 1.4:  Structure of the Audit Report 
Chapter Overview 
2. The AWD Program Examines the acquisition strategies, program phases, 
governance and management structures, and processes for 
the design, development and construction of the DDGs. 
3. The AWD Alliance and the 
Design Contract 
Examines the development and operation of the AWD 
Program’s alliance arrangements, and the extent to which 
they effectively support the resolution of AWD acquisition 
issues. Also examines the alignment of the Platform 
System Design contract with the Alliance contract. 
4. Engineering, Regulation, and 
Test and Evaluation 
Examines the AWD build phase from the perspectives of 
definition of systems engineering requirements, technical 
regulation, and test and evaluation. 
5. Design Progress Examines the Hobart-class DDG design, design and 
construction risk reduction, and the incorporation of design 
changes into the Hobart-class. 
6. Build Progress Examines the progress achieved in building the DDGs, and 
the impact of design change. Also considers the build 
program’s overall cost and schedule performance. 
7. Support System and 
Transition from Guided 
Missile Frigates 
Examines Defence’s development of the Support System 
arrangements required to ensure that the Hobart-class 
DDGs remain operational once they have been placed into 
service. Also examines Defence’s management of the 
transition from the Guided Missile Frigates (FFGs) to the 
DDGs, and the associated risks. 
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2. Development of the AWD Program 




2.1 The  Defence  White  Paper  2000  outlined  the  then  Government’s 
decision  to  acquire  ‘at  least  three  air‐defence  capable  ships’, which were  to 
replace the RAN’s FFGs from 2013.90 The 2001 Defence Capability Plan (DCP) 
described SEA 4000 as a multi‐stage project costing from $3.5 to $4.5 billion.91 
2.2 Since  the  2003  Defence  Procurement  Review92,  Defence  has  been 
required  to  gain  approval  to  acquire  major  capital  equipment  through  a 
strengthened  two‐pass  approval  process.  The  First  Pass  process  provides 
government  with  an  opportunity  to  narrow  the  alternative  solutions  being 
examined  by  Defence  to  meet  an  agreed  defence  capability  gap.  The 
government  may  then  approve  the  allocation  of  funds  from  Defence’s 
government‐endorsed Capital Investment Program to allow Defence to analyse 
the options in more detail, with respect to costs, schedule and technical risks. 
2.3 The  Second  Pass  process  is  the  final  milestone  in  the  approval  of  a 
major  capital  equipment  program’s  requirements  and  acquisition  phase. 
Defence’s Second Pass submission  to government  is to provide more detailed 





risks,  the  program  is  now  divided  into  six  phases:  Phase  1—Preliminary 
Design and Build Strategy; Phase 2—Design; Phase 3—Build; Phase 3.2—SM‐2 
                                                     
90  Department of Defence, Defence 2000: our future defence force, Defence White Paper, Canberra, 
2000, p. 90. In 2003, the number of ships to be acquired was confirmed as three. Senator the Hon. 
Robert Hill, Minister for Defence, Defence Capability Review, media release, Canberra, 7 November 
2003. 
91  Department of Defence, Defence Capability Plan 2001–2010. Public Version, Canberra, 2001, p. 263. 
92  Department of Defence, Defence Procurement Review 2003 (Kinnaird Review), August 2003, pp. iv, v, 
11. 
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Missile Upgrade;  Phase  3.3—DDG Test  and Evaluation  (not  approved);  and 
Phase 4—Cruise Missile Acquisition  (not approved).93 The  initial phases have 
allowed alternative solutions  to be examined  in successively greater detail  in 
terms  of DDG  platform  and  combat  system  selection,  contracting  strategies, 
and the program’s implications for Australia’s shipbuilding industry. 
2.5 Figure 2.1  shows  the DMO’s approved 2002  strategy and  timeline  for 
the DDGs’ acquisition. 
Figure 2.1: SEA 4000 acquisition strategy and timeline, as at July 2002 
 
Source: Defence Materiel Organisation, SEA 4000 Air Warfare Destroyer: Acquisition and Contracting 
Strategy, 4 July 2002. 
Notes: AINS—Acceptance into Naval Service  OCD—Operational Concept Document  
FPS—Function and Performance Specification Req—Requirements 
2.6 Defence  informed  the ANAO  that  the  total  expenditure  on  Phases  1 
and 2  was  $262.501  million.  This  constitutes  3.1  per  cent  of  the  current 
                                                     
93  SEA 4000 Phase 4, the acquisition of a maritime-based land-attack cruise missile for the DDGs, is 
scheduled for the period 2016 to 2025. The previous SEA 4000 Phase 5, which was a joint 
Australia/US research and development program into advanced Phased Array Technology for the 
Anzac frigates, was renamed in 2011 as SEA 1448 Phase 3 (approved). These two projects are 
beyond the scope of this audit. As noted in paragraph 1.32, this audit focuses principally on SEA 4000 
Phase 3–Build. 
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At  the  time  of  the  audit,  Phase  3  was  underway  and  its  expenditure  had 
reached $4.920 billion. 




SEA 4000 Phase 1–Preliminary Design and Build 
Strategy, 2000–05 
2.8 The  AWD  Program’s  preliminary  design  phase,  known  as  SEA 4000 
Phase 1, commenced in 2002, and involved the selection of the DDGs’ combat 
system and the major contractors for the project. 
2.9 In  July  2002,  the  Defence  Capability  and  Investment  Committee 
approved the AWD Program’s Acquisition and Contracting Strategy, which at 
the time had four options: separate contracts for design and construction; direct 
foreign  purchase;  combined  design‐and‐build;  and  an  international  joint 
project.95 The first option was selected because Defence was confident that the 







2.10 These  factors  were  considered  as  part  of  the  draft  August  2002 
Australian Naval Shipbuilding and Repair Sector Strategic Plan, which recognised 
a need  to  establish  and  sustain naval  ship  repair, upgrade  and  construction 
skills, as required in‐country, to meet the RAN’s current and future capability 
                                                     
94  The first two phases of SEA 4000 (Phases 1 and 2) ended in May 2005 and June 2007 respectively, 
and are generally not within the scope of this audit. However, they are outlined in this chapter and in 
Chapter 3, in terms of their role in Defence gaining government approval to acquire the DDGs, and 
their role in reducing the program’s risks. 
95  Defence Materiel Organisation, SEA 4000 Air Warfare Destroyer: Acquisition and Contracting 
Strategy, version 1.5, 4 July 2002, Annex A. 
96  Defence Materiel Organisation, SEA 4000 Air Warfare Destroyer: Acquisition and Contracting 
Strategy, version 1.5, 4 July 2002, Annex A. 
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In  April  2005,  Raytheon  was  selected  as  the  Combat  System–Systems 
Engineer.98 
2.12 The process of selecting a Shipbuilder took place during late 2004–early 
2005.  In  October  2004,  five  days  before  the  2004  federal  election,  the  then 
Government  announced  that  the  DDGs  would  be  built  in  Australia  by  an 
Australian company, and stated the criteria, chiefly pertaining to performance 
and  cost,  by  which  the  company  would  be  selected.99  This  decision  set  the 
ground  rules  for  the  Shipbuilder  tender  process,  which  took  place  from 
October  to  December  2004.  Three  responses  to  the  Shipbuilder  tender were 
received, and two of these underwent extensive analysis and  interaction with 
the  respondents.  While  both  responses  were  considered  to  provide  a 
satisfactory  basis  for  selection  as  the  AWD  Shipbuilder,  Defence  assessed 
ASC’s response as having demonstrable and significant advantages in all three 
key  areas  of  technical,  commercial  and  financial  evaluation. At First Pass  in 
May 2005,  the  then Government selected ASC AWD Shipbuilder Pty Ltd, an 
Australian  shipbuilder,  to  build  the  ships  to  the  design  that  was  to  be 
                                                     
97  Defence Materiel Organisation, Australian Naval Shipbuilding and Repair Sector Strategic Plan (draft), 
Canberra, September 2002, pp. 22, 32; Defence Materiel Organisation, SEA 4000 Air Warfare 
Destroyer: Acquisition and Contracting Strategy, version 1.5, 4 July 2002, p. 1. While released for 
public comment, the plan was ultimately not approved by the then Government. 
 In May 2013, the then Government released a new shipbuilding strategy, the Future Submarine 
Industry Skills Plan: A Plan for the Naval Shipbuilding Industry, and announced its intention to 
implement it, in order to address key issues in the long-term management of this industry. The 
Government stated its goal of assuring ‘Australia’s maritime security capability while providing more 
certainty to Australian industry through consideration of a smoother, coordinated shipbuilding program 
that will provide a more stable pattern of work for the industry and retain critical skills for the future 
through a range of specific measures’. Prime Minister, Minister for Defence, Minister for Climate 
Change, Industry and Innovation and Minister for Defence Materiel, 2013 Defence White Paper, Naval 
Shipbuilding, Release of the Future Submarine Industry Skills Plan, joint media release, 3 May 2013. 
98  The Aegis Weapon System is an advanced air defence system in service with the US Navy, which 
offers improved precision and shorter reaction times than those that have been previously deployed on 
Australian vessels. Raytheon is responsible for integrating Aegis and the other combat system 
equipment. For a fuller description of the Aegis Weapon System, see the section beginning at 
paragraph 6.66. 
99  Senator the Hon. Robert Hill, Minister for Defence, Australian ship builders to build air warfare 
destroyers, media release, Canberra, 4 October 2004; and Doorstop interview—AWDs to be built in 
Australia, 4 October 2004. 
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designs  being  developed  by  Blohm+Voss  of  Germany,  Gibbs  &  Cox  of  the 
United States, and Navantia. 




(b) to  markedly  improve  the  overall  capability  of  the  RAN’s  surface 
combatant force; 
(c) to build  the ships  in Australia,  thereby providing significant work  for 
Australia’s shipbuilding industry; and 
(d) to  establish  and  sustain  a  design  capability  in  Australia  that  could 
support  the evolution of  the ships  in service  in a responsive and cost‐
effective manner.102 
2.15 The then Government’s First Pass approval reduced to two the number 
of  alternative  solutions  to  be  examined  by Defence  in  Phase  2:  the  Existing 
Design offered by Navantia, and the Evolved Design offered by Gibbs & Cox. 
                                                     
100  ASC Pty Ltd is a wholly Commonwealth-owned and controlled Government Business Enterprise 
(GBE) subject to the Corporations Act 2001 and the Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 
1997. The Australian Submarine Corporation was originally established in 1985 as a joint venture 
between Swedish ship designer Kockums, Chicago Bridge & Iron (CBI), Wormald, and the 
Commonwealth, through the Australian Industry Development Corporation. In 1987, it was chosen to 
build the Collins Class submarines. During 1990, both CBI and Wormald sold their shares in the 
Australian Submarine Corporation, leaving the Commonwealth and Kockums as the remaining 
shareholders. In 2000 the Australian Government bought out Kockums, taking full ownership of the 
company. The Government announced that its acquisition was the ‘first stage of a reform process that 
is expected to lead to ASC’s onward sale to the private sector.’ 
 At the time the Shipbuilder role was awarded to ASC, therefore, it had been government policy for 
seven years that it would privatise ASC. In March 2004, Defence’s external adviser recommended that 
2006–07 would be a suitable time for privatisation. In February 2009, however, the then Government 
announced that the sale of ASC would not proceed, citing global financial uncertainty as presenting 
risks to a successful sale. 
101  The Hon. De-Anne Kelly MP, Answer to Question in Writing: ‘Sir Laurence Street’, House of 
Representatives Hansard, 12 September 2005, p. 183. 
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97  Defence Materiel Organisation, Australian Naval Shipbuilding and Repair Sector Strategic Plan (draft), 
Canberra, September 2002, pp. 22, 32; Defence Materiel Organisation, SEA 4000 Air Warfare 
Destroyer: Acquisition and Contracting Strategy, version 1.5, 4 July 2002, p. 1. While released for 
public comment, the plan was ultimately not approved by the then Government. 
 In May 2013, the then Government released a new shipbuilding strategy, the Future Submarine 
Industry Skills Plan: A Plan for the Naval Shipbuilding Industry, and announced its intention to 
implement it, in order to address key issues in the long-term management of this industry. The 
Government stated its goal of assuring ‘Australia’s maritime security capability while providing more 
certainty to Australian industry through consideration of a smoother, coordinated shipbuilding program 
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Change, Industry and Innovation and Minister for Defence Materiel, 2013 Defence White Paper, Naval 
Shipbuilding, Release of the Future Submarine Industry Skills Plan, joint media release, 3 May 2013. 
98  The Aegis Weapon System is an advanced air defence system in service with the US Navy, which 
offers improved precision and shorter reaction times than those that have been previously deployed on 
Australian vessels. Raytheon is responsible for integrating Aegis and the other combat system 
equipment. For a fuller description of the Aegis Weapon System, see the section beginning at 
paragraph 6.66. 
99  Senator the Hon. Robert Hill, Minister for Defence, Australian ship builders to build air warfare 
destroyers, media release, Canberra, 4 October 2004; and Doorstop interview—AWDs to be built in 
Australia, 4 October 2004. 
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2.16 At First Pass, Defence advised government  that building  the DDGs  in 
Australia would cost $680 million—or some 33 per cent—more than the cost of 
building them overseas. This premium for an Australian build was justified by 
Defence on  the grounds of  retaining  critical project management and design 
skills, and experience with sophisticated naval combat systems, which would 
enable  through‐life support of  the DDGs  in Australia and a continuing naval 
shipbuilding industry. For the 2007 Second Pass estimate of the premium, see 
paragraph 2.26. 
SEA 4000 Phase 2–Design, 2005–07 
2.17 The objective of Phase 2 was to further analyse the Navantia and Gibbs 
& Cox  ship and Support System designs,  so  that  the Government could  rely 
upon  comprehensive  analysis of operational  capability,  cost  (acquisition  and 
through‐life), schedule and risks when  it considered Second Pass approval of 
SEA 4000’s  build  phase—Phase  3.  During  Phase  2,  Defence  substantively 





Gibbs & Cox were  engaged  by Defence  under  individual  contracts.  In May 
2005, Navantia was engaged as  the Platform System Designer  for  its Existing 
Design, and in August 2005, Gibbs & Cox was engaged as the Platform System 









103  AWD Alliance, Air Warfare Destroyer Test and Evaluation Master Plan, September 2007. 
104  The Existing Design option was for a modified F-100 design from Navantia, while the Evolved Design 
option was to be developed from Gibbs & Cox’s Arleigh Burke-class DDG-51 design. 
105  General Dynamics Bath Iron Works and Raytheon are US-based firms foremost engaged in naval ship 
and submarine design and construction, and integrated defence systems. 
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2.19 In  late 2004, when bidding during Phase 1  for  the role of Shipbuilder, 
ASC advised Defence  that  it was  confident  that  its offsite block  construction 
plan was practical and efficient, and that it had demonstrated a contingency of 
excess capacity and ability  to deliver blocks  in a cost‐efficient manner and  to 
the required quality.106 
2.20 By April 2007, near the end of Phase 2, the DMO was confident that the 
Existing  Design  contained  considerable  design‐for‐production  features,  and 
that  Navantia  had  thoroughly  documented  the  design  and  production  data 
package.  The  DMO’s  confidence  was  reflected  in  a  finding  that  there  was 
acceptable risk  in  the systems  integration strategy and  the architecture of  the 
Australianised  Combat  System,  centred  on  the  Aegis  Weapon  System.  The 
overall  level  of  confidence  led  to  the  belief  that  the  first  DDG  would  be 
delivered in December 2014, and possibly sooner.107 
Program management risk mitigation 
2.21 The business model  selected by  the  then Government  in 2004  for  the 
AWD Program was an alliance. At  the outset of Phase 2,  the Commonwealth 




risks,  by  developing  the  cooperative  relationships  needed  to  effectively 









106  ASC Shipbuilding Proposal, 2004, paragraph 3.1.1.4.3, quoted in DMO, SEA 4000 Program Air 
Warfare Destroyer: Phase 2 Overall Program Report, April 2007, p. 95. 
107  DMO, SEA 4000 Program Air Warfare Destroyer: Phase 2 Overall Program Report, April 2007, pp. 6–
7. 
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(a) they  recognised  the  role of  the governance bodies  established  for  the 
project,  such  as  a  Principals  Council,  a  Project  Board,  Integrated 
Product Teams and Cross Product Teams; but the contracts did not give 
those bodies a direct governance function108; 










the  original  intention  to  include  Navantia  as  part  of  the  alliance  did  not 
eventuate, and this has contributed to difficulties associated with exporting the 
design to Australia.110 
Second Pass submission to Government 
2.25 SEA  4000  Phase  2  ended  in  June  2007  with  the  then  Government’s 
Second Pass approval of the acquisition of three Hobart‐class DDGs based on 
Navantia’s  existing  F‐104  ship  platform  design,  with  specified  F‐105 
modifications,  and  additional  modifications  primarily  to  accommodate  the 
Australianised Combat System, which comprises an upgraded Aegis Weapon 
System  and  additional  Australian  elements  to  meet  specific  capability 
requirements  (this  option  was  referred  to  as  the  Existing  Design).111  The 
                                                     
108  The AWD Program’s Principals Council, Project Board, Integrated Product Teams and Cross Product 
Teams are discussed in paragraphs 3.37 to 3.52. 
109  Broadly speaking, ‘corporate governance’ refers to the processes by which organisations are directed, 
controlled and held to account. It encompasses authority, accountability, stewardship, leadership, 
direction and control exercised in the organisation. ANAO Better Practice Guide—Public Sector 
Governance, Canberra, July 2003, p. 6. 
110  For further discussion, see paragraphs 3.72 and 3.73. 
111  In 2005, Defence was advised of a risk that the United States’ Aegis production line would begin to 
shut down if further orders were not received, and that reopening the production line would come at 
considerable additional cost. In line with its August 2004 decision to adopt the Aegis Weapon System, 
the Government agreed to commence early acquisition, in order to avoid the considerable cost 
premium associated with reopening the production line. 
Footnote continued on the next page… 
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Footnote continued on the next page… 
Development of the AWD Program 
 
ANAO Audit Report No.22 2013–14 
Air Warfare Destroyer Program 
 
87 
Government  selected  Navantia’s  Existing  Design  over  the  Gibbs  &  Cox 




Premium for building the DDGs in Australia 
2.26 In the June 2007 Second Pass submission  to government, the Treasury 
noted  that  the premium associated with building  the DDGs  in Australia was 
around  $1 billion,  representing  an  effective  rate  of  assistance  of  over 




not  pre‐committing  to  an  Australian  ship  build—would  be  reflected  in  the 
(then)  forthcoming  Industry Self‐Reliance Plan.114 The Department of Finance 
noted  that  the  premium  for  an  Australian  build  was  much  higher  than 
anticipated, and  that almost half  the project by value would  still be  sourced 
from overseas. 
Design risk assessments 
2.27 As  indicated  in  paragraph  2.3,  the  Second  Pass  submission  to 
government was intended to provide detailed and rigorous analysis of options, 
including technical risk. At the time, Defence advised the Government that: 
 the  technical  risk  in  the program was high, but  the platform  risk was 
low,  because  the design  existed  and was  in  service with  the  Spanish 
Navy; 
                                                                                                                                             
 In 2006, Defence entered into a Foreign Military Sales case with the US Government (represented by 
the US Navy) to acquire the Aegis Weapon System. Funding was separated from SEA 4000 Phase 3 
to fund the Aegis acquisition under a new project phase, Phase 3.1. However, to better align the Aegis 
acquisition with the acquisitions of the platform system and residual elements of the combat system, 
Defence notified the Government of its intention to recombine Phase 3.1 with Phase 3 at Second Pass 
approval, in 2007. 
112  The Hon. John Howard MP, Prime Minister, Transcript of the Prime Minister The Hon. John Howard 
MP, Defence Announcement, Russell Offices, Canberra, media release, Canberra, 20 June 2007. 
113  An earlier estimate of $680 million is discussed at paragraph 2.16. 
114  The Government’s March 2007 Defence and Industry Policy Statement had stated that a Defence 
Industry Self-Reliance Plan would be developed that would outline the essential security role of 
industry in equipping, re-supplying and maintaining the ADF, and that priority local industry 
capabilities, identified as necessary for Australia’s essential security, would be detailed in the public 
version of the Defence Capability Plan. No Defence Industry Self-Reliance Plan was produced. 
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 the  schedule  risk  was  low–medium,  because  Navantia  had  proven 
work  packages  prepared  for  the  Existing  Design  option,  and  the 
industry proposal  took a  conservative approach  to  schedule  (Defence 
had high confidence in the Existing Design schedule); and 
 cost  risk was medium, with  the main  sources  of  risk  being  the  non‐
Aegis elements of the combat system, and possible labour costs. 
2.28 Defence  assessed  the  overall  risk  of  adopting  the  Existing Design  as 
medium.115 Defence advised the Government that it had consulted widely with 
industry and assessed  that  industry would be  competitive  for  the work  in a 
number of  locations.116 Defence advised government  that Navantia’s Existing 
Design was mature,  and  that  about  seven per cent  of  the  project  risk  in  the 




two  types  of design  change:  changes permitted by government direction  (at 
First Pass in 2005) to address Australian capability requirements, and changes 
that Navantia  and  the  Spanish Government had  agreed  for  the  latest  of  the 
F‐100  class  (F‐105)117, because of  limitations discovered by  the Spanish Navy 
while operating its F‐100 fleet.118 Together, these two types of design change—
                                                     
115  In its coordination comments on Defence’s advice to Government, Finance pointed out that there was 
a tension between Defence’s assessments of high technical risk, medium cost risk and low schedule 
risk. 
116  The difficulties facing the shipyards participating in the AWD Program are discussed in Chapter 6. 
117  The F-104, Méndez Núñez, was laid down in 2003, launched in 2004, and commissioned in 2006. The 
F-105, Cristóbal Colón, was laid down in June 2007, launched in November 2010, and commissioned 
in October 2012. 
118  In its January 2014 response to an extract from this audit report, ASC stated that ‘While the ABTIA 
and PSD contract define the design baseline as the F-104, it is ASC’s view that the Alliance is being 
delivered a production design derived from the F-105. The F-105 has evolved from the much earlier 
F-104 design and as a result, significant additional design risk has been driven into the AWD program 
due [to] the extensive nature of the design evolution from the F-104 to the F-105. This has manifested 
itself as substantial rework driven by design immaturity issues, which run across many aspects of the 
AWD program and have caused considerable cost and delay to date.’ See page 3 of ASC’s letter to 
the ANAO, reproduced in Appendix 3. 
  Navantia, in its own January 2014 response to an extract from this audit report, stated that ‘The design 
of the Australian AWD is very different from that of the existing F-104, incorporating lessons learnt 
from the Spanish Navy’s F-105 (not all known at the time of the contract), implementing Australian 
regulations, and taking account of obsolescence, Contract Amendment Proposals, etc. All these items, 
together with the supply chain information modifications in respect to F-104 equipment, imply a very 
relevant number of revisions/modifications to the existing F-104 design, to be implemented at the time 
that the information is made available to the designer—in most cases out of the designer’s control.’ 
See page 1 of Navantia’s comments to the ANAO, reproduced in Appendix 5. 
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for Australian  requirements  and  to  address  operational  shortcomings—were 
stated to be low‐risk and relatively low‐cost, and were to improve the Existing 
Design’s  range, speed, gun, sonar and other  residual capability  issues.119 The 
effect of  these design changes had been  taken  into account when developing 
the  Second  Pass  cost  estimate,  schedule  and  risk  summary  for  the  Existing 
Design.  The  cost  of  the  additional  design  changes  was  estimated  at 
$122 million. 
2.30 In commenting on  the Second Pass submission  in  June 2007,  the  then 
Department of Finance and Administration advised government that the F‐100 
platform,  including  the  proposed  design  changes,  was  based  on  a  mature 
design  and  mature  production  processes  which  could  be  transferred  to 
Australian shipbuilders at relatively low risk. 
2.31 However, halfway into the build phase of the AWD Program, there are 
strong  indications  that  the  risks  associated  with  incorporating  the  design 
changes  to Navantia’s  F‐104  design,  exporting  that  design  to Australia,  and 
adapting  the  designer’s  build  strategy  and  processes  to  accommodate  a 
distributed‐build construction method in Australia, were not fully understood 
at  the  time  of  the  June  2007  Second  Pass  submission  to  government.120  The 
design change and distributed build issues are examined in Chapters 5 and 6. 
SEA 4000 Phase 3–Build, post-2007 
2.32 The key activities in Phase 3 are finalisation of the design development, 
and  the construction,  test and delivery of  the  lead Hobart‐class DDG and  its 
two  follow‐on  DDGs.  Phase 3  also  includes  the  provision  of  RAN  crew 
training,  the  development  of  shore  facilities,  and  the  establishment  of  the 
DDGs’  logistic management  infrastructure. This phase  is  to  culminate  in  the 
Provisional  Acceptance  by  the  DMO  of  three  Hobart‐class  DDGs121,  the 
Acceptance of DDG Support System elements in accordance with the Alliance 
                                                     
119  These and other design changes were analysed during Phase 2, with the objective that they would 
achieve the then Government's core AWD capability requirements without compromising the existing 
platform design, while also avoiding extensive and expensive changes to broader fleet equipment and 
tactics. 
120  In its January 2014 response to an extract from this audit report, ASC stated that ‘ASC's experience in 
the Collins and the AWD programs continues to highlight the challenge of transferring a design to 
production in a new country with differing cultures, technical processes, facilities, supply chains and 
customers.’ See page 2 of ASC’s letter to the ANAO, reproduced in Appendix 3. 
121  Provisional Acceptance is defined in footnote 73. 
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SEA 4000 Phase 3.2–Missiles, post-2011 
2.33 In  August  2011,  the  Government  approved  SEA  4000  Phase  3.2,  to 
convert  Defence’s  stock  of  SM‐2  missiles  from  rail‐launch  configuration  (as 
used on the RAN FFGs) to vertical‐launch configuration for the DDGs, and to 
replace some SM‐2 missiles with more capable missiles.123 A separate project, 
SEA  1360,  is  proposed  to  equip  the  DDGs  with  the  long‐range  Standard 
Missile 6 (SM‐6) during 2021–24.124 The SM‐2 and SM‐6 missile projects are not 
examined in this audit. 
SEA 4000 Phase 3.3–Trials 
2.34 At  the  time of  the audit, SEA 4000 Phase 3.3  involved  the planning of 
Combat System Ship Qualification Trials, to be conducted by the RAN on each 
of  the  Hobart‐class  DDGs  as  part  of  their  Operational  Test  and  Evaluation 
process. This phase  is expected  to  lead  to a  recommendation  to  the Chief of 
Navy concerning the Operational Release of each DDG. 
2.35 The trials focus on operational evaluation of the ships, and on collecting 
data  needed  to  assess  system  performance  and  operator  proficiency.  This 
involves  live  target  tracking  and  firing  all  onboard weapon  systems,  and  is 
conducted primarily off the US West Coast or off Hawaii. 
2.36 To date, most ships fitted with an Aegis Weapon System, regardless of 
country  of  origin,  have  completed  a  US  Navy  Combat  System  Ship 
Qualification Trials program.125 These trials are intended to ‘verify and validate 
that  an  individual  ship’s  combat/weapons  systems  have  been  installed 
correctly  and  can  be  operated  and  maintained  in  a  safe  and  effective 
manner’.126 This is accomplished by assisting the Aegis‐fitted ship in achieving: 
                                                     
122  AWD Alliance, Air Warfare Destroyer Test and Evaluation Master Plan, September 2007. 
123  The Hon. Stephen Smith MP, Minister for Defence, Defence capability projects approved, media 
release, 30 August 2011. 
124  Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030, Defence White Paper 2009, Canberra, 
2009, p. 71; Department of Defence, Defence Capability Guide 2012, Canberra, 2012, p. 39. 
125  Royal Australian Navy, Capability Realisation Plan for the Acceptance into Operational Service of the 
Hobart Class Destroyer (DDG), Version 1, October 2012, p. 10. 
126  US Department of Defense, Department of the Navy, Naval Sea Systems Command Instruction 
9093.1c, Combat System Ship Qualification Trials for Surface Ships, 30 August 2006. 
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country  of  origin,  have  completed  a  US  Navy  Combat  System  Ship 
Qualification Trials program.125 These trials are intended to ‘verify and validate 
that  an  individual  ship’s  combat/weapons  systems  have  been  installed 
correctly  and  can  be  operated  and  maintained  in  a  safe  and  effective 
manner’.126 This is accomplished by assisting the Aegis‐fitted ship in achieving: 
                                                     
122  AWD Alliance, Air Warfare Destroyer Test and Evaluation Master Plan, September 2007. 
123  The Hon. Stephen Smith MP, Minister for Defence, Defence capability projects approved, media 
release, 30 August 2011. 
124  Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030, Defence White Paper 2009, Canberra, 
2009, p. 71; Department of Defence, Defence Capability Guide 2012, Canberra, 2012, p. 39. 
125  Royal Australian Navy, Capability Realisation Plan for the Acceptance into Operational Service of the 
Hobart Class Destroyer (DDG), Version 1, October 2012, p. 10. 
126  US Department of Defense, Department of the Navy, Naval Sea Systems Command Instruction 
9093.1c, Combat System Ship Qualification Trials for Surface Ships, 30 August 2006. 
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 a  sustainable  level  of  combat/weapon  system  operational  readiness; 
and 
 a maintainable level of materiel readiness. 
2.37 At  the  time of  the audit,  the Combat System Ship Qualification Trials 
were  being  planned.  SEA 4000  Phase 3.3  was  included  in  the  Defence 
Capability Plan 2012 with an estimated cost of less than $100 million127, and a 
feasibility study was being prepared in early 2014. However, these trials were 
yet  to  reach  the stage of First Pass approval by government. Phase 3.3  is not 
examined in this audit. 
Australian industry engagement in Phase 3 
2.38 SEA  4000  Phase  3  includes  the  objective  of  achieving  expenditure  of 
50 per  cent  of  the Alliance  contract’s  Target Cost  Estimate  on  products  and 
services  provided  by Australian  industry. By October  2013,  52.3  per  cent  of 
Direct  Project  Costs—or  $1.635  billion  of  $3.129  billion—had  been  spent  in 
Australia. 
2.39 Using  a  similar  measure,  Figure  2.2  shows,  in  percentage  terms,  the 
overall  SEA 4000  Phase 3  expenditure  by  currency,  as  at December  2013.  In 
summary,  at  that  time,  51.1  per  cent  of  AWD  Program  expenditure  had 
occurred overseas, and 48.9 per cent of expenditure had occurred in Australia. 
2.40 Figure  2.3  shows,  for  Phase  3  Australian  dollar  expenditure,  the 
percentage  spent  in  each  state,  with  the  principal  beneficiaries  being  South 
Australia  (60  per  cent),  New  South  Wales  (27  per  cent)  and  Victoria 
(10 per cent). 
2.41 As  at  February  2013,  ASC  had  some  200  subcontracts,  totalling 
$1.195 billion.  Of  these,  the  Australian  industry  content  amounted  to 
$617 million, or 52 per cent.128 
                                                     
127  Defence Capability Plan 2012, pp. 248–9. 
128  February 2013 Raytheon data indicated that it had 22 subcontracts to a value of $476 million 
(December 2006 prices). While six of these contracts, to a value of $80 million (17 per cent), were with 
Australian firms or subsidiaries, no exact figure was available for Australian industry content. 
Development of the AWD Program 
 
ANAO Audit Report No.22 2013–14 
Air Warfare Destroyer Program 
 
93 
Workforce recruitment targets 
2.42 The AWD Alliance’s Australian  Industry Capability Plan,  formulated 
in  2008,  included  workforce  development  plans  that  aimed  to  build  a  new 
shipbuilding workforce. Under this plan, the workforce recruitment targets for 
ASC were set at a total of: 370 technical, engineering, project management and 
general  management  personnel  (non‐trade  personnel);  and  491  trades 
personnel. Both  targets were met. Non‐trade personnel peaked at 780  in  July 
2013. Trade personnel met and exceeded  the  target  in September 2012, when 




in  the  2008  plan.  This  target  was  met,  with  numbers  peaking  at  464  in 
December  2012.  As  at  30  October  2013,  the  Raytheon  Australia  workforce 
consisted of 354 personnel.129 
Block construction target 
2.44 Under  the Alliance contract,  the  Industry Participants have been set a 
target of 70 per cent—or 65 of  the 93 DDG blocks—to be built by Australian 
industry  other  than ASC  (located  in  South Australia).  This was  to  enable  a 
spread of acquisition expenditure to shipyards in other states. However, block 







129  Air Warfare Destroyer Alliance, Australian Industry Capability Plan, 29 August 2008; Air Warfare 
Destroyer Alliance, Australian Industry Capability Progress Report (May–October 2013), 25 November 
2013. 
130  As stated in paragraph 1.2, the DDGs are being built using a distributed-build construction method, 
with the hull blocks of the three destroyers being constructed at four shipyards. For an outline of block 
reallocations among shipyards, and the current distribution of blocks, see paragraphs 6.48–6.51, The 
current block construction allocation for the three Hobart-class DDGs is shown in Figure 6.6. 
Figure 6.5 and Figure 6.6. 
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Figure 2.2: Expenditure on SEA 4000 Phase 3 in percentage terms, by 
currency, as at December 2013 
 
Source: Air Warfare Destroyer Program Management Office, information provided to the ANAO, 
January 2014. 
Figure 2.3: AUD expenditure on SEA 4000 Phase 3 in percentage terms, 
by state and territory, as at December 2013 
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129  Air Warfare Destroyer Alliance, Australian Industry Capability Plan, 29 August 2008; Air Warfare 
Destroyer Alliance, Australian Industry Capability Progress Report (May–October 2013), 25 November 
2013. 
130  As stated in paragraph 1.2, the DDGs are being built using a distributed-build construction method, 
with the hull blocks of the three destroyers being constructed at four shipyards. For an outline of block 
reallocations among shipyards, and the current distribution of blocks, see paragraphs 6.48–6.51, 
Figure 6.5 and Figure 6.6. 
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Phase 3 approved budgets and expenditure 
2.45 The  approved  budgets  and  expenditure  of  the  various  phases  of 
SEA 4000 are shown in Table 2.1. 





government‐approved  price  indexation  factor.  From  June  2010  these  annual 
adjustments were  replaced by  the  ‘outturn  budgeting’  concept, whereby  the 
approved  budget was updated with  a  life‐of‐project price  index. As  at  June 




June  2007  and  December  2013,  the  appreciation  in  the  Australian  dollar 
resulted  in  the  AWD  Program’s  foreign‐currency  requirements  for  Phase  3 
decreasing by $451 million as at December 2013.132 
2.48 Between  June 2007 and December 2013,  the  combined effects of price 
indexation  and  foreign‐exchange variations  resulted  in  the  approved  budget 
for SEA 4000 Phase 3 increasing by $722 million to $7.929 billion. 
                                                     
131  However, in the 2012–13 Major Projects Report, the DMO also acknowledged that indexation shortfall 
had contributed to its 2012–13 overspend of $106 million. ANAO Report No.12, 2013–14, 2012–13 
Major Projects Report, p. 151. 
132  ANAO Report No.12, 2013–14, 2012–13 Major Projects Report, p. 151. 
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AWD Alliance cost changes 
2.49 From  the  signing  of  the  AWD  Alliance  contract  in  October  2007  to 
31 December 2013,  the Target Cost Estimate has  increased  from $4.319 billion 
to  $4.443 billion  (December  2006  prices),  an  increase  of  $124 million,  or 
2.9 per cent.133 This  increase  is  the  result of DMO’s acceptance of 19 Contract 
Amendment Proposals  that have  increased  the Target Cost Estimate.134 Table 
2.2  lists  21 Contract Amendment  Proposals,  including  two  that  reduced  the 
Target Cost Estimate. The increase in the Target Cost Estimate has been funded 
from within the program’s current approved budget. 




Purpose Cost ($m, 
Dec 2006) 
1 Addition of bowthrusters to the DDG design 13.149 
2 
Addition of the helicopter Aircraft Ship Integrated Secure and 
Traverse (ASIST) system, which replaced the helicopter 
Recovery Assist, Securing and Traversing (RAST) system135 
-0.557 
4 Addition of AWD Systems Centre 45.871 
10 Addition of AWD insurance 40.789 
12 NECORA (Navantia Manufacturing Resource Planning System) 0.069 
15 Amendments to the Hobart Class Platform System Specification relating to the power distribution system 6.771 
                                                     
133  The Target Cost Estimate is the agreed estimate of the Direct Project Costs involved in the work under 
the Alliance contract and the Platform System Design contract. The Target Cost Estimate is discussed 
further in paragraphs 3.15 to 3.16 and 3.29 to 3.32. 
134  Altogether, to 31 December 2013 there had been 54 approved Contract Amendment Proposals. 
135  The ASIST system assists helicopters to land on ships at sea, and on landing secures them to the 
landing pad and traverses them into their hangars. ASIST was designed to replace the RAST system, 
which is used by the RAN and by other naval forces, including the US Navy and the Royal Navy. The 
ASIST system provides a similar, but not compatible, operating capability to that provided by the 
RAST system, as ASIST does not have a recovery-assist haul-down cable, which the RAST system 
provides to reduce the risk of damage to the helicopters caused by hard landings in heavy sea swells. 
Fitting the ASIST system to the DDGs requires the AIR 9000 Phase 8 Program to modify the Sikorsky 
Romeos’ RAST panel to incorporate ASIST functions. 
The current helicopter recovery system fitted to the RAN surface fleet is the RAST Mk IV, which is also 
fitted to the F-100 Class and was originally selected for the Hobart-class DDGs. The choice of this 
system, in view of possible future RAN aircraft selections, was discussed in various forums during 
SEA 4000 Phase 2, including on several occasions in Alliance briefings to the Chief of Navy. At the 
start of Phase 3, the RAN advised the AWD Program Management Office that the preferred helicopter 
recovery system for the DDGs was the ASIST system, because it might meet future capability 
requirements. According to the RAN, not proceeding with the change to ASIST would impact on the 
capability available, and the Hobart-class DDGs might fail to meet future capability requirements. 
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Purpose Cost ($m, 
Dec 2006) 
16 Personnel training for the ASIST system 1.250 
36 Design changes to the Magazine Fire-fighting Measures 2.859 
39 Financial Security136 -2.769 
41 440 VAC Residual Current Devices 0.031 
47 Platform System Design Consultancy 0.047 
65 Supply Chain Study funding 0.750 
68 Command Team Trainer additional funding 2.000 
69 Adjustment for the insurance costs required by the Insurance Wrap Policy 9.336 
74 Sonar Dome Insurance Spare 1.502 
78 
Changes to the Provisions Handling Crane to remove the 
potential hazard of the crane impacting the superstructure of 
the ship 
0.104 
83 Supply Chain Development Planning Phase 2a-2 0.553 
84 Commander Task Group Command Team Trainer 0.329 
87 Guard Rail Stanchions 0.288 
92 Supply Chain Development Sourcing (Phase 2B) 1.687 
96 Command Team Trainer Temporary Integration Facility (TIF) Preliminary Design 0.339 
 Total 124.398 
Source: Defence Materiel Organisation, and ANAO analysis of Contract Amendment Proposals. 
Notes: Contract Amendment Proposals 2 and 39 reduced the Target Cost Estimate. Contract Amendment 
Proposals 20, 22, 50, 51, 63, 64 and 89 involved the transfer of funds from the Alliance contract to 
the Platform System Design contract, and so did not increase or decrease the Target Cost 
Estimate. Contract Amendment Proposals 12 and 47 also involved the transfer of funds from the 
Alliance contract to the Platform System Design contract, but additionally incurred minor Alliance 
contract cost for their preparation. 
2.50 Contract amendments can be expected in a defence program of the size 
and  technological  complexity  of  SEA 4000  Phase 3.  Five  of  the  Contract 
                                                     
136  The Alliance contract originally required each Industry Participant to maintain a Financial Security. 
After the Government announcement in 2009 that ASC would not be privatised, the Alliance 
Participants agreed to remove the requirement from ASC, and to reduce the Target Cost Estimate 
accordingly. The requirement is expected to be reimposed if ASC is privatised. 
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Second  Pass,  in  the  context  of  an  exported  design  and  distributed‐build 
strategy,  the  contract  amendments  have  added  to  the  risks  and  challenges 
faced by the Alliance during the build phase of the AWD Program. Design and 





Commonwealth Funded Property 
2.51 Under  the  Alliance  contract,  Defence  is  funding  a  large  amount  of 
material  and  equipment  that  is being used by  the  Industry Participants  and 





material  may  be  offered  for  sale  to  the  Industry  Participants  and  their 
subcontractors, subject to value‐for‐money considerations. 
2.52 As at February 2013,  the AWD Program’s  register of Commonwealth 
Funded Property included these items: 
 a Manitowoc Model  21000  crane, Australia’s  biggest  heavy  lift  crane 
and one of only 12 in the world of this size, with a lifting capacity of 900 
                                                     
137  Contract Amendment Proposal 50 involved change of the Electronic Warfare baseline from the 
reference design to an alternate solution ($1.311 million transferred to the Platform System Design 
contract), but did not affect the Target Cost Estimate, and so is not shown in Table 2.2. 
138  The issue of contract amendments which affect the baseline design should also be considered in 
relation to the cost of any rework involved in their implementation; for discussion of rework, see 
paragraphs 6.55 to 6.65. 
139  Discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
140  Commonwealth of Australia, ASC AWD Shipbuilder, Raytheon Australia, Air Warfare Destroyer 
(SEA 4000) Alliance Based Target Incentive Agreement—Attachment 1—Glossary, 2007, p. 10. 
  
ANAO Audit Report No.22 2013–14 









Second  Pass,  in  the  context  of  an  exported  design  and  distributed‐build 
strategy,  the  contract  amendments  have  added  to  the  risks  and  challenges 
faced by the Alliance during the build phase of the AWD Program. Design and 





Commonwealth Funded Property 
2.51 Under  the  Alliance  contract,  Defence  is  funding  a  large  amount  of 
material  and  equipment  that  is being used by  the  Industry Participants  and 





material  may  be  offered  for  sale  to  the  Industry  Participants  and  their 
subcontractors, subject to value‐for‐money considerations. 
2.52 As at February 2013,  the AWD Program’s  register of Commonwealth 
Funded Property included these items: 
 a Manitowoc Model  21000  crane, Australia’s  biggest  heavy  lift  crane 
and one of only 12 in the world of this size, with a lifting capacity of 900 
                                                     
137  Contract Amendment Proposal 50 involved change of the Electronic Warfare baseline from the 
reference design to an alternate solution ($1.311 million transferred to the Platform System Design 
contract), but did not affect the Target Cost Estimate, and so is not shown in Table 2.2. 
138  The issue of contract amendments which affect the baseline design should also be considered in 
relation to the cost of any rework involved in their implementation; for discussion of rework, see 
paragraphs 6.55 to 6.65. 
139  Discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
140  Commonwealth of Australia, ASC AWD Shipbuilder, Raytheon Australia, Air Warfare Destroyer 
(SEA 4000) Alliance Based Target Incentive Agreement—Attachment 1—Glossary, 2007, p. 10. 
Development of the AWD Program 
 
ANAO Audit Report No.22 2013–14 





consolidation  of  ship  blocks  on  the  South  Australian  Government‐
owned  Common  User  Facility  at  the  Techport  Australia  Maritime 
Precinct; and 
 two  Outfit  Support  Towers  situated  on  the  Common  User  Facility. 
These  five‐storey buildings are situated directly beside  the hard stand 
where  the  ships  are  being  consolidated,  enabling  access  for 
shipbuilding  staff.  The  towers  were  built  in  2010  at  a  cost  of 
$11.668 million.142 
2.53 Upon  completion  of  the  AWD  Program,  material  costing  less  than 
$1 million  that  has  qualified  as  a  Direct  Project  Cost  under  the  Alliance 
contract remains the property of the relevant company.143 
2.54 In February 2011, the Program Management Office considered whether 




the  Industry Participants  to adopt a number of changes  in  implementing  the 
Commonwealth Funded Property provisions  of  the Alliance  contract.  It  also 
suggested that procurements of plant and equipment be presumed, in the first 
instance,  to  be  Commonwealth  Funded  Property,  with  the  onus  on  the 
Industry  Participants  to  demonstrate  why  items  were  not  Commonwealth 
Funded  Property  under  the  Alliance  contract  (having  regard  to  any  agreed 
methodology).  However,  the  Industry  Participants  did  not  share  Defence’s 
view,  and  declined  the  suggested  changes.  In  February  2012,  the  AWD 
Alliance Project Board  resolved  that  the method of acquiring and accounting 
for Commonwealth Funded Property on the project should be reviewed, with 
a  view  to  crediting  to  the  Target  Cost  Estimate  the  residual  value  of 
                                                     
141  ASC, information provided to the ANAO, October 2013. 
142  ASC, information provided to the ANAO, October 2013. 
143  The principle of Commonwealth Funded Property—that the Commonwealth funds the purchase of 
items/facilities critical to progressing a project and to be offered for sale at the end of the project—has 
applied to other Defence contracts, for example, some of the Collins Class submarine-building 
facilities. 
144  Individually, these transporters cost some $625 000 each, but they must be used as a pair, and 
therefore could be considered to be a system costing more than $1 million. 
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Alliance Project Board agreed  that  it would assess  the potential  for returning 
funds  to  the Target Cost Estimate by  the  sale  of property purchased  by  the 
project at the end of the project.145 
2.56 In respect of these arrangements, the ANAO notes that the definition of 




behalf  of  the  Commonwealth  in  respect  of  the  custody  or  control  of  the 
property; 






South Australian Government-owned property 
2.58 The  South  Australian  Government’s  Techport  Australia  Maritime 
Precinct was constructed between 2008 and 2012.146 Within  that precinct, and 
adjacent  to  the  ASC  Shipyard,  is  a  Common  User  Facility  costing  some 
$254 million,  where  the  building  blocks  for  all  three  destroyers  are  to  be 
consolidated  and  then  launched.  This  facility  includes  a  dry  berth,  transfer 
system, a  shiplift dock and a wharf. The  shiplift dock  is 156 metres  long, 34 
metres wide and can lift 9300 tonnes. 
2.59 Techport  also  contains  the Maritime  Skills Centre,  the AWD  Systems 
Centre,  the ASC  South  shipyard  and Raytheon Australia’s  South Australian 
headquarters.  Figure  2.4  shows  the  Techport  precinct,  and  highlights  the 
                                                     
145  For further discussion of the Alliance contract pricing model, see paragraphs 3.29 to 3.32. 
146  As part of its support for a South Australian build location for the DDGs, the South Australian 
Government offered an assistance package, which the Commonwealth accepted in May 2005. The 
South Australian Government committed to constructing the Techport Australia Maritime Precinct and 
a purpose-built Common User Facility (CUF), at a cost of some $300 million. In November 2008, the 
AWD Alliance signed a ten-year lease for the AWD Systems Centre at Techport. 
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Alliance Project Board agreed  that  it would assess  the potential  for returning 
funds  to  the Target Cost Estimate by  the  sale  of property purchased  by  the 
project at the end of the project.145 
2.56 In respect of these arrangements, the ANAO notes that the definition of 




behalf  of  the  Commonwealth  in  respect  of  the  custody  or  control  of  the 
property; 






South Australian Government-owned property 
2.58 The  South  Australian  Government’s  Techport  Australia  Maritime 
Precinct was constructed between 2008 and 2012.146 Within  that precinct, and 
adjacent  to  the  ASC  Shipyard,  is  a  Common  User  Facility  costing  some 
$254 million,  where  the  building  blocks  for  all  three  destroyers  are  to  be 
consolidated  and  then  launched.  This  facility  includes  a  dry  berth,  transfer 
system, a  shiplift dock and a wharf. The  shiplift dock  is 156 metres  long, 34 
metres wide and can lift 9300 tonnes. 
2.59 Techport  also  contains  the Maritime  Skills Centre,  the AWD  Systems 
Centre,  the ASC  South  shipyard  and Raytheon Australia’s  South Australian 
headquarters.  Figure  2.4  shows  the  Techport  precinct,  and  highlights  the 
                                                     
145  For further discussion of the Alliance contract pricing model, see paragraphs 3.29 to 3.32. 
146  As part of its support for a South Australian build location for the DDGs, the South Australian 
Government offered an assistance package, which the Commonwealth accepted in May 2005. The 
South Australian Government committed to constructing the Techport Australia Maritime Precinct and 
a purpose-built Common User Facility (CUF), at a cost of some $300 million. In November 2008, the 
AWD Alliance signed a ten-year lease for the AWD Systems Centre at Techport. 
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Figure 2.4: Techport Australia Maritime Precinct 
 
Source: AWD Program Management Office, March 2013. 
Organisational arrangements for capability development 
oversight 
2.60 Another key aspect of  the AWD Program  is  the Defence management 
structure  used  to  oversee  the delivery  of  the DDGs,  in  accordance with  the 
parameters set by government. The Defence management structure shown  in 
Figure  2.5  is  responsible  for  the development  of  the  Fundamental  Inputs  to 
Capability  (FIC)  for  the RAN’s DDG program.147 The management  structure 
includes: 
 the Capability Manager  (the Chief of Navy), advised by  the Director‐





147  Defence’s FIC, and the groups responsible for managing their development, are shown in Table 1.3. 
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the  time  of  the  audit,  the Chief  of Navy’s  responsibility  for  overseeing  and 
coordinating  all  elements  necessary  to  introduce  the  DDGs’  full  level  of 
operational  capability  into  service by  the date agreed  to by government had 
not been documented  into a  Joint Project Directive  issued by  the Secretary of 
Defence and  the Chief of  the Defence Force.149 SEA 4000 Phase 3 commenced 







ensure  alignment  between  government  decisions  and  the  capability  to  be 
delivered. 
                                                     
148  The two Canberra-class Landing Helicopter Dock (LHDs), HMAS Canberra and HMAS Adelaide, are 
scheduled to achieve Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in December 2014 and November 2016 
respectively. The ships will replace one of the Kanimbla-class landing platform amphibious ships and 
the Tobruk-class Landing Ship Heavy (LSH) vessel. 
149  There is a Joint Project Directive for SEA 4000 Phase 3.2–Standard Missile-2 Conversion and 
Upgrade, but not for SEA 4000 Phase 3–Build. 
  
ANAO Audit Report No.22 2013–14 










the  time  of  the  audit,  the Chief  of Navy’s  responsibility  for  overseeing  and 
coordinating  all  elements  necessary  to  introduce  the  DDGs’  full  level  of 
operational  capability  into  service by  the date agreed  to by government had 
not been documented  into a  Joint Project Directive  issued by  the Secretary of 
Defence and  the Chief of  the Defence Force.149 SEA 4000 Phase 3 commenced 







ensure  alignment  between  government  decisions  and  the  capability  to  be 
delivered. 
                                                     
148  The two Canberra-class Landing Helicopter Dock (LHDs), HMAS Canberra and HMAS Adelaide, are 
scheduled to achieve Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in December 2014 and November 2016 
respectively. The ships will replace one of the Kanimbla-class landing platform amphibious ships and 
the Tobruk-class Landing Ship Heavy (LSH) vessel. 
149  There is a Joint Project Directive for SEA 4000 Phase 3.2–Standard Missile-2 Conversion and 
Upgrade, but not for SEA 4000 Phase 3–Build. 
Development of the AWD Program 
 
ANAO Audit Report No.22 2013–14 
Air Warfare Destroyer Program 
 
103 



























Source: RAN, AWD Capability Implementation Team. 
2.64 Given  the cost and complexity of  the AWD Program,  there would be 
benefit  in Defence  creating  a  Joint  Project Directive  for  Phase  3–Build.  This 
would help ensure ongoing alignment between government decisions and the 
contribution  required of each part of  the Defence organisation.  It would also 
provide  a  sound basis  for  seeking  a  change  to  the  capability being  acquired 
where contingencies arise.150 
                                                     
150  For discussion of Joint Project Directives, see ANAO Audit Report No.6, 2013–14, Capability 
Development Reform, Chapter 11. The report noted that Joint Project Directives were first proposed in 
the response to the Mortimer Review in May 2009, with the prime function of clearly expressing, in a 
working form, the essence of a government decision and assigning responsibilities to Defence Groups. 
However, Defence took over two years to begin to produce Joint Project Directives and, contrary to the 
intent expressed in the original proposal, Joint Project Directives have not been issued immediately 
after government approval. 
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Option for a fourth destroyer 
2.65 At  the  AWD  Program’s  Second  Pass  approval  in  June  2007,  the 
Government  considered  the  option  to  acquire  a  fourth  destroyer.151  The 
Alliance contract, signed in October 2007, provided an option for an additional 
Hobart‐class DDG, which needed to be exercised by October 2008. Since then, 
Defence  has  done  further work  to  assess  the  viability  of  acquiring  a  fourth 
DDG,  should  the Government  so decide. The Defence White Paper 2013 did 
not mention an acquisition of a fourth DDG.152 
2.66 Following  the  change  of  government  in  September  2013,  Senator  the 









2.67 The AWD  Program’s  preliminary  design  phase,  known  as  SEA  4000 
Phase 1, commenced in 2002, and involved the selection of the DDGs’ combat 
system and the competitive selection of the major contractors for the project. In 
May  2005,  the  AWD  Program  received  First  Pass  government  approval  to 
proceed  into Phase 2. The  then Government’s First Pass approval reduced  to 
                                                     
151  The Hon. Brendan Nelson, Minister for Defence, Transcript of doorstop interview, Adelaide, media 
release, 4 October 2007. 
152  Department of Defence, Defence White Paper 2013, Canberra, 2013, p. 83.  
153  John Kerin, ‘Fourth destroyer on Coalition agenda’, Australian Financial Review, 20 September 2013, 
p. 9. 
 Public discussion of a shipbuilding review and of the possibility of acquiring a fourth DDG continued 
late in 2013; see, for example, John Kerin, ‘Cost fear sets off $8bn warships review’, Australian 
Financial Review, 7 October 2013, and Ian McPhedran, ‘Shipbuilding companies lobby Government 
for a fourth Air Warfare Destroyer’, News Limited Network, 8 October 2013. 
 In November 2013, the CEO DMO confirmed that a review of the maritime sector was under way. 
Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, Estimates Hansard, 20 November 
2013, pp. 85–6. 
154  Senator the Hon. David Johnston, Minister for Defence, and Senator the Hon. Mathias Cormann, 
Minister for Finance, Coalition committed to the efficient delivery of the Air Warfare Destroyer 
Program, media release, 17 December 2013. 
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151  The Hon. Brendan Nelson, Minister for Defence, Transcript of doorstop interview, Adelaide, media 
release, 4 October 2007. 
152  Department of Defence, Defence White Paper 2013, Canberra, 2013, p. 83.  
153  John Kerin, ‘Fourth destroyer on Coalition agenda’, Australian Financial Review, 20 September 2013, 
p. 9. 
 Public discussion of a shipbuilding review and of the possibility of acquiring a fourth DDG continued 
late in 2013; see, for example, John Kerin, ‘Cost fear sets off $8bn warships review’, Australian 
Financial Review, 7 October 2013, and Ian McPhedran, ‘Shipbuilding companies lobby Government 
for a fourth Air Warfare Destroyer’, News Limited Network, 8 October 2013. 
 In November 2013, the CEO DMO confirmed that a review of the maritime sector was under way. 
Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, Estimates Hansard, 20 November 
2013, pp. 85–6. 
154  Senator the Hon. David Johnston, Minister for Defence, and Senator the Hon. Mathias Cormann, 
Minister for Finance, Coalition committed to the efficient delivery of the Air Warfare Destroyer 
Program, media release, 17 December 2013. 
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could  rely  on  comprehensive  analysis  of  operational  capability,  cost 





design. Phase 2 ended  in  June 2007 with  the  then Government’s Second Pass 
approval of  the acquisition of  three Hobart‐class DDGs based on Navantia’s 









advised government  that:  the  technical  risk  in  the program was high but  the 
platform risk was low, because the design existed and was in service with the 
Spanish  Navy;  the  schedule  risk  was  low–medium,  because  Navantia  had 
proven  work  packages  prepared  for  the  Existing  Design  option,  and  the 
industry proposal took a conservative approach to schedule; and cost risk was 
medium, with  the main  sources of  risk being  the non‐Aegis  elements of  the 
combat  system,  and  possible  labour  costs.  The  submission  also  advised 
government  that  the F‐100 platform,  including  the proposed design changes, 
was based on a mature design and mature production processes, which could 
be  transferred  to  Australian  shipbuilders  at  relatively  low  risk. 
Notwithstanding the resources applied during Phase 2 to develop the designs 
and mitigate  risks, halfway  into  the  build phase  of  the AWD Program,  it  is 
apparent  that  the  risks  associated with  incorporating  the  design  changes  to 
Navantia’s F‐104 design, exporting that design to Australia, and adapting the 
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designer’s  build  strategy  and  processes  to  accommodate  a  distributed‐build 
construction method in Australia were underestimated at the time of the June 
2007 Second Pass submission to government. 
2.70 Contract  amendments  are  expected  and  budgeted  for  in  a  defence 
program of  the  size  and  technological  complexity of SEA 4000 Phase  3. Five 
Alliance  contract  amendments  relate  to  scope  change  for  the  construction of 
the ship, and were foreshadowed in the funding submission at Second Pass in 
2007. That  submission  contained  an  allowance  of  $122 million  for  platform‐
related  changes  that  were  a  consequence  of  F‐105  modifications  and  RAN 
requirements. As at December 2013, the AWD Alliance’s Target Cost Estimate 
for construction of the DDGs had increased by $124 million, or 2.9 per cent, as 
a  result  of  19  contract  amendments.  While  the  value  of  Alliance  contract 
amendments was largely known at Second Pass, in the context of an exported 
design and distributed‐build strategy, the contract amendments have added to 
the  risks and  challenges  faced by  the Alliance during  the build phase of  the 
AWD Program. 
2.71 SEA  4000  Phase  3  includes  the  objective  of  achieving  expenditure  of 
50 per  cent  of  the Alliance  contract’s  Target Cost  Estimate  on  products  and 
services  provided  by Australian  industry. By October  2013,  52.3  per  cent  of 
Direct  Project  Costs—or  $1.635  billion  of  $3.129  billion—had  been  spent  in 
Australia.  Based  on  expenditure  by  currency,  as  at  December  2013, 




case  the  Chief  of  Navy),  to  facilitate  the  introduction  of  full  operational 
capability  into service by  the date agreed by Government. SEA 4000 Phase 3 
commenced prior  to  the  introduction of  Joint Project Directives, and Defence 
has  not  retrospectively  developed  a  directive  for  the  AWD  Program. 
Nevertheless, the completion of a Joint Project Directive for the AWD Program 
would assist to maintain clarity in roles and responsibilities within Defence for 
the delivery of  the DDGs,  including  in  the event of  turnover of key Defence 
personnel,  or  changes  in  program  parameters  as  a  result  of  government 
decisions. 
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acquisition  issues.  It  also  examines  the  alignment  of  the  Platform  System  Design 
contract with the Alliance contract. 
Introduction 
3.1 In  the  public  sector  context,  alliance  contracting  involves  an 
arrangement between a government agency as ‘owner‐participant’, and one or 
more  ‘non‐owner  participants’,  for  the  delivery  of  capital  works.  Project 
alliances are characterised by: 
 sharing of risks and rewards between the participants; 









alliance contracting arrangements. The benefits  include  the ability  to apply a 
pricing structure which provides a strong incentive to motivate the non‐owner 
participants  to  deliver  the  project  on  time,  at  cost,  and  in  accordance  with 
requirements;  and  for  the  participants  to  collectively,  collaboratively  and 
flexibly manage project  risks  and  issues.156 Of particular note,  circumstances 
which  lead to contract variations under a standard contract may not result  in 
                                                     
155  ANAO Audit Report No.37, 2009–10, Lightweight Torpedo Replacement Project; and Victorian 
Government, Department of Treasury and Finance, Project Alliancing Practitioners’ Guide, Melbourne, 
2006. 
156  Victorian Government, Department of Treasury and Finance, Project Alliancing Practitioners’ Guide, 
Melbourne, 2006. 
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consideration  of  the  respective  skills,  capacity  and  integrity  of  the  potential 
alliance  participants  through  a  tender  process.  Nevertheless,  in  contrast  to 
standard  contracting,  the  tender  process  does  not  establish  the  price  of  the 
project  through  the  bidding,  negotiating  and  awarding  of  a  contract  at  an 
agreed  level  of  remuneration.  This  can  lead  to  difficulty  in  demonstrating 
value  for money where  the  owner  and non‐owner participants develop  and 
agree the Target Cost Estimate for the project and other performance targets.158 
Another  related  factor  to  be  considered  is  that  the  owner‐participants  in  an 
alliance contract generally face high administration costs. For example, there is 
a  need  to  apply  expertise  to  validate  the  Target  Cost  Estimate  and  direct 
project  costs;  and  regular  senior  management  input  and  day‐to‐day  staff 
involvement are necessary to establish and maintain project alliances. 
3.4 Reflecting  these  considerations,  the  Victorian  Government’s  Project 
Alliancing Practitioners’ Guide states that: 
Project  alliancing  should  generally  only  be  considered  in  the  delivery  of 
complex  and high  risk  infrastructure projects, where  risks  are unpredictable 
and best managed collectively. The decision to use project alliancing must be 
based on a robust understanding of the project risk, including risks that cannot 
yet be determined or  scoped. Organisations must  also  ensure  they have  the 
understanding  and  resources  required  to  deliver  projects  through  project 
alliancing.159 
3.5 In July 2002, the DMO  identified an alliance contracting model as  ‘the 
preferred  contracting  strategy’  for  the  AWD  Program,  and  characterised  an 
alliance as: 
                                                     
157  Davies, P.J., Alliance Contracts and Public Sector Governance, Griffith Law School, Griffith University, 
August 2008. 
158  Note that, in the case of the AWD Program, in 2004 tenders were called for the roles of Shipbuilder 
and Combat System–Systems Engineer (CSSE); these tenders were awarded to ASC and Raytheon 
respectively. 
159  Victorian Government, Department of Treasury and Finance, Project Alliancing Practitioners’ Guide, 
Melbourne, 2006, p. 3. 
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157  Davies, P.J., Alliance Contracts and Public Sector Governance, Griffith Law School, Griffith University, 
August 2008. 
158  Note that, in the case of the AWD Program, in 2004 tenders were called for the roles of Shipbuilder 
and Combat System–Systems Engineer (CSSE); these tenders were awarded to ASC and Raytheon 
respectively. 
159  Victorian Government, Department of Treasury and Finance, Project Alliancing Practitioners’ Guide, 
Melbourne, 2006, p. 3. 
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a  risk  sharing  collaborative  approach  to  contracting  that  is  ideally  suited  to 
projects that are delivered in an environment of uncertainty, including diverse 
interests, shifting imperatives and rapid technological change.160 
3.6 The  DMO’s  September  2002  Australian  Naval  Shipbuilding  and  Repair 
Sector  Strategic  Plan  outlined  the  benefits  of  a  strategic  alliance  between 
Defence  and  a  sole‐source  Australian  shipbuilder  in  order  to  sustain 
strategically  important  industry capabilities during a period of reduced naval 
shipbuilding  expenditure over  the  following  15 years  (2002–17). Beneath  the 
proposed  strategic  alliance  would  be  a  number  of  project  alliances,  below 
which—at the subcontractor level—there would be open competition.161 
3.7 This  chapter  examines  the  development  and  operation  of  the  AWD 
Program’s  alliance  arrangements,  and  the  extent  to  which  they  effectively 
support  the  resolution  of  DDG  acquisition  issues.  It  also  examines  the 
alignment of the Platform System Design contract with the Alliance contract.162 





cost–benefit  analysis  demonstrates  that  the  benefits  of  managing  risks  and 
opportunities  in  an  alliance  contracting  arrangement  outweigh  the  costs  of 
establishing and supporting  the alliance. The costs of establishing an alliance 
are  significant,  sometimes  prohibitive,  and  as  such  an  alliance  structure  is 
rarely suitable  for projects valued at  less  than $80 million. Before proceeding 
                                                     
160  Defence Materiel Organisation, SEA 4000 Air Warfare Destroyer: Acquisition and Contracting 
Strategy, version 1.5, 4 July 2002, p. 11. 
161  The 2002 Australian Naval Shipbuilding and Repair Sector Strategic Plan, and the 2003 defence 
aerospace and defence electronics sector plans, arose from the then Government’s 2001 commitment 
to develop a strategic defence industry. Liberal National Coalition, Our Future Action Plan: 
Strengthening Australia’s Defences, 24 October 2001, pp. 44–8. Defence Materiel Organisation, 
Australian Naval Shipbuilding and Repair Sector Strategic Plan, Canberra, September 2002, pp. 9–13, 
19, 32; Chapters 10–11. While released for public comment, the plan was ultimately not approved by 
the then Government. 
162  In September 2013, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute raised questions about the effectiveness of 
the AWD Alliance contract, and in particular about the cost of program delays, the accuracy of the 
Target Cost Estimate and the potential imposition of liquidated damages. These matters are discussed 
later in this chapter. Mark Thomson, ‘The Air Warfare Destroyer project—how effective is the alliance 
model?’, ASPI Strategist blog, 16 September 2013. 
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with  an  alliance  acquisition  strategy,  specialist  legal  advice  should  be 
sought.163 
3.9 In  March  2004,  an  independent  advisory  firm,  Carnegie  Wylie, 
delivered a report to the then Minister for Defence and to the then Minister for 
Finance  and Administration  that  recommended  an  alliance‐style  contract  for 
the  AWD  Program.  This  recommendation  was  made  on  the  basis  that  an 
alliance had the potential to offer the Commonwealth a number of advantages. 
Primary among these was the ability to enter into a contract with a shipbuilder 
through  a  competitive  tender process,  even  though  the  ship design had not 
been  determined,  and  recognising  that  the  tender  process  would  not  itself 
determine the price of the project.164 An alliance was also considered to be the 
most  suitable  contracting  method  for  a  large‐scale,  lengthy  and  complex 
project, which would require modification, change and innovation throughout 
its  life.  However,  the  report  also  noted  government’s  limited  experience  in 
alliance contracting, and the skill and diligence Defence would need to exhibit 
to successfully deliver the AWD Program through an alliance. 
3.10 In May 2004,  the  then Minister  for Defence announced  that  tenderers 
for  the  AWD  contract  would  be  asked  to  bid  on  the  basis  of  an  alliance 
relationship with the Commonwealth.165 
3.11 In  June  2004,  Defence  commissioned  the  independent  advisory  firm 
and  a  second  firm  to  assist  it  to  develop  the  detailed  terms  of  the  AWD 
Program’s  alliance  relationships.  In  its  subsequent  October  2004  report,  the 
advisory  firm  recommended  that  the  Commonwealth  should  proceed  to 
establish  an  alliance‐based  contract  for  SEA  4000  with  a  shipbuilding 
contractor, with a view to expanding the alliance‐based contract to include the 
combat  system  engineer  and platform designer,  if possible.  In particular,  an 
alliance was  seen  as  a means  of  avoiding  traditional  contracting  practice  of 
‘bidding low’ and then recovering margin via scope variations. The report also 




163  Department of Defence, Defence Procurement Policy Manual: Mandatory Procurement Guidance for 
Defence and DMO Staff, Canberra, 1 July 2011, pp. 2.2 to 2.7. 
164  See paragraph 3.3 above. 
165  Senator the Hon. Robert Hill, Minister for Defence, and Senator the Hon. Nick Minchin, Minister for 
Finance, Naval Shipbuilding: Moving Forward, media release, 27 May 2004. 
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163  Department of Defence, Defence Procurement Policy Manual: Mandatory Procurement Guidance for 
Defence and DMO Staff, Canberra, 1 July 2011, pp. 2.2 to 2.7. 
164  See paragraph 3.3 above. 
165  Senator the Hon. Robert Hill, Minister for Defence, and Senator the Hon. Nick Minchin, Minister for 
Finance, Naval Shipbuilding: Moving Forward, media release, 27 May 2004. 
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advised  that  it  was  vital  that  the  Commonwealth  access  the  best  internal 
expertise  and  relevant  commercial  experience  in  both  the  contract‐letting 
process  and  its ongoing  implementation  and monitoring,  and  that  a  capable 
‘owner’s  team’ with  the  requisite  skills,  continuity  and  institutional memory 
would be necessary for a successful outcome. 
3.12 The advisory firm further recommended that the Commonwealth strike 
a  balance  between  the  beneficial  close  working  relationship  inherent  in  an 
alliance,  and  the  assumption  of  legal  obligations  beyond  those  the 
Commonwealth would  normally  accept  (for  example,  fiduciary  obligations). 
The firm made a number of other recommendations about the need to depart 
from the traditional or ‘pure’ alliance model. In particular, the firm raised the 
question  as  to  whether  it  was  appropriate  for  the  parties  to  have  ‘total 
collective responsibility’, having regard to the expected roles of the parties and 






(d) that  the alliance arrangements  include mechanisms  for managing and 
limiting price variations. 
3.13 SEA 4000  Phase  2,  the  design  phase  of  the  project,  which  received 
Government  approval  in  May  2005,  had  alliance‐like  features,  including 
obligations  to  cooperate and  collaborate, and  to work  in good  faith. Defence 
intended  that  the alliance‐like arrangements established  in Phase 2 would be 
reconfigured  and  expanded  for  the  construction  contracts  in  Phase  3.  The 
rationale given for choosing an alliance strategy for Phase 3 was that it would: 
 support the 2002 Australian Naval Shipbuilding and Repair Sector Strategic 
Plan  by  complementing  the  Commonwealth’s  proposed  strategic 
alliance partnership with an Australian shipbuilding entity; 
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3.14 The AWD Alliance was mostly designed along  the  lines suggested by 
Defence’s  external  advisers. While  the Alliance  includes ASC  and Raytheon, 
the original intention to also include the Platform System Designer (Navantia) 
did not eventuate. This matter is discussed in more detail at paragraph 3.72. 
Target Cost Estimate development and validation 
3.15 Governments  may  not  have  the  requisite  skills  or  resources  to 
contribute  substantively  to  the  development  of  an  alliance  Target  Cost 
Estimate.  As  a  consequence,  government,  as  the  owner‐participant,  will 
generally  need  to  validate  the  cost  estimate,  including  by  auditing  and 
conducting  independent  cost  analysis.  For  the  AWD  Program,  the  Industry 
Participants developed the Target Cost Estimate (TCE) during SEA 4000 Phase 
2.167 It is comprised of three elements: 













166  Defence Materiel Organisation, SEA 4000 Air Warfare Destroyer: Acquisition and Contracting 
Strategy, version 1.5, 4 July 2002, p. 11. 
167  The Alliance contract acknowledges that the Industry Participants prepared the Target Cost Estimate 
and the Commonwealth accepted it. Commonwealth of Australia, ASC AWD Shipbuilder, Raytheon 
Australia, Air Warfare Destroyer (SEA 4000) Alliance Based Target Incentive Agreement, General 
Conditions of Contract, clause 37.1.1. 
168  For detailed discussion of the Alliance pricing model, see paragraphs 3.29 to 3.32. 
169  See footnote 104. 
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uncertainty  estimation  techniques  were  applied  to  the  cost  elements  to 
determine  the  most  likely  outcomes.  Navantia,  Bath  Iron  Works,  Defence 
Science and Technology Organisation, the UK Ministry of Defence, the United 
States Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), the RAN and contracted cost‐
estimating  experts  assisted  the  two  design  option  teams  and  the  AWD 
Program  Management  Office  in  the  development  of  the  final  Target  Cost 
Estimate and program cost estimate. Defence, specifically  the AWD Program 
Management  Office,  was  involved  in  the  review  of  the  final  Target  Cost 
Estimate development. This review involvement did not constitute ‘validation’ 
in  a  technical  sense,  because  the Australianised AWD  design  had  not  been 
previously built. The review undertook to determine the reasonableness of the 
pricing and  the  robustness of  the Target Cost Estimate development process 
for Second Pass consideration. At Second Pass, the then Department of Finance 
and  Administration  (Investment  Analysis  Branch)  and  Defence  (Chief 
Capability Development Group, the DMO and the RAN) reviewed the Cabinet 
Submission cost estimates from accuracy and affordability perspectives. 
The AWD Alliance 
3.17 In October  2007,  the  then Government  announced  the  signing  of  the 
Alliance contract for acquisition of the DDGs. This acquisition contract differs 
from  fixed‐price  contract  arrangements,  under  which  Prime  Contractors 
typically  receive  progress  payments  based  on  a  mix  of  earned  value  and 
milestone achievement.  Instead,  the Alliance contract  is based on a cost‐plus‐
incentive‐fee  arrangement,  under  which  the  Industry  Participants  receive 
monthly payments of Direct Project Costs,  and  incentive  fees based on  their 
cost performance relative to a Target Cost Estimate. 
3.18 The  Alliance  contract  imposes  a  ‘fundamental  obligation’  on  the 
Industry Participants  to deliver  the DDGs and other Supplies and  to achieve 





170  Commonwealth of Australia, ASC AWD Shipbuilder, Raytheon Australia, Air Warfare Destroyer 
(SEA 4000) Alliance Based Target Incentive Agreement, General Conditions of Contract, clauses 
7.2.1 and 18.1. 
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3.19 The  Commonwealth  has  also  taken  on  a  number  of  ‘fundamental 
obligations’, which include: 
 providing  Government  Furnished  Material  (GFM),  equipment  and 
information regarding the Aegis Weapon System procured through the 
US  Government  Foreign  Military  Sales  Case,  and  Defence  personnel 
that assist the AWD acquisition program; and 
 providing  the  supplies  delivered  by  Navantia,  under  the  Platform 
System Design contract. 
3.20 The AWD Program utilises a three‐way Alliance Based Target Incentive 
Agreement  (the  Alliance  contract)  between  the  following  three  Alliance 
participants, two of which are Australian Government entities: 
 The  DMO171,  which  is  responsible,  via  its  Materiel  Acquisition 
Agreement  with  Defence,  for  the  overall  management  of  the  AWD 
Program.  The  DMO  is  supported  by  the  following  two  Industry 
Participants: 
 ASC AWD Shipbuilder Pty Ltd, a subsidiary of ASC Pty Ltd (formerly 










171  The DMO is a non-statutory government agency staffed through the Department of Defence; it 
exercises a degree of financial and operational independence and is subject to the Financial 
Management and Accountability Act 1997. 
172  Block construction has been subcontracted to Forgacs, based in Newcastle, BAE Systems, based in 
Melbourne, and Navantia, based in Ferrol, Spain. For further discussion of the block allocations, see 
paragraphs 6.41 and 6.48 to 6.52. 
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 development of an  integrated‐lifecycle‐support solution  for  the 
platform system,  including provision of specified  facilities and 
training. 







 development of an  integrated‐lifecycle‐support solution  for  the 
Combat  System,  including provision of  specified  facilities  and 
training. 
3.21 The  Industry  Participants  have  agreed  to  cooperatively  manage  the 
platform system and combat system work, and so are collectively responsible 
to the DMO for DDG block construction and systems integration. The Industry 






173  A combat system architecture is a logical construct for defining and controlling the physical realisation 
of a combat system and associated processes for target engagement. It is formed by partitioning the 
system into subsystems and interconnections so that, over the entire lifecycle of the system, 
applicable functional, organisational, and physical requirements of combat operations can be met. (US 
Naval Surface Warfare Center (NAVSWC), Combat System Architecture: Design Principles and 
Methodology, TR 91-795, 1991, p. 2. 
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Figure 3.1: AWD Alliance key contractual and governance relationships 
 
Source: Defence Materiel Organisation. 
Notes: FMS—Foreign Military Sale (US). 
PSD—Platform System Design. 
3.23 The  Alliance  is  not  a  legal  entity,  as  it  consists  of  separate  Industry 
Participants  (ASC  and Raytheon,  each  responsible  under  their  own  existing 
management  structures  for  the  execution  of  the  program),  and  the  DMO. 
However,  the Alliance operates as a  ‘virtual organisation’.  It has a Principals 
Council, Project Board, Chief Executive Officer, and an Alliance Management 
Team comprising ASC, Raytheon and Defence personnel, who are responsible 
for  overall  project  management  (see  Figure  3.3).  Alliance  personnel  drawn 
from all of the Alliance participants form the Alliance’s functional groups, and 




Alliance incentives and risk management 
3.24 Project  alliances  offer  potential  benefits  over  traditional  construction 
contracting methodology. They also raise new and different risks that have to 
be  managed—in  particular,  determining  the  appropriate  balance  between 
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maintaining  the  collaborative  spirit  of  the  alliance,  and  protecting  the 
Commonwealth’s  financial  interests  and  expected  outcomes.174  Under 
traditional contracts, the parties have specific individual obligations, and risks 
are  generally  allocated  to  the party  considered  best  able  to manage  them.175 
Under  a  project  alliance,  risks  and  responsibilities  are  generally  shared  and 
managed collectively, rather than allocated to individual parties.176 
3.25 The  Alliance  participants  have  contracted  to  work  collaboratively 
under  a  ‘shared  risk  and  reward’  structure,  which  aims  to  ensure  that  all 
parties are aligned  in  the  common objective of delivering  the  three DDGs  to 
the  specific  requirements,  within  the  approved  budget  and  schedule.  The 
Alliance is characterised by: 
 a  collective  responsibility  for  work  conducted,  and  collective 
ownership of associated risks; 
 collaborative working principles; and 




3.26 Informed by external advice, referred  to  in paragraphs 3.9  to 3.14,  the 
provisions of the Alliance contract were intended to strike a reasonable balance 
in  promoting  a  collaborative  management  approach  while  protecting  the 
Commonwealth’s  interests.  As  previously  discussed  in  paragraph  3.18,  the 
Alliance  contract  imposes  a  fundamental  obligation  on  the  Industry 
Participants  to deliver  the DDGs and other Supplies and  to achieve delivery 
schedule commitments. Further, the Alliance contract combines elements of a 
typical alliance contract with the more ‘standard’ risk‐allocation provisions of a 
fixed‐price  contract.  The  specific  provisions  of  the  contract  reflecting  this 
approach include: 
                                                     
174  ANAO Audit Report No.34, 1999–2000, Construction of the National Museum of Australia and 
Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies, p. 13. 
175  This principle is reiterated in Department of Finance and Deregulation, Commonwealth Procurement 
Rules, Canberra, 2012, p. 24. 
176  Victorian Government, Department of Treasury and Finance, Project Alliancing Practitioners’ Guide, 
Melbourne, 2006, p. 9. 
177  Carnegie, Wylie & Company, Alliance Contracting for SEA 4000 Air Warfare Destroyer, report for 
Department of Defence, October 2004, p. 20. 
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 a multi‐tiered  governance  framework  involving  representatives  of  all 
contracting parties (typical alliance principle); 
 unilateral  rights  for  the Commonwealth,  represented by  the DMO,  to 
issue directions to ensure that its requirements are met, and to exercise 







to  each  other  for  delivering  specified  project  outcomes  (modified 
alliance principle); 
 the  Industry  Participants  to  be  entitled  to  reimbursement  of  direct 





 damages  to  be  claimed  by  the  Commonwealth  and  the  Industry 
Participants  in  certain  instances,  subject  to  specified  caps  (modified 
alliance principle)178; and 
 the  Industry  Participants  to  manage  the  Platform  System  Design 
contract, but not its terms and conditions (typical alliance principle). 
3.27 One  of  the  risks  of  an  alliance  arrangement  is  that  the  non‐owner 
participants  will  have  less  incentive  to  perform  if  all  potential  incentive 
payments  are  lost.  In  such  a  situation,  these  participants  may  only  recover 
Direct Project Costs, and  there may be reduced  incentive  for  them  to achieve 
contracted outcomes. The Alliance contract seeks to mitigate this risk through 
                                                     
178  Department of Defence, Summary of the key aspects of the AWD Alliance Based Target Incentive 
Agreement (ABTIA), September 2010, p. 1. 
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178  Department of Defence, Summary of the key aspects of the AWD Alliance Based Target Incentive 
Agreement (ABTIA), September 2010, p. 1. 
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the  fundamental obligation of  the  Industry Participants  to deliver  the DDGs 
and other Supplies, their joint and several liability for certain project outcomes, 
and the Liquidated Damages provisions (see paragraphs 3.63 to 3.67). 
3.28 The  Alliance  contract  also  contains  these  warranties  by  the  Industry 
Participants: 
 the  Industry  Participants  warranted  that,  based  on  their  own 
investigations,  they  had  assessed,  to  their  own  satisfaction,  the  risks 
they were assuming; 
 the  Industry Participants acknowledged  that  the Commonwealth was 
relying  on  their  skill  and  judgement,  and  their warranties  under  the 
contract; and 
 the  Industry  Participants  warranted  that  they  had  the  resources  (or 
sufficient  access  to  resources)  required  to  perform  their  obligations 
under the contract.179,180 
AWD Alliance pricing model 
3.29 The Alliance contract  is a cost‐plus‐incentive‐fee contract, which seeks 
to  reduce  the  AWD  Program’s  cost  by  offering  the  contractors  financial 
incentives  to  manage  the  program’s  cost  risks.  The  contract  provides 
contractors with cost‐reimbursement payments and a progressive Fee payment 
based on Earned Value data. The Industry Participant Fee (comprised of profit 
margin  and  corporate  overhead  costs)  is  to  be  adjusted  at  the  end  of  the 
program according  to a  formula based on  the end  total cost  (see Figure 3.2). 
Direct Project Costs  in  excess of  the Target Cost Estimate will be  fully paid, 
however  the  Fee  decreases  at  an  agreed  ratio  when  these  costs  exceed  the 
Target  Cost  Estimate.  If  costs  fall  below  the  Target  Cost  Estimate,  the  Fee 
increases according to an agreed ratio. 
                                                     
179  Commonwealth of Australia, ASC AWD Shipbuilder, Raytheon Australia, Air Warfare Destroyer 
(SEA 4000) Alliance Based Target Incentive Agreement, General Conditions of Contract, clauses 
95.1, 96.2 and 97.1. 
180  In its January 2014 response to an extract from this audit report, ASC stated that ‘these warranties 
were given on the basis of the understanding that the Hobart Class was based on an existing and 
proven design from the Navantia F-100 (and more particularly the F-104 ship). This was reflected in 
the selection of the F-100 class as the “existing design” under the SEA 4000 Phase 2 arrangements, 
which drove ASC’s expectations moving forward into negotiations and execution of SEA 4000 Phase 
3.’ See page 3 of ASC’s letter to the ANAO, reproduced in Appendix 3. 
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Figure 3.2: AWD Alliance contract pricing model 
 
Source: AWD Program Management Office, June 2013. 
3.30 Figure  3.2  shows  the  relationship  between  the  actual  cost  and  the 






even  if  the  contractors  have  exhausted  their  Fee  entitlements.  Under  this 
scenario,  the  intention of  the pricing model  is  that  the  Industry Participants 
break even on the Direct Project Costs of actual work done, but do not receive 
profit  or  reimbursement  of  Corporate  Overhead  costs.  However,  Raytheon 
Australia continues to be entitled to receive a separate Procurement Fee.181 






181  The Alliance contract was structured differently for ASC, which will not receive a Procurement Fee. 
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181  The Alliance contract was structured differently for ASC, which will not receive a Procurement Fee. 
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measured.  The  Industry  Participants  developed  the  Target  Cost 
Estimate during SEA 4000 Phase 2182, and it comprises the Direct Project 
Costs that were expected to be incurred by the Industry Participants in 
carrying out  their work  in  accordance with  the Alliance  contract  and 
the  Platform  System  Design  contract.  It  also  includes  the  Platform 




(to  $4.443 billion183)  since  contract  signature  in  October  2007  (see 
paragraph 2.49 and Table 2.2). During the same period, there has been a 
proportional adjustment to the Target Fee. 
 Direct  Project  Costs:  Direct  Project  Costs  represent  the  direct  costs  of 
performing work under the Alliance contract. Specified direct costs that 
the  Industry  Participants  incur  are  reimbursed  by  Defence.  The 
Alliance contract includes a schedule that defines the costs claimable as 
Reimbursable Direct  Project Costs,  and  in  some  cases  it  specifies  the 
amounts  able  to  be  claimed  as  Direct  Project  Costs  (for  example,  in 
relation  to  labour  rates), or  sets  conditions or  limits on  amounts  that 
can be  claimed. The Alliance  contract makes provision  for a  series of 
advance payments to be made to the Industry Participants, which they 
can  draw  down  to  meet  Reimbursable  Direct  Project  Costs.  Direct 
Project Costs also include certain other costs that Defence will pay (but 
not  to  the  Industry  Participants).  These  are  called  non‐Reimbursable 
Direct Project Costs, for example, payments under the Platform System 
Design  contract  and  payments  of  Defence  costs.  Both  Reimbursable 
Direct  Project  Costs  and  non‐Reimbursable  Direct  Project  Costs  are 
included in the calculation of each Industry Participant’s entitlement to 
claim amounts of Fee under the pain‐share gain‐share model (discussed 
below). By December  2013,  $2.985  billion  in Direct Project Costs  had 
been paid by Defence to the Industry Participants. 
 Fee:  Subject  to  their  performance,  the  Industry  Participants  have  the 
opportunity to receive payment of a Fee, which represents their Profit 
                                                     
182  See paragraphs 3.15 to 3.16. 
183  December 2006 prices. 
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Implications of the Alliance contract for the Commonwealth’s risk management 
approach 
3.33 The Alliance contract is designed to provide strong financial incentives 
to  motivate  the  Industry  Participants  to  work  together  to  mitigate  AWD 
Program  risks  and  to  quickly  resolve  issues.  The  reimbursement  of  defined 
Direct Project Costs and  the payment of Fee are determined by  the  Industry 
Participants’ collective  (not  individual) performance against an agreed Target 
Cost  Estimate.  The  management  reserve  also  enables  contingencies  to  be 
managed within  existing  contractual  arrangements.186 However,  it  should be 
noted  that,  under  the  pricing model,  the Commonwealth  shares  the  cost  of 
production  inefficiency. While  the  Industry  Participants’  Fee may  reduce  to 
zero, the Commonwealth will continue to be liable for Direct Project Costs. 
3.34 Notwithstanding  the  financial  incentives  provided  by  the  Alliance 
contract,  and  its  other  features  intended  to  protect  the  Commonwealth’s 
interests,  the  fundamental design  of  the Alliance means  that  significant  risk 
remains with  the Commonwealth. While ASC AWD Shipbuilder Pty Ltd  is a 
subsidiary  of  ASC  Pty  Ltd,  and  does  not  have  the  legal  persona  of  the 
Commonwealth,  it  is nonetheless  a  subsidiary of  a Commonwealth business 
entity  whose  board  is  ultimately  responsible  to  the  Australian  Government 
and  Parliament  through  the  shareholder  Minister.187  At  the  end  of  the  day, 
accountability for the performance of Commonwealth GBEs is shared by entity 
management  and  the  shareholder Minister(s);  as  the  latter  ‘exercise  strategic 
control consistent with  their accountability  to  the Parliament and  the public’, 
while  the entity directors are expected  to ensure  that  ‘the GBE’s activities are 
conducted so as  to seek  to minimise any divergence of  interests between  the 
GBE and the shareholders’.188 
3.35 The  Australian  Government  is  reliant  on  a  range  of  mechanisms  to 
mitigate  its  AWD  Program  risks,  which  include  substantial  financial  and 
                                                     
186  There are also ‘Risk Pool Events’ (such as natural disaster or war) and Target Cost Estimate and 
Schedule adjustment events within the Alliance contract, which are additional risks carried by the 
Commonwealth, and these are not intended to be covered by the management reserve. 
187  The shareholder Minister for ASC Pty Ltd is the Minister for Finance. As indicated in footnote 100, 
ASC is also subject to legal and compliance frameworks, including the Corporations Act 2001. 
188  Department of Finance and Deregulation, Commonwealth Government Business Enterprise—
Governance and Oversight Guidelines, Canberra, 2011, p. 6. 
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and  Corporate  Overheads.  The  Alliance  contract  specifies  an  agreed 
Target Fee, which  is  the amount  that  the  Industry Participants would 
receive if the cost at completion of the work under the Alliance contract 
equals the Target Cost Estimate. The Industry Participants are entitled 
to progressive payments,  on  account  of  their  entitlement  to  a  Fee,  at 
quarterly  intervals.  The  amount  of  these  ’on  account’  payments  is 
calculated on a  ‘moderated’ Earned Value basis, which  is designed  to 
calculate payments for the current quarter by reference to the extent to 
which  the  work  under  the  Alliance  contract  has  progressed  toward 
overall  completion,  and  based  on  an  estimate of  the  final  cost  of  the 
work. With the exception of Raytheon’s separate procurement fee, all of 
the  Industry  Participants’  Fee  entitlements  are  ‘at  risk’  under  the 




Target Cost Estimate. Defence and  the  Industry Participants share  the 
impact of actual costs that exceed the Target Cost Estimate. If the Target 
Cost  Estimate  is  exceeded,  each  Industry  Participant’s  Target  Fee  is 
reduced by 50 per cent of  the amount of  the excess, until payment of 




Estimate  enables  the  Industry  Participants  to  respond  flexibly  to  risks  and 
opportunities. The management reserve is composed of two elements. The Tier 
1  management  reserve  is  controlled  by  unanimous  decisions  of  the  Project 
Board,  to  allow  the  Industry  Participants  to  manage  risks,  including  cost 
estimate  uncertainties.  The  Tier  2  management  reserve  is  controlled  by  the 




184  Commonwealth of Australia, ASC AWD Shipbuilder, Raytheon Australia, Air Warfare Destroyer 
(SEA 4000) Alliance Based Target Incentive Agreement – Attachment 15 – Fee Data, 2007. 
185  The Alliance CEO informed the ANAO that the Tier 2 management reserve was created at the start of 
the project by ‘challenging’ the project execution budgets. 
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186  There are also ‘Risk Pool Events’ (such as natural disaster or war) and Target Cost Estimate and 
Schedule adjustment events within the Alliance contract, which are additional risks carried by the 
Commonwealth, and these are not intended to be covered by the management reserve. 
187  The shareholder Minister for ASC Pty Ltd is the Minister for Finance. As indicated in footnote 100, 
ASC is also subject to legal and compliance frameworks, including the Corporations Act 2001. 
188  Department of Finance and Deregulation, Commonwealth Government Business Enterprise—
Governance and Oversight Guidelines, Canberra, 2011, p. 6. 
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184  Commonwealth of Australia, ASC AWD Shipbuilder, Raytheon Australia, Air Warfare Destroyer 
(SEA 4000) Alliance Based Target Incentive Agreement – Attachment 15 – Fee Data, 2007. 
185  The Alliance CEO informed the ANAO that the Tier 2 management reserve was created at the start of 
the project by ‘challenging’ the project execution budgets. 
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capability  risks.  The  Australian  Government  can  reasonably  look  to  the 
Commonwealth  representative  in  the  Alliance,  the  DMO,  as  the  ‘owner‐
participant’, to adopt an active stance within the context of the Alliance, while 
also  encouraging  and  enabling  the  Industry  Participants  to  apply  their 
expertise  to quickly  resolve  issues.  In  this  respect,  the ANAO noted  that  the 
DMO  has  appointed  several  experienced  officers  with  relevant  industry 
expertise in shipbuilding to the AWD Program Management Office, and since 
2005  has  engaged  a  firm  with  expertise  in  managing  major  construction 
contracts  to  provide  day‐to‐day  advice  to  the  DMO  on  contractual  issues. 
These  arrangements  assist  the  DMO  in  its  interactions  with  the  Industry 




3.36 Further,  the  Australian  Government,  through  the  responsible 
(shareholder)  Minister,  has  additional  mechanisms  available  to  protect  the 
Commonwealth’s  interest  and  manage  risks  relating  to  the  performance  of 
GBEs  and  their  subsidiaries,  should  it  wish  to  expand  its  oversight  of 
performance.189,190 
AWD Alliance governance 





189  The Commonwealth Government Business Enterprise—Governance and Oversight Guidelines 
provide that the main features of the Commonwealth’s relationship with its GBEs include a strong 
interest in the performance of GBEs, ‘active oversight by the Commonwealth’, and the exercise of 
strategic control consistent with shareholder Ministers’ accountability to the Parliament and the public. 
The mechanisms available to government to manage risks include the inclusion of indicators in 
Corporate Plans, an annual Statement of Corporate Intent reflecting agreed outcomes, confidential 
quarterly progress reports provided by the Chair to the stakeholder Minister(s), annual strategic 
meetings involving the Minister(s), and continuous disclosure requirements relating to the operations 
of the GBE and its subsidiaries. Department of Finance and Deregulation, Commonwealth 
Government Business Enterprise—Governance and Oversight Guidelines, Canberra, 2011, pp. 6–7, 
15–24. 
190  The ASC’s shareholder Minister announced on 17 December 2013 the appointment of three new 
board members. 
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its  compliance with  the  International  Standards Organisation’s AS/NZS  ISO 
9001:2008, Quality Management System—Requirements. That audit resulted in the 
achievement  of  certification  to  ISO 9001:2008  in  September  2008. A  triennial 
recertification audit conducted  in August 2011 did not  lead  to any corrective 
action  requests, and  resulted  in a continuation of  ISO 9001:2008  certification. 
That  certification  is  also  relevant  to  the Alliance maintaining  its Authorised 
Engineering Organisation status (see paragraphs 4.14 to 4.17). 
Figure 3.3: AWD Alliance governance and management arrangements 
AWD  Alliance Principals Council
AWD Alliance Project Board
AWD Alliance Management Team –
led by the Alliance CEO
Wider Project Team
Each position with clear accountability for 
specific outcomes
Single project team structure
Best-for-project basis
No duplication of roles or systems
Deliver the project
ONE TEAM
Set an inspirational vision for the Program
Set the AWD Alliance Charter, Top Level Policy and 
Financial Delegations
Approve and set the Performance Measurement Baseline
Appoint/empower the Alliance Management Team
Political interface as required 
Harness best resources from participant organisations
Monitor Alliance performance and take corrective action as 
required
Confine/resolve inter-participant conflict within the Alliance
Corporate Governance, Political Assurance
Accountable to deliver three AWDs and a Support System 
in accordance with the Alliance contract
Appoint/empower wider team
Engagement with customers and stakeholders
Day-to-day management of the project
Provide effective leadership to the wider team
Measure/forecast/report performance to the Project Board
Take appropriate corrective action
Communication Accountability
 
Source: Commonwealth of Australia, ASC AWD Shipbuilder, Raytheon Australia, Air Warfare Destroyer 
(SEA 4000) Alliance Based Target Incentive Agreement, Attachment 16 – Project Management 
Principles, p. 3. 
3.39 The  following  sections  provide  further  detail  on  the  Alliance’s 
governance and management structure. 
  
ANAO Audit Report No.22 2013–14 
Air Warfare Destroyer Program 
 
126 
AWD Alliance Principals Council 
3.40 The  AWD  Alliance  Principals  Council,  first  established  in  December 
2005 for SEA 4000 Phase 2 (the design phase)191, was reconstituted for the AWD 
build  phase.  The  Principals  Council  consists  of  the  Chief  Executive  Officer 
DMO; the Chief of Defence’s Capability Development Group; the Chairman of 
ASC Pty Ltd  (that  is, of  the parent  company of ASC AWD Shipbuilder);  the 
President  Integrated  Defence  Systems,  Raytheon  Corporation,  USA;  and  an 
independent  chair  appointed  by  the  Minister  for  Defence.  The  Principals 











one meeting  to be held  in Adelaide  each year.’192 However,  the Council has 
only met eight  times since 2007, and at  the  time of  the audit,  the most recent 
meeting  had  been  held  in  February  2012.  This  is  despite  significant  and 
persistent  detailed  design  immaturity,  and  construction  and  shipbuilding 
productivity  issues  (discussed  in Chapters 5 and 6  respectively), and a claim 
for a schedule extension and Target Cost Estimate adjustment by the Industry 
Participants,  which  has  not  been  resolved  at  the  Project  Board  level  (see 
paragraph 5.73). 
                                                     
191  Senator the Hon. Robert Hill, Minister for Defence, New Alliance Council for Air Warfare Destroyer 
Program, media release, 8 December 2005. 
192  The AWD Alliance contract, in canvassing the nature and functions of the Principals Council, specifies 
that this body should hold meetings at least once a year. The Phase 3 Project Management Plan 
states that the Principals Council meets at least twice a year, or more frequently as need dictates. 
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one meeting  to be held  in Adelaide  each year.’192 However,  the Council has 
only met eight  times since 2007, and at  the  time of  the audit,  the most recent 
meeting  had  been  held  in  February  2012.  This  is  despite  significant  and 
persistent  detailed  design  immaturity,  and  construction  and  shipbuilding 
productivity  issues  (discussed  in Chapters 5 and 6  respectively), and a claim 
for a schedule extension and Target Cost Estimate adjustment by the Industry 
Participants,  which  has  not  been  resolved  at  the  Project  Board  level  (see 
paragraph 5.73). 
                                                     
191  Senator the Hon. Robert Hill, Minister for Defence, New Alliance Council for Air Warfare Destroyer 
Program, media release, 8 December 2005. 
192  The AWD Alliance contract, in canvassing the nature and functions of the Principals Council, specifies 
that this body should hold meetings at least once a year. The Phase 3 Project Management Plan 
states that the Principals Council meets at least twice a year, or more frequently as need dictates. 
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3.42 AWD  Alliance  records  in  2010  emphasised  the  importance  of  the 
Principals Council,  but  noted  the  need  to  clarify  the  role  of  the  independent 
chair: 
[the]  respective Principals on  the Council were well  informed  through normal 
organisational  reporting  and  did  not  need  to  be  informed  of  Alliance 
performance via the Council. The briefings to the Council therefore only had the 
objective of  informing the  independent chair. Noting the role of the Council  in 
dispute  resolution  and  strategic direction,  and  the  detailed  knowledge  of  the 
‘dependent’ Principals, the role of the ‘independent’ person is not clear.193 
3.43 The  position  of  the  independent  chair  has  been  left  unfilled  since 
August 2011, on the grounds that the role was under review to ensure that  it 
was  best  structured  to  meet  the  needs  of  all  parties  to  the  Alliance.  There 
would  be merit  in  expediting  the  review,  as  the  independent  chair  offers  a 
potential source of additional  insight and advice  to  the Alliance participants, 
the  Defence  Minister  and  the  ASC  shareholder  Minister  (the  Minister  for 
Finance). As  indicated  in paragraph 3.40,  the  independent chair  is appointed 
by the Minister for Defence, after consultation with the Industry Participants.194 
Recommendation No.1  
3.44 The ANAO recommends that the DMO: 
 reinvigorate  the  AWD  Alliance  Principals  Council,  as  a  source  of 
additional leadership, insight and strategic advice on key issues facing 
the Alliance participants; and 
 raise  with  the  Minister  for  Defence  the  appointment  of  a  suitably 
experienced and independent AWD Alliance Principals Council Chair. 
Defence’s response: Agreed 
Defence  will  re‐invigorate  the  Principals  Council  and  appoint  a  suitably 
experienced independent Council Chair. 
AWD Alliance Project Board 
3.45 The AWD Alliance Project Board is below the AWD Alliance Principals 
Council  in  the  governance  structure.  Its  members  are:  the  AWD  Program 
                                                     
193  AWD Alliance, Project Board Meeting Minutes, 24 November 2010. 
194  For further discussion of the AWD Alliance Principals Council, see paragraphs 5.70–5.72. 
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3.46 In  practice,  since  2008,  the  Alliance  CEO  has  also  attended  Project 
Board meetings,  although  he  does  not  have  a  vote.  The  board  is  concerned 
with  governance  of  the  project,  monitoring  ongoing  performance  and 
approving strategies  for acquisition. Financial decisions which affect changes 
in  the  scope  of  the  Alliance  and  Platform  System  Design  contracts  require 
Commonwealth approval, and if necessary the exercise of the Commonwealth 
financial delegation held by the AWD Program Manager.196 






perspective,  the  arrangement  for  unanimous  decision‐making  has  been 
established  to  protect  the  Commonwealth’s  interests,  in  the  event  that  the 
                                                     
195  Following a decision of the Alliance Principals Council in July 2009, the Alliance contract was 
amended in 2011 to change ASC’s membership of the Project Board from the CEO of ASC 
Shipbuilding Pty Ltd to the CEO of the parent company, ASC Pty Ltd. Previously, the Alliance CEO 
had filled the role of ASC member on the Project Board. 
196  The Alliance CEO is accountable for management of the project within the project budget. 
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DMO  does  not  agree with  a  position  taken  by  the  Industry  Participants.  In 
circumstances  where  there  may  not  be  a  unanimous  view,  the  Alliance 
principles  of  cooperation  and  collaboration  should  inform  the  parties’ 
approach to negotiations. 
3.48 The Project Board has generally met at  least monthly  since 2007. The 
minutes  of  the  Project  Board  show  that  it  is  concerned with  preparing  and 
reviewing  management  strategies  covering  the  DDGs’  design  and 
construction, and with key issues raised during the day‐to‐day management of 
the  project.  These  include  the  Alliance’s  commercial  management  and 
budgeting,  insurance,  and  media  and  communications.  The  minutes  also 
indicate that, since mid‐2010, the Project Board has been concerned about the 
cost  and  schedule  impact  of  immaturity  in  the  detailed  design,  and  it  has 
pursued practical  remedies  for  the  situation,  including  engagement with  the 
Platform System Designer (Navantia). However, as at November 2013, detailed 
design  immaturity  and  its  adverse  impact  on  ASC’s  production  costs  and 
schedule  had  persisted  for  over  three  years,  indicating  that  the  strategies 
adopted by the AWD Project Board have not been fully effective in addressing 
the  timely  resolution and mitigation of detailed design  immaturity.197 This  is 
discussed further in Chapter 5. 
AWD Alliance Management and Product Teams 
3.49 The Alliance Management Team  is comprised of personnel  from each 
of  the  three  Alliance  participants  (Defence,  ASC  and  Raytheon),  and  its 
functions  are  to manage, under  the Alliance CEO,  relevant  aspects  of work, 
and  to  give  effect  to  the decisions  of  the  Principals Council  and  the  Project 
Board.  The  Alliance  Management  Team  reports  to  the  Alliance  CEO.  The 
Alliance CEO  is  appointed  by  the Project Board,  and  is  responsible  to  it  for 
carrying out the decisions of the Principals Council and the Project Board, and 
managing all AWD work as an agent of the Industry Participants.198 
3.50 The  use  of  Integrated  Product  Teams  is  intended  to  ensure  that 
decisions  are  made  at  the  lowest  level  commensurate  with  technical 
knowledge  requirements  and  effective  risk  management.  The  Alliance 
                                                     
197  In October 2013, the Alliance CEO commented to the ANAO that ‘It is debatable whether the 
strategies have been fully effective or whether it has been possible to fully mitigate the impact of 
design change. The two are not necessarily the same.’ 
198  The Alliance headquarters are at the AWD Systems Centre, located at the Techport Australia Maritime 
Precinct, in Adelaide (discussed at paragraphs 2.58 to 2.59). 
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to  ensure  that plans  and processes  are  integrated  across  the Alliance. These 
teams are arranged as follows: 
 The  Operations  Cross  Product  Team  is  responsible  for  control  and 




to  the  Alliance,  establishing  the  engineering  plans,  processes  and 
frameworks  that  integrate  engineering  activities  across  the  Integrated 
Product  Teams.  These  functions  contribute  to  the  maintenance  of 
Authorised  Engineering  Organisation  certification  for  the  AWD 
Program  Management  Office.  The  Engineering  Cross  Product  Team 
also provides management and control of  the DDGs’  top‐level system 




including:  workforce  planning,  risk  and  opportunity  management, 
financial  management,  earned  value  management,  contract 
management,  facilities,  information  technology,  human  resource 
management,  administration,  reporting,  insurance  management  and 
security services. 
3.52 An  important  task  in  forming  the  Alliance  involved  developing  an 





of Defence, represented by  the DMO, as  the owner‐participant; and  two non‐
owner participants, namely ASC AWD Shipbuilder Pty Ltd, a subsidiary of a 
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relationships between  these organisations,  relating  to  specific  issues199, AWD 
Program documents and Alliance participant cooperation observed as part of 
this  audit  indicate  that  overall  there  has  been  progress  in  developing  the 
Alliance structure and intended culture. 
AWD Alliance personnel 
3.53 As at November 2013, the AWD Alliance organisation consisted of the 
personnel outlined in Table 3.1. 
3.54 Of  the 1913 personnel  listed below, 1489 were employed by ASC, 371 
by Raytheon Australia, 38 by Defence, and 15 by Navantia. One of the Defence 
personnel,  a Navy member,  reports  to  the Alliance CEO  and  to  the DMO’s 
AWD Program Manager. The remaining Defence personnel report to managers 
in the respective product teams. 
Table 3.1: AWD Alliance personnel numbers, November 2013 
Team Personnel 
Combat System Integrated Product Team 172 
Pre-Production Integrated Product Team 304 
Production Integrated Product Team 1052 
Test & Activation Integrated Product Team 84 
Support Integrated Product Team 105 
Alliance Operations Cross Product Team 17 
Engineering Cross Product Team 41 
Business Services Cross Product Team 79 
Shipbuilding Shared Services 59 
Total 1913 
Source: AWD Alliance. 
3.55 At  the  time  of  the  audit  fieldwork,  there were no Defence personnel 
located  at  the  subcontracted  shipyards  at  the  BAE  Systems  shipyard  in 
                                                     
199  For example, the Industry Participants have made a claim for a Target Cost Estimate adjustment 
relating to the impact of design immaturity. The AWD Alliance Project Board could not come to an 
agreement on the Target Cost Estimate claim, because the Commonwealth member, on advice from 
the DMO, could not agree to the claim. As at July 2013, the Industry Participants were considering 
their position on the matter. See paragraph 5.73. 
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Williamstown,  nor  at  the  Forgacs  shipyards  in  Newcastle.  However,  the 
Alliance’s Design Acceptance Representatives  inspect  the  shipyards  to verify 
compliance  with  the  Alliance  contract’s  engineering  requirements.  These 
Design Acceptance Representatives are members of  the Alliance and are not 
necessarily Commonwealth employees. This underscores the importance of the 
Alliance  contract’s  provisions  regarding  shipbuilding  oversight,  in  terms  of 
quality control and  the regulation of  the  technical  integrity of ADF Maritime 
Materiel.200 
Cost of administration 
3.56 As  indicated  in  paragraph  3.3,  the  owner‐participant  of  an  alliance 
contract  generally  faces  high  administration  costs  in  terms  of  auditing, 
application  of  specialist  expertise,  senior management  input  and day‐to‐day 
management participation  in  the arrangement. As at May 2013, Defence had 
placed  27  Defence  personnel  and  two  Lockheed  Martin  personnel  in  the 
Alliance. This number does not include other Defence Organisation personnel 




from  a  Commonwealth  perspective,  and  the  major  PMO  costs  relate  to 
personnel.[201] The PMO numbers have remained at around 50 since 2011. The 
Commonwealth  also  has  an  obligation  to  provide  personnel  to  work  in 
Alliance  positions,  and  has  routinely  made  about  30  people  available.  The 
Embedded  Service  Fee, which  covers  both  Alliance  and  PMO  personnel,  is 
considered  a  reliable  indicator  of  the PMO  costs,  and  these  are  expected  to 
remain at around $8 million until they begin to tail away after 2019. Defence 
believes  that  these  [figures  represent]  savings  [which] would not have been 
possible  if  the program had not adopted  the Alliance‐like structure, and  that 
                                                     
200  The AWD Program’s technical regulation arrangements for the design and acceptance of the DDGs 
are discussed in paragraphs 4.26–4.43. 
201  The average PMO personnel numbers are: four Average Funded Strength staff, 40 Australian Public 
Service staff, six Contracting Support Branch Australian Public Service, and one Professional Service 
Provider. 
 By way of comparison, Defence advised that the ANZAC Systems Program Office (SPO), which 
administers the ANZAC Ship Integrated Materiel Support Program Alliance (ASIPA) from a 
Commonwealth perspective, had an Average Funded Strength/Full Time Equivalent of 25.33 staff. 
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3.58 The  Alliance  contract  has  also  been  instrumental  in  facilitating  the 
acceptance  into  the  program  of  a  large  number  of  changes  in  the  detailed 
design documentation provided by Navantia without the need for changes to 
undergo the contract price and schedule negotiations and adjustments that are 
normally  the  case  with  fixed‐price  contracts.  Instead,  contract  amendments 
have been dealt with at a much broader level, as shown in Table 2.2. This has 
avoided  the  need  for  significant  RAN  and  DMO  involvement  in  assessing 
design  changes  and  negotiating  price  adjustments,  and  removed  the  risk  of 
potentially  costly  claims  for  the  time  taken  to  contractually  agree  to  design 
changes.  In  the  context  of  the  challenges  faced  by  the  AWD  Program,  the 
Alliance CEO has noted that: 
it  is  clear  that  there  is  no way  in which  the  traditional Defence  contracting 
model  would  have  coped  without  a  substantial  impact  on  the  project  and 




Commonwealth,  because  of  the  Direct  Project  Costs  associated  with  block 
construction  rework,  the  contribution of design  change  to  schedule  slippage, 
and the consequent delay in availability of the capability to the RAN.204 
3.60 Design  change  has  also  had  significant  implications  for  the  Industry 
Participants,  through  schedule  impacts  and  a  reduction  in  Fee.  In  October 
2013, ASC informed the ANAO that: 
Each  design  change  that  brings  about  additional  work  affects  the  Industry 
Participants,  in  that  if  the Target Cost Estimate  is not adjusted,  the  Industry 
Participants run the risk of losing their Fee through pain‐share. Consequently 
there  is no motivation  for  the  Industry Participants  to  introduce change  into 
the design unless they are compensated accordingly. 
                                                     
202  DMO’s obligation to provide personnel to the Alliance was offset by a reduction in the Target Cost 
Estimate. 
203  Rod Equid, AWD Alliance CEO, speech to Pacific 2013 International Maritime Conference, Sydney, 
8 October 2013. 
204  Design changes still need to be assessed by the RAN’s technical and operational regulators. For 
detailed discussion of the implementation and impact of design change, see Chapter 5. 
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AWD Alliance reporting 
3.61 The  Alliance  Industry  Participants  report  to  Defence  through  the 
mechanisms  contained  in  the Alliance  contract. The principal mechanism,  in 
terms  of  the  Industry  Participants’  cost  and  schedule  performance,  is  the 
Earned Value Management  System  (see paragraphs  6.73  to  6.111). There  are 
also  a  range of other  reports  that provide more detailed  explanations  of  the 
AWD  Program’s  progress,  in  terms  of  day‐to‐day  project  risk  and  issues 
management, and system verification and validation monitoring. 
3.62 The  Alliance  CEO  informed  the  ANAO  in  October  2013  that,  in  his 
opinion, Defence enjoyed: 
unprecedented  transparency with respect  to  Industry Participant  information 
and  program  performance  data  generally,  due  to  the  embedded 
Commonwealth  personnel,  the  day‐to‐day  interaction  with  the  Program 
Management Office, and the open‐book arrangements. 
Provisional Acceptance Incentives and Liquidated Damages 
3.63 As  indicated  in  paragraph  3.18,  the  Alliance  contract  contains  a 
fundamental  obligation  on  the  Industry Participants  to deliver  the DDGs  as 
specified and within schedule. 
3.64 Provisional  Acceptance  of  each  DDG  is  to  be  granted  by  the 
Commonwealth  if  the  DDG  complies  with  the  Alliance  contract’s 
requirements,  subject  only  to  Minor  Defects  and  other  Defects  (identified 




Date  for Provisional Acceptance.  If  the  Industry Participants do not  achieve 
Provisional  Acceptance  of  the  DDGs  as  scheduled,  after  a  six‐month  grace 
                                                     
205  Verification and validation is discussed in paragraphs 4.44 to 4.50. 
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period  Liquidated  Damages  can  be  applied  by  the  Commonwealth.206  The 
agreed amounts of Liquidated Damages payable for delays are as follows: 






Commonwealth  of  providing  alternative  capability  during  the  period 
concerned. The  calculations  took  into  account  the  cost  of providing:  current 
naval  assets;  additional  air  cover  to  substitute  for  the non‐availability of  the 
Aegis  Weapon  System;  and  additional  crews.  They  also  took  into  account 
savings to the Commonwealth that would have accrued with on‐time delivery. 
3.67 The AWD Program Management Office was also advised that the risk‐
sharing  principles  underlying  the Alliance  operate  in  relation  to  Liquidated 
Damages.  Rather  than  having  the  Commonwealth  collect  the  Liquidated 
Damages from the Industry Participants, Liquidated Damages, if imposed, are 
to  be  treated  as  Non‐Reimbursable  Direct  Project  Costs.  This  means  that 
50 per cent of the amount of Liquidated Damages imposed counts towards the 
Industry  Participantsʹ  pain‐share  gain‐share  arrangements.  By  this  measure, 
schedule  risks,  in  terms of  the  additional  costs  that  the Commonwealth will 
bear due to late acceptance of a DDG, are shared between the Commonwealth 
and the Industry Participants. 
DMO management position 
3.68 The  DMO  has  actively  participated  in  the  Alliance’s  governance 
structure,  in  its operations  through  the placement of Defence personnel  into 
the  Alliance  organisation,  and  has  also  closely  monitored  the  build  phase 
through  its AWD Program Management Office. At  the  same  time,  the DMO 
                                                     
206  This liquidated damages regime was adopted when it became too difficult to implement the original 
principle—recommended by Defence’s advisers in 2004—that the Industry Participants would be liable 
for the first $100 million of cost associated with the work to rectify major errors made during 
construction. Insurance for this plan did not represent good value, and instead, it was decided that all 
rework would be allowed as reimbursable Direct Project Costs and hence subject to the pain-
share/gain-share regime, and that liquidated damages would also be introduced into the contractual 
arrangements. 
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period  Liquidated  Damages  can  be  applied  by  the  Commonwealth.206  The 
agreed amounts of Liquidated Damages payable for delays are as follows: 
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has placed significant emphasis on  the  fundamental obligation established  in 
the Alliance contract that the Industry Participants deliver the DDGs and other 
supplies,  and  on  the  contractual  warranties  provided  by  the  Industry 
Participants  (see  paragraph  3.28),  which  were  based  on  the  Industry 
Participants’ own assessments during Phase 2 of the AWD Program. 
3.69 As  at  November  2013,  the  Alliance  was  experiencing  a  range  of 
difficulties that have cost and schedule implications. Longstanding issues with 
the  maturity  of  detailed  design  documentation  were  ongoing,  resulting  in 
significant  rework207,  major  construction  problems  had  re‐emerged  at 
subcontractor  level,  and  shipbuilding  productivity  remained  well  below 
expected levels.208 
3.70 In  these  circumstances,  it  remains  incumbent  on  the  DMO,  as  the 
owner‐participant, to make full use of the Alliance structure and framework to 
inform  itself of program risks and  take an active role  in guiding and gaining 
assurance  about  the  strategies  to be pursued by  the  Industry Participants  to 
manage and resolve build program issues, which are ongoing. The DMO faces 
both an  immediate, and a continuing challenge,  in acting  to mitigate  the key 
risks  faced  by  the  AWD  Program,  so  as  to  achieve  the  timely  delivery  of 
capability to the RAN and limit the overall cost to the Commonwealth. 
Platform System Design contract 
3.71 A key element of  the AWD Program  is  the work being performed by 
Navantia under its Platform System Design (PSD) contract with Defence. This 
contract  obligates  Navantia  to  supply  design  documentation  to  support  the 







impose, and  in  the absence of an alliance arrangement,  the Commonwealth’s 
relationship with  the US and Spanish governments was expected  to  improve 
                                                     
207  See paragraphs 5.36 to 5.61 and 6.55 to 6.65. 
208  See paragraph 6.51 and 6.112 to 6.131. 
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access  to  government‐owned  Intellectual  Property.209  The  then  value  of  the 
Platform System Design work (some $300 million) was low when compared to 
the then cost of the Alliance contract (some $4.2 billion), and there was limited 
incentive  for  Navantia  to  put  its  own  profit  share  at  risk  by  entering  an 
Alliance  arrangement  with  a  new  shipbuilder,  and  taking  part  in  the  pain‐
share gain‐share regime  it  imposed on potential profit. For  its part, Navantia 
informed  the  ANAO  in  October  2013  that  there  was  a  lack  of  clarity  with 
respect to the proposed liability regime. Navantia stated that: 
When  the possibility of being part of  the AWD Alliance was on  the  table,  it 




3.73 Defence decided  to  form  a  separate Platform  System Design  contract 
with Navantia. Defence sought  to minimise  the  impact of Navantia’s absence 





paragraphs  5.43  to  5.74  and  Figure  5.10).  While  the  Alliance  has  applied  a 
range of strategies to address detailed design immaturity, the problem and its 
consequences were ongoing in 2013. The most recent initiatives to improve the 
design‐to‐production  process  have  included  measures  to  better  incorporate 
Navantia’s  knowledge  and  experience  into  the  Alliance.210  Nevertheless, 
Navantia  is  not  represented  on  any  of  the  key  Alliance  governance  bodies, 
including the Project Board. 
3.75 The  fact  that  the Platform System Designer  is not part of  the Alliance 
has  detracted  from  the  Alliance’s  ability  to  collectively  and  collaboratively 




209  Access to Intellectual Property is very important in enabling the maintenance of a complex system 
over its long service life. 
210  These arrangements are discussed in paragraphs 5.63–5.66. 
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in  addressing  detailed  design  immaturity  issues  in  the  most  timely  way 
possible,  resulting  in  more  out‐of‐sequence  rework  than  was  budgeted  for. 
Navantia’s  absence  from  the  Alliance  arrangements  has  resulted  in  an 
incomplete  alignment  of  incentives  for  sharing  of  best  practices  and  for 
reducing  costs  from  design  conception  through  to  shipbuilding  and  ship 
acceptance.211 
3.76 The  design  issues  have  highlighted  that,  ideally,  an  alliance  should 
include all of  the key  industry  contributors  to  the  task being undertaken, as 
initially envisaged for the AWD Program. When it is not possible to achieve a 
comprehensive  alliance  arrangement  because  of  the  stance  taken  by  an 
industry  contributor,  appropriate  governance  and  operational  arrangements 
should  be  established  to  mitigate  the  associated  risks  and  enable  effective 
integration between the key contributors to the project. 






Platform  System  Designer  under  the  PSD  contract.213  Moreover,  the  PSD 
contract price  is  included  in  the Alliance  contract’s Direct Project Costs, and 
                                                     
211  In his January 2014 response to an extract from this audit report, the Alliance CEO stated that ‘in the 
case of the AWD [Platform System Designer], Navantia is motivated to strive for program success 
more because of protection of their international reputation than direct financial outcomes which are 
limited in any case by the relativity between the PSD work-share and the overall program costs’. See 
page 9 of the Alliance CEO’s comments to the ANAO, reproduced in Appendix 2. Separately, the 
Alliance CEO informed the ANAO that Navantia has been treated in and has acted in an alliance 
manner. 
 In its January 2014 response to an extract from this audit report, Navantia stated that it considered 
‘that it is rather unfair to associate the amount of engineering issues in AWD with the fact that 
Navantia is not exposed to the reduced incentive payments of the Alliance. Navantia has 
demonstrated its commitment to the program at all times, providing services beyond its contractual 
obligation and increasing its level of effort to adapt the information to a less skilled workforce.’ See 
pages 3–4 of Navantia’s comments to the ANAO, reproduced in Appendix 5. 
212  Four ASC staff and two Raytheon staff were on the Alliance team that negotiated the Platform System 
Design contract with Navantia, in Spain and Australia, in May and June 2007. The April 2007 DMO 
Negotiation Instruction noted that ‘The objective of attendance by the Industry Participant 
representatives is to ensure a common Alliance approach towards the engagement of the PSD.’ 
213  Commonwealth of Australia, ASC AWD Shipbuilder, Raytheon Australia, Air Warfare Destroyer 
(SEA 4000) Alliance Based Target Incentive Agreement, General Conditions of Contract, clause 25.1. 
  
ANAO Audit Report No.22 2013–14 
Air Warfare Destroyer Program 
 
140 
the PSD costs  thus  form part of  the Alliance contract’s pain‐share gain‐share 
arrangement. 
3.78 The  PSD  Supplies  provided  by  Navantia  include  the  Technical  Data 
Package (see paragraphs 5.27 to 5.32), consultancy services to the Alliance, and 
technology transfers, including the Manufacturing Resource Planning System, 
NECORA.  Navantia  is  responsible  for  ensuring  the  performance  of  the 
platform,  provided  that  the  ships  are  built  and  tested  in  accordance  with 
Category 1 of the Technical Data Package. 
3.79 Defence  provides  the  Technical  Data  Package  and  platform  design 
consultancy services supplied by Navantia to the Industry Participants under 
the Alliance contract. Because of the limited technical involvement of Defence 
in  the  work  under  the  Alliance  contract,  and  to  enable  the  Industry 
Participants  to  manage  the  risks  associated  with  the  design  and  consulting 
services,  the  Commonwealth  has  granted  limited  delegations  to  a  PSD 
Director, appointed by the Industry Participants following the approval of the 
Project  Board,  for  the  day‐to‐day  management  of  the  PSD  contract.  These 
delegations include accepting Navantia’s PSD Supplies under the PSD contract 








(b) is  the agent of  the Industry Participants or an Industry Participant  (as 
applicable)  in  relation  to  all  matters  concerning  the  work  under  the 
PSD contract; and 
(c) is,  to  the  extent  of  his  or  her  delegation,  the  agent  of  the 
Commonwealth,  and  has  delegated  authority  to  bind  the 
                                                     
214  In October 2013, the Alliance CEO informed the ANAO that the basis for acceptance of PSD supplies 
does not require the Industry Participants to validate the design, nor could they do this even if they so 
wished, because they do not have access to the underlying design intent or the supporting design 
models. 
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3.82 Some design documents offered by  the Platform System Designer  for 
Acceptance or Approval have been rejected under the delegations to the PSD 
Director. The design documents rejected by the PSD Director were considered 
unusable  due  to  the  extent  of  errors  and  omissions.  These  documents were 
subsequently  reworked and  redelivered by Navantia. The delivery of design 
documents is discussed further in Chapter 5 (see paragraphs 5.33 to 5.61). 
PSD contract amendments 
3.83 Since  the signing of  the Platform System Design contract, 36 Contract 
Amendment Proposals have been  approved,  including  21  that have  affected 
the design, as  shown  in Table 3.2. Navantia  informed  the ANAO  in October 
2013 that Contract Amendment Proposals 6, 12, 18, 34 and 40215 involved up to 
five  rebaselines  of  the  combat  system.  Five  other  Contract  Amendment 
Proposals  (not  listed  in  Table  3.2)  have  increased  the  value  of  consultancy 
services from Navantia by $34.253 million216, and there have been ten Contract 
Amendment Proposals  that were administrative  in nature.  In December 2006 
prices,  the value  of  the PSD  contract has  increased  from  $373.551 million  at 
signing in October 2007, to $411.900 million as at July 2013. 
Table 3.2: Design changes affecting the Platform System Design 




Date Approved Purpose Cost ($m, 
Dec 2006) 
1 22 January 2008 
Technical changes to align the PSD contract 




215  Contract Amendment Proposal 40, Combat System Design Chill, has not yet been formally approved, 
but has incurred costs under the Alliance’s internal arrangement to expedite some construction activity 
before formal approval has been completed. This ‘proceed as if approved’ arrangement includes a 
not-to-exceed cost, and limits on any schedule or other implications are formally advised by Defence. 
Two other proposed Contract Amendment Proposals are covered by similar arrangements. 
216  This includes a $10 million increase to the Alliance’s Target Cost Estimate by Contract Amendment 
Proposal 42 in July 2013. 
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Date Approved Purpose Cost ($m, 
Dec 2006) 
4 15 August 2008 Replacement of RAST Helicopter Recovery System with ASIST 1.603 
6 14 November 2008 Combat Information Centre rearrangement 2.227 
7 6 September 2010 TDP Update  
9 14 November 2008 F-105 Changes  
10 4 September 2008 Deletion of support for Sea Sprite  
12 17 November 2008 Rebaseline for Hobart Class Combat System 4.936 
14 12 April 2010 F-105 Changes  
15 30 April 2010 Gun Magazine 0.021 
16 29 May 2009 Tank Boundary 0.168  
18 22 March 2011 
Alignment with Combat System Vendor 
Furnished Information Delivery 3.1 and 
Current Limiting Devices 
2.599 
19 9 April 2010 Sewage ventilation 0.210  
21 18 August 2011 Modification of available space, Gymnasium and Active Towed Array Sonar room 0.710  
24 5 August 2011 Magazine Fire-Fighting Measures 0.358  
25 23 December 2011 Sewage Treatment Plant obsolescence 0.286  
27 17 November 2011 Modification to Galley, Bakery and Pantry/Self Service 0.230 
28 23 December 2011 Electronic Warfare Configuration 1.311 
29 22 December 2011 Improvements to Combat System Government Furnished Material 0.589 
30 22 December 2011 Direct Support Element Compartment 0.913 
34 23 January 2013 Improvements to Combat System Government Furnished Material 1.850 
45 1 July 2013 Naval Fire Control System 0.283 
Total cost 18.325 
Source: ANAO analysis of AWD Alliance data. 
Notes: The stated cost includes in 17 cases the cost of preparing the Contract Amendment Proposal. 
Actual change to the contract value from the listed Contract Amendment Proposals is an increase 
of $17.230 million (base date December 2006). Two other Contract Amendment Proposals 
reduced the value of the PSD contract by $14.777 million. 
 For Navantia’s diagram of the impact of these Contract Amendment Proposals on individual ship 
blocks, see Figure 5.2. 
3.84 While  the cost of changes  to  the Platform System Design contract, set 
out  in  Table  3.2,  amounts  to  $18.325  million,  the  real  significance  of  these 
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3.84 While  the cost of changes  to  the Platform System Design contract, set 
out  in  Table  3.2,  amounts  to  $18.325  million,  the  real  significance  of  these 
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contract  amendments  is  in  their  impact  on  the  development  of  the  detailed 
design and the build program (see Chapters 5 and 6). 
Intellectual Property 
3.85 An  important  aspect  of  commercial  contracting  is  the  issue  of 
Intellectual  Property  rights.  As  long  ago  as  1994,  the  Industry  Commission 
commented on Intellectual Property in its report Defence Procurement: 
The  efficiency  of  acquisition  of  goods  and  services  by  Defence  depends 
importantly on the ownership of and access to intellectual property (IP). This 
issue  is  becoming  progressively  more  important  as  computer  software 
accounts  for  a  growing proportion  of  the procurement  costs  of many major 
projects. The ability to provide through‐life support, and to extend the  life of 
many  weapons  ‘platforms’,  depends  critically  on  access  to  intellectual 
property.217 
3.86 The  Intellectual  Property  ownership  and  licensing  arrangements 
provided for under the Alliance contract and related agreements (including the 
Platform  System  Design  contract  between  the  DMO  and  Navantia)  are 
complex,  and  require  relatively  detailed  management  arrangements.  In  the 






listing  30 710  Intellectual  Property  items,  with  each  item  supported  by 
descriptions and links to reference documents. A desktop review by the AWD 
Program Management Office  in  September  2012  identified  significant  issues 
with the data presented. This was primarily related to the quality of data being 
entered  into  the source databases. Subsequent reviews  in May and  June 2013 
showed signs of improvement, but issues remain, particularly with older data. 




217  Industry Commission, Defence Procurement, Report No.41, August 1994, p. 122. 
218  ANAO Report No.15, 2012–13, 2011–12 Major Projects Report, p. 197. 
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3.88 The  three‐way Alliance  between  the DMO  as  owner‐participant,  and 
ASC  and  Raytheon  as  non‐owner  participants,  binds  three  diverse 
organisations  in  a managerial  and  financial  sense by  the need  to deliver  the 
three DDGs within cost, schedule and capability specifications. 
3.89 Project  alliances  offer  potential  benefits  over  traditional  construction 
contracting methodology. They also raise new and different risks that have to 
be  managed—in  particular,  determining  the  appropriate  balance  between 
maintaining  the  collaborative  spirit  of  the  alliance,  and  protecting  the 
Commonwealth’s  financial  interests  and  expected  outcomes.219  Under 
traditional contracts, the parties have specific individual obligations, and risks 
are  generally  allocated  to  the  party  considered  best  able  to  manage  them. 
Under  a  project  alliance,  risks  and  responsibilities  are  generally  shared  and 
managed  collectively,  rather  than allocated  to  individual parties.220  Informed 
by  external  advice,  the provisions  of  the Alliance  contract were  intended  to 
strike  a  reasonable  balance  in  promoting  a  collaborative  management 
approach while protecting the Commonwealth’s interests. In consequence, the 
Alliance  contract  combines  elements  of  a  typical  alliance  contract  with  the 
more ‘standard’ risk allocation provisions of a fixed‐price contract. 
3.90 The  Alliance  contract  is  intended  to  provide  financial  incentives  to 
motivate the Industry Participants to work together to mitigate AWD Program 
risks  and  to  quickly  resolve  issues.  The  reimbursement  of  defined  Direct 
Project Costs  and  the payment of  ‘Fee’  (profit  and Corporate Overhead)  are 
determined  by  the  Industry  Participants’  collective  (not  individual) 
performance against an agreed Target Cost Estimate. The management reserve 
also  enables  contingencies  to  be  managed  within  existing  contractual 
arrangements. The Alliance  contract has been  instrumental  in  facilitating  the 






219  ANAO Audit Report No.34, 1999–2000, Construction of the National Museum of Australia and 
Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies, p. 13. 
220  Victorian Government, Department of Treasury and Finance, Project Alliancing Practitioners’ Guide, 
Melbourne, 2006, p. 9. 
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3.88 The  three‐way Alliance  between  the DMO  as  owner‐participant,  and 
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may  reduce  to zero,  the Commonwealth will  continue  to be  liable  for Direct 
Project Costs. 
3.91 Notwithstanding  the  financial  incentives  provided  by  the  Alliance 
contract,  and  its  other  features  intended  to  protect  the  Commonwealth’s 
interests,  such  as  the  ‘fundamental  obligation’  and  industry  warranties,  the 
underlying design of the Alliance means that significant risk remains with the 
Commonwealth. While ASC AWD Shipbuilder Pty Ltd is a subsidiary of ASC 
Pty  Ltd,  and  does  not  have  the  legal  persona  of  the  Commonwealth,  it  is 
nonetheless a subsidiary of a Commonwealth business entity whose board  is 
ultimately responsible to the Australian Government (through the shareholder 
Minister)  and  the  Parliament,  and  whose  income  flows  primarily  from  the 
Commonwealth.  In  these  circumstances,  the  fundamental  obligations  agreed 
by ASC, and the contractual warranties  it has offered to the DMO, may be of 
limited  financial  benefit  to  the  Commonwealth.  A  range  of  mechanisms  is 
available  to  the  Australian  Government,  as  discussed  in  its  Commonwealth 
Government  Business  Enterprise—Governance  and  Oversight  Guidelines,  for  the 
shareholder Minister to be provided with additional performance information 
from  ASC  and  its  subsidiary,  should  government  wish  to  receive  such 
information. 
3.92 The Australian Government  can  reasonably  look  to  the DMO,  as  the 
Commonwealth representative  in  the Alliance and  the  ‘owner‐participant’,  to 
adopt  an  active  stance  within  the  context  of  the  Alliance,  while  also 
encouraging and enabling the Industry Participants to apply their expertise to 
quickly  resolve  issues.  In  this  respect,  the  ANAO  noted  that  the  DMO  has 
appointed  several  experienced  officers  with  relevant  industry  expertise  in 
shipbuilding  to  the AWD  Program Management Office,  and  has  engaged  a 
firm with major construction contract management expertise  to provide day‐
to‐day  advice  on  contractual  issues.  The  DMO  has,  as  part  of  the  Alliance 
contract, also  invested  significantly  in directly  staffing  the Alliance, as a  risk 
mitigation strategy. These arrangements assist the DMO in its interactions with 
the  Industry  Participants,  and  in  providing  advice  on  risk  management 
approaches. 
3.93 As  at  November  2013,  the  Alliance  was  experiencing  a  range  of 
difficulties that have cost and schedule implications. Longstanding issues with 
the  maturity  of  detailed  design  documentation  were  ongoing,  resulting  in 
significant  rework,  and  major  construction  problems  had  re‐emerged  at 
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timely  delivery  of  capability  to  the  RAN  and  limit  the  overall  cost  to  the 
Commonwealth. 
3.94 Further,  the  Alliance  operates  under  three  major  governance  bodies: 
the Principals Council, the Project Board, and the Alliance Management Team. 
However,  the  Alliance  governance  structure  has  not  been  fully  utilised  to 
contribute to the mitigation of risk. The Principals Council, consisting of chief 
executives and an independent chair, has met only eight times since 2007, not 
achieving  the  annual  frequency  envisaged  by  the  Alliance  contract  (no 
meetings were  held  in  2011  or  2013).). The Project Board,  the working‐level 
governance body, has generally met at least monthly since 2007, and hence has 
provided  the primary decision‐making body  for  the Alliance. The potentially 
valuable  role  of  the  independent  chair  of  the  Principals  Council  remains 
vacant, and Navantia is outside the Alliance. 
3.95 The original  intention  to  include  the Platform System Designer  in  the 
Alliance did not eventuate, and  this has contributed  to difficulties associated 
with  exporting  the  design  to Australia.  The DMO’s  Phase  2 Overall  Program 
Report  states  that Navantia was not prepared  to agree  to  the  liability  regime 
that  the Alliance contract was  to  impose. For  its part, Navantia  informed  the 
ANAO  in  October  2013  that  there  was  a  lack  of  clarity  with  respect  to  the 
proposed  liability  regime,  and  that  it  preferred  a  separate  contract  be 
established  for  the Platform System Design. Defence  sought  to minimise  the 
impact of Navantia’s exclusion  from  the Alliance by  incorporating provisions 
into  the  Alliance  and  Platform  System  Design  contracts  that  provide  for 
cooperation  and  collaboration between Navantia  and  the Alliance,  including 





an arrangement. It has also resulted  in an  incomplete alignment of  incentives 
for  sharing  of  best practices  and  for  reducing  costs,  from design  conception 
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an arrangement. It has also resulted  in an  incomplete alignment of  incentives 
for  sharing  of  best practices  and  for  reducing  costs,  from design  conception 
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through  to  shipbuilding  and  ship  acceptance.  The  design  issues  have 
highlighted  that,  ideally,  an  alliance  should  include  all  of  the  key  industry 
contributors to the task being undertaken, as initially envisaged for the AWD 
Program.  When  it  is  not  possible  to  achieve  a  comprehensive  alliance 
arrangement  because  of  the  stance  taken  by  an  industry  contributor, 
appropriate governance and operational arrangements  should be  established 
to mitigate  the  associated  risks  and  enable  effective  integration  between  the 
key contributors to the project. 
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4. Engineering, Regulation and Test 
and Evaluation 
This  chapter  examines  the AWD  build  phase  from  the  perspectives  of  definition  of 
systems engineering requirements, technical regulation, and test and evaluation. 
Introduction 
4.1 The  AWD  Program  is  a  complex  and  lengthy  systems  engineering 
program  subject  to  a  series  of  interrelated  engineering  processes.  Systems 
engineering involves the orderly process of bringing complicated systems into 
being  through  an  integrated  set  of  phased  processes  that  covers  user 
requirements  definition,  system  design,  development  and  production,  and 
operational system support.221 It is Defence policy that the acquisition of ADF 





 progressively  conduct  tests  and  evaluations  that  seek  to  verify  and 
validate compliance with contracted requirements. 




 the  DMO’s  verification  and  validation  that  systems  accepted  from 
contractors comply with government‐approved  requirements, and  the 
DMO’s  compliance  with  the  RAN’s  technical  and  safety  regulations; 
and 
                                                     
221  Blanchard, B.S., System Engineering Management, Second Edition, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 
1998, pp. 1, 10–12, 35–48. 
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 the  RAN’s  certification  that  the  systems  offered  for  release  into 
operational service are fit for service, and any risks posed to personnel, 
public safety, and the environment fall within acceptable levels. 
4.3 Within  this  context,  this  chapter  outlines  the  AWD  Program’s 




AWD requirements definition 
4.4 The AWD Program has three key Capability Definition Documents that 
specify the program’s requirements in terms of: the functions that each DDG is 
to  perform,  how  well  each  function  is  to  be  performed,  and  the  tests  and 
evaluations  needed  to  verify  and  validate  contractor  achievement  of  the 
specified  requirements.  The  Capability  Definition  Documents  comprise  the 
Operational Concept Document,  the Function  and Performance  Specification 
and  the  Test  Concept  Document.222  Requirements  contained  within  these 
documents are  translated  into  the AWD Alliance  contract  in  the  form of  the 
Hobart  Class  Platform  System  Specification  (HCPSS)  and  Hobart  Class 
                                                     
222  The Operational Concept Document (OCD) is intended to inform system acquirers and developers of 
the ADF’s operational requirements. Without specifying particular solutions, the OCD: describes the 
characteristics of the required capability from an operational perspective; facilitates an understanding 
of the overall system goals from both the Mission System and Support System perspectives; details 
missions and scenarios associated with operations and support from both the Mission System and 
Support System perspectives; provides a reference for determining ‘fitness for service’; and provides a 
justifiable basis for the formal requirements for both the Mission System and Support System. 
 The Function and Performance Specification (FPS) defines what the ADF requires. It specifies the 
system’s functional requirements from the perspective of the needs of final users; specifies, in 
quantifiable terms, the system’s critical performance requirements that are the basis for design 
acceptance and qualification testing of the system; and provides the basis for the contracted Mission 
System and Support Systems’ design specifications. 
 The Test Concept Document (TCD) outlines the approach and strategy to be used to verify and 
validate that the design and operational requirements of the new or upgraded capability have been 
met. It defines the ADF’s intended test and evaluation approach and strategy for accepting the 
system, agreed between the DMO and Defence; it forms the basis for the project’s Test and 
Evaluation Master Plan, and identifies the funding and resources required for the project’s test and 
evaluation program, which culminates with System Acceptance and Operational Release; it defines 
the Critical Operational Issues (identified in the Operational Concept Document) that are to be tested 
and evaluated to assess the system’s ability to perform its mission; it defines the Critical Technical 
Parameters derived from the critical requirements identified in the Function and Performance 
Specification; and finally it defines the agreed operational scenarios that need to be successfully 
trialled in order for the delivered capability to receive Operational Release. 
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term efforts  to ensure  that  the Operational Concept Document  reflected user 
needs,  taking  into account  funding priorities. Systems engineering principles 
were  then  used  to  translate  these  needs  into  the  Function  and  Performance 
Specification,  and  into  a  Test  Concept  Document  that  specifies  how  the 
achievement of each function and performance specification was to be verified. 
Overall, there were eight iterations of the Operational Concept Document, six 
iterations  of  the  Function  and  Performance  Specification  and  four  initial 
iterations of the Test Concept Document. Initial development of the Capability 
Definition  Documents  was  largely  complete  by  Second  Pass  approval  on 
19 June 2007. 
4.6 During  2010,  Defence  developed  a  fifth  Test  Concept  Document  to 




performance of  the numerous off‐the‐shelf subsystems. Defence  informed  the 
ANAO  that  these  changes  to  the  specifications  are  closely  monitored  and 
agreed  by  the Capability Manager’s AWD Capability  Implementation  Team 
and  the  CDG  representatives.  As  at  April  2013,  the  Capability  Definition 
Documents had been fundamentally stable since Second Pass approval in June 
2007. 
4.8 A  significant  future  change  to  the Hobart‐class DDGs’ design will be 
the modifications  to  the helicopter hangar  and  Support  Systems  required  in 
support of the Sikorsky MH‐60R helicopter, which was selected in June 2011 to 
operate  from  the  Hobart‐class  DDGs.  At  the  time  of  the  audit,  a  Platform 
Integration  Study  by  the DMO’s AIR  9000 Multi‐Role Helicopter  Program’s 
                                                     
223  The HCPSS forms part of both the Alliance contract and the Platform System Design contract. It 
describes the systems, arrangements, dimensions, structures, materials, components, equipment and 
other elements; and the standards, capacities and performance characteristics of the Hobart-class 
DDG. The HCSS details the requirements for the Combat System and Support System. 
224  SEA 4000 Phase 3’s Materiel Acquisition Agreement is outlined in paragraph 1.31. 
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223  The HCPSS forms part of both the Alliance contract and the Platform System Design contract. It 
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224  SEA 4000 Phase 3’s Materiel Acquisition Agreement is outlined in paragraph 1.31. 
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Phase  8   Program  Office  was  under  way  to  fully  define  the  necessary 
modifications to be incorporated into the ships. 
4.9 In the 2012–13 Major Projects Report, the DMO stated that: 
all  significant  government  specified  capability  is  currently  planned  to  be 
achieved and in some warfare areas, the capability will be exceeded.225 
Technical Regulation 
4.10 In  June 2002,  the  then Secretary of Defence and  the  then Chief of  the 
Defence  Force  jointly  issued  an  instruction  establishing  the ADF’s Technical 
Regulatory Framework. The instruction aimed to standardise and integrate, at 
an overarching policy  level, each Service’s  responsibility  to ensure  that ADF 
materiel  is  fit  for service, and only poses acceptable  risk  to personnel, public 
safety, and  the environment.226 Management  structures, policy and processes 
for  the Technical Regulatory Framework are set out  in  three sets of manuals, 
developed by  each Service’s Technical Regulatory Authority on behalf of  its 
Service Chief. 
4.11 The  ADF  Technical  Regulatory  Framework  sets  out  materiel 
certification  processes  intended  to  provide  Capability  Managers  with 
assurance  that  a  product,  service  or  organisation  complies  with  stated 
specifications,  standards  or  other  requirements.227  The  certification  of  ADF 
materiel is a continuous process, operating for each phase of a project: 
 Pre‐contract:  During  pre‐contract  negotiations,  certification 
requirements (in the form of a Certification Basis228, Certification Plans 
and System Safety Program Plans) are  to be agreed  for  inclusion  into 
acquisition  contracts.  Also  during  this  period,  the  Defence 
organisations responsible  for  the engineering aspects of RAN materiel 
design  and  construction  are  to  obtain  authorisation  to  perform  their 
                                                     
225  ANAO Report No.12, 2013–14, 2012–13 Major Projects Report, p. 148. 
226  Defence Instructions (General) LOG 4-5-012, Regulation of technical integrity of Australian Defence 
Force materiel, September 2010, p. 2. 
227  Defence Instructions (General) LOG 4-5-012, Regulation of technical integrity of Australian Defence 
Force materiel, September 2010. 
228  Defence Instructions (General) LOG 4-5-012, Regulation of technical integrity of Australian Defence 
Force materiel, September 2010. The Certification Basis is comprised of the compilation of 
requirements relating to a Mission System’s technical integrity. Technical integrity is defined as its 
fitness for service, safety and compliance with regulations for environmental protection. 
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 The Alliance  contract  contains a Project Certification Plan and 
Safety  Program  Requirements,  and  the  AWD  Alliance  first 
received AEO certification  in  July 2008  (see paragraphs 4.15  to 
4.17). 
 Production: During this phase, Prime Contractors and the DMO are to 
certify  that  designs  and  products  comply  with  contracted  and 
regulatory  requirements.  Both  parties  to  the  contract  are  to  confirm, 
through  verification  and  validation  activities,  that  end‐products  fulfil 




 The  AWD  Program’s  verification  and  validation  program  is 
outlined in paragraphs 4.44 to 4.50. 
 Post  System  Acceptance:  This  phase  extends  beyond  the  DMO’s 
contractual acceptance of Mission and Support Systems  to  include  the 
other  Fundamental  Inputs  to  Capability,  including  trained  naval 




in  order  to  assess  the  level  of  risk  to  seaworthiness disclosed  by  the 
                                                     
229  Royal Australian Navy, ABR 6492, Navy Technical Regulations Manual (NTRM), July 2003, Vol. 2, 
Section 2, Chapter 4. 
230  First of Class Trials are those trials, including First of Class flight trials, designed to: 
 measure and record the actual performance envelope of new equipment, systems and units 
independent of operator performance; 
 establish a baseline against which future performance of equipment can be tested; and 
 be part of test and evaluation conducted during the naval test, evaluation and acceptance period. 
 Royal Australian Navy, ABR 6205, Naval Operational Test and Evaluation Manual, Revision 4, July 
2010, Glossary. 
231  TI 338 reports are developed by DMO Systems Program Offices, and provide key risk information to 
the RAN’s Commanding Officers and Force Commanders. These provide an account of the materiel 
state of the Mission and Support Systems, in terms of operational limitations within the parameters 
approved by government at Second Pass approval, and hazard risk assessments of the remaining 
risks at the time of materiel release by the DMO to the RAN. Royal Australian Navy, ABR 6205, Naval 
Operational Test and Evaluation Manual (NOTEMAN), Edition 4, 2011, Annex A to Chapter 5. 
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 In  Service:  Periodic  re‐validation  of  a  ship’s  certification  occurs  in 
accordance  with  certification  renewal  programs.  The  RAN  also  has 
Materiel  Condition  Assessment  processes  focused  on  functional 
performance  assessments  to  confirm  fitness‐for‐service,  and  physical 





RAN Regulatory System structure 
The RAN’s Regulatory System has three regulatory domains: 
• Operations Regulation, headed by Commander Australian Fleet, and the 
Delegate: Chief Staff Officer Operational Seaworthiness Directorate; 
• Technical Regulation and Logistic Support Regulation, headed by the 
Director General Technical Seaworthiness (DGTS); and 
• Safety Management System Regulation, comprising Head Navy People and 
Reputation, and the Delegate: Director General Navy Certification and Safety. 
DGTS is the RAN’s current Technical Regulatory Authority and is responsible for the 
certification of the technical integrity of ADF maritime materiel. DGTS is also 
accountable for ensuring that requirements are defined, and that responsible 
authorities are competent to discharge their responsibilities, are authorised to do so, 
and have appropriate management systems in place. Under current reforms, this role 
will be taken over by the Head Navy Engineering. 
4.13 As the Hobart‐class DDGs are to have a helicopter capability, they will 
require  Airworthiness  Certification  of  their  shipborne  aviation  facilities. 
Director General Technical Airworthiness (DGTA) is the certification authority 
and  subject‐matter  expert  for  ADF  aviation  systems,  and  so  will  assist  the 
RAN’s  Technical  and  Operational  regulators  with  recommendations 
concerning the acceptance of these facilities and their risks. 
Hobart-class DDG certification 
4.14 Certification  is  the  act of  issuing  a  certificate  that provides  assurance 
that  a  product,  service  or  organisation  complies  with  a  stated  specification 
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Regulators’  requirements  provides  the  basis  for  the  Chief  of  Navy’s 
consideration of Initial Operational Release and Operational Release of new or 
upgraded naval materiel.232,233 
4.15 The  AWD  Program  commenced  developing  its  Project  Certification 
Plan in 2007. Since then, the Alliance has revised the Project Certification Plan 
to  include  feedback  from  the  RAN,  and  to  provide  the  basis  for  four 
subordinate  Certification  Plans  covering  armament,  security  accreditation, 
shipbuilder  certification,  and  aviation  certification.  In  May  2011,  the  AWD 
Program  received  a  letter  of  endorsement  from  Head  Navy  Engineering 
covering the program’s updated Technical Integrity Certification Basis. 
4.16 Defence’s  Technical  Regulatory  Framework  requires  Defence 
organisations that undertake the design and construction of ADF materiel, or 
that accept designs and  construction,  to be authorised  to perform  their  tasks 
through Authorised Engineering Organisation (AEO) certification. AEOs are to 
ensure  that  all  ADF  materiel  is  designed,  constructed  and  maintained  to 
approved standards, by competent and authorised individuals who are acting 
as  members  of  an  approved  organisation,  and  whose  work  is  certified  as 
correct.234 
                                                     
232  The RAN recognises the costs of over-regulation, and so the degree of regulation to be applied to 
naval capability is to be based on formal risk management principles, and should, wherever possible, 
be developed with an awareness and recognition of civil regulatory standards and regimes. The 
acceptable levels of residual risk will vary according to the context associated with that capability, 
including its physical and operational environments, and accordingly to changes in standards and 
expectations over time. Regulators are to identify their regulatory requirements, and tailor these to the 
risk inherent in each capability. Department of Defence, Defence Instructions (Navy) ADMIN 37-16, 
Navy Regulatory System, July 2008, pp. 1–3. 
233  RAN regulations applicable to CDG and DMO’s roles include: 
 ensuring that, prior to Second Pass approval by government, each project’s Capability Definition 
Documents have been certified as complying with the RAN Regulators’ requirements; 
 ensuring that each project’s Certification Plan is approved by the DMO Project Director, endorsed 
by the RAN’s Regulatory Authorities and authorised by the Director General Navy Certification and 
Safety, at the ’earliest stages of an acquisition/procurement’; and 
 managing ongoing compliance with approved Certification Plans. 
234  AEO certification provides high confidence that the organisation has: 
 technical management systems appropriate to the type of work being performed. These include 
quality management systems such as ISO 9001, engineering management systems, design 
support networks, and configuration management systems. The organisation must also have a 
Senior Design Engineer, responsible to the Senior Executive for ensuring compliance of the 
organisation with the regulations, and for assigning Engineering Authority to individuals within the 
organisation; 
 personnel with appropriate authority, training, qualifications, experience, demonstrated 
competence and integrity to undertake the activities required; 
Footnote continued on the next page… 
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Footnote continued on the next page… 
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4.17 The AWD Alliance  first  achieved AEO  status  in  July  2008. The AEO 
authorisation was  reviewed  in 2011 and  remains valid until  July 2014. As an 
AEO,  the  AWD  Alliance  undertakes  regular  interaction  with  regulators. 
Regulator transparency of the AWD Program’s technical  integrity  is achieved 
through  regulator  endorsement  of  the  Engineering  Management  Plan  and 
Project Certification Plan. 
AWD Classification arrangements 
4.18 A  ship  is  known  as  being  in  class  if  it  meets  all  the  minimum 
requirements  laid  down  by  a  Classification  Society.  Defence  informed  the 
ANAO  that,  where  appropriate,  it  utilises  shipping  industry  Classification 
Societies  to provide  independent verification  that  the majority of  the RAN’s 
fleet  complies  with  design,  construction  and  operation  requirements  that 
govern each vessel’s particular class. This aligns with commercial shipbuilding 
practice whereby,  for  finance  and  insurance  purposes,  shipbuilders  contract 
Classification  Societies  to  independently  verify  and  certify  that  ship designs 
and  construction  comply  with  international  conventions,  rules  and 
regulations.235  This  is  primarily  done  for  commercial  reasons,  as  it  puts  the 
onus  on  the  shipbuilder  to  achieve  certification,  whilst  simultaneously 
isolating  the  shipowner  from  any  disagreement  over  certification  and  any 
delay that may arise from that dispute. 
4.19 The  certification  (classing)  of  the  Hobart‐class  DDGs  under  Class 
Society rules was not within the agreed scope of the Alliance contract that was 
signed in October 2007. The DMO informed the ANAO that most of the design 
work  for  the F‐100 Class was performed during  the period 1995  to 2000, and 
that  the design  is based on military  standards derived  from  the US Navy or 
                                                                                                                                             
 processes that are documented, controlled and approved for all the organisation’s engineering 
activities. These include procedures and plans to specify and define technical activities, which 
must be controlled and approved by an appropriately qualified individual, nominated within the 
quality system; and 
 data applied to, and derived from, technical activities that are accessible, authoritative, accurate, 
appropriate and complete. 
 Adapted by the ANAO from Australian Defence Force, Australian Air Publication 7001.053, Technical 
Airworthiness Management Manual, Section 3, Chapter 1; and Department of Defence, Defence 
Instructions (Navy) ADMIN 37-16, Navy Regulatory System, July 2008, p. 3. 
235  The main rules and regulations pertaining to commercial shipping are the International Maritime 
Organisation’s safety and environment protection regulations. 
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4.20 Rules  are  now  available  for  the  classification  of warships,  and  these 
include  the NATO ANEP  77 Naval  Ship Code, promulgated  in  2009.237 These 
rules are designed for naval ships as an alternative to the Safety of Life at Sea 
Convention (known as SOLAS), and include links to relevant commercial ship 
rule  sets.  They  are  intended  to  provide  a  common  set  of  minimum 
specifications  and  parameters  for  the  construction  and  operation  of  naval 
vessels, so as to assist design and construction and to improve inter‐operability 
and  through‐life  logistics  support.  Class  Societies  normally  perform  a  plan 





not being built  to a prescribed  set of Class  rules, and  the  intention  is not  to 
class the ships once in service. However, the DDG System Program Office, or 
the RAN, may  engage  a Classification  Society  to  provide  specific  assurance 
services if and when required. 
4.22 At  the  time  of  the  audit,  the RAN  informed  the ANAO  that  current 
reforms  of Navy’s  regulatory  system  include  a  review  of  the  application  of 
international  conventions,  including  ‘classing’  of  vessels,  and  the 
implementation of a Defence Seaworthiness Management System. 
Australian Maritime Safety Authority and Classification Society certificates 
4.23 Warships  are  not  obliged  to  conform  to  Australian  Maritime  Safety 
Authority  (AMSA)  requirements  for  safety  and  environmental  protection. 
However,  the  Head  Navy  Engineering  is  to  take  cognisance  of  these 
requirements,  unless  operational  priorities  make  them  inappropriate  or 
impracticable.  A  Classification  Society  may  be  engaged  to  undertake  an 
assessment to detail any variances from the AMSA requirements. 
                                                     
236  These standards-setting organisations and standards are: Data Distribution Service (DDS), the US 
Navy’s Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), and NATO’s Standardization Agreement 
(STANAG). 
237  ANEP 77 provides a generic set of function and performance requirements related to safety and 
environmental protection requirements applicable for naval ships. 
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4.24 The AWD Alliance  has  engaged  a Class  Society  to  assess  the DDGs’ 
compliance with AMSA Marine Orders, based on  the DDGs’ Critical Design 
Review documents and ship inspections. The Class Society will not perform a 
plan  approval  or  a  construction  survey  function  that  is  normally  associated 
with classing a vessel, but will be required to provide a level of assurance that 
the  contemporary  practices  defined  by  the  Marine  Orders  have  been 
addressed.  Four  assessments  are  to  be  performed:  the  first  is  a  preliminary 
assessment based on the design information available at the time of the AWD 
System’s  Critical  Design  Review,  and  this  is  to  be  followed  by  three 
assessments—one for each of the DDGs as they near completion. 
4.25 Defence  informed  the ANAO  that  in August 2013,  the Critical Design 
Review assessment by a Class Society was underway, and the RAN Regulators 
were of the opinion that: 
 the  AWD  Alliance  will  continue  attempts  to  obtain  the  outstanding 
information to allow the compliance assessment to continue; 
 outcomes of  the  compliance  assessment will  feed  into  the  safety  case 
argument  for  AWD.  Non‐compliances  (including  instances  where 
information  is  missing)  which  result  in  a  potential  hazard  will  be 
subject to the AWD safety management process; and 
 the AWD Alliance will  provide  further  updates  of  progress  towards 
completing the compliance assessment. 
Designer’s Certificates and Design Certification 
4.26 The  ADF  philosophy  of  technical  regulation  is  that  organisations 
responsible  for  delivering  supplies  or  services  are  required  to  provide 
Designer’s  Certificates  certifying  that  the  materiel  for  which  they  are 
responsible is approved, that it complies with specified standards, and that it is 
technically fit for service in its intended role. 
4.27 Defence’s  technical  regulations  also  require  Design  Acceptance 
Representatives to provide Design Certificates that certify they have validated 
the design by proving,  through evaluation of a designer’s claims outlined  in 
Designer’s  Certificates  and  supporting  Objective  Quality  Evidence,  that  the 
specified intended end‐use of a product or system has been accomplished in its 
intended  environment. Design Certification  of  the Hobart‐class DDGs  is  the 
responsibility of the Alliance. 
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4.30 As  shown  in  Figure  4.1, Design Approval  delegations  cover Combat 
System  engineering,  Shipbuilder  engineering  and  Platform  System  design; 
these delegations are outlined below. 
Combat System Designer’s Certificate 
4.31 Raytheon  Australia  is  the  designer  of  the  Combat  System,  and  its 
Combat System Chief Engineer is to provide the Designer’s Certificate for that 
system. Raytheon’s  ‘Design Authority’  delegates  are  allocated  responsibility 
for Designer’s Certificates against specific elements of the Combat System. An 
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4.31 Raytheon  Australia  is  the  designer  of  the  Combat  System,  and  its 
Combat System Chief Engineer is to provide the Designer’s Certificate for that 
system. Raytheon’s  ‘Design Authority’  delegates  are  allocated  responsibility 
for Designer’s Certificates against specific elements of the Combat System. An 
interim Designer’s Certificate  is  required  for  the Combat System prior  to sea 
trials. The integration of the Combat System into the Platform System requires 
a final Designer’s Certificate to be issued by the AWD Technical Director. 
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Figure 4.1: AWD Program’s engineering authority delegations, and 
Design Acceptance reporting 
 
Source: Air Warfare Destroyer Program Management Office. 
Note: The blue arrows show the Design Approval authority delegations for Designer’s Certificates, the 
black arrows show the Design Acceptance authorisations for Design Certificates, and the green 
arrows show the engineering management delegations. The figure also shows the hierarchical 
flow-down of delegations from the Director General Technical Seaworthiness at Level 1, to the 
systems, coordination and test engineers at Level 3. 
L1, L2, and L3 indicate the level of delegation under the RAN’s Technical Regulatory Framework. 
1*PMSG and 3*PMSG refers to the one and three-star Program Management Stakeholder 
Groups. 
PM AWD refers to the DMO’s AWD Program Manager. 
Shipbuilder engineering Designer’s Certificate 
4.32 The AWD Program has a Shipbuilder Chief Engineer,  responsible  for 
production engineering management, including design approval of production 
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4.34 Before  the  first  DDG  commences  sea  trials,  an  interim  Designer’s 
Certificate  for  the  Platform  System  will  need  to  be  issued  by  Navantia, 
although  this  has  not  yet  been  contracted.  This  interim  certificate  is  to  be 
followed by Navantia providing a final Designer’s Certificate 45 days prior to 
Provisional  Acceptance.  Navantia’s  contract  makes  it  responsible  for 
warranting  that  the  function  and  performance  of  the  Hobart‐class  Platform 
System satisfies the contracted specification, provided that the ships are built in 
accordance  with  Category 1  of  the  Technical  Data  Package  (see  paragraph 
5.30).239 
4.35 Any  risks  to  fitness  for  service,  safety  or  the  environment  are  to  be 
identified,  documented  and  submitted  by  the  designers  to  the  Design 
Acceptance  Representatives.  Design  Acceptance  Representatives  may  call 
upon  the AWD Program’s Technical  Support Network  to  assist with design 
acceptance,  where  that  is  appropriate,  to  cover  the  competency  and  risk 
profiles of particular designs that are being accepted.240 
Certificates of Conformance 
4.36 Underpinning  the  Designers’  Certificates  are  system  and  subsystem 
Certificates  of  Conformance  issued  by  their  respective  Original  Equipment 
Manufacturer, including ASC AWD Shipbuilder. These certificates provide an 
assurance  that  the  DDGs  and  their  installed  equipment  have  been 
manufactured in a way that fully complies with their approved specifications. 
                                                     
238  To assist with the timely resolution of issues during ship construction, Navantia has, at the Alliance’s 
request, provided a document that details criteria and thresholds under which the ASC, Raytheon and 
their block subcontractors are authorised to make minor design adjustments during production. For 
details, see paragraph 6.22. 
239  The Platform System Designer (Navantia) represents and warrants to the Commonwealth that the 
DDGs, if constructed in accordance with the Technical Data Package (Category 1), will achieve the 
Platform System’s specified function and performance requirements. 
240  RAN technical regulations recognise that AEOs do not normally have sufficient internal technical 
resources or the capability to carry out all their engineering responsibilities using only their own 
personnel. Achieving AEO status is therefore dependent upon the establishment of adequate external 
technical support arrangements that complement and supplement internal technical capacity and 
capability. 
  
ANAO Audit Report No.22 2013–14 
Air Warfare Destroyer Program 
 
160 




4.34 Before  the  first  DDG  commences  sea  trials,  an  interim  Designer’s 
Certificate  for  the  Platform  System  will  need  to  be  issued  by  Navantia, 
although  this  has  not  yet  been  contracted.  This  interim  certificate  is  to  be 
followed by Navantia providing a final Designer’s Certificate 45 days prior to 
Provisional  Acceptance.  Navantia’s  contract  makes  it  responsible  for 
warranting  that  the  function  and  performance  of  the  Hobart‐class  Platform 
System satisfies the contracted specification, provided that the ships are built in 
accordance  with  Category 1  of  the  Technical  Data  Package  (see  paragraph 
5.30).239 
4.35 Any  risks  to  fitness  for  service,  safety  or  the  environment  are  to  be 
identified,  documented  and  submitted  by  the  designers  to  the  Design 
Acceptance  Representatives.  Design  Acceptance  Representatives  may  call 
upon  the AWD Program’s Technical  Support Network  to  assist with design 
acceptance,  where  that  is  appropriate,  to  cover  the  competency  and  risk 
profiles of particular designs that are being accepted.240 
Certificates of Conformance 
4.36 Underpinning  the  Designers’  Certificates  are  system  and  subsystem 
Certificates  of  Conformance  issued  by  their  respective  Original  Equipment 
Manufacturer, including ASC AWD Shipbuilder. These certificates provide an 
assurance  that  the  DDGs  and  their  installed  equipment  have  been 
manufactured in a way that fully complies with their approved specifications. 
                                                     
238  To assist with the timely resolution of issues during ship construction, Navantia has, at the Alliance’s 
request, provided a document that details criteria and thresholds under which the ASC, Raytheon and 
their block subcontractors are authorised to make minor design adjustments during production. For 
details, see paragraph 6.22. 
239  The Platform System Designer (Navantia) represents and warrants to the Commonwealth that the 
DDGs, if constructed in accordance with the Technical Data Package (Category 1), will achieve the 
Platform System’s specified function and performance requirements. 
240  RAN technical regulations recognise that AEOs do not normally have sufficient internal technical 
resources or the capability to carry out all their engineering responsibilities using only their own 
personnel. Achieving AEO status is therefore dependent upon the establishment of adequate external 
technical support arrangements that complement and supplement internal technical capacity and 
capability. 
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The Alliance Engineering Director and DDG Design Acceptance 
4.37 The  Alliance  Engineering  Director  is  responsible  for  engineering 
management  within  the  Alliance,  including  management  of  the  Alliance’s 
technical  risks  and  system  safety,  and  for  maintaining  the  Alliance’s  AEO 
status  under  the  Navy’s  Technical  Regulatory  System.  This  responsibility 
includes  ensuring  that  only  competent  and  authorised  persons  manage  the 
technical risks that fall within their engineering delegations. 
4.38 The  Alliance  Engineering  Director  is  responsible  for  providing  an 
independent  assessment  of  the  technical  integrity  risk  associated  with  the 
Hobart‐class DDGs’ design. He has a Level 2 engineering authority delegation 
from  the  Director  General  Technical  Seaworthiness  (DGTS),  for  design 
acceptance covering the DDGs’ Platform System and Combat System elements, 
and  for  the  DDGs’  Support  System.  He  issues  Level  3  Design  Acceptance 
Representative delegations within  the AWD Program  for design  acceptance, 
based on each individual’s role and competence to conduct design acceptance. 
4.39 The  Design  Acceptance  Representatives  are  engineers  who,  in 
accordance with  the requirements of  the Naval Technical Regulatory System, 
are required to be independent of the designers. They provide validation of the 
designers’  certification,  prior  to  acceptance  of  the  supplies.  They  may  be 
members  of,  or  independent  contractors  to,  the  Australian  Defence 
Organisation, provided they are not involved in the design. 
4.40 Unlike  the  ADF’s  Technical  Airworthiness  Regulations,  the  RAN’s 
Technical  Integrity  Regulations  do  not  involve  Design  Acceptance 
Representatives accepting designs offered by Design Authorities.  Instead,  the 
RAN’s Design Acceptance Representatives provide  independent assessments 
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may  then accept or  reject  that  risk.241 Furthermore,  the RAN’s  regulations do 
not  restrict  the  position  of  Design  Acceptance  Representatives  to 
Commonwealth  employees.  At  the  time  of  the  audit,  the  AWD  Alliance’s 
Engineering  Director,  and  his  subordinate  engineers  who  hold  Design 
Acceptance Representative delegations, were not necessarily Commonwealth 
employees,  and  they  operated  under  Alliance  Industry  Participant  and 
Navantia engineering delegations. 
4.41 Normative  regulatory  structures provide  for  independent  assessment 
of design risks by requiring organisational separation between designers and 
the  individuals  responsible  for  accepting  designs,  or  assessing  the  risks  in 
accepting  the  designs.  However,  as  outlined  above,  the  Alliance  Technical 
Director  is  responsible  for  the  certification  of  the Hobart‐class DDG  design, 
and  the  Alliance  Engineering  Director’s  Design  Acceptance  Representatives 
are  responsible  for  providing  independent  assessments  of  the  technical 
integrity risk associated with that design. To support the integrity of these risk 
assessments,  the  Design  Acceptance  Representatives  report  to  the  General 
Manager Stakeholder Engagement  (GMSE). GMSE  is a one‐star Officer of  the 
RAN’s Engineering Branch, and reports to the DMO’s AWD Program Manager 
on design acceptance issues (see Figure 4.1). GMSE also chairs the RAN’s one‐




high  levels  of  confidence  that  the  AWD  Program’s  Design  Acceptance 
Representatives  remain  independent and  impartial  in  relation  to  the Hobart‐
class DDG design process. Defence advised that these mechanisms include: 
(a) Design Acceptance Representative assessments of non‐compliances and 
changes  to  the  DDGs’  certification  basis  being  forwarded  to,  and 
                                                     
241  AWD Alliance, Engineering Management Plan, Issue 6, May 2012, p. 22. The RAN’s Technical 
Integrity Regulations state that the responsibility of this individual is to conduct a validation of the 
design, design process, the Designer’s Certificate and Objective Quality Evidence presented, and 
identify the risk to technical integrity associated with the design when incorporated into ADF Maritime 
Materiel. The individual responsible for design certification must be delegated that role, and this 
delegation must be recorded in the Engineering Authority Register. The Design Acceptance 
Representatives (DARs), if required, may be assisted in validating the design by other competent 
individuals not involved in the design, but the DAR remains solely responsible for design certification. 
ABR 6492, Naval Technical Regulations Manual, July 2003, Volume 2, Section 2, Chapter 3, 
paragraph 3.5a. 
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assessed  by,  authorised  representatives  of  the  Navy  Technical 
Regulators; 
(b) Design  Acceptance  Representative  assessments  of  hazards  identified 
within  the  AWD  system  safety  program  being  forwarded  to,  and 
assessed  by,  authorised  representatives  of  the  Navy  Technical 
Regulators; 
(c) the AWD Program Management Office  routinely seeking advice  from 
authorised  representatives  of  the  Navy  Technical  Regulators  on  the 
program’s system safety program; and 
(d) the  involvement  of  authorised  representatives  of  the Navy  Technical 
Regulators on AWD Critical Design Reviews. 
AWD Program certification reviews 
4.43 The AWD Program has a Regulatory Review Group  (RRG)  formed  to 
conduct  regular  reviews of  the  certification program activities. This group  is 
co‐chaired by  the RAN’s Director General Navy Certification and Safety and 
the AWD Alliance Engineering Director, and  it  includes representatives  from 
amongst  the  Navy  Regulatory  System  personnel.  The  Regulatory  Review 
Group  is  responsible  for  reviewing  the development of  the AWD Program’s 
Project Certification  Plan,  examining working‐level  regulatory  issues  and,  if 
necessary,  referring  such  issues  to  the  one‐star  Program  Management 
Stakeholder Group (PMSG) for consideration and resolution. 
System verification and validation 
4.44 The  Alliance  contract  requires  the  Industry  Participants  to  develop, 
deliver  and maintain  a  schedule  of  test  and  evaluation  activities  leading  to 
acceptance  of  each  DDG  by  the  DMO.  At  the  time  of  the  audit,  the  AWD 
Program had not completed building the first ship, and very few of the DDGs’ 
systems had been installed and set to work. Consequently, the verification and 
validation  activities  for  system  acquisition,  shown  in  Figure  4.2,  had  not 
progressed  to  any  significant  extent  in  terms  of  testing  installed  systems, 
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Figure 4.2: Verification and validation phases and their major activities 
 
Source: AWD Alliance, Air Warfare Destroyer Test and Evaluation Master Plan, September 2007. 
Notes: RANTEAA—RAN Test, Evaluation and Acceptance Authority . 
SURFOR—RAN Surface Force. 
Test and Evaluation 
4.45 Defence  regulations  require  that  data  applied  to,  and  derived  from, 
technical  activities  must  be  authoritative,  accurate,  appropriate  and 
complete.243  The  DMO  is  required  to  maintain  records  of  the  testing  and 
evaluation,  contractual  acceptance,  and  configuration  management  of  ADF 
materiel,  in  a  systematic  and  complete  fashion.  This  is  essential  for  ADF 
materiel acceptance, in terms of providing assurance that the materiel remains 
                                                     
242  The Alliance CEO informed the ANAO in January 2014 that 864 of 1986 combat-system-level 
requirements had by then passed verification and validation categories 0–3. (These categories of 
testing precede the Harbour Release Tests and Sea Acceptance Trials that occur after the systems 
are installed into the ship.) 
243  Such data must always be accessible, but need not be retained in-house. 
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fit  for service and poses only acceptable  risk  to personnel, public safety, and 
the environment. 
4.46 DMO Project Office personnel are  required  to confirm  the contractual 
compliance  of  design  requirements  through  the  documented  traceability  of 
requirements during  the design process,  and  the documented verification of 
those requirements during the construction process. This may  involve project 
personnel witnessing Acceptance Tests, specified within the Alliance contract, 




4.47 Once designs  are  complete,  the  test  and  evaluation  of  final  products 
commences,  with  the  objective  of  verifying  and  validating  that  all  design 
requirements have been met. It is DMO policy that progressive verification and 
validation be used  to ensure  that contractors maintain an appropriate degree 
of oversight and  control over  the evolving  system’s production.  In  this way, 
risks and  issues affecting contractual compliance may be  resolved before  the 




4.48 The  DMO’s  systems  engineering  standard  requires  the  recording  of 
verification  results  in  accordance  with  acquirer–supplier  agreements, 
verification plan instructions or product directives or procedures. Verification 
Cross  Reference  Matrices,  complete  with  verification  results  based  on  an 
approved  test  and  evaluation  program,  are  relied  upon  during  the materiel 
certification  process  to  provide  objective  evidence  that  contractors  have 
complied with contractual specifications, standards and requirements.244 
                                                     
244  Defence Materiel Organisation, ASDEFCON (Strategic Materiel) Handbook, March 2002, Part 3, Draft. 
Since 2002, DMO has produced other versions of ASDEFCON (SM), with the latest being published in 
2004. 
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Verification is defined as: confirmation by examination and provision of objective 
evidence [through test and evaluation procedures] that specified requirements to which 
a product or service, or aggregation of products and services, is built, coded, 
assembled and provided have been fulfilled. [ISO 9000:2006, Quality management 
systems—Fundamentals and vocabulary]. Put simply, verification is a process for 
proving that product designs and development comply with specified function and 
performance requirements.245 
Validation is defined as: proof through evaluation of objective evidence that the 
specified intended end-use of a product or system is accomplished in an intended 
environment.246 Put simply, validation is used to determine whether or not a system, 
product, or service is operationally effective and suitable. 
4.49 The AWD Alliance  contract  requires  the AWD Program Management 
Office’s approval of the AWD Test and Evaluation Plan and its verification and 
validation plans, and approval of Acceptance Test Plans and Acceptance Test 
Procedures.  The  contract  also  requires  the  Program  Management  Office’s 
acceptance of test reports. The AWD Program uses a Test Management System 
(TMS)  database,  a  Requirements  Management  System  (RMS)  database,  a 
Hazard Tracking System  (HTS) and a Verification Cross Reference Matrix  to 




4.50 However,  as  mentioned  earlier,  at  the  time  of  the  audit  the  build 
program was at  the Hull  Integration Complete stage. Very  few of  the DDGs’ 
systems had been installed and set to work. Consequently, it may not be until 
December  2014—when  Ship  1’s  combat  system  is  scheduled  to  be  fully 
installed—that  the  AWD  Program’s  system‐level  tests  and  evaluations,  on 
board  the  ship  and  at  sea,  will  begin  to  fully  verify  and  validate  system 
performance against function and performance specifications. 
                                                     
245  Defence Materiel Organisation, DMO Acquisition and Sustainment Manual, 2007, pp. 74–5. 
 The DMO’s verification and validation manual categorises verification and validation procedures into 
inspections, demonstrations, analysis, modeling and simulation, tests, system reviews, audits, defence 
trials, walkthroughs, experiments, red teaming, operational analysis and research, and explosive 
ordnance proof. Defence Materiel Organisation, Defence Materiel Verification and Validation Manual, 
November 2008, pp. 18–19, 56–66. 
246  International Standards Organisation, ISO 9000:2006, Quality Management Systems—Fundamentals 
and vocabulary. 
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to  perform,  how  well  each  function  is  to  be  performed,  and  the  tests  and 
evaluations  needed  to  verify  and  validate  contractor  achievement  of  the 
specified  requirements. Requirements  contained within  these documents  are 
translated  into  the  AWD  Alliance  contract  in  the  form  of  the  Hobart  Class 
Platform  System  Specification  (HCPSS)  and  Hobart  Class  Systems 
Specification (HCSS). The AWD Alliance is required to conduct test procedures 
and produce test reports that verify compliance with these specifications. As at 
April  2013,  the  Capability  Definition  Documents  had  been  fundamentally 
stable  since  Second  Pass  approval  in  June  2007.  The  HCPSS  has,  however, 
changed  many  times  since  contract  commencement  to  account  for  design 
changes. 
4.52 The ADF  introduced a standardised Technical Regulatory Framework 
in 2002  to ensure  that ADF materiel  is  fit  for service. The AWD Program has 
complied  with  those  sections  of  the  Technical  Regulatory  Framework  that 
cover program activities up to midway through the build phase, including the 
preparation of a Project Certification Plan and Safety Program Requirements. 
The  AWD  Alliance  achieved  the  status  of  an  Authorised  Engineering 




individuals  responsible  for  accepting  designs,  or  assessing  the  risks  in 
accepting the designs. However, the Alliance Technical Director is responsible 
for  the  certification  of  the  Hobart‐class  DDG  design,  and  the  Alliance 
Engineering Director’s Design Acceptance Representatives are responsible for 
providing  independent  assessments  of  the  technical  integrity  risk  associated 
with that design. To support the integrity of these risk assessments, the Design 
Acceptance  Representatives  report  to  the  General  Manager  Stakeholder 
Engagement  (GMSE). GMSE  is  a  one‐star Officer  of  the RAN’s  Engineering 
Branch, and reports  to DMO’s AWD Program Manager on design acceptance 
issues.  GMSE  also  chairs  the  RAN’s  one‐star  Program  Management 
Stakeholder  Group,  and  reports  to  the  three‐star  Program  Management 
Stakeholder Group. 
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Regulatory  System  has  assurance  mechanisms  to  provide  high  levels  of 





work. Consequently,  it may  not  be  until December  2014—when  the  combat 
system of Ship 1  is scheduled  to be  fully  installed—that  the AWD Program’s 
system‐level tests and evaluations, on board the ship and at sea, will begin to 
fully  verify  and  validate  system  performance  against  function  and 
performance specifications. In January 2014, the AWD Alliance CEO informed 
the  ANAO  that,  of  1986  Combat  System  requirements,  864  had  been  fully 
completed and are not subject to further validation.247 
                                                     
247  See also the overview of the Combat System Design at page 8 of the Alliance CEO’s letter to the 
ANAO, reproduced in Appendix 2. 
  
ANAO Audit Report No.22 2013–14 




Regulatory  System  has  assurance  mechanisms  to  provide  high  levels  of 





work. Consequently,  it may  not  be  until December  2014—when  the  combat 
system of Ship 1  is scheduled  to be  fully  installed—that  the AWD Program’s 
system‐level tests and evaluations, on board the ship and at sea, will begin to 
fully  verify  and  validate  system  performance  against  function  and 
performance specifications. In January 2014, the AWD Alliance CEO informed 
the  ANAO  that,  of  1986  Combat  System  requirements,  864  had  been  fully 
completed and are not subject to further validation.247 
                                                     
247  See also the overview of the Combat System Design at page 8 of the Alliance CEO’s letter to the 
ANAO, reproduced in Appendix 2. 
 
 
ANAO Audit Report No.22 2013–14 
Air Warfare Destroyer Program 
 
169 
5. Design Progress 
This  chapter  examines  the Hobart‐class DDG  design,  design  and  construction  risk 
reduction, and the incorporation of design changes into the Hobart‐class. 
Introduction 
5.1 No matter how well planned a project has been,  if there  is  inadequate 
control over changes, this will compromise the  likelihood of completing  it on 
schedule  and  to  budget.248  The  AWD  Program  sought  to  mitigate  design 
change  risks by basing  the Hobart‐class DDGs on  the F‐104 platform, which 






from  lessons  learned  in  the  construction  and  operation  of  the  F‐100s  were 
applied to the fifth Spanish frigate, the F‐105, and many of these changes have 
been included in the Hobart‐class DDG platform design.249 
5.3 On  receipt  of  the  Second  Pass  government  approval  in  June  2007, 
Defence, with the agreement of the Industry Participants, engaged Navantia as 
the Hobart‐class Platform System Designer, responsible for: 
(a) modifying  the  design  of  the  Platform  System  for  the  F‐104  to  take 
account  of  an  Australianised  Combat  System  (based  on  the  Aegis 
Weapon  System),  obsolescence,  Australian  legislative  requirements250 
and specified platform changes; and 
(b) providing to Defence the design of the Platform System for the Hobart‐
class  DDGs,  and  other  goods  and  services,  including  production 
information and  technology  transfer,  training and other assistance  (all 
                                                     
248  Bentley, C., Prince2: a practical handbook, 2nd edn, Elsevier Butterworth-Heinemann, Oxford, 2002, 
p. 217. 
249  The fifth Álvaro de Bazán-class FFG, F-105 Cristóbal Colón, was commissioned into the Spanish 
Navy in October 2012. 
250  Such as compliance with requirements for protected fuel tanks, appropriate sewage treatment, and 
doors that open to 90 degrees. 
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forming  part  of  the  Platform  System  Design  Supplies)  to  allow  the 
DDGs  to  be  constructed,  and  thereafter  used  and  maintained,  by 
Defence. 
5.4 Other  inputs  to  the  Platform  System  Design  come  directly  from  the 
day‐to‐day Navantia and AWD Alliance collaboration, which seeks to improve 
the design from the end‐user standpoint. Any changes to the design after the 
Platform  System  Design  contract  was  awarded  in  October  2007  were  to  be 
managed by Engineering Change Proposal and Contract Amendment Proposal 
processes. 
5.5 Platform  System  design  changes  may  be  considered  as  evolutionary 









program.  Accurate  and  clear  design  documentation,  and  rapid  feedback  to 
resolve design problems and issues are necessary for minimising rework251 and 
associated cost and schedule overruns during construction.252 
5.6 Figure  5.1  shows  the  complex network of domestic  and  international 
relationships and  the communications necessary  to provide  the DDG design, 
produce  blocks,  report  problems  and  issues,  and  receive  feedback  from  the 
designer on technical queries. 
                                                     
251  As discussed in Chapter 6, rework may not be limited to one ship, as the AWD Program involves 
parallel work that can affect all three ships. 
252  In the latest ANAO 2012–13 Major Projects Report, the DMO acknowledged design change 
management as a major project issue, and stated that it will impact cost and possibly schedule. The 
DMO further stated that the severity of the cost and schedule impacts to the Commonwealth will be 
dependent on the scope and timing of the change implementation relative to ship completion. ANAO 
Report No.12, 2013–14, 2012–13 Major Projects Report, p. 157. 
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Figure 5.1: Design distribution and feedback loops in the AWD 
Program 
 
Source: ANAO analysis. 
Note: PIR—Problem and Issue Report. 
TQ—Technical Queries. 
Design and construction risk reduction 
5.7 The  effective  creation  of  a  design  requires  a  workforce  with  the 
appropriate skills, the capacity to complete the task on time, and the tools, data 




a  report  on  the  shared modular  build  of warships,  prepared  by  the RAND 
Corporation  for  the  US  Navy,  identified  several  key  areas  of  focus  for  risk 
reduction.254  These  areas,  and  the  ANAO’s  summary  assessment  of  their 
management as part of the AWD Program, are set out in Table 5.1 below. 
                                                     
253  Department of Defence, Defence Materiel Organisation, Future Submarine Industry Skills Plan. A Plan 
for the Naval Shipbuilding Industry, May 2013, p. 51. 
254  National Defense Research Institute, Shared Modular Build of Warships: How a Shared Build Can 
Support Future Shipbuilding, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 2011, pp. 39–40. The term ‘modular 
build’ is equivalent to the ‘block construction’ terminology generally used in this ANAO report. 
  
ANAO Audit Report No.22 2013–14 
Air Warfare Destroyer Program 
 
172 
Table 5.1: AWD Program risk reduction areas, and ANAO’s summary 
assessment of the AWD Program 
Key risk 
area 
Description ANAO assessment 
Design 
completion 
Detailed design255 is a key step in 
mitigating rework requirements during 
module integration, because it allows 
better quality control and ensures 
accurate and timely stock delivery to the 
production process. This becomes even 
more important when those modules are 
to be built at two or more locations. In 
particular, the design at the module 
interfaces needs to be fully understood 
and, therefore, practically complete for 
modules to integrate easily and at least 
cost. 
The detailed design, in terms of 
construction drawings, continues to 
be changed. Design completion has 
therefore not been achieved (see 
paragraphs 5.36 to 5.61). 
                                                     
255  In commercial shipbuilding, the three design phases typically involve: 
 basic design: fix ship steel structure and set hydrodynamics; design safety systems and get 
approvals from applicable authorities; route all major distributive systems, including electricity, 
water, and other utilities; ensure that the ship will meet the performance specification; complete 
(shipbuilder) and review (buyer); 
 functional design: provide further iteration of the basic design (generally equates to 3-D modelling); 
provide information on exact position of piping and other outfitting in each block; complete 
(shipbuilder) and review (buyer); and 
 detail (production) design: generate work instructions that show detailed system information, and 
include guidance for subcontractors and suppliers, installation drawings, schedules, materials lists, 
and lists of prefabricated materials and parts; often outsourced by shipbuilder and generally not 
reviewed by buyer. 
 US Government Accountability Office, High levels of knowledge at key points differentiate commercial 
shipbuilding from Navy shipbuilding, Washington DC, May 2009, GAO-09-322, pp. 23–4. This GAO 
report found that in US Navy shipbuilding programs, new designs often make little use of prior ship 
designs. As a result, a full understanding of the effort needed to execute a program is rarely achieved 
at the time a design and construction contract is negotiated. Further, complete information on the 
systems that will be installed on the ship may not be available, leading to changes that ripple through 
the design as knowledge grows. Starting construction without a stable design is a common practice, 
and the resulting volatility leads to costly out-of-sequence work and rework. 
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Description ANAO assessment 
Motivating 
cooperation 
Contractual requirements are only the 
first stage of cooperation between 
shared-build shipyards. For the more 
complex warships, a higher level of trust 
and openness is needed between the 
parties involved. This can be difficult 
when there is an underlying and 
continuing shipbuilding competition. 
Strong collaboration can lead to shared 
best practices and reduced costs. The 
government (or Navy) has a role to play 
in bringing shared-build yards together, 
and can encourage cooperation by, for 
example, contracting structures and 
profit share arrangements. 
There is evidence of cooperative 
arrangements between the three 
Australian shipyards involved in the 
AWD Program. This is reinforced by 
alliance management processes and 
the emphasis on the importance of 
achieving shared responsibility for 
outcomes expressed in the cost-plus-
incentive-fee Alliance contract (see 
paragraphs 3.29 to 3.32). The 
delegation by the Commonwealth to 
the Industry Participants of 
responsibility for the day-to-day 
management of the Platform System 
Design contract provides for 
collaboration between the parties. In 
practice, in response to immaturity in 
the detailed design, the AWD 
Alliance has had to take measures to 
better leverage Navantia’s knowledge 
and experience into the Alliance (see 





Shipyards involved in a shared-build 
strategy need to reach a detailed and 
common understanding of what affects 
the module interfaces and their 
integration. Such commonality requires 
either common design software or 
compatible software linked to a common 
design data bank. 
All three shipyards are required to 
build the Hobart-class DDGs using 
mandatory specifications and 
supportive guidance contained within 
the Technical Data Package provided 
by Navantia (see paragraphs 5.27 to 
5.32, and 6.5 to 6.11). Since 2011, 
these shipyards have used a 
software-based dimensional 
accuracy control system to ensure 
the required dimensional accuracy is 
achieved (see paragraphs 6.13 to 
6.21). While the shipyards do not 
share a 3-D Computer Aided Design 
(CAD) model of the platform design, 
since July 2010, Navantia’s team at 
ASC has had access to a 3-D CAD 
model of the Hobart-class DDG 
design to assist in resolving design 
issues (see paragraph 5.64(c)). 
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Aligning production practices requires 
each yard, and in particular the 
integration yard, to understand 
differences in production processes. This 
is of vital importance at the interfaces of 
complex, outfitted modules. Aligning the 
production schedules also requires 
pacing module construction to the same 
completion drumbeat. 
Each shipyard involved in the AWD 
Program has developed production 
processes in line with its particular 
facilities and workforce. There have 
been significant changes in block 
allocations between the shipyards in 
response to construction issues (see 
paragraphs 6.48 to 6.51). At the time 
of the audit, the AWD Program was 
dealing with a large number of 
Corrective Action Requests from an 
Integrated Baseline Review, which 
noted that the schedule was at risk of 
failure despite recent review work 
(see paragraphs 6.81 to 6.92). 
Source: ANAO analysis of Defence records. 
Note: Risk areas and descriptions are based on: National Defense Research Institute, Shared Modular 
Build of Warships: How a Shared Build Can Support Future Shipbuilding, RAND Corporation, 
Santa Monica, 2011, p. xiv. 
5.9 In  2006,  when  the  AWD  Program  was  preparing  for  Second  Pass 
approval of the build phase (Phase 3), the design and engineering assumptions 
for SEA 4000 were that: 
 The  Shipbuilder  (ASC)  was  reliant  on  the  Platform  System Designer 
(Navantia) to provide the ship design capability to deliver full detailed 
design data packs. 
 It  was  expected  that  the  Shipbuilder  would  have  a  design  and 
engineering department with sufficient capability  to complete specific 
AWD production engineering activities. The primary role of the design 
and engineering department would be  to verify  that  the design work 








256  Existing Design Project Manager, ASC AWD Shipbuilder Pty Ltd, Existing Design Estimating 
Assumptions, prepared for DMO, 15 December 2006, p. 15. 
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256  Existing Design Project Manager, ASC AWD Shipbuilder Pty Ltd, Existing Design Estimating 
Assumptions, prepared for DMO, 15 December 2006, p. 15. 
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as part  of  SEA  4000 Phase  2,  to  assess  the way  forward;  and  by  the  end  of 
Phase  2, was  confident  that  design  issues would  not  impact  unduly  on  the 
construction program. While Defence  could  reasonably derive  confidence, as 
part of that process, from Navantia’s long history and experience in designing 
and building warships, a less tangible but nonetheless important consideration 
in  the  Australian  context  would  have  been  Navantia’s  lack  of  previous 
experience  in  exporting  a  design  to  a  third‐party  shipyard.  This  factor, 
combined  with  the  non‐inclusion  of  Navantia  in  the  Alliance  contract 
(discussed  in Chapter 3), has added risks to the AWD Program that were not 
fully  assessed  as  part  of  SEA  4000  Phase  2.  The  ANAO  has  observed  (see 
paragraph 3.76) that, ideally, an alliance should include the key contributors to 
the  task  being  undertaken,  and  when  it  is  not  possible  to  achieve  a 
comprehensive  alliance  arrangement  because  of  the  stance  taken  by  an 
industry  contributor,  appropriate  governance  and  operational  arrangements 
should  be  established  to  mitigate  the  associated  risks  and  enable  effective 
integration between the key contributors to the project. Similarly, there would 
be merit  in  assessing  the past  experience  and performance of key  capability 
partners in respect to working in a distributed shipbuilding context. 
5.11 In  a  similar  vein,  prior  to  the  AWD  build  program,  ASC  lacked 
shipbuilding  experience.  As  noted  in  paragraph  2.18,  during  Phase  2,  in 
recognition  of  its  lack  of  shipbuilding  experience,  ASC  engaged  Bath  Iron 
Works to provide expertise in shipbuilding technology and interim design and 
construction  risk  reduction. The Alliance  informed  the ANAO  that Bath  Iron 
Works  personnel  were  also  appointed  to  key  Alliance  positions,  including 
Shipbuilding  Director  and  Technical  Director,  and  Platform  System  Design 
representatives were stationed at all three yards (ASC, Forgacs and BAE). 
Lead Yard Services 
5.12 When  a  lead  shipbuilder  transfers  its  design,  it  is  common  for  the 
shipbuilder  to  also  provide  Shipbuilding  Lead  Yard  Services  of  the  kind 
needed  to address  the key risk areas outlined  in Table 5.1. These services are 
defined as  the collective services  that  the  lead shipbuilder  for a class of ships 
will provide  to another shipyard  that  is building  follow‐on ships of  the same 
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5.13 However,  the Alliance  formed  the view  that  the design‐to‐production 
process could operate effectively without Navantia providing extensive Lead 





the  relevant  time  was  reasonable,  as  the  F‐100  design  had  been  built  four 
times,  and  the  fifth  [ship of  that  class] was  in production well  ahead of  the 
AWD  production  schedule.  The  expectation  was  that  production  issues, 
commonly captured in ‘as built’ or ‘red lines’, would have been fed back into 
the  design  after  the  first‐of‐class  had  been  built  and  tested  in  Spain  by 




sound  design,  there  remained  significant  untested  expectations  about  the 
quality of the detailed design documentation to be provided by Navantia. 
5.15 Navantia  raised  issues  with  the  ANAO  in  relation  to  the  design‐to‐
production process adopted for the Hobart‐class DDGs. Specifically: 
                                                     
257  UK National Audit Office, HC98-III Session 2007–2008, The Landing Ship Dock (Auxiliary) Project, 30 
November 2007, pp. 7, 13. 
258  These drawings are usually the original design drawings revised to reflect any changes made in the 
shipyard, such as changes to pipe or duct routing or to electrical-cable tray routing or terminal-unit 
locations. ‘As built’ drawings may be derived from ‘red line’ drawings, which are essentially 
intermediate drawings that show corrections or changes made to previous drawings. The term ‘red 
line’ refers to the usual practice of using red pens to amend drawings by hand to reflect changes made 
during block production. 
259  Navantia, in its January 2014 response to an extract from this audit report, stated that ‘The design of 
the Australian AWD is very different from that of the existing F-104, incorporating lessons learnt from 
the Spanish Navy’s F-105 (not all known at the time of the contract), implementing Australian 
regulations, and taking account of obsolescence, Contract Amendment Proposals, etc. All these items, 
together with the supply chain information modifications in respect to F-104 equipment, imply a very 
relevant number of revisions/modifications to the existing F-104 design, to be implemented at the time 
that the information is made available to the designer—in most cases out of the designer’s control.’ 
See page 1 of Navantia’s comments to the ANAO, reproduced in Appendix 5. 
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 the  build  sequence  was  driven  by  the  installation  of  the  Combat 
System,  and  the  sequence was not  the  same  as  that  followed  for  the 
F‐100; 
 the  Intermediate Products  (used  to plan and budget  the construction) 
were not defined in line with Navantia’s drawings structure, leading to 
a mismatch with Navantia supplies260; and 
 some  procedures  and  building  strategies  developed  by  Bath  Iron 
Works were not directly applicable to the Hobart‐class DDGs.261 
5.16 While  the  Alliance  has  taken  steps  to  better  integrate  Navantia’s 
knowledge and experience over  time  (as discussed at paragraphs 5.62  to 5.69 
below), a key  lesson  to be drawn  for  future  shipbuilding programs  is  that a 
higher  level  of  integration  should  be  sought  between  the  designer  and 
shipbuilder throughout the program. Further, the advice provided by ASC and 
Navantia at paragraphs 5.13 and 5.15 above indicates that the Phase 2 (design) 
process,  and  subsequent  design  reviews  (discussed  below),  were  not  fully 
effective  in  working  through  a  range  of  fundamental  issues  relating  to  the 
design, which continue to impact on the program’s build phase. 
Design progress 
5.17 The  Hobart‐class  DDG  design  process  commenced  within  Defence’s 
Capability  Development  Group  when,  with  the  assistance  of  the  DMO,  the 
DDGs’ requirements were defined. This process (outlined in paragraphs 4.4 to 
4.8)  produced  the  AWD  Alliance  contract’s  Hobart  Class  Platform  System 
Specification  (HCPSS) and Hobart Class Systems Specification  (HCSS). These 
documents  specified  the  DDGs’  functional  requirements  from  the  RAN’s 
operational‐use perspective, and the DDGs’ critical performance requirements, 
which  form  the  basis  for  design  acceptance  tests  and  evaluations,  and 
operational tests and evaluations. 
                                                     
260  In its January 2014 response to an extract from this audit report, ASC stated that ‘the requirement to 
adjust the content, structure and schedule of design product deliveries in the PSD Contract in order to 
align with the AWD Build Strategy remains vague, and a major source of frustration for the Alliance 
parties. For example, as the Technical Data Package (TDP) content, structure and delivery schedule 
specified in the PSD Contract is based on Navantia’s own build strategies for its shipyards, the 
resulting design products have not aligned with the AWD Build Strategy (i.e. a distributed vs 
centralised build strategy).’ See page 2 of ASC’s letter to the ANAO, reproduced in Appendix 3. 
261  The Alliance CEO informed the ANAO that the build sequence was driven by the Osborne shipyard 
design, which included level facilities, as against the inclined‐way facilities used by Navantia. 
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Production of functional drawings and construction drawings, and 

















5.20 The  development  of  construction  drawings  commenced  in  August 
2008, and was scheduled  for completion  in August 2011. As  the Hobart‐class 
platform  design  is  based  on  Navantia’s  F‐104  design,  some  construction 
drawings not affected by  the agreed changes  to  the F‐104 configuration were 
provided  to  the AWD Alliance prior  to  the completion of  the Critical Design 
Review  in  December  2009  (see  paragraph  5.22).  Construction  drawings 
produced during  the 2008  to 2010 period  focused on product definitions and 
construction optimisation processes. 
5.21 The Hobart‐class DDGs’ Preliminary Design Review (PDR) commenced 
in December  2008  and  concluded  in  February  2009, with  the  completion  of 
follow‐up  actions.  The  PDR  was  conducted  by  Navantia  over  a  three‐day 
period,  and  was  attended  by  Alliance  and  Commonwealth  representatives. 
                                                     
262  The term ‘drawing’ has to be understood in the traditional sense; the drawings may be composed of a 
number of sheets (hundreds, in many cases) containing sketches, arrangements, general notes and 
information, instructions, material lists, numerical tables, weights and centre of gravity, etc. 
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all  been  defined  appropriately  and  satisfied  their  parent  requirements; 
approaches  to  the next  level  of design development had  been  appropriately 
planned; and risks were identified and appropriate risk mitigation plans were 
in  place.  Once  the  PDR  was  complete,  more  detailed  design  activities 
commenced, and these continued throughout 2009. 
Critical Design Review 
5.22 The  Critical  Design  Review  (CDR)  was  conducted  in  November–












 the  building  blocks  were  either  ready  for  further  development, 
adequately  defined  for  procurement,  or  adequately  defined  for 
fabrication. 
5.24 The  November  2009  final  report  of  the  Platform  System  CDR 
complimented Navantia on the quality of the functional design, and concluded 
that  ‘the  team  is  well  positioned  to  proceed  through  Detail  Design  and 




[The Critical Design Review] was contractually set  for  the  functional design, 
not the detailed design. This is a critical distinction, noting that the majority of 
the Technical Data Package maturity  issues  [arising during  the build phase] 
relate to the detailed design of the platform and not the functional design. 
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5.26 The construction of  the DDGs began  in December 2009, a month after 
the CDR  report had noted  that  the program was well positioned  to proceed 
through detailed design and construction. In 2013, the AWD Program Manager 
identified  one  of  the  challenges  at  the  outset  of  the  AWD  Program  as 
‘concurrent platform system design and build’.263 Nevertheless, neither of  the 
program’s design reviews covered the detailed design of the DDGs. 
Delivery of platform construction Technical Data 
5.27 The effectiveness of a shared or distributed‐build strategy, such as that 
employed  by  the  AWD  Program,  is  reliant  on  the  shipbuilders  receiving 
accurate  and  stable  technical  data  packages.  These  are  necessary  to  enable 
efficient production  and  effective  quality  assurance processes. They  are  also 
necessary  contractually,  because,  in  the  case  of  distributed‐build  programs, 
accurate  and  stable  technical data  enables  lead  shipyards  and  subcontractor 
shipyards  to agree and work  to criteria  for completion and acceptance of  the 
various ship blocks which make up the vessel. 
5.28 Navantia  is  required  to  provide  Technical  Data  Package  Category 1 
deliverables  that  conform  to  the  HCPSS.  The  designer  is  also  required  to 
provide  Technical  Data  Package  Category  2  deliverables,  which  contain 
reference  information  to  assist  with  the  construction,  testing,  trialling  and 
delivery  of  the  DDGs  in  Australia.  The  block  design  data  packs  were 
scheduled  for  delivery  progressively  between  the  completion  of  functional 
drawings in February 2009 and the completion of the last block design data in 
April 2011. 
5.29 Under  the  Platform  System  Design  contract,  the  Technical  Data 
Package  is  subject  to  review  at  six‐monthly  intervals,  with  either  accuracy 
confirmed  or  the  drawing(s)  updated  and  reissued  by  the  Platform  System 
Designer through a process known as Maintenance Drops. 
5.30 The Category 1 Technical Data Package, as delivered  for Approval or 
Acceptance,  should  comprise  all  the  Platform  System  Design  information 
needed  for  a  professional,  skilled  shipbuilder  to  construct,  test,  trial  and 
deliver  the Platform System  for  the DDGs, and  for a skilled Combat System–
Systems Engineer to install and physically integrate the Australianised Combat 
                                                     
263  AWD Program Manager, speech to Pacific 2013 International Maritime Conference, Sydney, 
8 October 2013. 
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263  AWD Program Manager, speech to Pacific 2013 International Maritime Conference, Sydney, 
8 October 2013. 
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5.31 The  Category  2  Technical  Data  Package  provides  supporting 








5.32 The  Category  1  Technical  Data  Package  supplies  from  Navantia  are 
warranted to be fit for the purpose for which they are provided. 
Acceptance of Platform System Design supplies 
5.33 After  Navantia  has  delivered  its  design  documentation  to  the  DMO 
through Navantia’s NECORA system,  the Alliance’s Platform System Design 
group  then manages  these Platform System Design supplies. On advice  from 
the  Industry  Participants,  the  PSD  Director  may  accept  or  reject  these 
supplies.264  If  they  conform  to  the  contract  requirements,  they  are  formally 
accepted and made available for use by the Alliance. 
5.34 If  a  delivery  of  Platform  System  Design  supplies  contains  a  Key 
Platform  System Design  Supply,  and  has  been  accepted prior  to  the  related 
                                                     
264  The PSD Director, nominated by the Industry Participants, is the Commonwealth Representative’s 
delegate. 
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Design  contract  cannot  be  applied.  However,  under  those  circumstances, 
contractual  remedies  still  exist, by way of  requiring Navantia  to make good 
any omissions, defects or non‐conforming materials or work  in  the Platform 
System Design supplies, at no cost to the Commonwealth.265 
5.35 From  these  Platform  System  Design  supplies,  ASC  compiles  work 
packs  containing  fabrication  and  installation  data,  for  use  by  the  shipyard 
production  teams.  ASC’s  work  packs  are  then  used  by  each  shipyard  to 
produce work  instructions and procedures  that  take  into account each yard’s 
internal practices, skills and resources. 
Immaturity in the detailed design 
5.36 AWD  Alliance  records  indicate  that  drawing  revisions  and  updates 
have occurred for a variety of reasons, as categorised in Table 5.2. 
Table 5.2: Categories of Hobart-class DDG design change 
Change category Description 
Certification Changes required to achieve certification by regulatory 
bodies (e.g. security, explosive ordnance, aviation). 
Platform System Design Omission Changes required to correct errors or omissions in the 
Platform System Design identified by Navantia. 
F-105 Lessons Learned Changes to the Platform System Design identified by 
the Spanish F-105 Build and Test Programs. 
Ship 1 Lessons Learned Changes identified by the Alliance during the AWD 
Build and Test Programs to correct Technical Data 
Package errors and omissions. 
Design Issues Changes necessary to resolve Problem and Issues 
Reports and Technical Queries 
Commonwealth-requested Change Changes requested by the AWD Program Management 
Office. 
System Safety Changes required to address hazards identified by the 
Alliance System Safety Program. 
Obsolescence Changes required to address equipment obsolescence 
issues. 
                                                     
265  The Platform System Design contract does not contain provisions relating to compensation payable to 
the Commonwealth for the cost of rework that can be directly attributed to omissions or defects in the 
Platform System Design supplies. As discussed below (see paragraphs 5.36 to 5.38), it is difficult to 
explicitly attribute the sources of design change to a particular cause. The main recourse for defective 
supplies is rectification of the supplies under warranty. 
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Change category Description 
Combat System Design Vendor 
Furnished Information 
Combat System design changes promulgated through 
Vendor Furnished Information. 
Non-compliance Changes to the platform required to address design 
non-compliances with the specified requirements. 
Legislative Compliance Changes required to comply with legislative 
requirements. 
Platform System Vendor 
Furnished Information 
Changes required to comply with changes to Platform 
System Vendor Furnished Information (for example, 
changes in equipment installation requirements). 
Integrated Logistics System Changes required to address issues identified by 
Integrated Logistics System analyses, for example, the 
need to carry additional support equipment. 
On-board Allowance List Changes required to accommodate items on the ship’s 
On-board Allowance List. 
Source: AWD Alliance. 
5.37 The total number of construction drawings for the Hobart‐class DDG is 
2132, and the total number of revisions issued as at October 2013 was 6071.266 
Overall,  the  high  number  of  revisions  and  the  range  of  design  change 
categories indicate significant immaturity in the detailed design of the Hobart‐
class DDGs. 
5.38 During  the  audit,  the  ANAO  was  advised  by  the  parties  that  it  is 
difficult to calculate the contribution of different causes to the  level of design 
change. Further, there has been disagreement over the relative contribution of 
causes  of  design  changes.  The  Alliance  CEO  has  estimated,  based  on 
management  judgement,  that  over  half  of  detailed  design  change  is  due  to 
defects and deficiencies  in drawings.267 The ASC  informed  the ANAO  that  it 
had no  reason  to  suspect  that  these drawings  failed  to  incorporate  ‘as built’ 
design corrections and  lessons  learned from the construction of the F‐105. On 
the  other  hand,  Navantia  has  emphasised  that  over  1700  drawings  were 
affected  by  Contract  Amendment  Proposals,  and  that  Vendor  Furnished 
                                                     
266  Navantia informed the ANAO in November 2013 that it estimated some 2400 of the revised drawings 
involved significant changes, while the rest mainly addressed minor errors, editorial matters, technical 
queries, and so forth. 
267  The Alliance CEO informed the ANAO in October 2013 that design defects and deficiencies were 
estimated to account for 63 per cent of the total volume of change experienced on the project. F-105 
lessons learned were estimated to account for 15 per cent; and late, defective or deficient Vendor 
Furnished Information for 13 per cent. 
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Figure 5.2: DDG blocks affected by Platform System Design Contract 


























Source: Navantia, November 2013. 
5.40 Navantia  also  emphasised  that  it  invested  significant  resources  to 
incorporate  additional  detail  into  the  construction  drawings  for  the  less 
experienced  Australian  shipyards,  as  compared  to  drawings  for  its  own 
shipyard.  Navantia  noted  that,  in  its  own  shipyard,  many  minor  design 
changes  are  resolved  ‘on  the  spot’ by  its  experienced production workforce, 
rather than through the revision of design documentation.270 
                                                     
268  While acknowledging that a larger proportion of all drawing changes was attributable to Navantia, 
Navantia considered that no more than 10 per cent of the significant drawing changes have occurred 
as a result of errors or lessons learned from the F-105, and that external sources such as contract 
amendments and Vendor Furnished Information have been the main causes of significant changes to 
drawings. 
269  See Table 3.2 for a list of the approved Platform System Design Contract Amendment Proposals that 
have affected the design. 
270  The Alliance CEO informed the ANAO in January 2014 that the Alliance is building in accordance with 
the Category 1 Technical Data Package. Any deviations from this design documentation require 
Commonwealth and/or Platform System Designer endorsement, which limits ‘on the spot’ changes 
being made by the Alliance production workforce. 
 See also discussion of the Threshold Document at paragraphs 6.22 to 6.24. 
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 The  early  Technical  Data  Package  deliveries  covering  functional 
descriptions  and  Purchase  Technical  Specifications  were,  in  general, 
acceptable  for  use.271  However,  when  deliveries  of  construction 
drawings  commenced  in  2009,  it  became  apparent  that  there  were 
drawing quality issues. 
 It  was  not  until  2010,  when  Alliance  block  production  work  had 
advanced  to a  stage where design  interface defects272 were arising on 
the  blocks,  that  the potential  extent  and  implications  of  these defects 
became  apparent.  The  defects  and  deficiencies  associated  with  the 
Technical  Data  Package  construction  drawings  had,  to  that  point  in 
time,  included missing dimensions, missing detail,  translation  errors, 
and CAD errors. This resulted  in the rework and redelivery of a  large 
number  of  drawings.  The  redeliveries  invariably  occurred  later  than 
expected  for  Ship  1,  with  consequent  block  rework  and  resource 
implications. 
 Navantia was  incrementally  supplying  revised design drawings with 
errors  corrected,  in  compliance  with  the  Platform  System  Design 
contract’s warranty provisions. 
 The drawing defects and deficiencies are not related to the issue of late 




271  However, in October 2013, ASC informed the ANAO that the Purchase Technical Specification 
documents: 
   generally have required numerous updates, noting that, on average to the end of April 2013, each 
Purchase Technical Specification has been revised 3.8 times (see Figure 5.5). Many of these 
revisions subsequently require formal changes to subcontracts where they are delivered after a 
subcontract is executed (this is in addition to known changes, that is, revisions to incorporate 
changes required from negotiations with subcontractors). This invariably generates additional cost. 
272  A design interface defect can result in pipes not connecting, for example. 
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Vendor Furnished Information 
5.42 In  order  to meet  its  contracted  obligations, Navantia  relies  upon  the 
Alliance  for  the  timely  supply  of  Vendor  Furnished  Information  for  the 
purpose  of  completing design drawings  needed  for  equipment  installations. 
The supply of this Vendor Furnished Information should have been completed 
by  March  2011  (some  41  months  after  contract  signature).  For  a  variety  of 
reasons,  the delivery milestones  for Vendor Furnished  Information were not 
achieved. As a consequence, Technical Data Package deliveries  for  the blocks 
containing Combat System equipment and related systems were either late or 
incomplete.  However,  in  cases  where  Vendor  Furnished  Information  was 
incomplete, provision  in  the Technical Data Package had been made  for  the 
space,  weight  and  platform  system  requirements  of  the  Combat  System 
equipment  and  related  systems.  Platform  design  statistics  show  that 
subsequent  Technical  Data  Package  updates  occurred  as  additional  Vendor 
Furnished Information was made available. 
Extent of design change 
5.43 In  relation  to  the  amount of  change  to be  expected  in  a  shipbuilding 
program,  a RAND Corporation  report  published  in  2005  identified  that  the 
scale  and  cost  of  change  differed  between  commercial  and  military 
shipbuilding programs: 
Military  ships of a given class may have a unique design, while commercial 
vessels  tend  to be more  evolutionary or produced  from  established designs. 
When changes are made, they are accomplished within just one to four weeks 
for  commercial vessels but  require  from  four  to 22 weeks  for military  ships. 
Contractors we interviewed also indicated that commercial ship changes, even 
for complex projects, also  tend  to be smaller  than  those  for military ships, as 
indicated  by  the  value  of  change  orders,  approximately  4  percent  of  total 
vessel  cost  for  new  production  for  commercial  ships  and  approximately 
8 percent for military ships.273 
                                                     
273  RAND Europe, Monitoring the Progress of Shipbuilding Programmes, MG-235, RAND Corporation, 
Santa Monica, 2005, pp. 24–5. 
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incomplete.  However,  in  cases  where  Vendor  Furnished  Information  was 
incomplete, provision  in  the Technical Data Package had been made  for  the 
space,  weight  and  platform  system  requirements  of  the  Combat  System 
equipment  and  related  systems.  Platform  design  statistics  show  that 
subsequent  Technical  Data  Package  updates  occurred  as  additional  Vendor 
Furnished Information was made available. 
Extent of design change 
5.43 In  relation  to  the  amount of  change  to be  expected  in  a  shipbuilding 
program,  a RAND Corporation  report  published  in  2005  identified  that  the 
scale  and  cost  of  change  differed  between  commercial  and  military 
shipbuilding programs: 
Military  ships of a given class may have a unique design, while commercial 
vessels  tend  to be more  evolutionary or produced  from  established designs. 
When changes are made, they are accomplished within just one to four weeks 
for  commercial vessels but  require  from  four  to 22 weeks  for military  ships. 
Contractors we interviewed also indicated that commercial ship changes, even 
for complex projects, also  tend  to be smaller  than  those  for military ships, as 
indicated  by  the  value  of  change  orders,  approximately  4  percent  of  total 
vessel  cost  for  new  production  for  commercial  ships  and  approximately 
8 percent for military ships.273 
                                                     
273  RAND Europe, Monitoring the Progress of Shipbuilding Programmes, MG-235, RAND Corporation, 
Santa Monica, 2005, pp. 24–5. 
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5.44 Other  studies  indicate  that  real  cost  changes,  as  a  result  of  design 
changes, amounting to 15 per cent for lead warships and 10 per cent for follow‐
on warships are not unreasonable.274 
5.45 Defence  informed  the  ANAO  that,  in  terms  of  hours  worked,  the 
amount  of  design  change  experienced  by  the  AWD  Program  to  the  end  of 
Maintenance Drop 1 (October 2011) amounted to around seven per cent of the 
budgeted cost of  the build program. Since  then  the amount of design change 
has increased, predominantly with the commencement of Maintenance Drop 2 






5.46 Figure  5.3  is  an  extract  from  an  AWD  Alliance  report  showing  the 
extent of design document changes received from Navantia via Technical Data 
Package  updates,  from  the  commencement  of  the  Platform  System  Design 
contract  in  October  2007  to  March  2013.  The  grey  column  for  each  month 
shows  the  number  of  initial  documents  delivered,  while  the  blue  column 
shows the number of revisions delivered. 
                                                     
274  See, for example, DL Clark, DM Howell, and CE Wilson, Improving naval shipbuilding project 
efficiency through rework reduction, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 2007, pp. 62–8. 
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Figure 5.3: Platform System Design document revisions, 
October 2007–March 2013 
 
Source: AWD Alliance, April 2013. 
Note: This figure includes data for both construction drawings and other documents; the totals of initial 
documents (3480) and revisions (7240) in this figure are therefore different from the number of 
construction drawings (2132) and revisions (6071) stated in paragraph 5.37. The proportion of 
revised documents in this figure is 208 per cent, while in paragraph 5.37 the proportion is 




Table  5.2,  some  drawing  revisions  were  necessary  to  incorporate  the 
Australianised  Combat  System  and  other  engineering  changes  required  by 
Defence (such as the replacement of the RAST helicopter landing system with 
ASIST). Defence  advised  that  these  engineering  changes, which  followed  an 
Engineering  Change  Proposal  process  and  led  to  the  implementation  of 
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Drops  1  and  2,  and  an  ongoing  Maintenance  Drop  3.275  Overall,  Figure  5.4 
shows  that  the  large number of  revisions continued  into 2012 and 2013, also 
demonstrating that there has been ongoing detailed design immaturity during 
the DDGs’ block construction phase. 
Figure 5.4: Platform System Design construction drawing revisions, 
February 2009–June 2013 
 
Source: AWD Alliance, October 2013. 
5.49 Figure 5.5 shows that, by March 2013, there had been an average of 2.75 
revisions  for  every drawing delivered  for  the  31 blocks  in  each Hobart‐class 
DDG.276 In October 2013, ASC informed the ANAO that: 
While  the data  in Figure 5.5  indicates a high  level of design  change,  it only 
partly reflects the issue. The amount of change in each drawing revision is also 
important,  as  that  is what  generates  the  rework  and  impacts.  For  example, 
                                                     
275  Maintenance Drop 1, involving 881 revised drawings, was delivered from November 2010 to October 
2011. Maintenance Drop 2, involving 1046 revised drawings, was delivered from August 2011 to 
October 2012. Maintenance Drop 3, involving 493 revised drawings, was delivered from March to 
November 2013. As noted in footnote 262, a drawing may include hundreds of sheets. 
276  The average cited includes only the data for blocks, which is a subset of the data shown in Figure 5.5; 
it does not include the data entitled N/A, non-block related, functional, or Procurement Technical 
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only  resulted  in  three minor pipe segment changes, however 100 per cent of 
the pipe work on that block has been changed. 
Figure 5.5: Average number of revisions per drawing delivered, as at 
March 2013 
 
Source: AWD Alliance, March 2013. 
Notes: NBR Non-block related. 
FUNC Functional. 
PTS Purchase Technical Specification. 





to  2.2  revisions  of  structural  drawings,  to  1.4  revisions  of  general  design 
drawings.277 
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Figure 5.6: Drawing revisions by shipbuilding discipline, as at 
March 2013 
 
Source: AWD Alliance, April 2013. 
5.51 Figure 5.7  shows  the categories assigned by Alliance  staff  to Problem 
and Issue Reports in the AWD Alliance’s engineering database. These reports 
are  raised  by  block  building  teams,  and  they  identify  areas  of  the  Platform 
System  Technical  Data  Packages  that  require  clarification  or  additional 
designer input. These reports therefore represent the shop‐floor view of design 
issues,  rather  than  a  definitive  analysis.  As  noted  previously,  without  a 
detailed analysis,  it  is very difficult  to attribute specific causes  to a particular 
design problem. 
5.52 By  discipline,  AWD  Alliance  data  indicates  that  30  per  cent  of  the 
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such  as  heating,  ventilation,  and  air  conditioning  (HVAC),  foundations, 
machinery, protective coatings and insulation.278 
5.53 Of  the  10 813  records  in  the  Problem  and  Issue  Reports  database, 
design interference and design deficiency together accounted for 4996 records, 
or 46.2 per cent of all  records—by  far  the  largest percentage of all  records.279 
The  next  major  grouping  of  categories,  construction  interferences  and 
construction deficiencies, together accounted for 1783 records, or 16.5 per cent 
of all records. 
Figure 5.7: Categories of Problem and Issue Reports, July 2009–
April 2013 
 
Source: ANAO analysis of AWD Alliance data. 
                                                     
278  Because of rounding, figures in this paragraph do not add to 100. 
279  Design interferences include incorrect spacing of structures, equipment, piping systems, cable 
systems and air-conditioning systems. Interferences result in clashes occurring, or correct operation 
being hindered, during or after equipment and system installation. 
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5.54 Each  drawing  revision’s  impact  on  the  construction  program  is 
dependent on when the revision is received. For example, revisions occurring 
before  the  commencement of block  construction may  require  changes  in  the 
supply  of material  to  the  shipbuilder. However,  revisions  received during  a 
block’s construction have a greater  impact, as  these may  result  in a need  for 
costly  and  time‐consuming  rework.  In  the  case  of  similar  blocks  which  are 




high  in shipbuilding terms,  it  is the timing of the delivery of change that has 
had the most significant impact on the AWD Program. 
5.56 Figure  5.8  shows  that  Maintenance  Drop  1  was  typically  received 
between a third and half way through the block construction period for Ship 1. 




has  affected  production,  as  shown  in  [Figure  5.9].  This  figure  represents 
Alliance  experience  to  a  point  of  time  and  the  impact  on  production. New 
emerging issues may have a much greater rework and schedule impact. Of all 
the change received and processed to date, it is estimated that 45 per cent has 
been  accommodated  in  sequence,  either  by  naturally  aligning  with  the 
production  schedule  or  as  a  result  of  the  Alliance  re‐sequencing  work  to 




280  See paragraphs 6.55 to 6.65 for examples of the kind of rework experienced during the construction of 
the first DDG. 
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Figure 5.8: Timing of block construction and of drawing revision 




























































































































































































































































F Final delivery of Initial Drawings
Ship 1 block production period
Maintenance Drop 1
Maintenance Drop 2
 Ship 2 production start  
Source: AWD Alliance, October 2013. 
5.58 Figure 5.9 shows  the Alliance CEO’s estimate of  the  impact of design 
change on the construction program. 
5.59 Navantia informed the ANAO that once a design drawing is delivered 
to  the  Alliance,  it  enters  a  process  in  which  there  are  many  approvals  and 




281  In its January 2014 response to an extract from this audit report, Navantia stated that it is ‘fully 
convinced that the major driver for cost overruns and delays has not been the number of 
modification/revisions/errors/omissions […], but rather the deficiencies in the process and 
management of such issues, which in an experienced shipyard would have had a relatively small 
impact.’ See page 3 of Navantia’s comments to the ANAO, reproduced in Appendix 5. 
 The Alliance CEO informed the ANAO in January 2014 that the design drawing review process was 
new, instigated by the Alliance to manage the ongoing volume of design change being introduced, to 
mitigate its impact on production and to understand its impact so that the DMO could approve the 
change before implementation. 
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Figure 5.8: Timing of block construction and of drawing revision 
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this background,  there would be merit  in Defence working with  its Alliance 
partners and Navantia to review the design change management process, with 
a view to addressing the potential for any further backlogs. 
Figure 5.9: Impact of design change (AWD Alliance estimates) 
 
Source: AWD Alliance, October 2013. 
Notes: These estimates are based on drawing counts and management judgement. They do not consider 
impacts on non-production activities, for example, planning.  
In its January 2014 response to an extract from this audit report, ASC noted that ‘The significant 
period between the initial drawing deliveries and the updated revisions being provided (12–24 
months) has greatly exacerbated’ the impact of design change in Ship 1. See page 3 of ASC’s 
letter to the ANAO, reproduced in Appendix 3. 
5.60 More  fundamentally,  under  the  Platform  System  Design  contract 
Navantia  does  not  have  to  pay  compensation  as  a  result  of  the  timing  or 
volume  of Technical Data Package  revisions. This  is principally  because  the 
Technical Data Package was expected to be revised as the design matured and 
as Australian  requirements were  incorporated  into  it. However,  this has also 




to  eight  per  cent  of  the  total  vessel  cost.  While  not  providing  a  directly 
comparable figure, in October 2013 the Alliance CEO informed the ANAO that 
the volume of design change seen by production is above 20 per cent. The level 
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expected  at  the  time  of  Second  Pass  approval  in  2007.282  When  considering 
these  measures  together  with  the  various  causes  of  design  change,  it  is 
reasonable  to  expect  shipbuilding programs  to  implement  a  range  of  timely 
management  responses  to  address  the  associated  risks, which  are  examined 
below. 
The Alliance’s response to Technical Data immaturity 
5.62 If the Industry Participants consider that the Technical Data Package is 
inconsistent  with  the  contractual  specifications  or  otherwise  deficient  or 
defective, the Alliance contract requires them to report promptly to the DMO 
and  to assist  the DMO  in resolving  the matter,  including by dealing with  the 
Platform System Designer, if necessary.283 
5.63 The  Alliance  has  taken  a  range  of  actions  to  mitigate  the  impact  of 





282  In his January 2014 response to an extract from this audit report, the Alliance CEO outlined his view of 
the headline considerations in relation to the detailed design; see page 5 of the Alliance CEO’s letter 
to the ANAO, reproduced in Appendix 2. 
283  Commonwealth of Australia, ASC AWD Shipbuilder, Raytheon Australia, Air Warfare Destroyer 
(SEA 4000) Alliance Based Target Incentive Agreement, General Conditions of Contract, clause 23. 
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Figure 5.10: Timeline of AWD Alliance actions to address detailed 
design immaturity 
 
Source: AWD Alliance, June 2013. 
Note: The Effective Date of the Alliance contract was 5 October 2007. 




they had  reached  the  required  level of maturity.284 The Project Board 
approved  this  approach,  considering  that  some  block  rework  was 
normally  expected  in  shipbuilding,  and  although  the  imperative  to 
continue working might appear  to not be an effective strategy,  it was 
considered  to  have  benefits.  In  October  2013,  the  Alliance  CEO 
informed the ANAO that: 
                                                     
284  AWD Alliance Industry Participants, Air Warfare Destroyer—SEA 4000-1180: Extension Claim and 
TCE Adjustment Claim, Annex D: Steps taken to minimise schedule delay, 30 March 2012, pp. 2–3. 
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Original  defects  were  tolerable  and  accepted  with  comments.  The 
reason for continuing forward was made as a best‐for‐project decision 
to  hold  schedule  and  cost.  The  later  introduction  of  change  via 
Maintenance Drop 1 and  the  introduction of change by  the Platform 
System Designer was a bigger problem. By then, block production was 
underway and  the delivery schedule was fixed and  ‘insured’  [for  the 
Commonwealth] with Liquidated Damages. 
In  addition,  in  the  Industry  Participants’  view,  by  working 
collaboratively with the Platform System Designer as contemplated by 
the  Alliance  contract  and  Platform  System  Design  contract,  and  not 
triggering  a  contractual  dispute  that  might  have  debilitating 
consequences  for  the  program,  the  Industry  Participants  sought  to 
ensure  that  the  drawings  were  revised,  at  no  additional  cost  to  the 
Commonwealth, under the Platform System Design contract.285   
At  the  time  this  strategy was  adopted,  the  significance of  the defects 
and  deficiencies  for  production  was  not  known.  For  example,  the 
Industry Participants have stated that they were not aware, and had no 
reason  to  suspect,  that  completed  interference  checks286 had not been 
conducted  on  the  drawings  by  Navantia,  nor  were  they  aware  that 
some production lessons learnt on the F‐100 class had not been fed back 
into the drawings. 
(b) Applying  additional  engineering  review  effort  to  the  Technical  Data 
Package  deliveries,  in  order  to  isolate  and  assess  the  impact  of 
construction drawing  changes  on production. This  effort  required  an 
average of  20  full‐time personnel  for  the duration of  the  initial block 
construction drawing deliveries from March 2009 to April 2011. Whilst 
                                                     
285  Even though drawings may be revised under warranty, the cost of consequential block production 
rework is being borne by the Commonwealth as Direct Project Costs. 
286  CAD-assisted clash and interference checking is performed on structures, equipment, piping systems, 
cable systems and air-conditioning systems etc to ensure that they are properly spaced for installation, 
that moving parts such as doors and hatches can move as intended, and that equipment may be 
installed and operated correctly. The overall aim is to discover and solve design problems in the 
drafting room rather than during PO1 and PO2, when design changes often become extremely 
expensive. 
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these  actions  were  successful  in  reducing  the  level  of  defects  and 
deficiencies  that were progressing  into production, some defects were 
extremely  complex,  to  the  extent  of  being  impossible  to  detect  by 
drawing  reviews  alone.  For  example,  drawing  defects  leading  to 
clashes between  structure and piping  remained  in drawings  that had 
been passed to the AWD Alliance production team. It is also important 
to note that by early 2010 the Technical Data Package reviews could not 
be  completed  in  the  time  available,  as  they  had  saturated  the  AWD 
Alliance  shipbuilding  engineering  and  planning  departments’ 
resources.  This  resulted  in  late  releases  of  design  drawings  to  ship 
production.287   
For its part, Navantia established a review team which was intended to 
ensure  that  the  quality  issues  from  the  Initial  Block  Platform 
Construction  Drawing  deliveries  were  not  repeated.  However,  the 
review  process  also  led  to  schedule  delays  (and  additional 
unanticipated  cost)  by  introducing  another  step  into  the  delivery 
process,  which  delayed  the  release  of  drawings  to  the  Industry 
Participants  typically  by  4–8  weeks.  The  Industry  Participants  also 
succeeded  in  having  Navantia  increase  its  design  team  in  Australia 
by 14.   
As  at  June  2013,  the Estimate At Completion  budget  for  engineering 





Platform  System  Design.  The  CAD  model  is  used  by  the  AWD 
Alliance’s planning and production teams to clarify production queries 
and  issues  (often within a  four  to  six‐hour period), and  if possible  to 
reduce the number of queries raised with Navantia.288   
Since July 2010, Navantia has also provided  its team  in Australia with 
remote  access  to  its  full  3‐D  CAD  model  of  the  Hobart‐class  DDG 
design. This enables Navantia to  investigate design  issues and queries 
                                                     
287  By mid-2010, the Alliance was not meeting the Platform System Design contract’s Platform System 
Design data review time of 20 working days or less, as the Block Drawing reviews were typically 
taking two months, and four months for Non Block Related reviews. 
288  For further discussion of 3-D CAD, see paragraphs 6.7 to 6.11. 
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within  its office at ASC, using  the 3‐D CAD model. As a part of  that 
effort,  in  February  2013,  Navantia  established  a  Design  Approval 
Delegate  within  ASC  to  approve  design  changes  (within  his 
delegation),  and  to  update  the  CAD  model.  Overall,  the  Industry 
Participants  consider  that  the  introduction  of  CAD  tools  and  the 
Platform System Design Approval Delegate have delivered significant 
program benefits. 
(d) Conducting  schedule  prioritisation.  The  Alliance  established  a  Block 
Maintenance Drop  release schedule  that aligned, as  far as practicable, 
with  the  production  sequence  for  Ship  1,  and  released  updated 
construction  drawings  to  the  Ship  2  program  in  its  earlier  stages  of 
construction. The Alliance considers that, had this prioritisation action 
not  been  taken,  the  impact  of Maintenance Drop  1  on  Ship  1 would 
have  been  far  greater. These  schedule prioritisation  efforts  continued 
for Maintenance Drop 2. 
(e) Processing  change  more  efficiently,  by  working  with  Navantia  to 
identify drawing changes early and to manage the change effectively at 
the  block  construction  sites.  This  action  included  the  deployment  of 
three full‐time planners from Bath Iron Works (Maine, USA) to Forgacs 
for three months to assist in mitigating the impact of the large number 
of  piping‐related  design  changes.  These  planners  also  worked  with 
Navantia to enable the changes made in drawing updates to be quickly 
identified and their impact on production assessed. 
(f) Introducing  ‘form,  fit and  function’ assessments,  to support  technical, 
risk‐based decisions on whether or not drawing updates are material to 
the  design  intent  and  therefore  whether  they  necessarily  need  to  be 
flowed to production or can be waived. This required close and timely 
collaboration and agreement between the AWD Alliance and the AWD 
Program Management Office  to ensure  that no unacceptable  risk was 
introduced into the program. 
(g) Better  leveraging  of  Navantia’s  F‐100  knowledge  and  experience.  In 
November 2012, stronger links were created between Navantia’s design 
team in Spain and the Alliance’s production team in Australia. The role 
of  Navantia’s  on‐site  resident  team  was  expanded  from  providing  a 
transactional  support  capacity  to  being  fully  integrated  into  the 
Alliance  team.  This  included  the  appointment  and  secondment  of 
Navantia  personnel  to  Australia  to  the  key  Alliance  positions  of 
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Chief Test Engineer. The overall objectives of  these  initiatives  include 
improving  operational  efficiency  and  providing  greater  assurance 
regarding the production schedule by: 
 facilitating  the  interpretation  of  the  platform  design  intent  as 
expressed in the Technical Data Package; 




 improving  non‐conformance  management  and  build  change 
lead times; and 
 supporting whole‐of‐ship certification.289 
(h) Establishing a Collaborative Change Assessment Process  in  June 2013. 
This process involved an assessment of the criticality of design changes 
(that is, whether individual changes are to be implemented or not, and 
how  best  to  treat  change  that  is  to  be  released  to  production).  The 
Alliance informed the ANAO that, although not yet fully adopted as at 
June 2013, this new step was ‘already demonstrating close collaboration 
between  the  parties  to  manage  both  the  volume  and  the  impact  of 
design change’. 
5.65 As  already  noted,  there  has  been  more  immaturity  in  the  detailed 






289  In the 2012–13 Major Projects Report, the DMO acknowledged an emergent risk that ‘The PSD 
contract may not provide the level of support that is required to complete ship construction in a timely 
and cost effective manner’, and stated its remedial action as ‘Establishment of ongoing design support 
services including construction design support and local design authority availability in support of Ship 
construction through to delivery of Ship 03’. ANAO Report No.12, 2013–14, 2012–13 Major Projects 
Report, p. 157. 
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time  issues have continued  to emerge, giving rise  to significant redesign and 
rework  during  construction.  Some  of  the  key  steps  taken  to  better  manage 
immaturity  were  not  implemented  until  late  2012,  and  the  Collaborative 
Change Assessment Process was being developed in June 2013. 
5.67 It was  not  until November  2013,  in  the  course  of  the  audit,  that  the 
ANAO  observed  action  in  accordance  with  the  Alliance  contract  provision 
outlined in paragraph 5.62 above as to how to deal with potentially deficient or 
defective  design  data.  The  Alliance  advised  the  DMO  that  changes  to  keel 
block  drawings  received  in  2013  as  part  of  Maintenance  Drop  3—after  the 
completion of the keel blocks in 2012—indicated ‘that the drawings received in 
2009  were  deficient  and  defective  “resulting  in  an  inability  for  the  ship  to 
function as  specified”’, and  the DMO approached Navantia  for  its advice on 
the matter.290 




would  be  affected.  Navantia  did  not  agree  with  the  Industry  Participants’ 
claim  ‘that  the  drawings  received  in  2009  were  deficient  and  defective 
“resulting  in  an  inability  for  the  ship  to  function  as  specified”’,  noting  its 
experience in successfully delivering the Spanish F‐100 class of ships. 
5.69 During  the  design  phase  of  the  AWD  Program,  the  Alliance  placed 
reliance  on  the  expectation  that  Navantia’s  detailed  design  would  not  be 
subject  to a  large amount of  revision. Further,  the design  reviews conducted 
during the build phase of the AWD Program (see paragraphs 5.18 to 5.26) did 
not  examine  Navantia’s  detailed  design  documentation.  While  the  design 
change management process was one of the matters considered as part of the 
Production Readiness Review  (see paragraphs  6.25  to  6.31),  the Alliance has 
applied a long series of new strategies in order to address significant volumes 
of  change  in  design  documentation  more  efficiently  and  effectively.  These 
factors  highlight  the  need  for  Defence  to  ensure  that  the  design  change 
                                                     
290  Air Warfare Destroyer Program Management Office, Air Warfare Destroyer—Keel Block Pipework 
Changes, AWD/OUT/2013/868, 6 November 2013. 
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290  Air Warfare Destroyer Program Management Office, Air Warfare Destroyer—Keel Block Pipework 
Changes, AWD/OUT/2013/868, 6 November 2013. 
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volume and  timing of design change. Further,  the anticipated  level of design 
change  should be based on project  analysis  and prior  experience  for  similar 
projects.291 
AWD Principals Council and Project Board consideration of 
Technical Data immaturity 
5.70 The  impact  of  design  changes was  discussed  at  the AWD  Principals 
Council’s February  2012 meeting, particularly with  regard  to Technical Data 
Package  changes  received  through Maintenance Drops  1  and  2, which were 
received  from November  2010  and August  2011  respectively  (see paragraph 
5.71).  The minutes  of  this  meeting  recorded  the  CEO  DMO’s  view  that  the 




to do  so.  In  addition,  all parties had  signed off  as being  able  to  execute  the 
program,  and  the Alliance was paid  to manage  the Platform  System Design 
contract, but not its terms and conditions.293 
5.71 The  AWD  Principals  Council’s  February  2012  minutes  also  noted 
advice from the CEO of the AWD Alliance that, amongst other things: 
 the  issue  of  the  Technical  Data  Package  and  design  change  was  the 
single largest program issue, and one of the root causes of the cost and 
schedule issues then being experienced; 
 the  AWD  Program  was  seriously  impacted  by  the  quantity  of  late 
change  to  the  Technical  Data  Package,  particularly  in  Maintenance 
Drops 1 and 2; 
                                                     
291  In the 2013–13 Major Projects Report, the DMO acknowledged that the major challenges faced by the 
AWD Program include: ‘achieving maximum productivity levels through efficient shipyard operation 
and change management’. ANAO Report No.12, 2013–14, 2012–13 Major Projects Report, p. 150. 
292  As noted in paragraph 2.6, the total expenditure on SEA 4000’s prior phases was $262.501 million, 
which constitutes 3.1 per cent of the current $8.455 billion budget for all project phases identified in 
Table 2.1. 
293  AWD Alliance Principals Council, meeting minutes, 20 February 2012, paragraph 17. 
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 the Alliance  believed  that  the Maintenance Drops were  intended  for 
maintenance of the Technical Data Package to correct minor issues, and 
were not the mechanism to introduce large volumes of change; and 
 the delay  being  experienced  by  the program  to have  corrections  and 
lessons  learned  put  into  the  drawings  was  stated  to  be  12  to 
24 months.294 
5.72 As  at November  2013,  the AWD Alliance Principals Council had not 
met  for  21  months—since  February  2012—and  had  not  conducted  further 
deliberations on the Technical Data Package  issue. A further Council meeting 
that had been scheduled for October 2013 had to be postponed. 
5.73 As a consequence of  the design documentation  issues outlined above, 
in March 2012 the Industry Participants submitted to the AWD Alliance Project 
Board a $240.6 million  (December 2006 prices) claim  for a schedule extension 
and  a  Target  Cost  Estimate  adjustment.  This  claim  was  subsequently 
considered by  the Project Board, but  the Board could not come  to agreement 




Whilst  the  Platform  System  Designer  has  worked  diligently  to  correct  the 
defects  and  deficiencies  with  the  Technical  Data  Package,  there  is  no  clear 
[Alliance contract] provision to deal with consequential impact of the resulting 
changes. The  resulting volume of  rework  and disruption  to  the  sequence of 
work in production has been significant in terms of cost and schedule impact, 
particularly for ASC and its block subcontractors.295 
Emergent design and construction issues 
5.75 In October 2013, the Alliance CEO further informed the ANAO that: 
The program  is entering the more complex outfitting and activation phase of 
the  build.  Key  areas  already  underway  include  the  engine  rooms  and 
                                                     
294  ibid., paragraph 16. 
295  In its January 2014 response to an extract from this audit report, ASC contended that ‘there are 
relevant contractual provisions dealing with this issue, which were the subject of considerable 
negotiation prior to execution of the [Alliance contract]. Noting that the claim with respect to the design 
remains unresolved, it is not appropriate for any party to comment further on this issue.’ See page 4 of 
ASC’s letter to the ANAO, reproduced in Appendix 3. 
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294  ibid., paragraph 16. 
295  In its January 2014 response to an extract from this audit report, ASC contended that ‘there are 
relevant contractual provisions dealing with this issue, which were the subject of considerable 
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remains unresolved, it is not appropriate for any party to comment further on this issue.’ See page 4 of 
ASC’s letter to the ANAO, reproduced in Appendix 3. 
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accommodation  spaces. This phase of  the build  is  typically where  the more 
complex system‐level design issues begin to manifest. 
The  program  is  managing  a  number  of  emergent  technical  issues  some  of 













the  Industry  Participants  of  their  obligations.  As  the  Commonwealth’s 




5.78 No matter how well planned a project has been,  if there  is  inadequate 
control over changes, this will compromise the  likelihood of completing  it on 
schedule and to budget. The AWD Program sought to mitigate design change 
risks  by  basing  the  Hobart‐class  DDGs  on  the  F‐104  platform,  which  was 
designed and built by Navantia and is in operation with the Spanish Navy. A 
number  of  changes  have  been  included  in  the  Hobart‐class  DDG  platform 
design, as the schedule for those options was seen as being manageable. Four 
main  reasons  for  these  changes  were:  the  Australianised  Combat  System 
(based  on  the  Aegis  Weapon  System),  obsolescence,  Australian  legislative 
                                                     
296  Sarah Martin, ‘AWD program “plagued” by design changes’, The Australian, 18 September 2013, p. 2. 
297  Sarah Martin, ‘Coalition facing troubled waters as it prepares to sink $250bn into naval shipbuilding’, 
The Weekend Australian, 28 September 2013, p. 15. 
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requirements  and  lessons  learned  from  the  F‐105.  Platform  System  design 
changes may be considered as evolutionary and relatively  low‐risk when  the 
designers,  shipbuilders  and  technical  regulators  have  a  history  of  working 
together on the development of the particular class of ship. However, the same 
design changes can take on a quite different character and level of risk when a 
shipbuilding program  involves  a  newly  exported design,  a  new  shipbuilder 
and a distributed design‐and‐build environment of the sort established for the 
Australian AWD Program. 
5.79 The  AWD  Program’s  Critical  Design  Review,  as  required  by  the 
Alliance contract, focused on the functional design of the DDGs and concluded 
in late 2009 that ‘the team is well positioned to proceed through Detail Design 
and Construction’. However,  the  report  also noted  that  a key  challenge was 
‘churn  in  the design  and  construction due  to  changes,  holds  and  revisions’. 
Nonetheless,  construction  began  as  planned  within  one  month  of  this 
conclusion. 
5.80 The  Alliance  formed  the  view  that  the  design‐to‐production  process 
could  operate  effectively  without  Navantia  providing  extensive  Lead  Yard 
Services298, including planning and production support intended to ensure, as 
far  as  is  reasonably  practicable,  that  the  lessons  from  the  initial  build  are 
transferred  to  the  follow‐on  build  yard.  In  light  of  the  problems  that  have 
occurred in transferring the design to Australia, ASC informed the ANAO that 
there  was  an  expectation  that  production  issues  commonly  captured  in  ‘as 
built’ drawings would have been fed back into the design by Navantia because 
this  is  standard  shipyard  practice.  For  its  part,  Navantia  noted  that  some 
aspects  of  the design‐to‐production process  adopted  for  the DDGs were not 




5.81 During  the  construction  phase,  the  AWD  Program  has  experienced 
ongoing  immaturity  in  the detailed design, which has  significantly exceeded 
that expected at  the  time of Second Pass approval  in 2007. This has  involved 
Navantia providing a large number of revised design documents between 2009 
                                                     
298  These services are defined as the collective services that the lead shipbuilder for a class of ships will 
provide to another shipyard that is building follow-on ships of the same class. 
  
ANAO Audit Report No.22 2013–14 
Air Warfare Destroyer Program 
 
206 
requirements  and  lessons  learned  from  the  F‐105.  Platform  System  design 
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and  2013.  The  extent  of  this  problem  is  evident  from  the  large  number  of 
drawing revisions  that have been delivered by  the designer, at an average of 
2.75  revisions per drawing  (as at March 2013), and by design deficiency and 
design  interference  accounting  for  some  5000  records  or  46  per  cent  of  all 
records in the Alliance’s Problem and Issue Reports database (as at April 2013). 
Drawing  revisions  from  Navantia  have  at  times  saturated  the  Alliance’s 
engineering  and  planning  departments,  resulting  in  late  releases  of  design 
drawings to ship production. 
5.82 AWD  Alliance  records  indicate  that  drawing  revisions  and  updates 
have occurred for a variety of reasons, including: drawing errors or omissions, 
to  incorporate design  changes  required by Defence,  and  to  cater  for Vendor 
Furnished Information (VFI). During the audit, the ANAO was advised by the 




of detailed design change  is due  to defects and deficiencies  in drawings. On 
the other  hand, Navantia  has  emphasised  that  a  large majority  of drawings 
were affected by Contract Amendment Proposals, and that Vendor Furnished 
Information  (VFI)  caused 700 hold‐ups  (notices  to  stop work)  that had  to be 
implemented  in  later  drawings.  Navantia  also  emphasised  that  it  invested 
significant  resources  to  incorporate  additional  detail  into  the  construction 






timing of  the delivery of change  that has had  the most significant  impact on 
the AWD Program. Alliance data shows that the first set of drawing revisions 
was  typically  received  between  a  third  and  half  way  through  the  block 
construction period  for Ship 1. Similarly,  the second set of drawing revisions 
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5.84 Navantia’s  contract  allows  for  ‘maintenance’ updates  to  the Platform 
System Design, and the incorporation of some updates is necessary to preserve 
warranties  from  Navantia  as  to  the  DDGs’  Platform  System  function  and 
performance. The cost of incorporating design updates, and the risk of updates 
continuing,  are  factored  into  the  Alliance  contract’s  gain‐share  pain‐share 
regime. To date, design  changes have  resulted  in  reduced  fees  for ASC  and 
Raytheon,  and  in  extra  Direct  Project  Costs  for  Defence.  However,  as 
previously  discussed, Navantia  is  not  part  of  the Alliance. This  reduces  the 
contractual  incentives on  the ship designer  to eliminate errors and omissions 
quickly. 
5.85 Irrespective  of  the  extent  and  causes  of  design  change,  the  Alliance 
contract requires the Industry Participants to work together with the DMO and 
the Platform System Designer to address design issues. The Alliance has taken 
a  range  of  actions  to  mitigate  the  impact  of  immaturity  in  the  detailed 
design.299  The  actions  taken  have  included  the  application  of  additional 
engineering  review  effort,  the purchase  and use  of Computer Aided Design 
(CAD)  tools,  schedule  prioritisation,  better  leveraging  of  Navantia’s 
knowledge  and  experience  to  support  the design‐to‐production process,  and 
developing a Collaborative Change Assessment Process. However, these steps 
have been  taken over a  four‐year period, during which  time design maturity 
issues have continued to emerge, and have affected  the shipbuilding process. 
The problems of design change and its consequences were ongoing in 2013, as 
illustrated  by  the  Alliance  CEO’s  October  2013  advice  to  the  ANAO  about 
emergent  issues  and  the  ASC  CEO’s  public  warning  in  October  2013  that 
ongoing design revisions might disrupt  the delivery schedule. The DMO has 
appropriately  reminded  the  Industry  Participants  of  their  contractual 
obligations,  including  the  ‘fundamental  obligation’  to deliver  the DDGs  and 
other  Supplies  and  to  achieve  certain  schedule  commitments.  As  the 
Commonwealth’s  representative  in  the  Alliance,  the  DMO  appreciates  the 
need  to  be  actively  engaged  in  monitoring  developments,  managing  the 
relationships between  the parties and ensuring  that  technical  issues are dealt 
with expeditiously. 
                                                     
299  In January 2014 the Alliance CEO informed the ANAO that, while actions taken by the Alliance have 
mitigated the impact of design change, only Navantia, as the owner and producer of the platform 
design, can rectify the design quality issues. 
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6. Build Progress 
This chapter examines the progress achieved in building the DDGs, and the impact of 
design  change.  It  also  considers  the  build  program’s  overall  cost  and  schedule 
performance. 
Introduction 
6.1 Block  construction  forms  the major  part  of  the  shipbuilding  process, 
and so has significant implications for the success of the shipbuilding program, 
including  its  cost  and  schedule  performance.  Within  the  Alliance  contract, 
Hobart‐class  DDG  block  construction  and  consolidation  costs  amount  to 
$1.030 billion of the $2.198 billion (December 2006 prices) cost of constructing 
the three DDGs complete with their Combat Systems. 
6.2 Both  the  AWD  Alliance  and  the  Platform  System  Design  contracts 
require  the  Industry Participants  to develop  build  strategies  and production 
processes that will result in each DDG block complying with its build quality 




Williamstown;  Forgacs  at  Newcastle;  and  Navantia  at  Ferrol,  Spain.  The 










Design and design-to-production organisation 
6.5 Shipyards involved in a shared‐build strategy need to reach a detailed 
and  common  understanding  of  what  affects  the  block  interfaces  and  their 
integration. All aspects of modern  shipbuilding are  Information Technology‐
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configuration  management  to  build  execution  systems  and  business 




BAE Systems and Forgacs, and has management  teams  in  those shipyards  to 
manage each block construction subcontract. All subcontract block work  is to 
be  undertaken  in  accordance with work  packs  supplied  by ASC,  and  these 
work  packs  include  Navantia’s  Technical  Data  Package  Category  1  and  2 
information.  The  subcontracting  shipyards  may  submit  applications  for 
deviations  and  waivers  regarding  compliance  with  the  requirements  of  the 
Hobart Class Platform System Specification for the AWD Program Manager’s 
approval.301  
Computer Aided Design (CAD) and production 
6.7 According to Navantia’s System Engineering Management Plan for the 
Hobart‐class DDGs,  the  construction drawings were  to  be  created using  the 





6.8 In  its April  2007 Phase  2 Overall Program Report,  the DMO noted  that 
Navantia  used  different  3‐D  CAD  applications  for  general  design  and 
arrangements; hull structure design; and piping and Heating, Ventilation and 
Air  Conditioning  (HVAC).  The  DMO  did  not  identify  this  as  a  matter  of 
                                                     
300  National Defense Research Institute, Shared Modular Build of Warships: How a Shared Build Can 
Support Future Shipbuilding, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 2011, p. 15. 
301  In January 2014, Forgacs informed the ANAO that: ‘A misinterpretation of the standards applicable to 
the AWD Program between the ASC onsite team and Forgacs created a paradigm of rigid adherence 
to the specification to such an extent that thousands of hours of extra work on rectification of these 
issues caused significant delays in the delivery of the blocks, cost overruns and quality issues as a 
result of damage caused by the actual repair effort. Recent acknowledgement of this misinterpretation 
has resulted in a collaborative ‘gold standard’ agreement between Forgacs and ASC of the application 
of the specification—especially with respect to the welding standard and block dimensional tolerances 
at the block mating edges—improving schedule and quality of the product at Forgacs, and significantly 
reducing cost’. 
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concern.  However,  in  October  2013,  the  Alliance  and  ASC  respectively 
informed the ANAO that: 
Various CAD tools were used by Navantia, but these were not integrated. As a 
consequence  it  is  intrinsically more difficult  to  identify  and  resolve detailed 
design issues. 
The  3‐D CAD models were  in  separate  tools  for  each discipline, preventing 
basic interference and clash detection, which has now manifested itself as large 
amounts of rework in production, particularly in the piping discipline. 
6.9 Under  the  Platform  System  Design  contract,  Navantia  was  only 
required  to  deliver  two‐dimensional  (2‐D)  engineering  drawings  in  PDF 
format, which can be difficult to  interpret. As discussed  in paragraph 5.9, the 
Alliance  had  made  the  assumption  that  it  did  not  require  a  large 
CAD/modelling capability.  In addition, Navantia was unwilling  to release  its 
3‐D models for intellectual property reasons. 
6.10 The  immaturity  in  the  detailed  design  experienced  during  ship 
construction led to the Alliance purchasing a basic CAD model from Navantia 
in February 2010.302 This 3‐D model does not provide full CAD capability, but 
it  assisted  production  engineering  and  visualisation  of  production 
requirements. Until January 2013, the use of this 3‐D model was limited by the 
Alliance having only 31 licences for the software. In January 2013, in response 
to ongoing production  issues,  an  additional  3‐D PDF model was purchased, 
and  was  made  available  throughout  the  shipyards  as  an  aid  in  resolving 
production  issues.  Further,  in  February  2013,  Navantia  placed  a  design 
approval  engineer  at  ASC  Osborne  to  facilitate  more  timely  resolution  of 
design issues that are within his delegation (see paragraph 5.64(g)). 
6.11 The  DMO  informed  the  ANAO  that  Alliance  Production  and 
Engineering teams are now able to more effectively isolate technical problems 
and  issues,  with  the  assistance  of  Navantia’s  on‐site  resident  team.  The 
purchase  and  use  of  the  3‐D  CAD  model,  and  increased  integration  with 
Navantia, have been positive developments for the AWD Program, supporting 
more  timely  and  effective  resolution  of  design  and  construction  issues. 
However,  it would have been preferable  to have applied suitable  technology 
                                                     
302  As noted in Table 5.1 and paragraph 5.64(c), Navantia has also provided its team in Australia with 
remote access to its full 3-D CAD model of the Hobart-class DDG design since July 2010. 
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factored  into  the shipbuilding cost and schedule estimates agreed  to by each 
shipyard.305 
6.16 The  shipbuilding  accuracy  requirements mandated  in  the Category 1 
Technical Data Package are reflected in AWD block building contracts. If there 
is a deviation from the dimensional accuracy requirements, corrective actions 
can  involve  rework,  or  acceptance  of  the  deviation,  subject  to  approval  by 
Navantia,  the  platform  designer.  This  ensures  that  Navantia  can  fulfil  its 
responsibility  of  providing  a  warranty  that  the  Hobart‐class  DDG  Platform 
System will,  if constructed  in accordance with  the Category 1 Technical Data 
Package, achieve  the  function and performance requirements specified  in  the 
Hobart Class Platform System Specification. 
Dimensional and Accuracy Control systems 
6.17 In  advanced  manufacturing,  the  required  accuracies  are  achieved 
through  the  use  of  Dimensional  and  Accuracy  Control  systems.  Aligning 
distributed‐build  production  practices  requires  each  shipyard—in  particular 
the  block  consolidation  shipyard—to  understand  the  differences  in  each 
shipyard’s  production  processes,  and  how  those  processes  will  affect  the 
achievement  of  specified  dimensional  accuracy.  This  is  of  particular 
importance at  the  interfaces of  complex, outfitted blocks, where dimensional 




 specified  three‐dimensional  ship’s  coordinates  that  define  discrete 
points on each ship’s superstructure; 





305  The Alliance CEO informed the ANAO that the dimensional control plan is that welding is done once. 
He also noted that, as soon as design change involving hot work is implemented, dimensional control 
becomes more difficult, as additional heat, applied by out-of-sequence welding, may introduce 
distortion that is difficult to correct. 
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Recommendation No.2  
6.12 The ANAO  recommends  that,  in order  to  reduce  the  risk of detailed 
design errors from the outset of future Australian naval shipbuilding, Defence 
require  and  oversee  the  implementation  of  a  fully‐integrated  design  review 
process, supported by contemporary Computer Aided Design technology. 
Defence’s response: Agreed. 
Dimensional accuracy requirements and control 
6.13 In a distributed‐build program such as the AWD Program, dimensional 
accuracy  tolerance budgets are assigned  to each block builder  to ensure  that 
blocks  built  at  different  shipyards  and  at  different  times  will  join  together 
within tolerance. 
6.14 The  dimensional  accuracy  requirements  for  the  construction  of  the 
structural elements of ship blocks are  typically  specified  to be about half  the 
thickness of the ship hull and deck plates. This allows tolerable pressures to be 
applied to the hull and deck plates to achieve an exact fit before the blocks are 






in  the  DDG  blocks,  as  they  contain  a  mix  of  heavy  and  lightweight  steel 
assemblies of varying  thickness. These blocks require welding sequences  that 
prevent  metal  distortion,  which  normally  occurs  as  a  result  of  metal 
contracting as it cools after the welding process. These welding sequences are 
determined via  a mix  of  recommendations  from welding  engineers,  and  the 
knowledge and experience of workshop personnel. These  requirements were 
                                                     
303  In its January 2014 response to an extract from this audit report, Navantia stated that the Alliance’s 
acquisition of 3-D models in 2010 was premature, and that it believed its support to the AWD Program 
through onsite and online access meant that the absence of 3-D models should not have constituted 
an inconvenience. See pages 4–5 of Navantia’s comments to the ANAO, reproduced in Appendix 5. 
304  Excessive misalignments may result in unacceptable stresses, leading to structural failure. 
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303  In its January 2014 response to an extract from this audit report, Navantia stated that the Alliance’s 
acquisition of 3-D models in 2010 was premature, and that it believed its support to the AWD Program 
through onsite and online access meant that the absence of 3-D models should not have constituted 
an inconvenience. See pages 4–5 of Navantia’s comments to the ANAO, reproduced in Appendix 5. 
304  Excessive misalignments may result in unacceptable stresses, leading to structural failure. 
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factored  into  the shipbuilding cost and schedule estimates agreed  to by each 
shipyard.305 
6.16 The  shipbuilding  accuracy  requirements mandated  in  the Category 1 
Technical Data Package are reflected in AWD block building contracts. If there 
is a deviation from the dimensional accuracy requirements, corrective actions 
can  involve  rework,  or  acceptance  of  the  deviation,  subject  to  approval  by 
Navantia,  the  platform  designer.  This  ensures  that  Navantia  can  fulfil  its 
responsibility  of  providing  a  warranty  that  the  Hobart‐class  DDG  Platform 
System will,  if constructed  in accordance with  the Category 1 Technical Data 
Package, achieve  the  function and performance requirements specified  in  the 
Hobart Class Platform System Specification. 
Dimensional and Accuracy Control systems 
6.17 In  advanced  manufacturing,  the  required  accuracies  are  achieved 
through  the  use  of  Dimensional  and  Accuracy  Control  systems.  Aligning 
distributed‐build  production  practices  requires  each  shipyard—in  particular 
the  block  consolidation  shipyard—to  understand  the  differences  in  each 
shipyard’s  production  processes,  and  how  those  processes  will  affect  the 
achievement  of  specified  dimensional  accuracy.  This  is  of  particular 
importance at  the  interfaces of  complex, outfitted blocks, where dimensional 




 specified  three‐dimensional  ship’s  coordinates  that  define  discrete 
points on each ship’s superstructure; 





305  The Alliance CEO informed the ANAO that the dimensional control plan is that welding is done once. 
He also noted that, as soon as design change involving hot work is implemented, dimensional control 
becomes more difficult, as additional heat, applied by out-of-sequence welding, may introduce 
distortion that is difficult to correct. 
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6.19 In addition,  since approximately  late 2011, all  three  sites have used a 
standardised  coordinate measurement  system  (CMS),  to measure and  record 
the  position  of  the  discretely  specified  measurement  points  on  each  block 
being built. 
6.20 The suite of Accuracy Control Check Sheets  is  tailored  for each of  the 
31 blocks, and  is used  to  record compliance with design  requirements at key 
stages  of  block  construction  and  consolidation.  These  Check  Sheets  are 
submitted  to ASC’s Accuracy Control Team  to  confirm  compliance with  the 
requirements, and to detect any variations early in the production process. 
6.21 The Alliance does not  track  statistical  trends  in dimensional accuracy 




Flexibility to manage minor design issues 
6.22 In October  2013, Navantia  informed  the ANAO  that  it has  sought  to 
assist ASC to solve minor production issues, which can appear all through the 
construction  of  the  ship,  by  developing  a  ‘Threshold  Document’.  This 
document,  requested  by  the  Alliance,  provides  ASC  Production  with  some 
flexibility  to make decisions when ship  functionality, performance and safety 
are  not  compromised.  For  example,  the  Threshold  Document  allows  for 
changing  the  design  to  resolve minor  clashes,  in  cases  when  those  changes 
have  no  impact  on  the  Technical  Data  Package  Category  1  specification.306 




convenient  delegations  to  approve  any  deviation  from  the  Technical  Data 
Package,  even when  it  is within  the  thresholds  established  in  the Threshold 
Document. Navantia  considers  the production process  to be  overly  complex 
and  time‐consuming,  in  that  it  involves:  calling  the  Alliance  Liaison  Team; 
                                                     
306  The Threshold Document authorises variations from the design in the order of 50–150 mm, depending 
on the location. Such design changes are expected to be documented by the shipyard in ‘red line’ and 
‘as built’ drawings. 
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the  answer;  and  gaining  approval  to  implement  the  PIR  solution.  Navantia 
noted  that,  by  the  time  the  PIR  answer  is  received  by  ASC  Production, 
complete with work orders, some weeks have passed.307 
6.24 As discussed  at paragraph  5.59,  subject  to  the  effectiveness  of  recent 
Alliance strategies to deal with design changes more efficiently, there could be 
merit in Defence working with its alliance partners and Navantia to review the 
design  change management process, with a view  to addressing  the potential 
for any further backlogs. 
Production Readiness Review and commencement of 
construction 
6.25 The  organisational  requirements  for  shipbuilding  design‐to‐
production,  outlined  in  the  previous  section,  highlight  the  importance  of  a 
Production Readiness Review (PRR) to demonstrate, before production begins, 
that: 
 manufacturing  processes  or  materials,  or  the  requirements  for 
manufacturing development effort, satisfy design requirements; and 
 the  following  systems/processes  are  ready  to  commence  production: 
planning, facilities allocation,  incorporation of producibility‐orientated 
changes,  identification  and  fabrication  of  tools,  test  equipment,  long‐
lead‐time acquisitions, and so forth. 
6.26 The  Alliance  PRR  Plan  (first  issued  in  June  2009)  noted  that  the 
platform design and most major Combat System equipment items were based 




307  In his January 2014 response to an extract from this audit report, the Alliance CEO stated that ‘Limited 
local authority is delegated to the Shipbuilder through the ‘Thresholds Document’ provided by 
Navantia (noting that this document was sought by the Alliance and negotiated in the period 
September 2009 to January 2012). The document provides limited delegation and the most effective 
treatment of TDP issues has been through the resident Navantia Liaison team and the focus on 
priority resolution of Technical Queries (TQs) through the Navantia design support network. With 
effect January 2014, a total of 5,409 TQs had been directed to Navantia with 71% of the 1,295 
requested 24 hour responses being satisfied.’ See page 5 of the Alliance CEO’s letter to the ANAO, 
reproduced in Appendix 2. 
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commencement  of  block  construction  in  September  2009.  This  system‐level 
PRR was held on 27 August 2009. The review panel was  informed  that  there 
was no  clear date by which  the design would be  stabilised  (referred  to  as  a 
production baseline freeze), because changes needed to be considered case‐by‐
case.  Nevertheless,  the  view  of  the  Alliance  was  that  there  was  a  well 
established process to manage design change. The PRR Report noted: 
general  agreement  that despite  some  threats  of  future  rework  and potential 
delays  to  some  later  block  deliveries,  there  is  no  reason  not  to  proceed  to 








to  use  technical  data  in  production,  and  to  manage  technical  problems 
discovered when construction was underway. 
6.29 ASC,  BAE  Systems  and  Forgacs  then  tested  their  readiness  to 
commence  block  construction  by  building  pilot  blocks.  The  pilot  blocks 
enabled  the  testing  of  data  packages,  work  orders,  material  supply, 
manufacturing processes and the production workforce. At the end of the pilot 
program, a PRR was  conducted by  the Alliance  in each  shipyard  to  confirm 
that  the shipyards were  ready  to proceed  into  full production. The  results of 
the PRR process were as follows: 
 BAE  Systems  passed  its  PRR  on  schedule  in  November  2009  and 
commenced block production in December 2009; 
                                                     
308  AWD Alliance, AWD System PRR Meeting Minutes, 27 August 2009. 
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308  AWD Alliance, AWD System PRR Meeting Minutes, 27 August 2009. 
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and approval  for Forgacs  to  commence production was delayed until March 
2010 as a direct result of the PRR.309 
6.31 The  PRRs  conducted  by  the  Alliance  in  late  2009  and  early  2010  to 
determine  the  readiness  of  block  construction  contractors  to  commence 
production appear now  to have been  inadequate  in ensuring  that production 
enabling  products,  such  as  the  technical  data  (discussed  in  the  previous 
chapter), facilities and personnel were in place and ready to begin production. 
6.32 The  following  sections  examine  the  block  construction  and  rework 
issues in more detail. 
Build sequence management 
6.33 To  achieve  shipbuilding  efficiency within  cost  and  schedule budgets, 





6.34 Shipbuilders plan  to  install  the ship’s systems  into each block prior  to 
block consolidation (integration) in order to improve construction efficiencies. 
If  equipment  is  not  ready  in  time  for  installation  into  each  block,  the 
shipbuilder will have  to work around  the missing equipment. Once units are 
installed,  access  to  internal  ship  compartments  becomes  more  difficult. 
                                                     
309  Forgacs similarly informed the ANAO that the Forgacs shipyard had been engaged in building ‘haul 
pack’ truck bodies for mining operations after the cessation of naval ship construction work in the nine 
years prior to AWD project signature, and as such had lost much of its shipbuilding capacity, 
equipment serviceability and knowledge. Forgacs also stated that the logistics capacity of its shipyard 
to store and protect ship material was insufficient to meet the requirements of the AWD Program. 
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6.35 Build  sequences  are  detailed  in  shipbuilders’  Integrated  Master 
Schedules, which link all of the detailed construction tasks based on Key Event 
Dates, on a block‐by‐block basis. At the time of the audit, the AWD Alliance’s 





Figure 6.1: Block construction sequence 
 




 Production Outfitting  Stage  1  (PO1):  this  is  the  phase  of  outfitting  a 






 Blast and Paint:  the block  is grit blasted  to bare metal, and protective 
coatings are applied; 
 Production Outfitting  Stage  2  (PO2):  this  is  the  phase  of  outfitting  a 
block  after  abrasive  blasting  and painting.  It  includes  all  ‘cold work’ 
that  can  be  done  on  a  block  before  the  block  is  moved  to  the 
                                                     
310  US Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions: Cost to Deliver Zumwalt-Class 
Destroyers Likely to Exceed Budget, Report to the Subcommittee on Seapower, Committee on Armed 
Services, U.S. Senate, GAO-08-804, July 2008, p. 9. 
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310  US Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions: Cost to Deliver Zumwalt-Class 
Destroyers Likely to Exceed Budget, Report to the Subcommittee on Seapower, Committee on Armed 
Services, U.S. Senate, GAO-08-804, July 2008, p. 9. 
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Shipbuilding  Hardstand  for  joining  with  the  rest  of  the  vessel.  PO2 
includes some equipment installation, cabling, insulation and lighting; 







Figure 6.2: Hobart-class DDG Block 407 during its PO2 phase, 
May 2013 
 
Source: AWD Alliance, May 2013. 
6.39 By  January  2014,  block  production  was  well  advanced  at  all  four 
shipyards.  Consolidation  of  blocks  in  the  form  of  a  hull  was  nearing 
completion on Ship 1, and zone‐level fit‐out was well underway. The majority 
of  Ship  2  blocks  were  structurally  complete  and  undergoing  PO1  and  PO2 
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Block construction issues 
6.40 As discussed  earlier,  the production  strategies  and processes used  to 
build  steel  blocks  need  to  take  into  consideration  distortion  of  the  steel 
structures, which is inevitably introduced during the welding of steel plate and 
beam  elements.  The  development  of  those  strategies  and  processes  requires 
skilled production engineers, dimensional control and monitoring specialists, 
and  welding  specialists  to  consider  wide‐ranging  variables  related  to  the 
material properties, dimensions and configuration of the steel assemblies to be 
welded. 
6.41 The  allocation  of  blocks  to  subcontractors  was  developed  by  ASC, 
approved by  the Alliance Project Board and subsequently negotiated by ASC 
in  2009.  BAE  Systems  was  allocated  36  blocks,  which  included  the  DDGs’ 
complex keel blocks, and Forgacs was allocated 29 blocks. 
Initial block construction issues at BAE Systems 
6.42 Block  107  of  Ship  1  was  the  first  Hobart‐class  DDG  block  to  be 
constructed by BAE  Systems. This keel block was  complex,  required precise 
dimensional  control,  and  was  a  challenge  for  a  shipyard  that  had  not 
constructed such a complex block since the 1993–2006 Anzac‐class and 2005–07 
Project Protector ship construction programs.311 This block was also subject to 




311  New Zealand’s Project Protector program produced two offshore patrol vessels (OPVs), which have 
been operated by the Royal New Zealand Navy since 2010, as well as other ships. The OPVs are 
named HMNZS Otago and HMNZS Wellington. 
312  In October 2013, ASC informed the ANAO that the BAE Systems subcontract was late to signature 
because of the financial issues at NQEA Australia Pty Ltd in the closing moments of the block tender 
process. 
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Source: AWD Alliance, January 2014. 
Note: PO1 and PO2 are discussed in paragraph 6.37. 
B&P: Blast and Paint. 
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Source: AWD Alliance, January 2014. 
Note: PO1 and PO2 are discussed in paragraph 6.37. 
B&P: Blast and Paint. 
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defects  in  Block  107.  BAE  Systems  was  notified  that  Block  107  was  out  of 
dimensional  tolerance and  that  the overall block was distorted. BAE Systems 
formally advised ASC  in August 2010  that distortion encountered during  the 





‘the  poor  build  quality  was  largely  the  result  of  BAE  Systems  not  having 
sufficient  experienced  production  supervisors—workshop  engineers  and 
foremen—despite  being  one  of  Australia’s  most  experienced  shipbuilding 
                                                     
313  BAE Systems stated that the potential for significant distortion of the sub-block was inherent in its 
design. The sub-block was extremely densely populated with stiffeners, girders and pipes, leading to a 
high density of welded joints. The welding design made the sub-block more susceptible to distortion by 
using single-sided, full-penetration welds on thick panels (up to 16 mm), requiring approximately twice 
as much heat to be put into the plate compared with a double-sided weld. The hardness of the DH36 
steel used in the design made the sub-block more prone to heat-induced distortion, compared with 
AH36 steel. 
Distortion of Block 107, Sub-Block 66 (107SB66), which exceeded design tolerances, was attributable 
to the build methodology employed, which did not compensate adequately for the distortion potential 
inherent in the design. Compensating or mitigating factors not present in the build strategy included, in 
order of significance: 
 employing a build sequence that included shell plates being welded together ‘off-block’ and then 
installed to the frame as a blanket and, more generally, employing a build sequence that saw large 
sections of 107SB66 being welded off-block so as to minimise heat input to the plate, as advised 
by the Platform System Designer, Navantia; 
 the use of a cambered construction jig (in lieu of the flat jig actually used) to offset the expected 
distortion, as advised by the Platform System Designer in discussions in early May 2010; and 
 the use of weld sequences tailored to suit the 107SB66 design. 
ln the absence of weld sequences tailored to the AWD Program, generic weld sequences were 
employed by BAE Systems based, initially, on its experience with the Anzac Ship Project 
methodology. Subsequently, and in response to ASC's Problem and Issue Report No. 2117, BAE 
Systems developed and implemented a procedure for Control of Distortion and Welding Sequences, 
for use specifically with the AWD platform. BAE Systems stated however that—in the absence of the 
other compensating or mitigating factors listed above—no weld sequence would rectify the high level 
of distortion observed in 107SB66 in any appreciable way. 
BAE Systems Australia, SB0002C—Offsite Block Subcontract—Notice of Delay Event—Ship 1 Blocks 
107 non-conforming Customer Furnished Material (CFM) resulting in out-of-tolerance distortion of 
B107SB66, letter to ASC AWD Shipbuilder, 30 August 2010. 
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6.45 In May 2011, Defence advised  the  then Minister  that concurrent work 
on the Landing Helicopter Dock ships (LHDs)316 and DDGs at the BAE Systems 
Williamstown  shipyard  had  stretched  the  shipyard’s  capacity,  so  that,  if  no 
action was taken to relieve the pressure on the BAE Systems shipyard, the first 
DDG would be two years late. 





6.47 The  first  three  blocks  constructed  by  BAE  Systems,  which  had  been 
affected  by  the  production  difficulties  leading  to  dimensional  inaccuracies, 
were ultimately delivered  to ASC  in August and September 2011.318 Defence 
informed the ANAO that, following their delivery, ASC undertook corrective 
action  on  these  blocks  to  ensure  that  they  (and  all  other  blocks)  were 
consolidated  in  accordance  with  recognised  standards  and  requirements319, 
and the Hobart Class Platform System Specification. 
                                                     
314  In its January 2014 response to an extract from this audit report, BAE Systems stated that ‘Whilst we 
agree with the statement in the report that a lack of sufficiently experienced shipbuilders was a 
significant cause (certainly BAE Systems as a responsible contractor needed to and did take action on 
its shortcomings including using reach back and additional hiring to bring in additional experienced 
resources), it was not the only cause. There were design issues, issues with data provided to BAE 
Systems and issues with inexperience on the part of our customer for the blocks [ASC] as well.’ See 
page 1 of the BAE Systems letter to the ANAO, reproduced in Appendix 6. 
315  The Australian newspaper published a report about the AWD production difficulties on 26 October 
2010. Cameron Stewart, ‘$8bn navy flagship founders after construction bungle’, The Australian, 26 
October 2010, p. 1. Defence advised the Minister of the problems the day before this article was 
published. 
316  HMAS Canberra and Adelaide. 
317  The Hon. Stephen Smith MP, Minister for Defence, Changes to Air Warfare Destroyer construction 
program, media release, Canberra, 26 May 2011. 
318  The Hon. Jason Clare MP, Minister for Defence Materiel, First keel block delivered for new Australian 
warship, media release, 18 August 2011; the Hon. Jason Clare MP, Minister for Defence Materiel, 
AWD—Another two blocks delivered, media release, 27 September 2011. 
319  International Association of Classification Societies, IACS No.47 – Shipbuilding and Repair Quality 
Standard, and International Standards Organisation, ISO 13920 – General Tolerance for Welded 
Construction. 
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6.45 In May 2011, Defence advised  the  then Minister  that concurrent work 
on the Landing Helicopter Dock ships (LHDs)316 and DDGs at the BAE Systems 
Williamstown  shipyard  had  stretched  the  shipyard’s  capacity,  so  that,  if  no 
action was taken to relieve the pressure on the BAE Systems shipyard, the first 
DDG would be two years late. 





6.47 The  first  three  blocks  constructed  by  BAE  Systems,  which  had  been 
affected  by  the  production  difficulties  leading  to  dimensional  inaccuracies, 
were ultimately delivered  to ASC  in August and September 2011.318 Defence 
informed the ANAO that, following their delivery, ASC undertook corrective 
action  on  these  blocks  to  ensure  that  they  (and  all  other  blocks)  were 
consolidated  in  accordance  with  recognised  standards  and  requirements319, 
and the Hobart Class Platform System Specification. 
                                                     
314  In its January 2014 response to an extract from this audit report, BAE Systems stated that ‘Whilst we 
agree with the statement in the report that a lack of sufficiently experienced shipbuilders was a 
significant cause (certainly BAE Systems as a responsible contractor needed to and did take action on 
its shortcomings including using reach back and additional hiring to bring in additional experienced 
resources), it was not the only cause. There were design issues, issues with data provided to BAE 
Systems and issues with inexperience on the part of our customer for the blocks [ASC] as well.’ See 
page 1 of the BAE Systems letter to the ANAO, reproduced in Appendix 6. 
315  The Australian newspaper published a report about the AWD production difficulties on 26 October 
2010. Cameron Stewart, ‘$8bn navy flagship founders after construction bungle’, The Australian, 26 
October 2010, p. 1. Defence advised the Minister of the problems the day before this article was 
published. 
316  HMAS Canberra and Adelaide. 
317  The Hon. Stephen Smith MP, Minister for Defence, Changes to Air Warfare Destroyer construction 
program, media release, Canberra, 26 May 2011. 
318  The Hon. Jason Clare MP, Minister for Defence Materiel, First keel block delivered for new Australian 
warship, media release, 18 August 2011; the Hon. Jason Clare MP, Minister for Defence Materiel, 
AWD—Another two blocks delivered, media release, 27 September 2011. 
319  International Association of Classification Societies, IACS No.47 – Shipbuilding and Repair Quality 




ANAO Audit Report No.22 2013–14 
Air Warfare Destroyer Program 
 
225 
AWD Alliance reallocates BAE Systems blocks to other 
shipbuilders 
6.48 From late 2010 to early 2012, the AWD Alliance reallocated blocks from 
BAE Systems  to  the other shipyards, with a view  to reducing  the anticipated 
two‐year  delay  on  each  of  the  three  ships  by  up  to  12  months.320  Defence 
advised  the  then Minister  in November  2010  that  the  reallocation  of  blocks 
from BAE Systems  to Forgacs was not a punitive move by  the Alliance, but 
was based on a need to reduce the risk of further cost and schedule overruns: 
Construction  work  in  the  BAE  Systems  shipyard  for  the  amphibious  ships 
(LHD  superstructure)  and AWDs will  require  19 blocks or  sub‐blocks being 
fabricated  in parallel (according to Alliance–BAE Systems discussions). There 
are  five AWD blocks being  fabricated at present. The block reallocation plan 
developed by  the Alliance and BAE Systems  technical  teams aims  to  reduce 
the  risk  of  project  management  workload,  shipyard  facility  constraints  and 
skilled workforce  demand,  as well  as  allow  the  BAE  Systems workforce  to 
concentrate  on  completing  higher  levels  of  outfitting  in  the  remaining  nine 
blocks. 
6.49 On  28  February  2011,  as  part  of  its  response  to  the  production 
difficulties outlined above, BAE Systems proposed a new operational schedule, 




6.50 The  progression  of  the  block  allocations  arising  from  the  AWD 
Program’s difficulties is shown in Figure 6.5. The figure includes the May 2013 
reallocation  of  four  blocks  from  Forgacs  to  BAE  Systems, which  recognised 
‘that  BAE  Systems  has  the  capacity  and  skill  to  successfully  take  on  an 
increased share of the workload’.321 
                                                     
320  The Hon. Stephen Smith MP, Minister for Defence, Changes to Air Warfare Destroyer construction 
program, media release, Canberra, 26 May 2011. 
321  The Hon. Stephen Smith MP, Minister for Defence, 2013 Defence White Paper. Naval Shipbuilding. 
Release of the Future Submarine Industry Skills Plan, media release, 3 May 2013. 
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6.51 Defence  records  show  that  further  reallocation  of  blocks  between 
shipyards was under discussion by the Alliance during the latter half of 2013, 
as  a  result  of  deteriorating  performance  and  significant  cost  escalation  at 
Forgacs.322 In December 2013, three more blocks were reallocated from Forgacs 
to BAE Systems.323 
6.52 The  current  block  construction  allocation  for  the  three  Hobart‐class 
DDGs is shown in Figure 6.6. 
                                                     
322  Media reports in November 2013 stated that ‘Forgacs is having major problems with its blocks’. See 
for example Ian McPhedran, ‘Minister’s concern at $8 billion destroyer project’, The Advertiser, 18 
November 2013, p. 4. The CEO DMO also advised a Senate Estimates hearing in November 2013 
that reallocation of some blocks might take place. Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade 
Legislation Committee, Estimates Hansard, 20 November 2013, p. 86. 
 In its January 2014 response to an extract from this audit report, Forgacs stated that ‘many of the 
facilities, cranage and general yard facilities were ill prepared to commence block production at the 
schedule, quality and cost demanded under the contract; and the pilot block allocated to assess 
capability was too small a sample to be a valid indication of capability or capacity. The subsequent 
reallocation of the BAE blocks to Forgacs just as the shipyard commenced to improve in maturity, 
placed additional stress on the already strained facilities and workforce and caused further issues with 
quality and schedule achievement at the Forgacs facilities.’ See page 1 of the Forgacs letter to the 
ANAO, reproduced in Appendix 7.  
Separately, Forgacs informed the ANAO that immaturity in detailed design has caused significant 
rework as well as schedule and administrative cost in the production of the Forgacs assigned blocks. 
Specifically, the technical effort required to interpret the ASC-supplied drawings has taken many extra 
hours of effort to provide work packs to the construction workforce that could be built to print. 
Additionally, as errors were discovered in the source documents as a result of this production activity, 
the resultant new drawings and consequent rework of blocks has caused further delays and cost. 
323  In its January 2014 response to an extract from this audit report, BAE Systems stated that ‘the Blocks 
reallocated during 2013 were offered and contracted on a fixed price, fixed schedule subcontract that 
results in lower cost and lower risk to ASC than if they had been reallocated under the original 
subcontract. This is the result of improvements in productivity and quality that come from having a 
continuity of work that allows a shipyard to increase and then maintain its experience and capabilities 
and therefore, should be given considerable weight in the overall audit conclusions and 
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Source: AWD Alliance. 
Note: The ASC allocation includes the three mast blocks (Block 711), which ASC has subcontracted to 
MG Engineering, Adelaide. 
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Production capacity and capability issues 
6.53 In  June  2011,  some  of  the  underlying  capacity  and  capability  issues 
facing Australian shipyards were described by an Alliance Project Board paper 
as follows: 
During  Phase  2  of  the  Program,  industry  and  government  operated  on  the 
shared  assumption  that  the Australian  shipbuilding  industry  in general had 
the core management, programmatic and  technical skills  required  to execute 
major  warship  construction  programs,  and  that  potential  subcontractors  to 
AWD  had  sufficient  financial  capacity,  facilities  and  commercial  appetite  to 
develop  capabilities  necessary  to  win  and  execute  contracts  for  significant 
portions of the AWD hull block production. 
This  perception  was  based  on  the  registrations  of  interest  received  from 
interested  companies,  which  included  detailed  capability  statements  and 
previous  contract histories. This view was  reinforced by  the  endorsement of 





this  type  on  the  scale  anticipated,  and  that  each  facility  where work  could 
potentially be conducted required significant capital investment to develop the 
necessary handling and processing capability. 





6.54 One  implication  of  this  frank  assessment  of  the  state  of  Australia’s 




324  AWD Alliance, Schedule Replan, Project Board paper, 16 June 2011, p. 2. 
 In a similar vein, the then Deputy CEO DMO had advised a Senate Estimates hearing in May 2011 
that his 2007 advice to government on the likely complexity and time issues of the AWD project, and 
the capacity of BAE Systems, was wrong. Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation 
Committee, Estimates Hansard, 30 May 2011, p. 119. 
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Block production rework 
6.55 In 2010,  the Alliance Project Board decided  that,  rather  than  rejecting 
Technical Data Package supplies until they had reached the anticipated level of 
maturity,  a  better  strategy would  be  to  continue working  and  consequently 
allow some defects and deficiencies in the Technical Data Package supplies to 
progress  into production. As noted  in paragraph 5.64(a),  in October 2013  the 
Alliance CEO informed the ANAO that the majority of defects and deficiencies 
were more  insidious, and were either discovered  in production or  identified 
later by the Platform System Designer in the form of change. 
6.56 Immaturity  in  the  Technical  Data  Package  ultimately  required 
production rework of the kind shown in the following figures, which illustrate 





production  rework have been  initiated by Navantia.325 Changes  to  the F‐104 
design necessary  to  incorporate  the Australianised Combat  System  involved 
the  installation of approximately 70 combat‐system and  sub‐system  elements 
in  almost  all  compartments  throughout  each  ship.  These  design  changes 
required some block rework after the PO2 and consolidation stages, as a result 
of the delivery of late or incomplete Vendor Furnished Information (after PO1 
completion)  that  affected  the  design  (Vendor  Furnished  Information  is 
discussed in paragraph 5.42). 
6.58 As  at  June  2013,  rework  on  blocks  in  Ship  1  had  involved  extensive 
amounts of time and materiel. For example: 
 after  Ship 1  Block  703  had  completed  the  PO2  phase,  the  impact  of 
Maintenance  Drop  2  was  that  the  block  required  an  additional  2028 
hours  of  rework,  involving  hot  work  (that  is,  welding)  of  piping, 
heating,  ventilation  and  air  conditioning  assemblies. Also,  a  contract 
amendment  (Contract  Amendment  Proposal  41)  resulted  in  an 
                                                     
325  As discussed in paragraph 2.29, these related to the incorporation of Australian capability 
requirements and F-105 design elements into the Hobart-class DDGs. 
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involved  equipment  foundations,  structure,  piping,  heating, 
ventilation,  air  conditioning  and  electrical  work.  Further,  a  contract 
amendment (Contract Amendment Proposal 40) imposed an additional 
1931 hours  of  hot  work,  involving  foundations  for  combat  system 
equipment.  Two  further  contract  amendments  affected  electrical, 
piping, heating, ventilation and air conditioning. 
6.59 In  summary,  reworking  two  of  the  31  blocks  in  Ship  1,  as described 




6.60 Figure  6.7  shows  an  example  of  the  extensive  amount  of  rework  in 
Ship 1  pipe  production  and  installation  that  was  caused  by  changes  in  the 
detailed design late in the PO1 production phase. 




damage  to  surrounding  installations,  and  requires  the  compartment  to  be 
reinspected for specification compliance, and repainted.326 
                                                     
326  The Alliance CEO and the ASC informed the ANAO that Figure 6.8 also shows the view plate 
(structure), which needed to be replaced twice, introducing hot work that impacted half the breadth of 
the block. 
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Figure 6.7: Piping system rework—Block 107 during PO1 phase 
 
Source: AWD Alliance, March 2012. 
Note: Unpainted pipe has been subjected to rework. 
Figure 6.8: Piping system rework—Block 407 after block consolidation 
 
Source: AWD Alliance, March 2012. 
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phase  in  Ship  1.  Many  doorways  throughout  the  ship  were  moved  by 
approximately 150 mm from their original position, to enable the doors to open 
to a minimum of 90 degrees, in line with Australian safety regulations.327 
Figure 6.9: Rework on doorways to provide a minimum 90-degree 
opening 
 
Source: AWD Alliance, March 2012. 
Note: The doorway has been moved 150 mm to the left of its original position. 
6.63 Figure 6.10 shows some of  the  large number of pipe spools  that have 
required replacement, either because of  the procurement of pipe  that did not 
meet  specifications,  or  because  of  changes  in  the detailed design during  the 
PO1  and  PO2  phases.  In  the  first  case,  a  supply‐chain  failure  led  to  the 
installation of defective pipes  into  the  ship.328 Navantia  informed  the ANAO 
that  it  assisted  the Alliance  by  endorsing  a design  change,  so  that  only  570 
pipes  were  replaced  after  2000  had  been  inspected.  The  replacement  pipes 
include  higher‐specification  copper  nickel  pipes  that  comply  with  military 
specifications  that  relate  to  dimensional  requirements,  materiel  properties, 
traceability  and  quality  control  requirements.  The  exception  to  this  design 
                                                     
327  The Alliance CEO informed the ANAO that ‘This change should have been treated before the TDP 
was issued to the Alliance.’ 
328  ASC lodged an insurance claim to cover the costs associated with defective copper pipe. 
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change  was  the  retention  of  copper  pipes  within  the  ships’  potable  water 
systems. More broadly, changes  in the detailed design have  led to  large‐scale 
replacement of pipes during construction of Ship 1. 
Figure 6.10: Pipe waste in temporary storage at ASC 
 
Source: AWD Alliance, March 2012. 
6.64 As a result of the production rework discussed above, the Alliance has 
experienced production  cost overruns  across multiple blocks, predominantly 
during  the  PO2  stage  and  Ship  1  block  consolidation.  Cost  overruns  have 
continued  for  Ship  2,  during  the  Structural  and  PO1  phases,  due  to  the 




6.65 Under  the Alliance contract,  the  Industry Participants are not directly 




to  conduct  rework  reduces  the  Industry  Participants’  ability  to  qualify  for 
additional  incentive Fees  that are  linked  to Provisional Acceptance of a DDG 
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furthermore,  the  time  needed  to  conduct  rework  increases  the  Industry 
Participants’  exposure  to  the  Alliance  contract’s  liquidated  damages  regime 
(see paragraph 3.65).330 




DDGs’  combat  system  development  risks,  the  government  decided  that  the 
ships would be equipped with an Aegis Weapon System very similar to those 




acquired  from  the  US  Government  through  a  $1.22  billion  Foreign  Military 
Sales (FMS) agreement, from numerous suppliers. Lockheed Martin, as the US 
Navy’s Combat System Engineering Agent  (CSEA), has been  responsible  for 
the  integration  and  testing  of  the  core  components  of  Aegis,  which  is 
conducted  at  the  US  Navy  Sea  System  Command’s  Combat  System 
development  facility  at Moorestown, New  Jersey, USA. The  cost breakdown 
for the Aegis Weapon System FMS case is shown in Table 6.1. 
6.68 Raytheon Australia is responsible for the planning, specification, design 
and  final  integration of  the Australianised Combat System, which  comprises 
an  upgraded  Aegis  Weapon  System  and  additional  Australian  elements  to 
meet specific capability requirements. 
                                                     
329  Provisional Acceptance of each DDG is to be granted by the Commonwealth if the DDG complies with 
the Alliance contract’s requirements, subject only to Minor Defects and other Defects (identified 
through the conduct of verification and validation activities) that the Commonwealth does not require to 
be rectified. 
330  In the 2012–13 Major Projects Report, the DMO acknowledged that the major challenges faced by the 
AWD Program include: ‘managing the level and timing of changes to the production baseline to 
minimise production rework’. ANAO Report No.12, 2013–14, 2012–13 Major Projects Report, p. 150. 
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Table 6.1: Aegis Weapon System cost breakdown 
Budget item Price (US$ million) 
Administrative Charges 36.6 
AEGIS System, Support Equipment and Spares 693.3 
Program Management 10.0 
Technical Assistance 426.4 




Source: AWD Program Management Office. 
6.69 The  Aegis  Weapon  System  sits  at  the  core  of  the  combat  system 
architecture. The other subsystems are dispositioned by functional groups, for 
example,  navigation,  communications  and  information  systems,  very‐short‐
range air defence, and  so  forth. These other  functional groups  interface with 
Aegis  to a greater or  lesser extent, but  they are not Aegis  subsystems. These 
systems are being acquired from Original Equipment Manufacturers, and they 
communicate  with  the  Aegis  core  through  the  newly  designed  Australian 
Tactical Interface. 
6.70 The  Australian  Tactical  Interface  has  been  adopted  and  designed  to 
mitigate combat‐system development risks by: 






6.71 The combat system  integration commenced  in 2010 at product vendor 
sites  in Europe,  as well  as  at  the US Navy’s  Sea  Systems Command  facility 
mentioned above.  Integration  testing  is also now occurring  in  the Australian 
Combat System Through Life Support Facility at Macquarie Park, Sydney; and 
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6.72 The  Hobart‐class  DDG  Combat  System  installation  and  set‐to‐work 
program is at a relatively early stage, and has not been examined in this audit. 
Construction cost-and-schedule performance 
6.73 In  all major production projects,  there  are  a number of  tasks  such  as 
planning,  estimating,  monitoring  and  controlling  tasks—related  to  finance, 




6.74 Any  loss  of  visibility  of  the  progress  of  work  affects  management’s 
ability  to  intelligently control engineering, personnel, materials,  facilities and 
schedule achievement. This will often result in construction cost increases and 
schedule  slippage.  Responsible  managers  can  rectify  production  problems 
quickly before they become critical, if they are aware of the status of personnel 
resources and work progress  in a  timely manner. Under  such circumstances, 
management  can  assign  logical  priorities  to  solving  various  production 
problems,  and  ideally  new  techniques  can  be  developed,  applied  and 
evaluated to improve shipyard production methods. 






 verification  and validation of hardware and  software progress, based 
on an approved test and evaluation program. 
Earned Value Management 
6.76 In the AWD Program, Earned Value Management (EVM) is used as the 
predominant  system  for  integrating  all  progress  measurement  processes,  to 
                                                     
331  The Earned Value Management System is also referred to as a Cost and Schedule Control System 
(CS2). 
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cost,  schedule  and  technical  achievement. The  implementation  of  an Earned 
Value Management System (EVMS) is a recognised function of cost estimating, 
planning and scheduling, and the follow‐through of program management. It 











EVM  reports.  These  reports  are  aligned  to  the  Industry  Participants’ 
accounting  periods,  and  are delivered  15 working days  after  the month‐end 
cut‐off date. The EVM  reports provide  the basis  for  reporting  the program’s 
progress,  in  terms  of  cost  and  schedule  performance,  to  the  AWD  Project 
Board, and to the one‐star Program Management Stakeholder Group.334 




and  managing  the  pain‐share  gain‐share  arrangements  over  the  life  of  the 
Alliance  contract.  Consequently,  the  AWD  Program’s  EVMS  needs  to  be 
accepted  and  validated  as  being  consistent  with  guidelines  adopted  by  the 
                                                     
332  US Department of Defense, Defense Contract Audit Agency, DCAA Contract Audit Manual, July 2011, 
Vol. 2, Section 11-201. 
333  Data from BAE Systems, Forgacs and Navantia is incorporated into the Earned Value Management 
System used by ASC and Raytheon. 
334  The Alliance’s Business Services Cross Product Team also provides the program’s cost and schedule 
performance data to the Alliance’s Integrated Product Teams and Cross Product Teams. 
335  See discussion of the Fee arrangements, beginning at paragraph 3.29. 
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DMO,  in  the  interest of  the program maintaining accurate progress reporting 
and financial management. 
6.79 At  the  time of  the audit,  the work under contract  that was needed  in 





were  comprised  of  400  at Raytheon,  1113  at ASC,  47  at BAE  Systems,  75  at 
Forgacs and 58 at Navantia. 
6.80 Payments  for  progress  achieved  on  work  packages  are made  on  the 
basis of a reimbursement of defined Direct Project Costs and the payment of a 




EVMS certification and Integrated Baseline Review 
6.81 The Alliance contract has a number of Key Target and Event Dates. The 
first  of  the Key  Event Dates  required  the  Industry  Participants, within  nine 
months after the contract was signed, to submit to a formal on‐site Integrated 
Baseline Review,  as  described  in  Table  6.2,  and  this was  completed  in  June 






336  Commonwealth of Australia, ASC AWD Shipbuilder, Raytheon Australia, Air Warfare Destroyer 
(SEA 4000) Alliance Based Target Incentive Agreement, Attachment 6 – Statement of Work, Clause 
3.2.5. 
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Table 6.2: Integrated Baseline Review 
An Integrated Baseline Review (IBR) is a technical and schedule review, focusing on 
the assignment, definition, scheduling and resourcing of work (including budgets), thus 
establishing early visibility into the acceptability of the Contractor’s contract planning. 
Where the contract provides for payment by earned value, the IBR also reviews the 
methods and metrics used to measure contract performance. Where a Contractor is 
using an already validated EVM system, the IBR is used as a streamlined approach to 
assessing the acceptability of the Performance Measurement Baseline on new 
contracts. The objectives of the IBR are to: 
(a) ensure that the complete scope of work is covered in the Contract Work 
Breakdown Structure; 
(b) assess whether the technical scope can be accomplished within cost-and-
schedule baseline constraints, and whether resources have been appropriately 
distributed to the contract tasks; 
(c) assess whether there is a logical sequence of effort that supports the contract 
schedule; 
(d) identify areas of risk in resource allocations and in the technical performance 
of the contract, and understand the cost and schedule implications of that risk; 
(e) assess the validity and accuracy of the Contractor’s baseline by examination of 
at least one Cost Performance Report or Cost Schedule Status Report; and 
(f) develop Project Office understanding of the Performance Measurement 
Baseline, resulting in a better appreciation of the Contractor’s performance 
management process and the methodologies used to measure performance. 




subcontract  or  group  of  subcontracts  requiring  work  in  excess  of  twelve 
months where the subcontract prices exceed: 
(a) $50  million—for  military  off‐the‐shelf  products  with  development 
content; or 
(b) $20 million—with significant development effort; or 
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AWD Program rebaseline 
6.84 In September 2012, Defence and  the Industry Participants commenced 
the  task  of  rebaselining  the  AWD  Program’s  construction  schedule  to 
incorporate a 15‐month delay to Ship 1 and an 18‐month interval between the 
Provisional  Acceptance  of  each  of  the  three  ships  (see  paragraphs  1.20  and 
1.21). A Schedule Change Request made by the Alliance in September 2012 was 
incorporated  into  the Alliance  contract  by  a  Contract Amendment  Proposal 
(CAP) approved by Defence in December 2012.337 
6.85 In  order  to  complete  the  AWD  Program’s  rebaseline,  the  program’s 
EVMS  and  associated  Contract  Master  Schedule  have  to  be  aligned  to  the 
agreed changes in the delivery schedule. Consequently, during the first half of 
2013, the AWD Alliance was recalculating the build program’s cost Estimate At 
Completion338,  and  was  examining  the  remaining  plans,  work  scope  and 
resources  necessary  to  complete  the  build.  The  Estimate  At  Completion 
recalculation was due to be completed in August 2013. 
6.86 As  at August  2013,  the AWD  Program  rebaseline  had  progressed  as 
follows: 
 Revised  Alliance  Key  Event  Dates were  agreed  and  provided  to  the 
Alliance  teams  in  September  2012,  with  instructions  that  the 




and  the  Project  Board  at  the  fourth‐quarter  2012  Estimate  At 
Completion review. 
 The cost  to move  the program  to  the new schedule dates would have 




337  For example, for Ship 1, the new Key Event Dates inserted into the Alliance contract were:  
9 December 2013  Complete Hull Integration;  
1 December 2014 Start Combat System Light Off; and  
10 August 2015 Commencement of Category 5 Trials. 
338  Estimate At Completion is the estimated cost of the build program—that is, the out-turn cost. 
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 Teams were  required  to  investigate how  to  reduce  costs against  their 




requested  to  incorporate  the  cost  reductions  into  their  second‐quarter 




intended  to  form  the  final  Cost  position  for  the  budgeted  work 
remaining against the revised schedule dates. 
 The  Integrated  Baseline  Review  was  to  be  conducted  on  the 
Performance Measurement Baseline for the remaining work by August 
2013. 
6.87 The  Integrated  Baseline  Review,  arising  from  the  September  2012 
program  reschedule, was  intended  to  result  in a  restoration of  confidence  in 
the  AWD  Program’s  cost  and  schedule  estimates,  and  was  initially  to  be 
completed  by  May  2013.  Despite  Project  Board  concern  that  the  Integrated 
Baseline Review was critical as a means of baselining work and budgets, and 
that progress was not able  to be accurately measured  in  the  interim,  the May 
2013 target was not met. 
6.88 On  2 October  2013, Defence  informed  the ANAO  that  the  Integrated 
Baseline Review had not been completed, and that a final report was expected 
in ‘September/October 2013’. 
6.89 However, on  9 September  2013  the AWD Alliance had  completed  an 
Integrated  Baseline  Review  report  that  contained  18  Major  and  30  Minor 
Corrective Action Requests  that were  to be ready  for closure by 1 November 
2013. The report found that there were ‘significant problems with the baseline’ 
for  the  Alliance’s  Integrated  Product  Teams  for  Pre‐Production,  Production 
and  Support,  and  that  ‘the  current  Program  Estimates  To  Complete  and 
Build Progress 
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 It was  […] particularly evident  in Production  that disconnect existed 
between  the  amount  of  work  the  Control  Account  Managers  had 
planned to complete (particularly in the near term) versus the amount 
of resources available […]; 
 many  issues  need  to  be  addressed  prior  to  acceptance  of  the 
Performance Measurement Baseline […]; 
 the  AWD  Program  faces  challenges  but  is  in  the  process  of 
implementing  what  should  prove  a  reliable  management  and 
reporting system suitable for the scope of work being undertaken for 
the Program. 
6.90 The  Integrated  Baseline  Review  Team  was  of  the  view  that  the 
Production  baseline  as  presented was  ‘challenged  from  a  cost  and  schedule 
perspective’. A  second  Integrated Baseline Review  of  the Production  stream 
was  recommended  after  completion  of  corrective  action  activities.  The  team 
also  found  that  the  Performance  Measurement  Baseline  was  ‘very  success‐
oriented and does not allow for the probability of rework due to “first of class” 
problems’,  and  that  the  issues  of  rework  and  unbudgeted  scope  had  ‘the 
potential  to  impact  [on]  budget  and  [on]  ability  to  effectively manage work 







in  order  to  accurately  reflect  an  achievable  forward  plan  for  the 
production program (Production Integrated Product Team); 
                                                     
339  Air Warfare Destroyer Alliance, 2013 Integrated Baseline Review Report, 9 September 2013, pp. 3–6. 
340  Including design change, left-off work from block subcontractors, rework, defect rectification or lack of 
material availability, as well as inaccurate forecasts of labour requirements, and a medium to high 
level of uncertainty in Estimate At Completion projections in the order of 20–50 per cent in some 
instances. 
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 consider  replanning  more  complex  activity  with  interim  milestones 
(Production Integrated Product Team)341; 
 conduct more training in use of the Earned Value system (Business and 
Services, Pre‐Production, Production  and  Support  Integrated Product 
Teams). 
6.92 Overall,  the  September  2013  Integrated  Baseline  Review  report 
indicated that major corrective actions were necessary to restore confidence in 
the  AWD  Program’s  cost  and  schedule  estimates.  The  report  highlighted 
problems  with  the  EVMS’s  Performance  Measurement  Baseline  and  that 
corrective action was  required  for  the EVMS  to be  considered acceptable  for 
accurate  performance  measurement.342  Consequently,  a  recalculation  of  the 
estimated  cost  of  the  Alliance  contract  (that  is,  the  EVMS  Estimate  At 
Completion discussed above)  is necessary  to ensure  that adequate allowance 
has  been  made  for  remaining  AWD  build  risks  and  issues,  such  as  those 
relating to construction drawing maturity and future productivity projections. 
Performance Measurement Baseline 
6.93 The  AWD  Program’s  EVMS  provides  a  Performance  Measurement 
Baseline,  which  is  a  time‐phased  schedule  of  all  the  work  planned  to  be 
performed, expressed in terms of the budgeted cost of that work—or in other 
words, the Budgeted Cost of Work Scheduled (BCWS or Planned Value). 
6.94 The  remainder  of  this  chapter  contains  statistics  and  graphs  drawn 
from the AWD Alliance’s EVMS as at September–November 2013. However, in 
light  of  the  finding  of  the  September  2013  Integrated  Baseline  Review,  as 
outlined in the preceding section, that ‘many issues need to be addressed prior 
to  acceptance  of  the  Performance  Measurement  Baseline’,  there  are  some 
doubts as  to  the quality of  the data presented, and  therefore  there  is reduced 
confidence in the AWD Program’s cost and schedule estimates. 
6.95 Figure  6.11  shows  the  Alliance’s  cumulative  cost  and  schedule 
performance. From  June 2008  to November 2013,  the AWD Program’s EVMS 
                                                     
341  Currently, a number of Production work packages are shown as 40 per cent complete upon 
commencement, with the remaining 60 per cent accredited once the work package is completed; the 
Integrated Baseline Review suggested that this is an appropriate methodology only when a work 
package takes less than two months to complete. 
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showed  the  Alliance’s  Actual  Cost  of  Work  Performed  (ACWP  or  Actual 
Costs)  trending  above  the  Budgeted  Cost  of  Work  Performed  (BCWP  or 
Earned  Value).343  During  the  same  period,  the  Alliance’s  Budgeted  Cost  of 
Work Performed trended below the Budgeted Cost of Work Scheduled.344 As at 
September  2013,  the  expenditure  on  the  Alliance  contract  had  reached 
$3.129 billion,  and  on  the  basis  of  the  EVMS  data  for  work  budgeted  and 
performed to that point in time, the Alliance was some: 
 $196  million  or  6.3  per  cent  over  budget  (as  against  $80  million  or 
3.2 per cent in September 2012); and 
 $60 million  or  2  per  cent  behind  schedule  (as  against  $52  million  or 
2.1 per cent in September 2012). 
6.96 Detailed analysis of the Alliance’s cost and schedule performance data 




 In  terms  of work  scope,  the AWD Program’s  ship  construction work 
scope has increased over time, due to unanticipated immaturity in the 
Platform  System  technical  data.  This  work  scope  instability  has  not 
been contained within the allocated budgets for schedule and cost. 
 In  terms  of  the  cost  of block production, productivity  is yet  to  reach 




343  In other words, the amount of the budget actually spent on the work scheduled at that time exceeded 
the budget allocated to that work. Therefore progress occurred at a greater cost than was estimated. 
344  In other words, the value of work completed at that time was less than the budgeted cost of work 
scheduled. Therefore schedule progress occurred more slowly than was estimated. 
  
ANAO Audit Report No.22 2013–14 
Air Warfare Destroyer Program 
 
246 
Figure 6.11: AWD Alliance’s cumulative cost and schedule performance, 
June 2008–November 2013 
 
Source: AWD Alliance, November 2013. 
Note In the light of concerns about cost overruns, the current estimated cost of $302 million in excess of 
the Target Cost Estimate should be treated with caution; the cost increase is likely to be 
significantly greater. The Alliance CEO informed the ANAO in January 2014 that future unplanned 
detailed design change cannot be accurately scoped, costed and scheduled, and is therefore not 
included in the Estimate At Completion. 
Earned Value Variance at Completion 




in  December  2013  by  the  Alliance’s  Control  Account  Managers  (see  Figure 
6.11), the AWD Program’s EVMS indicated that the Alliance contract would be 
completed  for  $4.611  billion.  Following  assessment  of  risks,  opportunities, 
estimating  uncertainty  and  schedule  delay,  the  total  cost  to  complete  the 
program was judged to be $4.776 billion, which is $302 million or 6.8 per cent 
over  the program’s Target Cost Estimate. This variance  includes  $27 million 
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amendments.345  Following  the  completion  of  the  Integrated Baseline Review 
report in September 2013, the Alliance was to recalculate this estimate, taking 




There  are  emerging  concerns  from  the AWD Alliance  around  cost  overruns 
and  associated  delays  in  shipbuilding  aspects  of  the  AWD  Program.  An 
independent review  is  to be commissioned  to  identify  factors contributing  to 
cost growth and delays, and to recommend remediations and mitigation.346 
6.100 The  Ministers  for  Defence  and  Finance  announced  on  17  December 
2013  that  the Government would establish an  independent review  to address 
‘unresolved issues’ associated with the AWD Program, with terms of reference 
to be finalised in early 2014. 
Industry Participant cost and schedule performance 
6.101 Since  June  2008,  the AWD Alliance has provided  the AWD Program 
Management Office with monthly EVM reports that document the  individual 
contractors’ progress in terms of the value of work accomplished with respect 
to Alliance budgets  authorised by  the Alliance CEO,  and Alliance  schedules 
approved by the Alliance CEO. When considered together, the value of work 
accomplished  and  the  time  taken  to  achieve  that  value  provide  a  direct 
indication of each contractor’s productivity. 
Combat System–Systems Engineering 
6.102 As  outlined  in  paragraph  3.20,  Raytheon,  as  the  Combat  System–




required  to  deliver  the  Hobart‐class  DDGs’  Combat  System.  The  budget 
allocated  to  combat  system  development  is  $1.159  billion  (December  2006 
                                                     
345  On a different measure, during 2012–13, as previously reported by the ANAO, the AWD Program 
exceeded its financial-year budget allocation by $106.4 million as a result of increased Direct Project 
Costs from the Industry Participants for labour, materials and sub-contract costs. ANAO Report No.12, 
2013–14, 2012–13 Major Projects Report, pp. 147, 151. 
346  ANAO Report No.12, 2013–14, 2012–13 Major Projects Report, p. 143. 
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Foreign  Military  Sales  program—is  not  included  in  the  AWD  Program’s 
EVMS. 
6.103 Figure  6.12  shows  Raytheon’s  overall  Cost  Performance  Index  (CPI), 







An  SPI  of  greater  than  one  means  that  the  work  accomplished  is  ahead  of 
schedule, and if it is less than one, the work was performed behind schedule. 
Figure 6.12: Raytheon Australia AWD Program cumulative cost and 
schedule performance indices, June 2008–November 2013 
 
Source: AWD Alliance, November 2013. 
6.105 As  at  September  2013, when  some  69  per  cent  of  the  budget  for  the 
DDGs’  Combat  System–Systems  Engineering  work  had  been  expended, 
Raytheon’s  cost  efficiency  was  1.0  or  100  per  cent,  and  its  schedule 
                                                     
347  Cost Performance Index = BCWP/ACWP or Earned Value/Actual Cost. 
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performance  was  0.99  or  99  per  cent,  and  this  performance  continued  into 





of  the Combat  System  equipment  and  components. ASC  also manages  Pre‐
Production and the outsourcing of block production to BAE Systems, Forgacs 




In  other  words,  ASC’s  control  over  its  costs  declined  from  progressing  on‐
budget in September 2010 to being 12 per cent over budget in November 2013. 
This has  resulted  in a Variance at Completion  (VAC—estimated actual  costs 
compared with budgeted cost) of $320 million (as at September 2013). 
Figure 6.13: ASC AWD Shipbuilder overall cumulative cost and schedule 
performance indices, June 2008–November 2013 
 
Source: AWD Alliance, November 2013. 
Note: Includes ASC’s total scope of work: DDG pre-production, production and block construction by 
ASC and its block subcontractors, consolidation and outfitting including installation of Platform 
System and Combat System equipment and components, and overall supervision, operations, 
production management, apprentice and production training. 
6.108 The  degrading  trend  in  cost  performance  is most  apparent  in ASC’s 
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and  in  March  2010  and  May  2011  at  Forgacs  and  Navantia  respectively. 
Production  also  includes  block  transportation,  and  block  consolidation  at 
ASC.349 
6.109 Figure  6.14  shows ASC’s CPI  and  SPI  for DDG  production. The CPI 
data show a continuing trend of significant cost overruns since the beginning 
of the program. 
Figure 6.14: ASC AWD Shipbuilder production cumulative cost and 
schedule performance indices, June 2008–November 2013 
 
Source: AWD Alliance, November 2013. 
Note: This figure includes only DDG block construction by ASC and its block subcontractors, block 
consolidation, production supervision, operations, production management, apprentice and 
production training. 
6.110 By November 2013, it was costing ASC $1.60 to produce work that was 
originally  estimated  to  cost  $1.00,  or  in  EVMS  terms,  cost  efficiency  had 
declined  from  1.0  in  September  2010  to  0.62  (62  per  cent).  Since  late  2010, 
production engineering issues at ASC and its block subcontractors, and ASC’s 
block  rework  to  address  changes  in  the  detailed  design  and  rectify  work 
undertaken  by  its  block  subcontractors,  have  contributed  to  persistent 
productivity below planned levels and production cost overruns.350  
                                                     
349  Production data does not include DDG pre-production, which includes engineering reviews and 
planning, configuration management, Combat System production support, work orders and materials 
support. 
350  In the 2012–13 Major Projects Report, the DMO acknowledged that the major challenges faced by the 
AWD Program include: ‘achieving maximum productivity levels through efficient shipyard operation 
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6.111 The  SPI data  shown  in  Figure  6.14  indicate  that,  by November  2013, 
ASC’s  shipbuilding  was  running  seven  per  cent  behind  schedule.  Further, 
ASC’s  CPI  and  SPI  indicate  that  ASC  has  placed  its  production  priorities 
mainly  on  achieving  high‐standard  build  to  specifications,  together  with 
schedule  achievement.  The  aim  of  this  strategy  is  to  achieve  high‐quality 
outcomes  and  at  the  same  time  avoid  large  time‐related  cost  increases  that 
occur with schedule overruns. 
Underlying causes of low shipbuilding productivity 
6.112 Cost  increases  can  result  from  both  design  changes  and  inefficient 
production‐engineering  strategies  and processes. Up until  2013,  the Alliance 
did not report detailed analysis of shipbuilding cost and schedule data, drawn 
from  the program’s EVMS,  on  the  extent  to which design  change  and  other 
factors  impacted  productivity.  In  October  2013,  ASC  and  the  Alliance  CEO 




issues,  is more  complex,  although  not  because  the  systems  are  incapable  of 
doing  so,  but  more  because  the  [Platform  System  Designer]  does  not 
differentiate change cause on drawings at sufficient fidelity  to allow accurate 
cost  apportionment  and  because  of  the  complexities  of  dislocation  and 
disruption  not  allowing  accurate  cost  capture.  That  said,  there  are  actions 
being taken to improve change cost capture. 
6.113 During  the DDG construction program,  immaturity  in detailed design 
documentation  has  tended  to  overshadow  other  factors  contributing  to  low 
shipbuilding  productivity.  For  example,  at  its  February  2012  meeting,  the 
Alliance Principals Council: 
... discussed productivity, noting that productivity needed to improve at both 
Forgacs  and ASC. The Council  acknowledged  the  current  issue  of  lack  of  a 
mature  [Technical Data Package] and agreed  that an  increase  in productivity 
would require the design to stabilise and change to cease.351 
6.114 In  October  2013,  ASC  informed  the  ANAO  that  the  productivity 
impacts of design changes and defective documentation include: 
                                                     
351  AWD Alliance Principals Council, meeting minutes, 20 February 2012, p. 3. 
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 disruption of work  sequencing, which  in  turn generates high  labour 
rotation and an  inability  to realise  ‘learning curve’  (that  is, efficiency 
through experience) benefits; 
 rework caused by design change; and 
 work  interruptions  arising  from  unavailability  of  material  and 
technical information. 
6.115 ASC also informed the ANAO that: 
ASC  has  actively  applied  its  resources  to  address  the  external  factors  that 
influence the ASC shipyard productivity and adapt with urgency and pace to 
gain  improvements  in  direct  labour  productivity  and  overall  production 
process efficiency. This has been achieved by the use of LEAN 6 Sigma[352] and 
other processes and  leveraging off Bath  Iron Works’  extensive experience  in 
production management. 
6.116 The  link  between  stable  or  mature  design  and  shipbuilding 














352  Lean Six Sigma is a combination of the LEAN manufacturing practice—pioneered by Toyota, and 
focusing on the elimination of waste—with the Six Sigma strategies and techniques developed by 
Motorola, focused on improving quality by removing defects and errors. 
353  Sarah Martin, ‘AWD program “plagued” by design changes’, The Australian, 18 September 2013, p. 2. 
 In subsequent correspondence with the ANAO, the ASC confirmed that it regarded design immaturity 
as having ‘caused considerable cost and delay to date’. See page 3 of ASC’s letter to the ANAO, 
reproduced in Appendix 3. 
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data  for  the  period August  to December  2013. The DMO’s  analysis  showed 
that all of the factors mentioned in paragraph 6.117 directly contributed to cost 
increases.  The  DMO’s  analysis  also  showed  that  the  most  significant  direct 
contribution driving cost  increases was block subcontractor performance. The 
direct  contribution  of  design  change  to  overall  monthly  cost  increases  was 
relatively  small  during  the  five‐month  period.355  The  DMO  informed  the 
ANAO that: 
One  factor  identified  has  been  design  change  from  the  Platform  System 
Designer  and  much  emphasised  by  ASC.  Other  clear  impacts  have  been 
subcontractor management and productivity performance in each of the three 
Australian  yards,  all  the  latter  are  the  responsibility  of  the  shipbuilder  to 
manage. A modest  level  of  design  change  is  normal  and  the  shipbuilder  is 
required  to  manage  the  plan  to  implement  change  with  the  minimum  of 
impact  to  the  overall  program.  That  is  the  basis  of  the  contract.  There  are 
multiple  other  factors  that  impact  cost  including  schedule,  Class  1  change, 
detailed  design  change,  subcontractor management  and  omissions  from  the 
initial estimates. 
6.119 In  a  similar  vein,  in  January  2014  the  Alliance  CEO  informed  the 
ANAO that: 
Alliance  records also disclose  that  the  [cost] over‐run has primarily  resulted 




outcomes;  churn  in  the  detailed‐design  being  greater  than  expected  (or 
allowed for); costs not properly estimated or budgeted in the TCE [Target Cost 
Estimate]  (and/or  invalid  assumptions)  and  production  productivity  not 
achieving the levels assumed in development of the TCE. The majority of these 
issues  are well  described  in  the ANAO  report.  The ANAO  has  provided  a 
significant  volume  of  commentary  on  the  ‘detailed‐design’  including  noting 
that  related  issues have  ‘tended  to overshadow other  factors  contributing  to 
                                                     
354  The AWD Program Office informed the ANAO that this data had not been collated in this manner by 
ASC or the AWD Alliance prior to August 2013. 
355  Design change also has an indirect impact on other factors listed in paragraph 6.117. 
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of  the  other  performance  causal  factors  that  include  especially  ‘subcontract 
outcomes’  and  ‘productivity’,  which  have  had  and  are  having  a  significant 
impact on the AWD Program.356 
External reviews and assessments of productivity 
6.120 Since  2010,  the  DMO  has  engaged  the  internationally  recognised 
shipbuilding  advisory  firm  First Marine  International  (FMI)  to  carry  out  an 
independent  assessment  of  the  objective  and  actual  productivity  of  the 
Australian DDG block builders. 
6.121 FMI has  identified a number of  inherent  factors relating  to  the nature 




and  the  third‐party  design,  technical  information  and  build  strategy.  FMI 
noted that these inherent factors need to be taken into account when assessing 
the  performance  that  could  be  achieved  or  considering  performance 
improvement actions. 
6.122 In 2010, FMI found that: 
Although  it  is  unlikely  that  core  productivity[357]  will  be  achieved  on  this 
project, in order to maximise the potential it is suggested that: 
1.  The  maximum  possible  attention  is  given  to  resolving  the  issues 




3.  Effective  processes  are  needed  to  ensure  the  maximum  productivity 
improvement is gained from lessons learnt. 
                                                     
356  See page 3 of the Alliance CEO’s letter to the ANAO, reproduced in Appendix 2. 
357  Core productivity is the best productivity a shipyard can achieve given a mature design. Although there 
are notable exceptions, core productivity is generally not reached before the fourth vessel in a series. 
Due to first-of-class performance drop-off, which can be as high as 50 per cent in established naval 
builders, actual productivity achieved early in the series is much lower than core productivity. First 
Marine International, Assessment of objective shipbuilding productivity for the AWD project, SEA 4000 
Air Warfare Destroyer Program, 28 July 2010, p. 6. 
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is  supported  by  some  good  shipbuilding  process metrics,  rather  than 
just the EVM data.358 




as  the  number  of  hours  of  work  on  structural  steel,  pipe  and  painting;  the 
proportion of support workers; and the proportion of supply items that arrive 
on time to production. 
6.124 In  2011,  FMI  found  that  good  progress  had  been  made  in  resolving 
Navantia  technical  information  issues and  the  transfer of  technology, and  in 
settling  into a stable production process. FMI also found that some work had 
been done  in capturing  lessons  learned and driving down the  learning curve. 
However, its report noted that no work had been done to ‘introduce a culture 
of  continuous  process  improvement  supported  by  process  metrics  to  drive 
performance improvement’. 
6.125 FMI’s 2012 update report, released in February 2013, noted that its 2010 
and  2011  reports  included  general  observations  and  suggestions  for 
productivity  improvement  that  are  relevant  to  the  project  as  a  whole.  FMI 
reported that: 
The  changes  made  have  lead  to  improvements  in  some  areas.  However, 
opportunities for improvements still exist on Ship 1. The focus on Ship 1 also 




were  issues  where  little  effective  action  had  been  taken,  17  (24  per  cent) 
showed  some  effective  action  taken,  four  issues  (5  per  cent)  were  largely 
resolved, and the status of the remaining two issues was not reported.360 FMI’s 
72  observations  and  suggestions  were  grouped  into  the  following  five 
                                                     
358  First Marine International, Assessment of objective shipbuilding productivity for the AWD project, SEA 
4000 Air Warfare Destroyer Program, 28 July 2010, p. 17. 
359  First Marine International, Assessment of actual and planned shipbuilding productivity for the AWD 
project, SEA 4000 Air Warfare Destroyer Program, 2012 update, 8 February 2013, p. 31. 
360  These unreported issues were Australian Standards creep and project focus ahead of productivity. 
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categories:  business  processes  and  communication;  personnel;  technical 
information and  change; production performance; and planning and control. 
Issues  needing  effective  action  were  predominant  throughout  all  these 
categories.361 
6.127 With  respect  to  detailed  design  maturity,  FMI  reported  in  its  2012 
update that: 
The processes  for configuration management and  the development of  the as‐
fitted drawings  remain undefined. However  robust  the  change management 
process  is  believed  to  be,  to  date  the  quality  of  the  Navantia  technical 
information has been poor.362 
6.128 While  reporting  good  progress  in  some  areas  in  relation  to  technical 
information and change, FMI’s 2012 update also reported little effective action 
in  relation  to  the  absence  of  ‘as  built’  technical  information,  mismatches 
between  technical  information  and  build  strategies,  and  the  level  of  rework 
due to technical information. 
6.129 In  January  2014,  the  DMO  informed  the  ANAO  that  many  of  the 
performance improvement opportunities reported by FMI since 2010 were yet 
to  be  implemented,  and  that  the  DMO  believed  these  improvements  were 
critical  to  the achievement of  improved shipbuilding productivity. The AWD 
Program Manager informed the ANAO that: 
... the shipbuilder and the Alliance must accept that there is a productivity and 
cost  issue  in  ship  production  (and  identify  the  causal  factors), measure  the 
issues and analyse  the  trends,  then  remediate. The Commonwealth,  through 
                                                     
361  First Marine International, Assessment of actual and planned shipbuilding productivity for the AWD 
project, SEA 4000 Air Warfare Destroyer Program, 2012 update, 8 February 2013, p. 32. 
 In his January 2014 response to an extract from this audit report, the Alliance CEO stated that ‘Since 
2010, the DMO has contracted for international benchmarking of the AWD shipbuilding production 
productivity. This benchmarking suggests that whilst the assumed productivity levels underpinning the 
initial AWD budgets were credible, the achieved productivity outcomes have been further away from 
best practice and suggested performance targets than anticipated. Of course there are a variety of 
reasons for this including the need to re-establish the quiescent industrial base particularly in the case 
of the lead shipbuilder ASC, where the Shipbuilding team is largely a start-up organisation with the 
vast majority of staff newly hired and from outside the sector. A similar situation arose with the block 
subcontractors. Other contributory factors (such as the disruption due to churn in the detailed-design) 
are discussed subsequently in this response. Whilst the outstanding quality of the product being built 
is an absolute credit to the production work-force and leadership, program issues remain with respect 
to cost, productivity and schedule certainty.’ See page 3 of the Alliance CEO’s letter to the ANAO, 
reproduced in Appendix 5. 
362  First Marine International, Assessment of actual and planned shipbuilding productivity for the AWD 
project, SEA 4000 Air Warfare Destroyer Program, 2012 update, 8 February 2013, p. 37. 
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361  First Marine International, Assessment of actual and planned shipbuilding productivity for the AWD 
project, SEA 4000 Air Warfare Destroyer Program, 2012 update, 8 February 2013, p. 32. 
 In his January 2014 response to an extract from this audit report, the Alliance CEO stated that ‘Since 
2010, the DMO has contracted for international benchmarking of the AWD shipbuilding production 
productivity. This benchmarking suggests that whilst the assumed productivity levels underpinning the 
initial AWD budgets were credible, the achieved productivity outcomes have been further away from 
best practice and suggested performance targets than anticipated. Of course there are a variety of 
reasons for this including the need to re-establish the quiescent industrial base particularly in the case 
of the lead shipbuilder ASC, where the Shipbuilding team is largely a start-up organisation with the 
vast majority of staff newly hired and from outside the sector. A similar situation arose with the block 
subcontractors. Other contributory factors (such as the disruption due to churn in the detailed-design) 
are discussed subsequently in this response. Whilst the outstanding quality of the product being built 
is an absolute credit to the production work-force and leadership, program issues remain with respect 
to cost, productivity and schedule certainty.’ See page 3 of the Alliance CEO’s letter to the ANAO, 
reproduced in Appendix 5. 
362  First Marine International, Assessment of actual and planned shipbuilding productivity for the AWD 
project, SEA 4000 Air Warfare Destroyer Program, 2012 update, 8 February 2013, p. 37. 
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scorecard  input  to  industry  and  regular  meetings  including  Defence–




measures of productivity. During  2012  the Commonwealth  and  the Alliance 
agreed  to  focus  on  productivity  as  one  of  two  key  areas  for  performance 
indicator reporting.364 In August 2012, the Alliance wrote to the DMO, noting 
that  it would,  amongst  other  actions,  establish  a  Productivity  Improvement 
Team,  implement FMI’s  suggested basket of measures and conduct a  review 
against  these.  Extensive  productivity  metrics  were  reported  on  for  the  first 
time in the Project Status Report released in February 2013. 
6.131 Against  the  backdrop  of  the  range  of  factors  contributing  to  the  low 
shipbuilding productivity in the construction phase of the DDGs, it is clear that 
a  rigorous  focus  is  needed  on  addressing  the  underlying  causes  so  that 
construction cost and schedule overruns are contained over  the remainder of 
the  DDG  build  program.  The  independent  review  of  the  AWD  Program 
presents an opportunity to identify strategies aimed at addressing construction 
challenges,  increasing productivity and mitigating  further cost overruns,  in a 
timely manner. 
Recommendation No.3  
6.132 The ANAO recommends that, for future Australian naval construction 
programs, Defence monitor performance against a set of productivity metrics 
from  the  outset,  so  as  to  promote  productivity,  gauge  the  key  factors 




363  In its January 2014 response to an extract from this audit report, ASC stated that ‘ASC's own 
productivity and performance in our shipyard and our supplier shipyards is improving as we apply the 
lessons we have learned, both good and bad, to the program.’ See page 1 of ASC’s letter to the 
ANAO, reproduced in Appendix 3. 
364  The Alliance contract permits the AWD Program Manager to set key performance indicators for the 
Industry Participants and—if the Industry Participants achieve superior performance against these 
indicators—to pay them a performance bonus of up to $1 million (November 2006 prices) in a six-
month period. Commonwealth of Australia, ASC AWD Shipbuilder, Raytheon Australia, Air Warfare 
Destroyer (SEA 4000) Alliance Based Target Incentive Agreement, General Conditions of Contract, 
clause 49. 
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6.133 3‐D  Computer  Aided  Design  (CAD)  tools  are  generally  used 
extensively  in  the  design  and  construction  of  modern  warships.  While 
Navantia used multiple 3‐D CAD models,  these were not  closely  integrated, 
making it more difficult to identify and resolve detailed design issues. Further, 






of production  issues, and  in  January 2013 Navantia placed a design approval 
engineer  at  ASC  Osborne.  While  the  3‐D  CAD  models  and  increased 
integration with Navantia are supporting more timely and effective resolution 
of  design  and  construction  issues,  it  would  have  been  preferable  to  have 
applied  suitable  technology  and  expertise  from  the  outset  of  the  build 
program,  particularly  given  the  risks  associated  with  Navantia  exporting  a 
design for the first time to a third‐party shipyard. 
6.134 During  the  design  phase  of  the  AWD  Program,  SEA  4000  Phase  2, 
industry  and  government  operated  on  the  shared  assumption  that  potential 
subcontractors  to  the AWD Program had  the  financial capacity,  facilities and 
commercial  incentive  to  develop  capabilities  necessary  to  win  and  execute 
contracts for significant portions of the DDG hull block production. However, 
during  the  subsequent  block  subcontract  tendering  and  source  selection 
process, it became apparent that none of the tendering shipyards had recently 
performed work  of  this  type  on  the  scale  anticipated,  and  that  each  facility 
where  work  could  potentially  be  conducted  required  significant  capital 
investment to develop the necessary handling and processing capability.365 The 
allocation of blocks to subcontractors was developed by ASC, approved by the 
Alliance  Project  Board  and  subsequently  negotiated  by  ASC  in  2009.  BAE 
Systems  was  allocated  36  blocks,  which  included  the  DDGs’  complex  keel 
blocks, and Forgacs was allocated 29 blocks. 
6.135 The Production Readiness Reviews  conducted by  the Alliance  in  late 
2009  and  early  2010  to  determine  the  readiness  of  block  construction 
                                                     
365  AWD Alliance, Schedule Replan, Project Board paper, 16 June 2011, p. 2. 
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contractors  to commence production appear now  to have been  inadequate  in 




keel  block  being  constructed  by  BAE  Systems.  This  placed  the  block 
construction schedule in  jeopardy, particularly as BAE Systems’ simultaneous 
construction of other blocks  for  the DDGs and  the Landing Helicopter Dock 
ships stretched its capacity to the point that, without remedial action, the first 
DDG would have been  two years  late. Defence advised  the  then Minister  for 
Defence  in October 2010  that  ‘the poor build quality was  largely  the result of 
BAE  Systems  not  having  sufficient  experienced  production  supervisors—
workshop  engineers  and  foremen—despite  being  one  of  Australia’s  most 
experienced  shipbuilding  organisations’.  Consequently,  there  was  a 
reallocation  of  some  BAE  Systems  blocks  to  Forgacs,  and  to  Navantia’s 
shipyard  in Ferrol, Spain.366 Defence records show  that  further reallocation of 
blocks  between  shipyards was  under  discussion  by  the Alliance  during  the 
latter half of 2013, as a result of deteriorating performance and significant cost 




decided  that,  rather  than  rejecting Navantia’s design  documentation  until  it 
had  reached  the  anticipated  level  of maturity,  a  better  strategy would  be  to 
continue working and consequently allow some defects and deficiencies in the 
supplies  to  progress  into  production.  In  October  2013,  the  Alliance  CEO 
informed  the ANAO  that  the majority of defects and deficiencies were more 
insidious, and were either discovered  in production or  identified  later by  the 
Platform  System  Designer  in  the  form  of  change.  The  receipt  of  revised 





366  In March 2012 and May 2013, BAE Systems was reallocated a total of eight blocks. The reallocation 
recognised that BAE Systems had the capacity and skill to successfully take on an increased share of 
the workload. 
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increases  the  Industry  Participants’  exposure  to  the  Alliance  contract’s 
liquidated damages for late delivery. While Navantia is not part of the Alliance 
and  is  therefore not exposed  to reduced  incentive payments,  it does bear  the 
cost of revisions to rectify errors and omissions in design documentation. 
6.139 Based  on  the  forward  estimates  by  the  Alliance’s  Control  Account 




block  rework  to  address  changes  in  the  detailed  design  and  rectify  work 
undertaken  by  its  block  subcontractors,  have  contributed  to  persistent 
productivity  below  planned  levels  and  production  cost  overruns.  By 
November 2013, it was costing ASC $1.60 to produce work that was originally 
estimated  to  cost  $1.00,  or  in  EVMS  terms,  production  cost  efficiency  had 
declined  from 1.0  in September 2010  to 0.62  (62 per cent) by November 2013. 
However  combat  system development  is progressing more  satisfactorily. By 
September  2013,  Raytheon  had  expended  69  per  cent  of  its  budget  for  the 
DDGs’ Combat System engineering work, with the Earned Value Management 
System  showing  its  cost  efficiency  at  1.0  or  100  per  cent,  and  schedule 
performance at 0.99 or 99 per cent. 
6.140 Between  2010  and  2013,  the  Alliance  and  ASC  did  not  routinely 
quantify the various elements that contributed to reduced productivity.367 ASC 
and the Alliance CEO noted that isolating costs associated with immaturity in 





367  In 2012, the AWD Alliance Principals Council discussed productivity, noting that: 
  productivity needed to improve at both Forgacs and ASC. The Council acknowledged the current 
issue of lack of a mature TDP and agreed that an increase in productivity would require the design 
to stabilise and change to cease. 
 AWD Alliance Principals Council, meeting minutes, 20 February 2012, p. 3. 
368  See paragraphs 5.45 and 6.112. 
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Manager  estimates  of  the  extent  to  which  different  factors  impacted  on 
shipbuilding productivity.369  In  January 2014,  the Alliance CEO  informed  the 
ANAO that: 
...  there are a variety of  root‐causes  for  the  cost  increases and  these  include: 
schedule  prolongation;  block  sub‐contract  outcomes;  churn  in  the  detailed 
design  being  greater  than  expected  (or  allowed  for);  costs  not  properly 
estimated  or  budgeted  in  the  TCE  [Target  Cost  Estimate]  (and/or  invalid 
assumptions) and production productivity not achieving the levels assumed in 
development of the TCE.370 
6.141 FMI  independently  assessed  the  objective  and  actual  productivity  of 
the Australian DDG block builders between  2010  and  2012, producing  three 
reports  on  the matter.  FMI’s  2012 update  report,  released  in  February  2013, 
noted that changes made by the shipbuilders had led to improvements in some 
areas.  However,  FMI  also  found  that,  of  the  72  overall  observations  and 
suggestions it made in 2010, 2011 and 2012, 49 (68 per cent) were found to be 
new  issues or were  issues where  little effective action had been  taken, 17  (24 
per  cent)  showed  some  effective  action  taken,  four  issues  (5 per cent)  were 
largely resolved, and the status of the remaining two issues was not reported. 
FMI’s 72 observations and  suggestions were grouped  into  the  following  five 
categories:  business  processes  and  communication;  personnel;  technical 
information and  change; production performance; and planning and control. 
Issues  needing  effective  action  were  predominant  throughout  all  these 
categories.371 
6.142 In  September  2012,  the Government  announced  a plan  to  extend  the 
AWD Program so that the delivery of the first ship was delayed by 15 months, 
and the interval between the delivery of the ships was increased from 15 to 18 
months.  Defence  and  the  Industry  Participants  subsequently  commenced 
rebaselining  the  construction  schedule.  The  September  2013  Integrated 
Baseline Review report indicated that major corrective actions were necessary 
                                                     
369  The DMO’s AWD Program Management Office analysed the monthly cost-variance data for the period 
August to December 2013. The analysis showed that design change, out-of-sequence work, defects 
and left-off work, rework, productivity and estimating error, and block subcontractors’ performance all 
directly contributed to monthly cost overruns in shipbuilding. The largest direct contribution to cost 
increases between August and December 2013 came from subcontractors’ performance. It should be 
noted that design change also has an indirect impact on other factors. 
370  See page 3 of the Alliance CEO’s letter to the ANAO, reproduced in Appendix 2. 
371  First Marine International, Assessment of actual and planned shipbuilding productivity for the AWD 
project, SEA 4000 Air Warfare Destroyer Program, 2012 update, 8 February 2013, p. 32. 
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report  highlighted  problems  with  the  EVMS’s  Performance  Measurement 
Baseline,  and  that  corrective  action  was  required  for  the  EVMS  to  be 
considered acceptable for accurate performance measurement. Consequently, a 
recalculation of  the estimated cost of  the Alliance contract  (that  is,  the EVMS 
Estimate At Completion discussed above) is necessary to ensure that adequate 
allowance has been made for remaining AWD build risks and  issues, such as 
those  relating  to  construction  drawing  maturity  and  future  productivity 
projections. 
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7. Support System and Transition from 
Guided Missile Frigates 
This  chapter  examines Defence’s  development  of  the  Support  System  arrangements 
required to ensure that the Hobart‐class DDGs remain operational once they have been 
placed  into service. The paper also examines Defence’s management of  the  transition 
from the Guided Missile Frigates (FFGs) to the DDGs, and the associated risks. 
Introduction 
7.1 Being  the  ‘parent  navy’  of  a  class  of  ship  or  submarine  requires  the 
RAN, and  its acquisition and sustainment organisations and  their supporting 
industries, to place appropriate priority on managing and  investing  in a cost‐
effective Support System, which  includes  engineering  services,  configuration 
control,  supply  support,  training  and  intellectual  property.  It  should  also 
include  developing  an  industry  capacity  to  understand  the  class’s  design 
philosophy to the extent necessary to design and implement modifications and 
to undertake major repairs safely and effectively.372 
7.2 Investments  in  Support  Systems—which  are  also  referred  to  as  in‐
service  support  arrangements,  sustainment  arrangements,  or  Integrated 
Logistics  Support  arrangements—often prove  costly  and  risky.  For  example, 
since  the  1990s,  the  in‐service  support  capability  for  the  Collins‐class 
submarines has been more  costly and  less effective  than was envisaged. The 





372  ANAO Audit Report No.23, 2008–09, Management of the Collins-class Operations Sustainment, p. 12. 
373  ANAO Audit Report No.34, 1997–98, New Submarine Project, pp. xxiii, 125–9. 
 The 2012 Coles report on the Collins program made a range of criticisms and observations on the 
cost-effectiveness of in-service support arrangements and submarine availability. The report noted 
that the cost-effectiveness of the Collins in-service support arrangements in achieving each Materiel 
Ready Day—on available but not absolute indicators—is about half that of international comparators. 
Further, the availability performance of the Collins-class has been slightly over half that achieved by 
the comparable international programs; the time in planned maintenance was about one third greater 
than for other nations; and the maintenance overruns and the percentage of days lost due to defects 
were approximately double that of the comparators.  
Department of Defence, Study into the Business of Sustaining Australia’s Strategic Collins Class 
Submarine Capability (The Coles Report), Canberra, November 2012, pp. ii, vi. 
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7.3 This  chapter  examines Defence’s development of  the Support System 
arrangements  required  to  ensure  that  the  Hobart‐class  DDGs  remain 
operational once they have been placed into service. The paper also examines 
Defence’s  management  of  the  transition  from  the  FFGs  to  the  DDGs,  and 
provides a brief overall assessment of the risks to the RAN’s major surface ship 
capability  from  the  perspective  of  the  DDGs’  delivery  schedule  and  the 
retention of skills developed through the AWD Program. 
Support System development 
7.4 The DDG Support System  is  influenced by  the design of  the  evolved 




the  RAN’s  Surface  Combatant  in‐service  support  environment.  The  overall 
scope of the Hobart‐class DDG Support System arrangements—as specified in 
the Materiel Acquisition Agreement  between  the DMO  and Defence,  and  in 
various  Alliance  documents—includes  the  following  principal  subsystems, 
equipment and services: 
 an  Integrated  Platform  Management  System  Pierside  Monitor, 
consisting of a set of computer and display equipment  for each DDG, 





374  The DDGs’ Platform System is based upon the F-104 and F-105 designs in service with the Spanish 
Navy, consisting of: 
 hull structure, including shell and supporting structure, hull decks and hull platforms; 
 propulsion plant, including propulsion unit, transmission and propulsion support systems; 
 electric plant, including electric power distribution, lighting and power generation support systems; 
 integrated platform management, general equipment arrangements, safety, security and personnel 
related systems; 
 auxiliary systems, including climate control, sea-water systems and fresh-water systems; and 
 outfit and furnishings, including ship fitting, hull compartments, living spaces and working spaces. 
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 a  Command  Team  Trainer  capable  of  training  at  the  level  of  a 
command team; 




of  the  Hobart‐class  Ship  System,  to  be  integrated  into  the  existing 
HMAS Watson bridge  simulator  system,  to allow crew  training  in  the 
handling of the ship in harbours, inshore and in offshore waters; 
 equipment  and  data  required  to  support  the  delivery  of  training, 
maintenance, engineering, and supply support services; 
 special‐purpose  Support  and  Test  Equipment  required  to  support 
Organic and External  (Light Repair and Maintenance)  for  the Mission 
System and Support System components of the Hobart‐class DDGs; 
 crew  training  for  three ship companies plus an additional 20 per cent, 
and  provision  of  DDG‐specific  documentation  and  courseware  for 
subsequent training; 
 three years of depot  stocks  for  replenishment of onboard  spares  (two 
years  for mandated Foreign Military Sales  (FMS) equipment), 90 days 
of onboard spares  (first outfit  for  three ships), and selected  long‐lead‐
time and  insurance  spares  (as determined by  the Capability Manager 
and the DMO); and 
 additional Program Management Office Support System products and 
services,  including  facilities  to house  the  Systems Program Office,  an 
Integrated  Logistics  Support  Facility,  an  AWD  Training  Centre,  an 
Operational Support Facility, and modifications to wharves to support 
berthing of the Hobart‐class DDGs at Garden Island in Sydney. 
Support System contracts 
7.5 The DDG Support System is a deliverable under the Alliance contract. 
However,  the  Alliance  is  not  currently  contracted  to  provide  in‐service 
support. In essence, the AWD Alliance is contracted in large part to ‘seed’ the 
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sustainment  capability  through  the  Integrated  Logistics  Support  Program 
specified  in the Alliance contract. This  includes recommending to the DMO a 
comprehensive  model  for  the  ongoing  management  and  update  of  the 
Integrated Logistics Support elements necessary for the in‐service phase. 
7.6 The intention is that the Alliance should use its contractual framework 
and  organisation  to  deliver  the  Engineering  Support,  Maintenance  Support, 
Supply Support  and  specific Training Support  for  the DDGs  for  a  transition 
period  (approximately  2016–20)  prior  to  the  implementation  of  the  future 
steady‐state  in‐service  support  contract.  This  period  will  be  known  as  the 
Transition Support Period.375 
7.7 The  largely  off‐the‐shelf  nature  of  the  Platform  System  and  Combat 
System  designs  results  in  a  need  for  the DMO  and  the RAN  to  form  close 
engineering,  design  and  logistics‐support  arrangements  with  the  relevant 
F‐104 FFG logistics program in Spain for the DDG Platform System, and with 








there  is  a  need  for  the  DMO  and  the  RAN  to  also  form  close  engineering, 
design  and  logistics  support  arrangements  with  the  Original  Equipment 
Manufacturers or their agents in Australia and overseas.377 
                                                     
375  At the time of the audit, the Transition Support Period was not included in the Alliance contract’s 
scope. The Support System elements that have been included in the Alliance contract’s scope are 
outlined in paragraph 7.4. 
376  Military off-the-shelf (MOTS) equipment is defined as items, including software, which are of a kind 
offered for sale (whether from a standard catalogue, product list or otherwise) in a military market on 
standard commercial terms and at standard prices. MOTS equipment may be deployed without 
modification in a variety of configurations. AWD Alliance, Integrated Support Plan, May 2010, p. 7. 
377  Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment is defined as equipment of a kind widely used and offered 
for sale (whether from a standard catalogue, product list or otherwise) by many vendors in a market 
(whether a general market or a military market) on standard commercial terms and at standard prices. 
COTS equipment may be deployed without modification in a variety of configurations. AWD Alliance, 
Integrated Support Plan, May 2010, p. 6. 
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7.9 The  Alliance  was  contracted  to  supply  limited  Logistics  Support 
Analysis  data  on  the  off‐the‐shelf  systems,  including  the  Aegis  Weapon 
System. Logistics  Support Analysis  is necessary  to  identify  and  evaluate  the 
logistics  support  necessary  to  maintain  the  DDGs’  equipment  in  a  fully 
operational  and  safe  state.  The  output  of  this  analysis  would  be  Logistics 
Support  Analysis  Records  for  each  DDG  system,  which  would  specify, 
amongst other  things,  the  required  levels of  spare and  repair parts,  test and 
support equipment, and skilled personnel. 
7.10 The  AWD  Program’s  Logistics  Support  Analysis  recognises  that  the 
RAN  may  operate  the  systems  in  different  operating  and  maintenance 
environments  to  that of each  system’s parent navy, and  this may  reduce  the 
valid  use  by  the  RAN  of  the  parent  navy’s  Logistics  Support  Analysis.  In 
August  2013,  the  RAN  informed  the  ANAO  that  the  data  received  from 
Navantia  is based on core Logistics Support Analysis conducted by Navantia 
as the designer and repair agent for the Spanish Navy, and Navantia continues 
to  modify  the  data  based  on  the  Spanish  Navy’s  in‐service  experience  of 
failures and repairs. The RAN further advised that the data is being modified 
to  better  align  with  the  RAN’s  operational  environment  and  expected  ship 




Support  Integrated  Product  Team.  The  DDG  Support  System  is  to  be 
developed by the Alliance Industry Participants by: 
 conducting analysis necessary  for  the development of support  for  the 
Mission System and Support System deliverables; 
 developing plans for the in‐service phase of the DDG capability. These 
plans  are  to  be  produced  in  time  to  allow  the  conduct  of  detailed 
planning, training and associated activities; 
 supplying  some  items necessary  to  support  the Mission  and  Support 
Systems  pending  the  commencement  of  the  Through  Life  Support 
contract; 
 planning  for  the  initial  establishment  of  Through  Life  Support 
arrangements; and 
 incorporating  into  the  Support  System  the  support  for  Government 
Furnished Material as provided by Defence. 
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7.12 Initial  sustainment planning  for  the DDGs has been described  in  this 
report for the purpose of establishing whether the necessary work to develop 
the DDGs’ Support System  is under way. Progress  is being monitored by  the 
RAN,  including  by  the  one‐star  and  three‐star  Program  Management 
Stakeholder Groups. However, the sustainment phase of the DDGs’ lifecycle is 




Parliamentary  Standing  Committee  on  Public  Works  (Public  Works 




DDG  Support  System  facilities  to  the  Public  Works  Committee  in  order  to 
obtain  parliamentary  approval  to  commence  work.380  Defence  sought 
ministerial approval for referral of the facilities to the Public Works Committee 
in  September  2011  and  again  in  October  2011.  However,  the  facilities  were 
deemed  by  the Department  of  Finance  and Deregulation  (Finance)  as  being 
unapproved,  because  they  were  not  explicitly  mentioned  in  the  June  2007 
SEA 4000 Second Pass Cabinet decision.381 
                                                     
378  Nonetheless, in the 2012–13 Major Projects Report, the DMO acknowledged that the major challenges 
faced by the AWD Program include: ‘Delivering an effective, efficient and sustainable through-life 
support system for the Hobart Class DDGs.’ ANAO Report No.12, 2013–14, 2012–13 Major Projects 
Report, p. 150. 
379  The House of Representatives may resolve that the work is urgent, or the Governor-General may 
declare that the work is for defence purposes and committee scrutiny would be contrary to the public 
interest, or the work may be deemed to be repetitive. 
380  The DDG facilities eventually referred to the Public Works Committee were the: 
 Training Centre at Randwick Barracks; 
 Command Team Trainer at HMAS Watson; 
 Through Life Support Facility at Garden Island; 
 Systems Program Office at Garden Island; 
 Lay Apart Store at Garden Island; 
 Integrated Platform Monitoring System Remote Monitoring Station at Garden Island; and 
 Berthing Infrastructure at Garden Island. 
381  The facilities were mentioned as a budget line item within an Attachment to the Second Pass 
Submission seeking selection of the Existing Design. 
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the  Minister  for  Defence  should  write  to  the  Prime  Minister  seeking 
clarification  that Defence was  authorised  to  spend  funds  on AWD  Program 
sustainment  facilities. The department  also offered  a quick  turnaround  from 
the  Prime Minister  to  such  an  urgent  letter. Notwithstanding  this  advice  to 
Defence, it was not until January 2013 that Defence provided specific advice to 
the then Minister about the failure to have the facilities expenditure explicitly 




Defence,  Finance  and  [the  Department  of  the  Prime  Minister  and  Cabinet] 
have not been able  to  resolve  this has  seen a 12 month delay  in progressing 
these matters for [Public Works Committee] approval. 
7.16 When  questioned  about  the  cause  of  the  delay  between  receiving 
advice from the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and the  letter 
from the Minister to the Prime Minister, Defence advised that it provided Early 
Indicators  and  Warnings  reports  to  the  Minister  in  September  and  October 
2012,  which  included  information  on  the  funding  approval  issues  and  the 
subsequent delays in referring the proposed sustainment facilities to the Public 
Works  Committee.  However,  Defence  noted  that  these  reports  included  a 
significant amount of detail  from many Defence projects, and acknowledged 
that  it  should  have  provided  separate  ministerial  correspondence  to  clearly 
highlight the funding issues.382 
7.17 In  response  to  the  Minister’s  letter,  the  Prime  Minister  gave  her 
approval, and the facilities were referred to the Public Works Committee on 21 
March 2013. The Public Works Committee held a public hearing on the project 
on  23  April  2013,  and  the  House  of  Representatives  approved  the  facilities 
expenditure on 16 May 2013. 
                                                     
382  In a similar vein, the ANAO has recently reported a theme of Defence not advising government in a 
timely way of difficulties arising in major projects, sometimes allowing years to pass before providing 
that advice. ANAO Audit Report No.6 2013–14, Capability Development Reform, p. 245. 
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the  delay  to  the  delivery  of  the  DDG  crew  training  facilities  at  Randwick 
Barracks and the Command Team Trainer facility at HMAS Watson in Sydney 
was in the order of 25 months. This delay will result in the RAN and the AWD 
Program  not  having  permanent,  dedicated  training  facilities  for  crew  and 
support personnel for the first DDG, and so alternate temporary arrangements 
will need to be established. The RAN further advised that: 
 the  temporary  Combat  System  equipment  training  facilities  are 
intended  to  be  sited  within  the  Sydney  basin,  so  as  to  minimise 
disruption to trainers and trainees where possible; and 
 Platform  System‐related  training  facilities  have  not  been  affected,  as 
this training was always planned to be conducted in Adelaide, in close 
proximity to the construction of the DDGs.383 
Maintenance spares support 
7.19 The  AWD  Program  now  intends  that  the  contract  for  the  Transition 
Support Period will be agreed by the end of 2014, and that an FMS Follow‐on 
Support Case will be put in place during 2015. Other contracts for the support 
of  individual  equipment  and  equipment  groups—including  a  Through  Life 
Support  contract with  their designers, Original Equipment Manufacturers or 
their agents—are expected to be put in place prior to or during 2015. 
Support System certification 
7.20 The  RAN  Technical  Regulatory  System  requires  certification  that 
Integrated  Logistics  Support  products  and  other  deliverables  have  achieved 
the required standards, as documented within RAN technical regulations. The 
aim of the standards  is to ensure that the  logistics solutions developed for all 
capabilities meet  the RAN’s expectations, as encapsulated  in current  logistics 
policies  and  practices  and  in  lessons  learnt  from  past  project decisions. The 
DMO agreed on  the  Integrated Logistics Support Certification Basis with  the 
RAN  in  November  2007,  and  agreed  that  the  level  of  conformity  with  the 
                                                     
383  In the 2012–13 Major Projects Report, the DMO stated that an interim Facilities solution has been 
identified to address the potential capability gap as a result of the delay in obtaining Public Works 
Committee approval. ANAO Report No.12, 2013–14, 2012–13 Major Projects Report, p. 156. 
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standard  is  to  be  encapsulated  in  the  AWD  Integrated  Logistics  Support 
Certification Matrix. 
7.21 At  the  time of offering each Hobart‐class DDG  to  the RAN  for  Initial 
Materiel  Release  in  2016,  2017  and  2019,  the  AWD  Program  Management 
Office  (or  AWD  Systems  Program  Office,  as  applicable  at  the  time)  will  be 
required  to  provide  the  RAN  with  an  Initial  Integrated  Logistics  Support 
Certification, based on sufficient Objective Quality Evidence provided by  the 
Alliance  and  others  to  adequately  support  the  ship  during  the  Naval 
Operational  Test  and  Evaluation  period.  Failures  to  achieve  the  required 
standards are  to be recorded  in relevant TI 338 reports  (Reports of  the Materiel 
State  of  the  Capability)  for  the  Hobart‐class  DDGs,  together  with  risk 
assessments and mitigation strategies. 
Sustainment costs 
7.22 In order  to budget  for  the  lifecycle cost of a new capability, Defence’s 
practice  is  to  estimate  the  new  system’s  Net  Personnel  and  Operating  Cost 
(NPOC), which is defined as: 
the difference between  future and  current mature operating  costs associated 
with a capability, facility, system or specific  item of equipment. It reflects the 
net  difference  between  the  cost  estimates  to  operate  a  new,  upgraded  or 
replacement  capability  offset  by  the  guidance  ([Defence  Management  and 
Financial Plan]  funding) available  to operate  the current capability, across all 
affected groups and the DMO.384 
7.23 The  NPOC  estimation  process  is  designed  to  identify  variations  in 
Defence’s personnel and operating costs caused by the introduction of new or 
enhanced Defence capability.385 
7.24 In  2007,  at  Second  Pass,  Defence  advised  the  Government  that  the 
estimated NPOC over  the 30‐year  life of  the DDG capability was $3.4 billion, 





384  Department of Defence, Defence Capability Development Handbook 2012, Canberra, 2012, p. 133. 
385  For discussion of Net Personnel and Operating Cost, see ANAO Audit Report No.6, 2013–14, 
Capability Development Reform, Chapter 7. 
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as $619 million  in  the years up  to and  including 2019–20, and a  further $2.07 
billion to 2029–30.386 
7.25 The RAN also estimated  that  it would cost $684 million  to sustain  the 
remaining four FFGs between 2012–13 and June 2019, when it is expected that 
the last FFG will be withdrawn from service.387 
7.26 Defence  informed  the  ANAO  that  NPOC  estimates  require  gradual 
refinement  until  the  full  capability  has  been  introduced.  In  the  case  of  the 
DDGs,  the  third and  final  trigger  for  the  release of NPOC  funding does not 




7.27 The RAN’s plan  for  the capability  transition  from  the FFG  fleet  to  the 
DDG  fleet  aligns,  on  a  one‐to‐one  basis,  the withdrawal  from  service  of  the 
FFGs with  the achievement of  specified operational  capability by  the DDGs. 
During this period, one FFG will be assigned the role of optimising the training 
throughput  of  key  elements  of  the  RAN’s  workforce,  in  particular  its 
technicians. The overall aim is to maintain an acceptable level of maritime air 
warfare capability, with an FFG available  to  ‘surge’  from  the  training  role  to 
full operational capability if needed. 
7.28 The RAN informed the ANAO that programming one FFG, for much of 
the  transition period,  to provide an enhanced  training  throughput as part of 
the  ‘Raise,  Train,  Sustain’  function  would  deliver  benefits  to  the  RAN’s 




7.29 Provisional Acceptance of DDG Ship 1  is scheduled to occur  in March 
2016. The three DDGs will progress through sea trials and increasing levels of 
                                                     
386  These estimates include the cost to Defence of in-service support of three Hobart-class DDGs, 
including costs of fuel, RAN personnel, and general overhead attributed to the AWD Program from 
other Defence Groups—over and above the costs currently incurred for the Adelaide-class FFGs. 
387  In July 2013, the RAN informed the ANAO that the cost of sustaining its remaining four FFGs in 2012–
13 was $131.664 million. 
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June  1999  and,  after  several  delays,  is  currently  scheduled  to  achieve  Final 
Operational Capability  in December 2014.389 The FFG  fleet  is scheduled  to be 
progressively withdrawn from service between 2014 and 2019. 




of  the FFG  fleet  is  scheduled  to be progressively withdrawn  from  service by 





upgrade  this  complex  capability  over  its  expected  service  life,  will  draw 
heavily on the knowledge and experience acquired in the earlier phases of the 
program. However, work  on  the  Support  System  is  likely  to  be  undertaken 
against  changes  in  the  Australian  shipbuilding  sector.  A  range  of  Defence 
stakeholders  have  observed  a  risk,  which  is  under  consideration  by  the 
Australian Government390,  that  the  experience  and knowledge gained by  the 
                                                     
388  ADF capability is formed by combining eight Fundamental Inputs to Capability, categorised and 
broadly defined in Table 1.3. The March 2020 date to achieve Final Operational Capability, reported in 
the 2012–13 Major Projects Report, represents a four-month delay over that reported a year earlier. 
ANAO Report No.12, 2013–14, 2012–13 Major Projects Report, p. 154; ANAO Report No.15, 2012–
13, 2011–12 Major Projects Report, p. 195. 
389  ANAO Report No.12, 2013–14, 2012–13 Major Projects Report, pp. 285, 291. 
390  See for example: Mark Thomson, ‘In the market for a naval shipbuilding plan’, ASPI Strategist blog, 26 
September 2013; ASC, A Sustainable Australian Naval Industry, Adelaide, October 2013; and Rod 
Equid, AWD Alliance CEO, speech to Pacific 2013 International Maritime Conference, Sydney, 8 
October 2013. 
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391  The Alliance CEO told the Pacific 2013 International Maritime Conference that ‘The AWD Alliance has 
already let some experienced and skilled people go and they will continue to leave the program at a 
rate of around 200 people each year through to 2018.’ Rod Equid, AWD Alliance CEO, speech to 
Pacific 2013 International Maritime Conference, Sydney, 8 October 2013. 
 In November 2013, the CEO DMO advised a Senate Estimates hearing that ‘the dip in maritime work 
commences in 2015. Maritime work planned and contracted at the moment continues through until 
2019 but there is a drop-off in the workforce from 2015.’ He also stated that the incoming government 
had requested a review of the maritime sector. Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation 
Committee, Estimates Hansard, 20 November 2013, pp. 85–6. 
 In their January 2014 responses to extracts from this audit report, BAE Systems commented on the 
need to avoid the ‘impending gap in naval shipbuilding’, and Forgacs stated that ‘the ship building 
capability will once again dilute and disappear if not utilised in an ongoing ship building program out 
across the defence portfolio.’ See their letters to the ANAO, reproduced in Appendices 6 and 7. 
392  The 2013 Future Submarine Industry Skills Plan indicates that some other naval construction plans 
are scheduled for Second Pass approval between 2014 and 2021. These are the Heavy Landing 
Craft, Offshore Patrol, Supply Ship and Future Frigate, as well as the Future Submarine. However, the 
complexity and difficulty of the design process, as shown in this audit report, indicates that these future 
projects are not likely to reach the production stage in time to support the retention of skills gained as 
part of the AWD build phase. Department of Defence, Department Materiel Organisation, Future 
Submarine Industry Skills Plan: A Plan for the Naval Shipbuilding Industry, Canberra, 2013, p. 162. 
 There is likely to be at least a five-year period between the end of the DDGs’ production in 2016 and 
the earliest possible commencement of construction of the Future Frigate Project under SEA 5000, in 
around 2021. Consequently, under current plans, skills gained at considerable cost may not be 
available in Australia for the next design and construction program for major surface ships. These 
issues have given rise to a range of proposals to cover the period from 2016 to 2021, including the 
construction of a fourth DDG and the bringing forward of other naval shipbuilding projects. 
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intellectual  property,  and  the  industrial  capacity  to  undertake  repairs, 
upgrades  and  maintenance.  Defence  has  sought  to  mitigate  risks  by 
commencing the development of the Hobart‐class DDG Support System early 
in the AWD Program’s build phase. Progress is being monitored by the RAN, 
including  by  the  one‐star  and  three‐star  Program  Management  Stakeholder 
Groups  (see  Appendix  8).  While  these  are  positive  developments,  the 
sustainment phase of  the DDGs’  lifecycle  is not expected  to begin until 2016, 
and it is too early to assess the adequacy of the Support System arrangements. 
7.34 Public works  that  cost more  than $15 million must be  referred  to  the 
Parliamentary  Standing  Committee  on  Public  Works  (Public  Works 
Committee) before work can commence. Defence records show that there was 
a significant delay  in gaining  the approval  to  refer  the DDG Support System 
facilities  to  the  Public  Works  Committee.  Defence  initiated  the  process  by 
seeking ministerial approval in late 2011, but it was not until March 2013 that 
the referral to the committee was made, and thus the facilities expenditure was 
not  approved  by  the  House  of  Representatives  until  May  2013.  This  has 
resulted in an overall delay of some 25 months in the delivery of the DDG crew 
training  facilities  at  Randwick  Barracks  and  the  Command  Team  Trainer 
facility  at  HMAS  Watson.  The  RAN  and  the  AWD  Program  will  not  have 
permanent, dedicated training facilities for crew and support personnel for the 
first DDG, and alternative temporary arrangements will need to be established. 





DDG  capability  was  $3.4  billion,  with  annual  NPOC  of  $70.4  million  from 
2018–19 (Budget 2007–08 Constant Price and Exchange). In December 2012, the 
RAN  revised  the  estimated NPOC  for  the DDGs  in  light of  their postponed 





ANAO Audit Report No.22 2013–14 
Air Warfare Destroyer Program 
 
274 




391  The Alliance CEO told the Pacific 2013 International Maritime Conference that ‘The AWD Alliance has 
already let some experienced and skilled people go and they will continue to leave the program at a 
rate of around 200 people each year through to 2018.’ Rod Equid, AWD Alliance CEO, speech to 
Pacific 2013 International Maritime Conference, Sydney, 8 October 2013. 
 In November 2013, the CEO DMO advised a Senate Estimates hearing that ‘the dip in maritime work 
commences in 2015. Maritime work planned and contracted at the moment continues through until 
2019 but there is a drop-off in the workforce from 2015.’ He also stated that the incoming government 
had requested a review of the maritime sector. Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation 
Committee, Estimates Hansard, 20 November 2013, pp. 85–6. 
 In their January 2014 responses to extracts from this audit report, BAE Systems commented on the 
need to avoid the ‘impending gap in naval shipbuilding’, and Forgacs stated that ‘the ship building 
capability will once again dilute and disappear if not utilised in an ongoing ship building program out 
across the defence portfolio.’ See their letters to the ANAO, reproduced in Appendices 6 and 7. 
392  The 2013 Future Submarine Industry Skills Plan indicates that some other naval construction plans 
are scheduled for Second Pass approval between 2014 and 2021. These are the Heavy Landing 
Craft, Offshore Patrol, Supply Ship and Future Frigate, as well as the Future Submarine. However, the 
complexity and difficulty of the design process, as shown in this audit report, indicates that these future 
projects are not likely to reach the production stage in time to support the retention of skills gained as 
part of the AWD build phase. Department of Defence, Department Materiel Organisation, Future 
Submarine Industry Skills Plan: A Plan for the Naval Shipbuilding Industry, Canberra, 2013, p. 162. 
 There is likely to be at least a five-year period between the end of the DDGs’ production in 2016 and 
the earliest possible commencement of construction of the Future Frigate Project under SEA 5000, in 
around 2021. Consequently, under current plans, skills gained at considerable cost may not be 
available in Australia for the next design and construction program for major surface ships. These 
issues have given rise to a range of proposals to cover the period from 2016 to 2021, including the 
construction of a fourth DDG and the bringing forward of other naval shipbuilding projects. 
Support System and Transition from Guided Missile Frigates 
 
ANAO Audit Report No.22 2013–14 







intellectual  property,  and  the  industrial  capacity  to  undertake  repairs, 
upgrades  and  maintenance.  Defence  has  sought  to  mitigate  risks  by 
commencing the development of the Hobart‐class DDG Support System early 
in the AWD Program’s build phase. Progress is being monitored by the RAN, 
including  by  the  one‐star  and  three‐star  Program  Management  Stakeholder 
Groups  (see  Appendix  8).  While  these  are  positive  developments,  the 
sustainment phase of  the DDGs’  lifecycle  is not expected  to begin until 2016, 
and it is too early to assess the adequacy of the Support System arrangements. 
7.34 Public works  that  cost more  than $15 million must be  referred  to  the 
Parliamentary  Standing  Committee  on  Public  Works  (Public  Works 
Committee) before work can commence. Defence records show that there was 
a significant delay  in gaining  the approval  to  refer  the DDG Support System 
facilities  to  the  Public  Works  Committee.  Defence  initiated  the  process  by 
seeking ministerial approval in late 2011, but it was not until March 2013 that 
the referral to the committee was made, and thus the facilities expenditure was 
not  approved  by  the  House  of  Representatives  until  May  2013.  This  has 
resulted in an overall delay of some 25 months in the delivery of the DDG crew 
training  facilities  at  Randwick  Barracks  and  the  Command  Team  Trainer 
facility  at  HMAS  Watson.  The  RAN  and  the  AWD  Program  will  not  have 
permanent, dedicated training facilities for crew and support personnel for the 
first DDG, and alternative temporary arrangements will need to be established. 





DDG  capability  was  $3.4  billion,  with  annual  NPOC  of  $70.4  million  from 
2018–19 (Budget 2007–08 Constant Price and Exchange). In December 2012, the 
RAN  revised  the  estimated NPOC  for  the DDGs  in  light of  their postponed 
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7.36 The  knowledge  and  experience  acquired  in  the  development  of  the 
DDGs will  form  the basis  for  the DDG Support System necessary  to  sustain 
and upgrade  this complex capability over  its expected  service  life. However, 
the Support System work is likely to be undertaken against the background of 












393  See for example: Department of Defence, Defence Materiel Organisation, Future Submarine Industry 
Skills Plan. A Plan for the Naval Shipbuilding Industry, May 2013. 
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Appendix 1: Defence response to the audit 
Australian Government 
Department of Defence 
SEC/OUT/2014/49 
CDF/OUT/2014/157 
Mr Ian McPhee 
Auditor-General for Australia 
Australian National Audit Office 
GPO Box 707 
CANBERRA ACT 2600 
r~ DearM~ 
Mr Dennis Richardson 
Secretary 
General David Hurley, AC, DSC 
Chief ofthe Defence Force 
REVISED SECTION 19 AUDIT REPORT - AIR WARFARE DESTROYER 
Thank you for the opportunity to review and provide comment on this audit. 
We acknowledge the considerable efforts expended by your staff in the conduct of this audit 
since its commencement in 2012 and we agree the audit recommendations. 





21 FEB 101( 
Attachments: 
I . Agency Response 
2. Defence Comments, Editorials 
&:AC,DSC 
General 
Chief of the Defence Force 
2t l'f 
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Defence welcomes this timely and thorough review of the Air Warfare Destroyer 
(A WD) program and appreciates the acknowledgement that the A WD project is a very 
complex undertaking initiated after a downturn in the Australian naval construction sector. 
Defence agrees with the ANAO recommendations. 
In respect of recommendation one, Defence will re-invigomte the Principals Council 
and appoint a suitably experienced independent Council Chair. 
Defence notes that with respect to Recommendations 2 and 3, the ANAO report 
recognises that both recommendations are already current practice. 
Jo respect of the report more broadly, it finds that, at the time that the A WD Project 
was approved by Government, Defence may not have fully appreciated the immaturity of 
ASC shipbuilding capabilities, or the extent to which the capabilities ofBAE Systems and 
Forgacs shipyards had atrophied since their last major shipbuilding activity. Defence's 
understanding of the Australian capability to build the AWD was in fact informed by 
significant investment in studies and preliminary design activities conducted by the industry 
participants, and relied on the resultant assumnces and warranties provided by industry. 
Defence agrees with the report's assessment that it overestimated the ability of domestic 
shipyards to 'ramp up' their productivity levels to the required level within a reasonable 
time. In this context, Defence also agrees with the ANAO commentary that normal levels 
of design change can take on a different character and level of risk with an inexperienced 
shipbuilder, and block building subcontmctors which had lost much of its shipbuilding 
capability. 
The audit has identified the potential problems that stem from inconsistent demand. 
This is particularly important if Australia is to retain an efficient and competent naval 
shipbuilding capability. 
Defence accepts that the report accurately reports the current status and challenges 
faced by the project. Defence would, however, make the following comments. 
Firstly, the report suggests that DMO did not make sufficient allowance for factors 
such as importing a surface ship design and the inexperience of domestic shipyards. 
Defence did consider these issues throughout Phases 1 and 2 of the A WD project and made 
sizeable investments in the shipbuilding industry in studying existing and evolved designs, 
and comparing these to contemporary projects of similar scale and scope in Austmlia and 
overseas. The estimated cost and schedule for the shipbuilding element exceeded all other 
contemporary examples, including even the original design and build of the Fl 00. 
Unfortunately even these conservative levels of efficiency have not been achieved and, on 
present estimates, the shipbuilding delay is anticipated to be at least 49 weeks (or 18 per 
cent) longer than the period required for the original Fl 00 design and build. Given the 
uncertainty surrounding the cost estimate at completion (EAC) and Defence's concerns over 
continued low productivity levels, the report will serve as significant background 
information for the recently announced Independent Review of the A WD Program. 
Secondly, Defence questions the emphasis in the ANAO report on the impact of 
design change. Defence considers the amount of design change was not excessive for a 
design of the complexity of the A WD, nor was the level of design change unpredicted at 
Government approval. The real issue around these changes was in the immaturity of the 
processes to manage the design change challenge with the designer and the block 
SENSITIVE 
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subcontractors. Defence accepts this is a major concern which must be addressed as a core 
performance requirement of an effective and efficient shipbuilding industry. 
Finally the report suggests Defence did not adequately monitor shipyard performance. 
Since the commencement of production, Defence has engaged First Marine lntemational, a 
highly regarded consultant to the international marine industry, to conduct annual 
benchmark assessments on shipbuilding performance in the A WD project. Defence has 
made these reports available to each of the shipyards on an annual basis to assist them with 
identifying key areas for improvement. 
SENSITIVE 
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19 February 2014 
Dr Tom loannQI(' -rO 11/1. 
Australian National Aud~ Office 
GPO Box707 
Canberra ACT 2601 
Dear Dr Ioannou, 
CEZ> 
2 1 FEB 2014 
q,os 
0 AIR WARFARE DESTROYER A LLI AN CE 
AWD Systems Cenlre 
620 Mersey Road North 
Osborne SA 5017 
GPO Box 1318 
Adelaide SA 5001 
p +61 8 8165 7000 
www.ausawd.com 
CEO AWD ALLIANCE RESPONSE TO ANAO AWD AUDIT REPORT 14 FEBRUARY 2014 
References: 
A. ANAO 2011/2088 dated 19 December2013 
B. ANAO #3065243 dated 14 February 2014 
References A and B requested CEO AWD Alliance (Alliance CEO) review of redacted versions of the ANAO draft 
report on their audit of the AWD program conducted in the period up to December 2013. A response to the 
report was requested in addition to seeking ed~orial comment. The Alliance CEO understands similar requests 
were made of all key AWD program stakeholders. This letter is the requested response, and editorial comment 
has been provided separately. 
Standing of the Alliance CEO resoonse to the ANAO 
The ANAO has stated the purpose of the subject aud~ as being "focused primarily on Defence's administration of 
the AWD Program·. Notwithstanding, the Alliance construct by its very nature and intent has established a close 
working relationship between the three fonnal Alliance Participants. Within that arrangement, each Participant is 
dependent on the othe(s perfonnance for a successful program outcome. By necess~ therefore, both DMO and 
industry perfonnance has been examined by the ANAO to satisfy the audit objectives. 
A key tenet of the Alliance construct is a high level of transparency between industry and the DMO facilitated by 
the "open book" arrangements, the manner in which the participants work together, the AWD governance 
arrangements and through the Defence personnel embedded within the Alliance's IPTs and CPTs perfonning 
project work. As an extension of this transparency, Industry Participant infonnation regarding the AWD Project 
was openly shared with the ANAO to support this audit. 
Building Australia's future air warfare capability 
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Within the AWD Alliance, the Industry Participants provide the necessary professional capability and capacity to 
perform relevant work to satisfy their contracted obligations. The Alliance CEO role is to centrally manage the 
AWD work on behalf of, and in conjunction with the Industry Participants whilst at the same time collaborating 
with the Commonwealth. In this regard, with the assistance of members of the Alliance Management Team 
(AMT), program data and comments have been provided to the ANAO as evidence for their audit and in 
response to various earlier drafts of the audit report. 
The ANAO report gives focus to schedule, cost, ship design, the Alliance contract and the performance of both 
the "Owner-Participanr (DMO) and the Industry Participants (ASC and Raytheon) in executing the AWD project 
ANAO's audit report assembles relevant SEA 4000 historical and performance issues and has delivered related 
commentary and interpretation. AWD is a large and complex project and unsurprisingly, the related 
considerations and issues are similarly complex. AWD comprises 150,505 scheduled tasks (December 2013), is 
67% complete in Earned Value terms with the scheduled tasks contained in 7,855 completed work packages, 
1 ,693 open work packages and 5,023 planning packages remaining to completion. 
The ANAO has requested individual responses to the penultimate draft audit report from each of the key AWD 
Alliance stakeholders with this response provided by the Alliance CEO. A level of "balance" in the views 
expressed by the Alliance CEO is incumbent in the nature of the AWD CEO role- both acting as an agent for the 
Industry Participant's and at the same time collaborating with the Commonwealth. This response has the 
standing of the Alliance CEO's view of the draft audit report and associated issues and is not necessarily a 
shared view of all of the Participants or stakeholders. 
The AWD Schedule 
With respect to the AWD schedule and the 'delays" affecting the AWD project and summarised by the ANAO-
experience would now suggest that the original contract schedule was optimistic in the circumstances of the 
AWD Program as it has unfolded. Impacts to the plan of record include: a small delay to contract signature, 
construction start-up issues within a quiescent industrial base, a lead shipbuilder with limited relevant surface 
combatant experience and new staff to recruit, the planned level of ship change ("Class 1" design change), and 
the export of a design from a third-party designer and the related level of maturity in the reference detailed-
design where the reference design had been developed for use by the designer's own production organisation. 
That said, it is noteworthy that PDR and CDR were successfully completed on schedule by December 2008 and 
December 2009 respectively given that the period allowed to achieve these reviews had been constrained on the 
basis of the "existing platform design" and yet the effort required for the Australian Combat System was not 
reduced by the nature of the second pass platform decision where the Combat System approach was largely 
common to both the platform options considered by government at second pass. Similarly, facilities were 
established and in place in a timely manner. 
Schedule, cost and productivity are clearly inter-related and the ANAO report discloses a number of key issues in 
each of these domains. 
With respect to cost, the ANAO has published historical AWD Earned Value performance data against the 
program's internal Performance Measurement Baseline, the historical Cost Variance (CV), and the predicted 
Variance at Completion 0/AC) based on the program 02 2013 Estimate at Completion analysis. 
AWD Project Management (performance measurement) is based on a monthly cycle of cascading reviews. A 
key element of these reviews is the "variance analysis" against the assigned Performance Measurement 
Baseline. The reporting Performance Measurement Baseline is "internal" to the Alliance on the basis that a 
decision was taken at start-up, not to authorise distribution of the entire Target Cost Estimate (TCE) and 
approximately 7% was held as Tier 2 Management ReseJVe (MR) as an initiative of the Alliance Management 
Building Australia's future air warfare capability 
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Team (AMT) and endorsed by the AWD Board. The Tier 2 MR supplemented the contract (Tier 1) Alliance MR 
w~h management of both pools of MR as described by the ANAO. As a consequence of the Tier 2 MR, the 
internal Perfomnance Measurement Baseline was initially more aggressive than the contract position represented 
by the TCE noting that the perfomnance variances reported by ANAO and current projections indicate that the 
TCE will ultimately be exceeded. 
AWD Financial Management is also undertaken through the quarterly Estimate At Completion process. Head-
line reporting is the historical Cost Variance (CV) (the Actual Cost of Work Perfomned (ACWP) compared with the 
Budgeted Cost of Work Perfomned) and the Estimate to Complete (ETC). The expected out-turn cost for the 
program is the net of the ACWP, the ETC, retained MR and management's view of analysis of Risk and 
Opportunity costs. This may then be compared w~h the TCE (comprising the assigned Perfomnance 
Measurement Baseline and the remaining Tier 1 and Tier 2 Management Reserve) as available funding to cover 
any over-run. 
Since June 2011 management has predicted that the TCE will be exceeded, as reported by the ANAO, and as at 
December 2013 a TCE over-run of $302m was predicted with this over-run nominally being shared 50:50 
between the CoA and the Industry Participants. The consequences are a reduction of the Industry Participants 
fee and a call on DMO's contingency set aside for the AWD program (separate to the MR allocated to the TCE). 
Alliance records also disclose that the over-run has primarily resulted from an increase of about $400m in the 
Estimate At Completion for Ship-building elements of the program primarily during the production period from the 
end of 2009 until now. Naturally there are a variety of root-causes for the cost increases and these include: 
schedule prolongation; block sub-contract outcomes; chum in the detailed-design being greater than expected 
(or allowed for); costs not properly estimated or budgeted in the TCE (and/or invalid assumptions) and production 
productivity not achieving the levels assumed in development of the TCE. The majority of these issues are well 
described in the ANAO report The ANAO has provided a significant volume of commentary on the "detailed-
design" including noting that related issues have "tended to overshadow other factors contributing to low 
shipbuilding productivity". The ANAO has provided a level of disclosure of the other perfomnance causal factors 
that include especially "subcontract outcomes" and "productiv~·. which have had and are having a significant 
impact on the AWD Program. ANAO's conclusion "against the backdrop of the range of factors contributing to the 
low shipbuilding productivity in the construction phase of the DOGs, it is clear that a rigorous focus is needed in 
addressing the underlying causes so that construction cost and schedule overruns are contained over the 
remainder of the DOG build program. The proposed <independent> review of the AWD Program presents an 
opportunity to identity strategies aimed at addressing construction challenges, increasing productivity and 
mitigating further cost overruns, in a timely manner" is appropriate and the proposed independent review should 
be welcomed by all of the AWD participants as a positive step towards achievement of acceptable outcomes 
from the AWD program. 
Since 2010, the DMO has contracted for international benchmarking of the AWD shipbuilding production 
productivity. This benchmarking suggests that whilst the assumed productivity levels underpinning the initial 
AWD budgets were credible, the achieved productivity outcomes have been further away from best practice and 
suggested perfomnance targets than anticipated. Of course there are a variety of reasons for this including the 
need to re-establish the quiescent industrial base particularly in the case of the lead shipbuilder ASC, where the 
Shipbuilding team is largely a start-up organisation with the vast majority of staff newly hired and from outside the 
sector. A similar situation arose with the block subcontractors. Other contributory factors (such as the disruption 
due to chum in the detailed-design) are discussed subsequently in this response. Whilst the outstanding quality 
of the product being built is an absolute credit to the production work-force and leadership, program issues 
remain with respect to cost, productivity and schedule certainty. That said, FMI have also identified that 
opportunities for improvement remain, particularly through learning from Ship 01 to Ship 03 as reported by the 
ANAO. 
Building Australia's future air warfare capability 
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2013 AWD Integrated Baseline Review 
The 2013 AWD Integrated Baseline Review (IBR) was not a contracted AWD program review but was 
undertaken as an initiative of the Alliance CEO and endorsed by the AWD Project Board in response to ongoing 
growth in the Estimate At Completion for shipbuilding elements of the program and concerns over the 
effectiveness of financial controls that were in place. 
The ANAO has detailed the definition of a conventional DMO IBR at Table 6.2. Notwithstanding, the 2013 AWD 
IBR focussed on both the 'validity and accuracy of the AWD baseline' and the effectiveness of the Earned Value 
(EV) techniques and performance management processes (including process compliance) within the project. 
The latter aspects were emphasised because of the quarter over quarter growth in Estimate At Completion that 
had been experienced since commencement of production. Similarly, as reported by the ANAO, production 
budgets have been exceeded on a month over month performance basis, irrespective of increases being made 
to those budgets over time. 
The ANAO has accurately reported many of the IBR findings. These include a number of process Corrective 
Action Requests (CARs) and a general observation that the production base-line was 'very success oriented" 
with no allowance for rework due to "first of class' problems. 
One of the key ou1comes sought from the IBR was a determination of actions required to redress any EV process 
and compliance issues and to thus ensure effective financial reporting and control mechanisms are in place. For 
example, the Alliance abil~y to 'report more detailed cost variance analysis on factors contributing to productivity 
shortfalls' (ANAO summary paragraph 35) depends on availability of source data within the Participant's financial 
and EV systems. 
A second important IBR outcome was completion of an assessment of the achievability of the Performance 
Measurement Baseline (resources, cost and schedule). An effective Estimate At Completion process must 
maintain a healthy tension between constraining budgets (aiming to minimise expenditure) and setting 
achievable performance targets. An IBR, of itself, will not re-estimate a program's Estimate At Completion bu1 
may indicate that a program re-plan is necessary where budgets are inadequate or the required underlying 
performance targets are assessed as no longer realistic. Subsequent to the 2013 AWD IBR, the AWD Projact 
Board tasked the Alliance CEO to perform further independent assessment of the Estimate At Completion and 
the proposed independent review of the AWD program is also expected to contribu1e in this regard. 
Detailed-Design 
Notwithstanding the fact that the ship design process is described in some detail by the ANAO with commentary; 
and has been a key AWD issue since 2010; the design considerations and issues are complex and remain at risk 
of being misunderstood or misinterpreted. 
Firstly, the functional design tor the F-100 series of ships including the AWD is sound as evidenced by the ships 
constructed by Navantia and delivered to the Armada. They are simply an excellent product and a similar 
ou1come is expected for AWD. 
The majority ofthe AWD discussion around 'design' and the associated issues relate to the manner in which the 
design intent is translated into construction documentation. Shipbuilders refer to this step as 'detailed design' 
bu1 the effort may otherwise be referred to as 'draughting' or 'design draughting'. Largely this is the process of 
developing further construction detail and producing construction documentation - generally two dimensional 
drawings that can be used to manufacture, construct and install components of the ship. W~hin the AWD project, 
production and delivery of the detailed-{lesign is Navantia's responsibility as the Platform System Designer 
(PSD). The task is accomplished by developing the design and draughting in three dimensional CAD models 
and extracting the two dimensional construction drawings that, amongst other things, are the supplies delivered 
from the PSD to the AWD Alliance. 
Building Australia's future air warfare capability 
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In AWD, delivery of the detailed-design is accomplished as a commercial transaction with the delivered supplies 
comprising the much discussed Category 1 Technical Data Package (TOP). Two head~ine considerations are 
relevant to examination of this activity: when Navantia builds their own ships, they are both the designer and the 
production organisation; and in the case of AWD, the design is transacted via the TOP documents and the AWD 
Alliance has a contracted obligation to build in accordance with the requirements of the TOP (Category 1 ). 
Capital warship designs are complex involving tens of thousands of individual drawing sheets. No two ships are 
ever identical and production runs are most usually limtted. Economical and time-line considerations usually 
constrain the effort that can be applied to the detailed-design. As a consequence, ship detailed-designs are 
never perfect due to their nature: that being the inherent complexity, the limited numbers of ships produced and 
the funding allowed for design. Modest rates of Technical Queries (TQs) to the engineering department or the 
third-party designer are the norm (except perhaps in very long production runs) as a result of the inherent 'design 
maturity' issues. Also, relatively limited 'Class 1" ship change often has a pervasive impact on construction 
products. That is, the implementation of Class 1 change increases the probability of problems or enrors at the 
detailed-design level. Furthermore, a level of design-build concurrency is usually accepted for schedule 
considerations on a 'managed-risk' basis. For all of these reasons, a certain rate of technical problem resolution 
should be expected, and as a consequence tt is necessary to resolve problems as they are discovered in 
production. The resolution of problems in this manner may be more protracted for an exported design compared, 
for example, with the case of Navantia designing and building their own ships where they are able to ' fix minor 
issues as they arise'. Programs such as Success, ANZAC, DDG-51 and LCS have reported issues of a similar 
nature and noted various levels of success, in mitigating the attendant issues. 
In the case of AWD, the Commonwealth has contracted that ' the Industry Participants must construct each AWD 
in accordance with the requirements of TOP (Category 1) and must install and physically integrate each AWD in 
a way that is consistent with TDP (Category 1)'. This is most likely motivated by a desire to preserve designer's 
warranties from Navantia and therefore, Navantia has been included in the decision making loop for TOP issues 
arising in AWD construction. Limtted local authority is delegated to the Shipbuilder through the 'Thresholds 
Document' provided by Navantia (noting that this document was sought by the Alliance and negotiated in the 
period September 2009 to January 2012). The document provides limited delegation and the most effective 
treatment of TOP issues has been through the resident Navantia Liaison team and the focus on priority resolution 
of Technical Queries (TQs) through the Navantia design support network. With effect January 2014, a total of 
5,409 TQs had been directed to Navantia with 71% of the 1 ,295 requested 24 hour responses being satisfied. 
In summary, the head-line considerations within the AWD project related to the ship's detailed-design include: 
a. The AWD is a 'modified MOTS' design and there is sufficient (planned) 'Class 1' change to have had 
a pervasive impact on the construction products; 
b. The reference design was created for use in an environment where the designer and production-house 
were within one organisation and, as described by Navantia, 'many minor problems were fixed on the 
spor. AWD is generally constrained to building in accordance with the TOP (Category 1) and 
therefore problems are by necessity resolved in conjunction with the PSD. The current 'Thresholds 
Documenr has been of limited benefrt with recent consideration of a revision to it discussed wtth 
Navantia; 
c. The quiescent nature; and consequential limited corporate experience and currency of the contributing 
Australian shipyards (including ASC as the lead shipbuilder) has compelled a conservative approach 
including the manner in which shipbuilding decisions are processed and has thus magnified the impact 
of design issues; and 
d. To assist the AWD Alliance, Navantia has been diligently updating the detailed design to incorporate 
eartier problem resolutions that had not eartier been rolled back into the reference design and also 
resolving other issues, but the timing of the cycling of the TOP has had an impact on the program as 
described by the ANAO. 
Building Australia's future air warfare capability 
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Change Management and Alliance Management of the PSD 
Associated with commentary around design is change and change management. Within AWD and the ANAO 
report, "change• is an over-used expression that collectively describes a range of impacts from "Class 1" change 
(controlled by CAP and or ECP) to any update to the TOP post-delivery for use by production. Clearly there are 
different management requirements and consequences depending on the source and timing of the change. 
The AWD program of record required finalisation of the Combat System equipment during Phase 3 of the project 
and concurrent with completion of the platform functional design through the PDR and CDR period. Thus updates 
to the PSD contract Combat System baseline was always contemplated and planned. The relevant information 
was transferred from the Alliance to the PSD through an agreed and contracted schedule of CS data 
deliverables, wihich was largely completed on schedule, and enacted in the PSD contract through PSD CAPs 12 
and 18. Similarly, the PSD Contract Attachment 7 platform changes were also implemented in the Hobart Class 
design as planned in the program of record. Notwithstanding the reported detailed-design maturity issues, the 
fundamental AWD design has remained very stable throughout the program with limited updates made, the 
majority of which were planned at contract signature. 
The concurrency between commencement of production and completion of the detailed-design post CDR was 
risk-managed as production commenced with a number of the keel blocks that had no or low impact from AWD 
Class 1 change and were therefore expected to be producible at low risk from the initial TOP deliverables. 
However, as described in some detail in the ANAO report, TOP supplies, including for the keel blocks, were 
revised and re-issued after formal delivery, notwithstanding the contracted and agreed delivery schedules and 
inadvertently compromising the production plan of record w~h consequences through engineering, planning and 
production rewor1< and/or out-of sequence wor1<. 
These revisions resuHed from a range of causes including in-process design wor1<, resolution of hold-ups due to 
late provision of data from the Alliance to Navantia, outcomes from Technical Queries and a category of detailed-
design ·maturity issues". The "maturity issues· experienced to date most probably relate to issues that had been 
discovered during earlier Navantia Ship production wor1< and that were "fixed on the spot" and not necessarily 
rolled back into the parent CAD models until a later time - this action intended to benem AWD and pre-empt 
TO's. Collectively, the pervasiveness of the updates to the TOP supplies, and specifically the timing, exacerbated 
the risk that had been accepted in the program of record concerning concurrent design and production. As 
identified by the ANAO, this taxed shipbuilding engineering and resulted in additional rewor1< and/or out of 
sequence wor1<. As always, this is part of a trade-off between maturity and completion of design and a longer 
schedule in the project planning phase. 
W~h respect to management of the PSD, and change in the TOP supplies, ~ may be implied from ANAO 
commentary that earlier reaction may have achieved earlier and more comprehensive resolution of the issues, 
but this view understates certain matters of practicality: 
a. The program of record was set at the contract stage based on what the parties knew at that time and 
against certain expectations. Acceptance of the aforementioned design-production concurrency risk 
was one key to constraining the schedule to acceptable bounds; 
b. The early TOP supplies were accepted with defects but only wihere these defects were not material to 
production. Furthermore, for ~ part, Navantia introduced an independent qual~ review that 
subsequently largely eliminated this type of defect in the follow-on deliveries; 
c. In applying due diligence from an Alliance perspective, some defects that would materially affect 
production, namely interferences, were discovered during an extraordinary detailed review of delivered 
data (for example Block 409 review) and some data was rejected where the consequential impact on the 
AWD schedule could be accommodated. For ~ part, Navantia subsequently implemented detailed 
interference checks before release of the block data to the AWD project; 
Building Australia's future air warfare capability 
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d. Other problems experienced have been more insidious such that they could only be detected during use 
of the TOP (Category 1) data for manufacture or production, and such matters have been resolved via 
the Alliance Problem Identification Report (PIR) and Technical Query (TQ) processes. A rate of such 
arising is normal in shipbuilding although within AWD the rate of arising's has exceeded the 
Shipbuilde~s expectations with consequences in planning, engineering and production rework as 
discussed by the ANAO; and 
e. For Navantia's part, Navantia have also been diligently updating the TOP to include, amongst other 
things, their lessons learnt from the F-105 and eal1ier F-100 production as 'TOP Maintenance'. The 
timing of the maintenance updates have resulted in unexpected additional engineering effort together 
with rework and/or out-of-sequence work within production as described by the ANAO wnhin the body of 
their report 
Notwithstanding the reported difficulties, the relationship between the Alliance and Navantia has remained strong 
and the parties have worked together to minimise the inpact of detailed-design issues on AWD production. This 
has included Navantia's investment in additional personnel allocated to their resident team in Australia for an 
extended period of time to assist the program, this type of technical services or ' lead-yard services' not being 
included in the original PSD scope as discussed by the ANAO. A number of additional actions taken by both the 
Alliance and Navantia to minimise the impact of TOP chum on AWD production are also described in the ANAO 
report. The issues developed progressively for AWD and were addressed as they arose. As a consequence of 
the AWD production schedule being 'locked in', there was and is no practical or cost-effective opportunny to 
completely eliminate the impacts which are to some extent inherent in the business of shipbuilding and especially 
where a detailed-design is transacted from a third party that retains design authority (designer authority). 
ANAO Recommendation for Desion Review 
The ANAO Reconvnendatlon 2 for robust design review in future naval shipbuilding programs is partially agreed 
noting the complexny of the subject of ship design as identified ea~ier in this response. The merits of ensuring 
an effective review and audn process are not disputed but this should be more about guaranteeing process 
effectiveness and obtaining assurance of compliance by the Designer rather than independently completing or 
duplicating elements of the Designe~s scope, the latter being unlikely to achieve the desired outcomes wnhout 
formally transferring the relevant scope to the production organisation (e.g. correction of detailed design errors by 
the production organisation). The following considerations are germane: 
a. The efficiency and effectiveness of the Designe~s processes to implement Class 1 change including 
managing concurrency with production effort (i.e. the impact on production) should be understood, 
reviewed and monnored. 
b. Wnh respect to straightforward quarlly issues (clarity, presentation, language etc.), the Designe~s 
internal processes should be reviewed and monnored. Whilst this type of issue is readily detected by 
inspection of design supplies, late correction causes unnecessary chum, and remediation at the source 
is more effective. Within the AWD program, this was accomplished by an update of Navantia's 
processes and the Navantia Independent Review Team action prior to release of data to the AWD 
program as described in the ANAO report 
c. The fundamental 'goodness' (integrity) of the design supplies is also most effectively addressed within 
the Design~s own processes. This includes, for example, the 'implementation of a fully-integrated 
design review process supported by contemporary Computer-Aided-Design technology'. In the case of 
AWD, the process for formal interference checks of design supplies was undertaken by Navantia albett 
commencing during the eMy block data delivery period -again as described by the ANAO. 
d. The level of refinement and accuracy of the detailed design is a matter of investment in the design and 
the concomttant cost-benefit. A final category of residual 'errors' manifest at the very detailed level of 
Building Australia's future air warfare capability 
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detailed design and are often almost inpossible to detect merely by inspection of design supplies or 
indeed by use of CAD. These are discovered in production and include issues that Navantia have noted 
are corrected "on the spor by their own production organisation. 
In summary, the recommendation for Defence assurance of the "implementation of a fully-integrated design 
review process supported by contemporary Computer-Aided-Design technology' is supported but this should be 
achieved within the Designer's organisation and may include closer engagement and integration with the 
responsible Designer team than was implemented on the AWD program. The thought thai use of CAD for 
improvement of, and/or checking of, the design outside the Designer's processes and organisation would have 
benefit should be discouraged except in the case that responsibiity for completion of the detailed design and/or 
correction of errors is transferred to the production organisation (bringing its own range of issues with data 
transactions and accountability). Notwithstanding, use of CAD to support production has merits in helping 
understand the design, to support plaming and to explore and document problems. 
Combat SVstem Design 
The ANAO report provides limHed commentary on the AWD Combat System describing the Combat System as 
"the UnHed States Aegis Weapon System and additional Australian elements to meet specific capability 
requirements•. The Aegis Weapon System (AWS) provides the core air-warfare functionality, and the Australian 
elements satisfy the additional functionality requirements such as Electronic Warfare, Underwater Systems, 
Short-Range Defence and Communications needs. 
The AWD program Combat System planning was conducted with a low risk appetite in satisfying these additional 
capability requirements with the following guiding principles: 
a. Low integration risk Oncluding necessary Aegis interfaces); 
b. MOTS or non-developmental high Technology Readiness Level (TRL) status subsystems; 
c. Low or no Aegis modifications; and 
d. Low ship Impact. 
The Raytheon Combat System System Engineer role described by the ANAO was to architect, procure and 
integrate those additional Australian elements of the Combat System. The Australian elements accounted for 52 
percent of the total CS procurement. To date there has been good progress with the Combat System 
successfully applying the intended principles and burning down the overall integration risk by tests and 
verification in various shore facilities including the United States Navy CSEDS facility that has verified the 
integration approach including the newly developed Australian Tactical Interface (ATI). With effect December 
2013, 161 of 497 (or 32%) of the Hobart Class Performance Specification requirements had been formally sold-
off to the DMO. More than 90 percent of Combat System interfaces will have been tested and verified in shore 
facilities prior to testing on the ship. In simple terms, the AWD Combat System approach will satisfy the 
Australian unique functional requirements, with an Aegis Weapon System core taking a low risk approach and 
assuring minimal program impact through Combat System related issues. 
The Alliance Contract 
The AWD Alliance and Project Team capability has been achieved and is enhanced by: 
a. The personnel allocated to the AWD project team from the Participant organisations; 
b. The Participant parent organisation corporate capability; 
Building Australia's future air warfare capability 
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c. ASC's relationship with its technology partner BIW; 
d. Raytheon 'reach-back' to its parent organisation; 
e. The 'Alliance-like' relationship maintained with Navantia; 
f. The Alliance's relationship with RAN stakeholders and regulatory representatives; 
g. The Alliance's relationship with the USN and its subcontractors (a relationship normally limited to 
government-to-government interaction}; and 
h. The open and effective relationship w~h the broader Defence stakeholder community. 
Comments by the ANAO regarding the overall merits of including all key program participants in an Alliance 
arrangement are broadly agreed (see for example ANAO audit report paragraph 3.76). The AWD project 
experience emphasises that the rationale for doing so is as much about the importance of eliminating 
commercial/transactional boundaries as aligning the motivation of individual Participants. That is, it is about 
program management efficiency. For example, in the case of the AWD PSD, Navantia is motivated to strive for 
program success more because of protection of their international reputation than direct financial outcomes 
which are lim~ed in any case by the relativ~ between the PSD work-share and the overall program costs. 
The decision to conduct Phase 3 of SEA 4000 in an 'Alliance' arrangement was taken ea~y in the program and 
'willingness to participate in the contemplated Phase 3 Alliance' was a condition of tendering for AWD work. 
There was also a strong focus on "practicing to be an Alliance' during SEA 4000 Phase 2. The AWD Alliance 
contract has established a collaborative and cooperative environment between the Participants and endeavours 
to eliminate unnecessary transactional (commercial} boundaries for the reasons of decision making efficiency 
and, particularly for the owner. cost reduction. In simple terms, the Alliance contract motivated the establishment 
of ' one AWD project team·. AWD experience suggests that a successful Alliance outcome is dependent on the 
following: 
a. Will amongst the Participants; 
b. Training and educating staff and stakeholders; and 
c. Practicing the agreed comer-stone principles. 
The AWD Alliance is governed in the first instance by the AWD Project Board with representation from the three 
Participants. Decisions are taken with concunrence from all three participants. For example. the early decision 
not to reject PSD data in favour of developing an 'Alliance like' relationship with Navantia was taken with the 
concunrence of the then Project Board members after weighing the identified benefits and risks. The participants 
and the broader stakeholder community have also been very effective at working together to minimise the impact 
of issues on the project (such as difficulties with the TOP} and deliver 'best for project' outcomes as opposed to 
focusing on commercial issues. 
The ANAO has summarised an understanding of the Alliance contract arrangements including referring in part to 
commentary from AS PI on the Alliance arrangement. In addition to the ASP I comments referenced in the ANAO 
report, ASPI also made a fundamental observation concerning the AWD Alliance within their report 'The Cost of 
Defence ASPI Defence Budget Brief 2013-2014' in stating: 
'Assuming that the TCE represents a credible estimate of the cost of work to be done, the arrangement 
<Alliance> has clear merits. Not only are there strong incentives to meet cost and schedule targets, but 
the parlicipants are encouraged to work together to resolve problems and are inhibited from shifting 
costs between one another. Of course. if the TCE is uncerlain or inadverlently erroneous, the whole 
Building Australia's future air warfare capability 
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arrangement becomes a lottery; with the potential for the tax payer to be ripped off, or for the 
commercial participants to be taken to the deaners. • 
Given the predicted AWD cost over-run, issues surrounding cost are the root cause of the current tensions 
between the participants that include accountability for the impact of TOP change and shipbuilding 
performance/productivity. With respect to the former, on the one hand the Commonwealth views the matter as 
within the Alliance shared-risk cornerstone principle and on the other hand the Industry Participants have sought 
additional consideration referring to the provisions of the Alliance contract. 
Despite these current tensions, the Alliance arrangement has achieved many of the original intentions (such as 
the positives identified in the above AS PI quotation); namely: 
a. There are good examples of technical problem resolutions without schedule impact or protracted 
commercial debates; 
b. The Commonwealth is not at the centre of every issue with costs to Defence escalating through 
variations; 
c. The contract schedule has been extended whilst minimising related cost increases and in particular 
avoiding prolongation claims from one party when the delay is caused by another; and 
d. There is a collaborative engagement with the relevant stakeholders, including the regulator community, 
and the program of progressive sell-off of requirements is agreed and well advanced. 
In addition, the open book and collaborative approaches have been successful and maintained. 
This ANAO report accurately summarises the background and status of the AWD project and the issues and 
challenges that have been experienced to date. These relate primarily to two inter-dependent factors: the 
quiescent shipbuilding sector capability and capacity; and the approach to exporting a ship design with the 
attendant organisational issues aptly described by ANAO. Ultimately at a head-line level, the outcome has been 
difficulty in maintaining the production schedule and cost performance, be it caused by disruption or participant 
performance. 
The majority of the ANAO commentary tends to focus on the issues, and less has been said about the 
successes, or in fact that the potential impacts of various challenges have been mitigated, and some issues 
avoided altogether through the cooperative and collaborative approach taken within AWD. Noteworthy 
successes include: establishment of the work-force, development of the facilities, the achievement of the ea~y 
design milestones, product quality and utility of the Alliance arrangement in problem resolution on a best-for-
program basis. Appropriate credit should be given to the architects of the Alliance arrangement and the 
participants that work tirelessly to make it successful. There are many positive lessons learnt that should be 
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Appendix 3: ASC response to audit extract 
 
   
IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE: OUT00006412014 
21 February 2014 
Dr Torn Joann¢' ~ '-*/ ... 
Group Executive Director 
Performance Audit Services Group 
Australian National Audit Office 
GPO Box 707 
Canberra ACT 2601 
Dear Dr Ioannou, 
Formal Response to ANAO Air Warfare Destroyer Performance Audit 
ASC is Australia's leading naval prime contractor and our values are service, safety, 
leadership, integrity, results and innovation. We are absolutely committed to the safe 
delivery of three Hobart Class Air Warfare Destroyers to the satisfaction of all our 
key stakeholders including the Australian Government, the Department of Defence, 
the Royal Australian Navy and the Defence Materiel Organisation, our shareholder 
and our industry partners. 
ASC's involvement in the A WD program began a decade ago when we were selected 
through open competition as the A WD Alliance Shipbuilder. We have risen to and 
overcome countless challenges in the period since, and the program today looks 
markedly different from the one first envisaged. Our workforce' s experience and 
confidence has grown in line with our capability. We have also worked diligently and 
successfully with our chosen shipbuilding capability partner, Bath Iron Works, to 
grow our knowledge and practices quickly and efficiently. 
This audit report offers a detailed and considered examination of the wide breadth of 
matters material to the program. Shipbuilding is fundamentally about teamwork and a 
view of quality, cost and schedule performance can only be arrived at by considering 
the performance of all the members of the team, underpinned by a desire to work 
collaboratively to improve performance. 
There are opportunities to improve performance. The governance arrangements of the 
A WD Alliance have not allowed common views of program performance, including 
most importantly the root cause of problem issues. In some instances this has 
prevented the resolution of these problems in a timely fashion commensurate with the 
inherent schedule and cost constraints of a shipbuilding program. The most 
demonstrable being the treatment of design change and the related matter of the claim 
arising from immature technical data. ASC' s own productivity and performance in 
our shipyard and our supplier shipyards is improving as we apply the lessons we have 
learned, both good and bad, to the program. 
!:_$(; 
ASCI't)'Ltd 
ABN 64 008 605 034 
GPO Box 24n,Melaide 
SoothAustralia5001 
ASCNorth 
694 Mersey Road North, Osborne 
SouthAustralia5017 
T + 61 8 8348 7000 
F + 61 8 8348 7001 
ASCSouth 
640 Mersey Road North, Osborne 
SouthAustrall35017 
T + 61 8 7423 4000 
F + 61 8 7423 4090 
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Implementation of the ANAO's recommendations will improve performance of the 
A WD program and the naval industry. ASC's experience in the Collins and the A WD 
programs continues to highlight the challenge of transferring a design to production in 
a new country with differing cultures, technical processes, facilities, supply chains 
and customers. Further, the challenge of sustaining a complex warship in service 
relies on these industrial capabilities being resident in country. Australia must be able 
to do this if we are to develop a sustainable naval industry that can grow its 
productivity and perform to world class standards. 
Now, in consideration of this audit, the task before all stakeholders is to apply the 
lessons we have learned and complete the program as efficiently as possible. 
Impact of design change 
ASC's experience on the Collins Class build program led ASC to propose a 
comprehensive integrated design build approach in its SEA 4000 Shipbuilder tender 
response. Our chosen capability partner, Bath Iron Works, confirmed this was an 
appropriate structure as a result of their experience on the DDG51 program. ASC's 
proposal contemplated an integrated Platform System Designer (PSD) and 
Shipbuilder design team within the Alliance, and had the PSD leading the early 
functional stages of design, with lead responsibility transitioning to the Shipbuilder in 
the later detailed and production design stages. This approach aimed to ensure that the 
end production design products matched the build strategy, facility capabilities and 
skill levels of the shipyard and its workforce. It also supported a more efficient build, 
as design products are closely aligned to production work packages. 
In 2007, the Government selected a ship design based on the Navantia F-100 frigate 
in service with the Spanish Armada, the A WD Alliance was formed and the Alliance 
based target incentive agreement (ABTIA) was executed. Based on a proven design 
that was largely build to print, the program formed around an assumption that the 
A WD Alliance Shipbuilder's role was limited to performing production engineering 
supported by the core resources necessary to receive PSD data and process it through 
to planning and production. The verification of the PSD functional design changes 
would have been performed through a standard systems engineering review process 
completed by the Alliance in accordance with this expectation. As the audit report 
points out, the reality of the engineering effort required throughout the program has 
differed greatly from ASC's expectations and the risks associated with the design and 
build strategy were underestimated at the time of the June 2007 Second Pass 
submission to Government. 
While there has been some debate regarding the 'design to production' process in the 
PSD Contract, it is clear that Navantia is required to work with the Shipbuilder to 
develop the A WD Build Strategy. The parties have endeavoured to achieve this 
outcome, however, the requirement to adjust the content, structure and schedule of 
design product deliveries in the PSD Contract in order to align with the A WD Build 
Strategy remains vague, and a major source of frustration for the Alliance parties. 
For example, as the Technical Data Package (TDP) content, structure and delivery 
schedule specified in the PSD Contract is based on Navantia's own build strategies 
for its shipyards, the resulting design products have not aligned with the A WD Build 
Strategy (i.e. a distributed vs centralised build strategy). This issue has been 
compounded by the design maturity issues noted below. 
  
ANAO Audit Report No.22 2013–14 





On numerous occasions throughout the report there is a reference to the Alliance 
CEO estimating that 45 per cent of design change has been acconunodated in 
sequence and of the remaining change, less than 20 per cent, has resulted in rework 
with 17 per cent estimated to have had no impact at all. 
ASC notes these conunents are not consistent with other statements in the audit 
attributed to the Alliance CEO that note the receipt of revised designs ( frequently 
after block production was already completed) has resulted in large amounts of costly 
out-of-sequence rework. 
All design change generates rework in some form and has a cost impact. This can 
range from re-review and release of revised drawings, replanning of work packages, 
scrapping of material already procured, to re-work of production work already 
completed. In addition it generates consequential delays as work is replanned, new 
material procured and production work performed out of sequence. The significant 
period between the initial drawing deliveries and the updated revisions being 
provided (12-24 months) has greatly exacerbated this problem on Ship 01. ASC has 
and continues to work with the Alliance participants and Navantia to minimise the 
impact of the design issues on all three ships, however, the magnitude of this issue 
cannot be ignored. 
Design maturity 
The Report identifies the warranties provided by the Industry Participants to the 
DMO in the ABTIA, however does not clarify that these warranties were given on the 
basis of the understanding that the Hobart Class was based on an existing and proven 
design from the Navantia F-100 (and more particularly the F-104 ship). This was 
reflected in the selection of the F-1 00 class as the "existing design" under the SEA 
4000 Phase 2 arrangements, which drove ASC's expectations moving forward into 
negotiations and execution of SEA 4000 Phase 3 (the ABTIA). 
While the ABTIA and PSD contract define the design baseline as the F-1 04, it is 
ASC's view that the Alliance is being delivered a production design derived from the 
F-105. The F-105 has evolved from the much earlier F-104 design and as a result, 
significant additional design risk has been driven into the A WD program due the 
extensive nature of the design evolution from the F-1 04 to the F-1 05. This has 
manifested itself as substantial rework driven by design immaturity issues, which run 
across many aspects of the A WD program and have caused considerable cost and 
delay to date. 
The Report also states that Navantia has indicated that in its shipyard many minor 
design changes are resolved 'on the spot' by its experienced production workforce 
rather than through the revision of design documentation. This highlights a key issue 
faced by the Industry Participants, as it was, and remains, impossible to anticipate 
these design changes (or in some cases defects) as they are not incorporated or 
corrected in the provided design. This practice by Navantia is considered to be 
another significant contributor to the design immaturity issues that have been 
experienced by the Industry Participants, and has in effect resulted in Navantia 
correcting its known design issues at the Alliance's expense. 
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Schedule and Cost Claim 
The Alliance CEO is quoted in the report as stating that there is no clear contractual 
provision to deal with the impact of design changes. ASC does not agree with this 
statement and contends that there are relevant contractual provisions dealing with this 
issue, which were the subject of considerable negotiation prior to execution of the 
ABTIA. Noting that the claim with respect to the design remains unresolved, it is not 
appropriate for any party to comment further on this issue. 
Summation 
ASC is presently working towards achieving key milestones for Ship 01 (the future 
HMAS Hobart) with a view to her launch later this year. Ships 02 and 03 are in 
production. As a program, we are moving to systems integration and test, which will 
be followed by acceptance. Notwithstanding past challenges, and those that remain 
ahead, ASC reaffirms its commitment as the A WD Alliance Shipbuilder to safely 
deliver three ships as efficiently as possible together with our Alliance partners. 
Yours sincerely 
Steve Ludlam 
Chief Executive Officer and Managing Director 
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4 February 2014 
-:{_ slz. 
Dr Tom loannqd" '0 
Australian National Audit Office 
GPO Box 707 
Canberra ACT 2601 
AIR WARFARE DESTROYER PERFORMANCE AUDIT 
Reference: 
A. ANAO 2011/2088 dated 19" December 2013 
Dear Dr Ioannou, 
C e> 
· 5FE~ 
Raytheon Au ~ 'd I 4 f · ., ue , ;ret,;·' 
Canberra An DOll AC f 2609 
Tel •61 2 61220200 
Frrx •61 2 6122 0201 
4C~ 003 709 295 
ABN J5 f'")J 709 2\15 
Reference A provided extracts of a draft report on the ANAO audit of the AWD program 
conducted during 2013 and sought a formal response on the draft report. 
The formal response from Raytheon Australia to the extracts of the draft ANAO report provided 
under Reference A is at Attachment A 
I am available to discuss the Raytheon Australia response or the draft ANAO report. 
Yoom•U 
r di/'warn v~:;i1n~ Director 
Attachment: 
A Raytheon Australia Response- Draft Report on the ANAO Audit of the AWD Program 
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Raytheon Australia Response- Draft Report on the ANAO Audit of the AWD Program 
1. AWD is a large and complex project which will deliver three world-class Hobart class 
ships and appropriate support system to the Royal Australian Navy. The Hobart class 
DDGs are highly complex platforms that combine a proven ship design with a highly 
complex Combat System tailored specifically to meet Australian requirements. 
2. The draft ANAO report provides limited commentary on the AWD Combat System 
which, in and of itself, represents a significant component, in both cost and capability, of 
the AWD program. Whilst the Aegis Weapon System (AWS) provides the core air-
warfare functionality, the Combat System elements tailored specifically to meet 
Australian requirements, such as Electronic Warfare, Underwater Systems, Short-
Range Defence and Communications, account for some 52% of the total Combat 
System procurement. 
3. Defence's decision early in the development of the AWD program to select the AWS for 
the core air-warfare functionality was the cornerstone for a low risk approach to the 
AWD Combat System. This was complemented by an approach to Combat System 
planning for the additional capability elements under guiding principles that included: 
low or no AWS modifications, Military off the Shelf (MOTS) or high Technical Readiness 
Level (TRL) for sub-systems, low integration risk, and low ship impact. This approach 
has and will ensure minimal program impact from Combat System related issues. 
4. Progress on Combat System architecture, procurement and integration has been good. 
The report correctly identifies Raytheon's Earned Value performance on Combat 
System in September 2013 as being 69% complete with a cost and schedule 
performance of 100% and 99% respectively. That cost and schedule performance 
continues into 2014. In addition, some 32% of Combat System Performance 
Specifications have already been sold-off to the DMO and over 90% of Combat System 
interfaces will have been tested and verified in shore facilities prior to testing on the 
ship, verifying the integration approach and reducing the overall integration risk. 
5. The report provides a good description of the AWD Alliance and recognises the 
complexity of the unique contract structures that underpin the AWD program. The report 
also provides a good synopsis of the benefits and limitations of the Alliance approach 
taken for the AWD program and correctly identifies that the Alliance approach would 
have benefited from having the Platform System Designer (PSD) as an additional 
Alliance participant. 
6. It is very important to note that AWD Alliance is not an entity in its own right but rather 
represents the vehicle through which the combined capabilities of the three participants 
are applied to the program. The Alliance depends on the full capabilities of all parties 
being brought to bear to deliver the agreed outcome. This includes broader corporate 
capabilities rather than just those capabilities pennanently committed under the Alliance 
structure. The Alliance also depends on each party working together to resolve issues 
as they arise and holding themselves accountable to the other parties for their individual 
performance within the Alliance in accordance with the ABTIA contract. Importantly, 
each party in the Alliance is reliant on the other parties; the ABTIA does not provide for 
contractual remedies between Industry Participants for individual performance and 
limited remedies between the DMO and the Alliance. 
Page2of3 
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7. The report correctly identifies that the Alliance Estimate at Completion (EAC) predicts 
that the Total Cost Estimate (TCE) for the program will be exceeded. This cost over-run 
is predominantly in Ship Building and stems from a number of root causes that warrant 
further investigation. Costs over the TCE will be nominally be shared 50:50 between the 
Commonwealth and the Industry Participants resulting in a call on the DMO's program 
contingency and reduction of the Industry Participants' fee respectively. The report 
correctly highlights ongoing challenges in regard to Ship Building. The existing and 
potential future cost over-runs are of significant concern and the root causes of such 
must be addressed if program costs are to be adequately controlled. 
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Navantia comments to Extract Report 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Navantia's response to the AWD report is based on the "Extract for Navantia S.A", which 
provides partial visibility to the complete report. It is a well-structured report and one that aims to 
analyse the overall performance of the program by addressing the engineering issues and initial 
contractual Alliance arrangements as being two drivers of the delays in schedule and cost 
overruns of the program. 
It is Navantia's intention to provide its best views on where the main issues of the AWD program 
remain with the intention only to be constructive rather than to justify Navantia's performance on 
some of the issues addressed in the report. 
a) PROGRAM COMPLEXITY 
AWD, as with any frigate program, is a very complex program, especially given the need to 
integrate a sophisticated and immature Combat System (at the time on signature, October 
2007).The design of the Australian AWD is very different from that of the existing F-104, 
incorporating lessons learnt from the Spanish Navy's F-105 (not all known at the time of the 
contract), implementing Australian regulations, and taking account of obsolescence, CAPs ... etc. 
All these items, together with the supply chain information modifications in respect to F-104 
equipment, imply a very relevant number of revisions/modifications to the existing F-104 design, 
to be implemented at the time that the information is made available to the designer - in most 
cases out of the designer's control. 
This complexity is within the nature of the frigate design and construction business, and AWD is 
not an exception. Any shipbuilding organisation for complex naval vessels must be prepared to 
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design, procurement, planning, production and test & trials activities, and in many occasions, 
late from a schedule perspective. This is confirmed by Navantia's experience in several 
programs with different scenarios, including the Spanish FFG program, where Navantia bought 
the design from Bath Iron Works (BIW). 
Impacts due to modifications are unavoidable, but the key is to minimise those by means of an 
efficient process to manage problems on a daily basis. This requires an experienced workforce, 
an adequate management toolset, and processes with the necessary flexibility to react to 
unexpected problems in order to minimise the impact. We believe this idea is captured in point 
5.5 (page 152) of the "extract". 
The above illustrates what any contractor must expect in any naval program as complex as the 
AWD. Moreover, Phase 2 provided an opportunity to analyse and understand the complexity of 
the AWD program. In addition to the natural complexity described above, we should include 
additional factors such as: 
Distributed production across Australia and Spain 
Production management process (developed by BIW) not aligned with the drawings 
structure 
Drawings prepared for a more experienced workforce 
In addition to the technical/industrial difficulties, significant subcontracting involves commercial 
issues which are typically rather complicated to solve, adding complexity to the program. 
It is relevant to note that the report acknowledges that one of the objectives of the AWD 
program was to establish and sustain a design capability in Australia that can support the 
evolution of the ships in service in responsive and cost effective manner. This, a sensible 
objective, highlights the lack of experience in place at the time of the contract signature (2007) 
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Without aiming to argue about Navantia's performance, which we honestly believe has been 
and is very satisfactory, Navantia is fully convinced that the major driver for cost overruns and 
delays has not been the number of modification/revisions/errors/omissions as indicated in the 
Extract, but rather the deficiencies in the process and management of such issues. which in an 
experienced shipyard would have had a relatively small impact. In the case of the AWD 
program, the impact is very significant. In this respect, we strongly recommend that the 
procedures be analysed comprehensively with the aim of finding ways to improve efficiency and 
flexibility. It is also worth mentioning that the AWD cost issues are compounding the problem 
management process, focusing attention more in documenting the associated responsibilities 
rather than solving the problem. 
Navantia recognises that credit is due to ASC and the Alliance for achieving in a very short 
period of time a level of skills to manage reasonably the program and its challenges, although 
more time and support is required to achieve a more effective performance of the program, 
which still has rather a long way to go. 
b) REPORT CLARIFICATIONS 
In this point Navantia would like to address some specific statements within the report that we 
consider relevant to provision of our perspective and to provide as much clarification as 
possible: 
b.1) Contractual arrangements. Alliance 
It is indicated that if Navantia was part of the Alliance, the engineering modifications would have 
been minimised. It is reasonable to believe that a more integrated organisation works better 
than a less integrated organisation, but regardless of the 
30 01 .2014 
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contractual arrangements, design modifications are unavoidable and in most cases are outside 
the designer's control as explained above. Therefore, the modifications would have been 
required anyway. It is also questionable that, in the scenario of Navantia being a member of the 
Alliance, Navantia would have had the capacity to influence the overall management process of 
the workflow, planning, procurement, progress control, etc. as these are key areas where 
companies like to implement their own policies and methods. 
We consider that it is rather unfair to associate the amount of engineering issues in AWD with 
the fact that Navantia is not exposed to the reduced incentive payments of the Alliance. 
Navantia has demonstrated its commitment to the program at all times, providing services 
beyond its contractual obligation and increasing its level of effort to adapt the information to a 
less skilled workforce. 
b.2) Maintenance Drops 
Supported by plenty of data, the report highlights the "maintenance drops" issue and arrival of 
updated information late in respect to the production schedule. It is important to understand that 
the Maintenance Drops is a contractual provision that aims to keep the drawings up to date 
periodically, where most of the information has been delivered well in advance, whenever 
known, via Definitive or other means, to minimise impacts as much as possible on the 
production floor. This is common practice in shipbuilding. 
b.3) 30 Model 
The inconvenience of not having available the 3D model of the design until 2010 is widely 
mentioned in the report. Irrespective of any commercial or IP issues, which are sensitive 
matters, the necessity of the 3D model as a tool for the fabrication of the AWD would not be 
significant until the outfitting jobs are well in advance. This means that having them in mid-
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is quite before the real necessity appeared. In addition, Navantia is supporting the 
construction with people on site with access to the 30 models, or on line contact with the 
engineering department in Spain, to solve any query that required the 30 model since 2009. 
Based on this, Navantia understand that the lack of 30 models until 2010 could not have 
provoked any inconvenient. 
b.4) ASC CEO. Media Statements 
Navantia is surprised that the quotation in the report of the public statement by ASC CEO about 
• ongoing design revisions might disrupt the delivery schedule, and that the delivery schedule 
for delivery of Ship 2 was tight" is presented as a confirmation of the design issues impact. 
Navantia regrets this focus, as at that time, we considered that it was totally inappropriate to use 
a national public media to report on the difficulties, and decided not to argue publically on the 
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Appendix 6: BAE Systems response to audit extract 
 
   
BAE Systems Australia Defence Ply Ltd 
ASN 51 006 870 846 
Maritime Business Unit 
Nelson House, Nelson Place 
WILLIAMSTOWN VICTORIA 3016 Australia 
Loc::::ked Bag 2 
WILLIAMSTOWN VICTORIA 3016 AU$tralia 
Telephone +61 3 9244 4000 
Facsimile· +61 3 9244 4400 
www baesystems.com/austral\a 
BAE SYSTEMS 
Your Ref: 20 I 1/2088 (dated 19 Dec 20 13) 
23 January 2014 
Dr Tom Ioannou 
Group Executive Director 
Performance Audit Services Group 
Australian National Audit Office 
GPO Box 707 
CANBERRA ACT 2601 
Dear Dr Ioannou, 
Copy Via Email: Patrick.ONeill@anao.gov.au 
BAE SYSTEMS COMMENTS ON EXTRACT OF ANAO AUDIT REPORT 
- AIR WARFARE DESTROYER PERFOIL'lANCE AUDIT 
I. BAE Systems thanks the ANAO for the extract provided to us and the invitation to comment on 
the audit findings and recommendations. However, we are unable to comment on the ANAO 
recommendations because none were shared with us in the extract provided. We are also unable 
to comment on many of the audit findings as only a limited number of them were included in 
the extract provided. 
2. Notwithstanding the above, from the information that was included in the extract provided, 
BAE Systems fully agrees with the statements in the report that all of the Australian naval 
shipbuilding industry companies that have participated in the A WD program, our company 
included, have faced a significant challenge from the need to re-establish capability, capacity 
and experience after the gap in naval shipbuilding that preceded the start of AWD construction. 
Clearly therefore, a key Recommendation in this report should be for the CoA to act quickly to 
ensure that the impending gap in naval shipbuilding currently being faced again by the industry 
is avoided. 
3. In a couple of places, the report mentions defects that were found on the initial blocks produced 
by BAE Systems. Whilst we agree with the statement in the report that a lack of sufficiently 
experienced shipbuilders was a significant cause (certainly BAE Systems as a responsible 
contractor needed to and did take action on its shortcomings including using reach back and 
additional hiring to bring in additional experienced resources), it was not the only cause. There 
were design issues, issues with data provided to BAE Systems and issues with inexperience on 
the part of our customer for the blocks as well. Based on the Table of Contents showing the 
topics and tables included in the report, these may be mentioned in the report in pages that were 
not in the extract provided to us, but we obviously don't know if that is the case (if not, we 
believe they should be mentioned as other significant causes). 
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Cont. ... /2 BAE SYSTEMS 
4. The report does mention that during 2013, Blocks have been reallocated to our company 
because BAE Systems "has the capacity and skill to successfully take on an increased share of 
the workload". We agree and would further highlight that the Blocks reallocated during 2013 
were offered and contracted on a fixed price, fixed schedule subcontract that results in lower 
cost and lower risk to ASC than if they had been reallocated under the original subcontract. This 
is the result of improvements in productivity and quality that come from having a continuity of 
work that allows a shipyard to increase and then maintain its experience and capabilities and 
therefore, should be given considerable weight in the overall audit conclusions and 
recommendations. 
Please do not hesitate to contact the undersigned should you wish to discuss or clarity anything herein. 
Yours Sincerely, 
d:~ 
Direct - (03) 9334 8099 
Encls.(2) I. Summary of High Level Response - BAE Systems 
2. Editorial Comments 
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29'" January 2014. 
Our Ref: 11270 
Addressee: 
Or Tom laonn~ ~ '/2-
Group Executive Direct or Performance Audit Services Group 
Reference: ANAO Letter Ref No: 2011/2088 
Subject: Forgacs Comments on ANAO Air Warfare Destroyer Performance Audit 
Forgacs Engineering Pty Ltd 
ABN 17 000 019 616 
SO f itzroy Street (PO Box 90) 
Carrington NSW 2294 
Tel: 02 4978 9100 Fax: 02 4962 2848 
t:;GD 
5 FEB 2014 
C,.4S 
Many thanks for the opportunity to comment on the reference document. As directed in the reference, the 
comments are incorporated in the format required. 
We have at all times made every effort to ensure comments are relevant to the report audit findings and the 
recommendations articulated as succinctly and emphatically as possible as follows: 
Summary of Forgacs Response 
The Forgacs shipyard, as at contract signature, had been engaged in building mining 'haul pack' truck bodies for 
some years and most of the shipbuilding experience had been lost during the intervening period between 
construction work on HMAS Manoora and Kanimbla and the start of the AWD program. Accordingly, many of the 
facilit ies, cranage and general yard facilities were ill prepared to commence block production at the schedule, 
quality and cost demanded under the contract; and the pilot block allocated to assess capability was too small a 
sample to be a valid indication of capability or capacity. The subsequent reallocation of the BAE blocks to Forgacs 
just as the shipyard commenced to improve in maturity, placed additional stress on the already strained facilities 
and workforce and caused further issues wit h quality and schedule achievement at the Forgacs facilities. 
Whilst the imperative of building naval combat system fitted ships in Australia is well articulated by the government 
the concern of Forgacs is twofold: 
a. That the costs of ramping back up to a competitive ship yard to maintain the indigenous shipbuilding 
capability has not been fully appreciated in terms of the magnitude of the investment required in facilit ies, 
recruitment training and retention of the workforce to reach competitive productivity , and 
b. Once established, the ship building capability wil l once again dilute and disappear if not utilised in an 
ongoing ship building program out across the defence portfolio. Whilst again much discussion has occurred, 
the time line for t he tender evaluation process of the next major defence project to prevent a gap in work is 
dangerously close. 
Newcastle I Tomago I Hexham I Sydney I Brisbane I Gladstone 
MARITIME I MINING I INFRASTRUCTURE I INDUSTRIAL 
www.forgacs.com.au 
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AWD and ASC program rescheduling of ship delivery dates has not manifested itself in any reduction or relief in 
Forgacs schedule delivery dates. On the contrary, as the costs of delivering the capability increased Forgacs has 
been required to direct its efforts to truncate the schedule and thus reduce project overhead. This had exactly the 
opposite effect intended by the rescheduling initiative of the AWD Alliance. Additionally, as schedule pressures 
increased the resource histogram also increased; to meet the demand, marginally skilled labour was recruited and 
quality reduced accordingly resulting in a demand for yet more labour. Once completed the consequent rapid 
reduction of the workforce as a result of the compressed schedule will also contradict the aim of the AWD 
reschedule to provide resource levelling. 
A misinterpretation of the standards applicable to _the AWD Program between the ASC on site team and Forgacs 
created a paradigm of rigid adherence to the specification to such an extent that thousands of hours of extra work 
on rectification of these issues caused significant delays in the delivery of the blocks, cost overruns and quality 
issues as a result of damage caused by the actual repair effort. Recent acknowledgement of this misinterpretation 
has resulted in ? collaborative 'gold standard' agreement between Forgacs and ASC of the application of the 
specification especially with respect to the welding standard and block dimensional tolerances at the block mating 
edges; improving schedule and quality of the product at Forgacs, significantly reducing cost. 
Yours Sincerely, 
Lindsay Stratton 
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER 
Forgacs 
Newcastle I Tomago I Hexham I Sydney I Brisbane I Gladstone 
MARITIME I MINING I INFRASTRUCTURE !INDUSTRIAL 
www.forgacs.com.au 
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Appendix 8: Organisational arrangements for capability 
development oversight 
This  appendix  provides  further  detail  on  the  arrangements  discussed  in  paragraphs 
2.60 to 2.64. 
AWD Capability Management Steering Group 
1. The AWD Capability Management Steering Group (CMSG) consists of 
a core group of  five one‐star RAN Officers assisted by  invited members and 
permanent observers predominantly  from  the Navy,  the Defence Science and 
Technology Organisation (DSTO) and the DMO. The Chief of Navy formed the 
CMSG  to  assist  in  the  provision  of  oversight  and  coordination  of  the DDG 
build phase. Specifically, the Chair of the CMSG is responsible for: 
 ensuring the correct specification of program outcomes; 







Three-star Program Management Stakeholder Group 
2. The  three‐star  Program  Management  Stakeholder  Group  consists  of 
DMO’s  General  Manager  Land  &  Maritime  (Chair),  the  Chief  of  Navy,  the 
Chief of the Capability Development Group, and the Chief Defence Scientist. It 
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One-star Program Management Stakeholder Group 
3. The one‐star PMSG was formed in order to support the AWD Program 




AWD Program Management Office 
4. The DMO’s AWD Program Management Office  (PMO)  is  the Defence 
organisation  that  has  overall  responsibility  for  ensuring  that  the  DDGs  are 
delivered to the RAN on time, on budget and to the required capability. In the 
AWD  Alliance  contract,  it  is  the  PMO  that  represents  the  interests  of  the 
Commonwealth on a day‐to‐day basis. The PMO  is  located within  the AWD 
Systems Centre at the Techport Australia Maritime Precinct in Adelaide. As at 
July 2013,  the PMO  consisted of 55 personnel, and an additional 27 Defence 
personnel  and  two  Lockheed  Martin  personnel  funded  by  Defence  were 
working in the AWD Alliance. 
AWD Capability Implementation Team 
5. In 2008, the RAN identified that it would need additional personnel to 
undertake its newly assigned Capability Management responsibilities, and that 
these  personnel  would  be  required  to  hold  specific  skill  sets  in  project 
management.394  Since  then  it  has  established  an  AWD  Capability 
Implementation Team (AWD CIT) to coordinate all of the activities required to 
deliver  the AWD capability. As at  January 2013,  the AWD CIT consisted of a 
relatively small team of eight personnel.395 
AWD Transition and Coordination Management Group 
6. The AWD Transition  and Coordination Management Group  (TCMG) 
was  established  in  April  2012  to  facilitate  interaction  between  the  AWD 
Program,  the  RAN  and  other  Defence  stakeholders  to  ensure  a  smooth 
                                                     
394  Mortimer Review Implementation Governance Committee, The Role of the Capability Manager under 
Mortimer Framework–Capability Manager Input (Navy), October 2009. 
395  In contrast, the New Air Combat Capability Implementation Team, which is acquiring the unmodified 
Military-Off-The-Shelf F-35 Joint Strike Fighter for the Royal Australian Air Force and planning its 
transition into service, had 90 filled positions in 2012. ANAO Audit Report No.6, 2012–13, 
Management of Australia’s Air Combat Capability—F-35A Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition, p. 59. 
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transition  of  all  the  Fundamental  Inputs  to  Capability,  including  support 
systems, involved in establishing the new DDG capability. 
7. The  TCMG  includes  representatives  from  the  RAN,  Defence’s 
Capability Development Group,  the AWD Program Management Office, and 
the Alliance,  and may  also  have  representatives  from  other  defence  groups 
such  as  Defence  Support  Group  and  Joint  Logistics  Command.  The  TCMG 
reports to the one‐star CMSG. 
AWD–LHD Sustainment Steering Group 
8. The AWD–LHD Sustainment Steering Group was established  in 2009, 
and  has  been  commissioned  to  provide  oversight,  direction,  guidance  and 
support  to  two  Sustainment  Groups:  one  formed  by  the  AWD  Program 
Management Office (for the Hobart‐class DDGs), and the other formed by the 
Amphibious Deployment and Sustainment Program that is acquiring the LHD 
Amphibious  Assault  Ships.  These  two  groups  have  the  task  of  defining  a 
sustainment  organisation  for  their  respective  capability  platforms.  The 
resulting  organisations  will  encompass  the  full  range  of  DMO  Systems 
Program  Office  functions  and  enablers,  as  well  as  wider  support  functions 
such as training and facilities functions. 
9. The  membership  of  the  AWD–LHD  Sustainment  Steering  Group 
includes  the DMO’s Director General Major Surface Ships  (Chair),  the AWD 
Deputy  Program  Manager  (Sustainment),  the  DMO’s  Director  General 
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Better Practice Guides 
The following Better Practice Guides are available on the ANAO website: 
Implementing Better Practice Grants Administration  Dec. 2013 
Human Resource Management Information Systems: Risks and controls  June 2013 
Preparation of Financial Statements by Public Sector Entities  June 2013 
Public Sector Internal Audit: An investment in assurance and business 
improvement 
Sept. 2012 
Public Sector Environmental Management: Reducing the environmental 
impacts of public sector operations 
Apr. 2012 
Developing and Managing Contracts: Getting the right outcome, 
achieving value for money 
Feb. 2012 
Public Sector Audit Committees: Independent assurance and advice for 
chief executives and boards 
Aug. 2011 
Fraud Control in Australian Government Entities  Mar. 2011 
Strategic and Operational Management of Assets by Public Sector 
Entities: Delivering agreed outcomes through an efficient and optimal 
asset base 
Sept. 2010 
Planning and Approving Projects – an Executive Perspective: Setting the 
foundation for results 
June 2010 
Innovation in the Public Sector: Enabling better performance, driving new 
directions 
Dec. 2009 
SAP ECC 6.0: Security and control  June 2009 
Business Continuity Management: Building resilience in public sector 
entities 
June 2009 
Developing and Managing Internal Budgets  June 2008 
Agency Management of Parliamentary Workflow  May 2008 
Fairness and Transparency in Purchasing Decisions: Probity in Australian 
Government procurement 
Aug. 2007 
Administering Regulation  Mar. 2007 
Implementation of Programme and Policy Initiatives: Making 
implementation matter 
Oct. 2006 
 
 
